











ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΑΙΔΩΝ



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## THE PHAEDO OF PLATO

EDITED

WITH INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND APPENDICES

BY

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## PREFACE

So many editions of the *Phaedo* are already in existence that the appearance of a fresh one would seem to require a word of explanation. The object of the present edition is to assist those who are beginning in earnest the study of Plato's philosophy, and who have advanced far enough to appreciate the peculiar difficulty of his writings. Accordingly my chief aim has been to elucidate the philosophical contents of the dialogue, to indicate as clearly as I was able the consecution of its thought, and to determine its position in the Platonic system. It has therefore been no part of my purpose to enter minutely into points of language for their own sake. But since it is utterly impossible to follow Plato's thought without a thorough mastery of his language, I have not abstained from dealing with such points, so far as seemed necessary for the right understanding of Plato's meaning, or where I thought that they had been insufficiently treated by previous editors. Among existing editions I am most indebted to the notes of those admirable scholars Wyttenbach and Heindorf. And since I have frequently had occasion to express dissent from the views of Prof. Geddes, I am anxious to take this opportunity of acknowledging

the advantage I have derived from his scholarly and lucid commentary.

Finally and above all my thanks are due to my friend Mr. Henry Jackson, to whose untiring kindness I owe far more than I can possibly acknowledge: the references to him in the notes very imperfectly indicate how fully he carries out the principle *κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων*.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,

*3rd November 1883.*

## PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION

THIS edition is substantially the same as the first, but contains some few additions and corrections. In making the latter I have again to thank Dr. Jackson for valuable assistance. Only one important change in interpretation has been introduced, which will be found in Appendix II.

The text still closely follows Schanz. I have made no change of reading on the authority of the papyrus fragment recently discovered. Such changes would of course only be justified on the ground either that the papyrus is a higher authority than the other manuscripts, or that it gives readings which are intrinsically superior to those of the received text. That the first alternative has been proved, few, I think, will care to maintain. As to the second, it is matter of opinion; for my part even the few variants which are approved as almost certain by so distinguished a Platonic scholar as Prof. Lewis Campbell<sup>1</sup> fail to carry conviction to me. Accordingly, so far as the papyrus is concerned, I have thought it best to leave the text in peace.

The chief novelty in this edition is the contribution of the publishers and printers. It is, as I understand, the

<sup>1</sup> *Classical Review* v 364.

first book in which Messrs. Macmillan have used their new Greek type. One glance is enough to show how bold a step they have made in the direction of a long-desired reform. It may be indeed that not all scholars will bestow upon the new fount the unstinted approval with which it is welcomed by Dr. Rutherford in the *Classical Review*: but none, I conceive, will fail to acknowledge that Messrs. Macmillan, in thus lifting our Greek typography out of the rut in which it has lain so long imbedded, have earned the cordial thanks of all who think that a printed page ought to aim at being a work of art.

12th May 1894.



## INTRODUCTION

### § 1. *Scope of the dialogue.*

A CAREFUL student of the Platonic dialogues can hardly fail to notice a certain peculiarity in their structure: he will observe that for the most part we find not one but several motives underlying the whole composition and artistically interwoven; so that if we put the question, what was Plato's object in writing any one dialogue, the answer can rarely be a simple one. These several motives are indeed formally subordinated to one definite end—for a Platonic λόγος is always ζῆλον κυνετήριον—but this end is not always, nor indeed often, the most important result of the dialogue or that which Plato had most at heart in its composition. A very good and simple illustration of this is supplied by the *Sophist*. The declared object of that dialogue is to define the sophist (218 B); and this object, amid all the intricacies of the argument, is held steadfastly in view until its final accomplishment, when the sophist is tracked down, captured, and bound hand and foot in the humorously labyrinthine paragraph which closes the Eleate's discourse. But as a means of obtaining this definition Plato employs his method of διαίρεσις; and the extreme elaboration with which this process is worked out, together with the high value which we know Plato set upon it, leaves no doubt that the exposition and illustration of this dialectical method is one of the motives of the dialogue. Thirdly, a point suddenly turns up, quite by accident, as it were, and without the slightest premeditation (236 D): the sophist, on the point of being convicted as a dealer in shams, takes shelter in the old puzzle about μὴ ὄν: which puzzle must be solved before the definition can be accomplished. Now it will be observed that the material and formal importance of these three motives are in reverse order. The definition of the sophist, the formal object of the dialogue, is simply a piece of pungent satire; but the method by which this object is attained is a matter of high interest and significance. By far the most momentous issue, however, is that which turns upon μὴ ὄν: the searching criticism of ὄν and μὴ ὄν, as

conceived in various philosophies; the masterly analysis of the five **γένη**, which clears up the problem of predication; the solution of the hitherto hopeless enigma concerning false judgments; all this constitutes one of the most memorable achievements of the human intellect: a science of logic is now first founded, and philosophy is placed upon a new basis. Yet in form this all-important metaphysical inquiry is merely an accidental difficulty involved in the definition of the sophist, which need not have arisen, had not the sophist turned out to be a sham. We see then how Plato proposes to himself an end mainly for the sake of the means: we may be sure that he cared little about defining the sophist, but very much about the metaphysical questions to which the process of definition was to give rise. Now this indirect way of going about his work is a peculiarity of Plato's which must be steadily kept in mind if we are to have any hope of understanding him at all. Also we must remember that Plato is before all things a metaphysician: ethics, politics, logic, physics are to him so many forms of applied metaphysics; and if we would rightly follow the current of his thought, it is from a metaphysical source that we must seek to trace it.

Bearing this in mind, let us see what is the result of a similar analysis applied to the structure of the *Phaedo*. Most persons who should be asked to describe this work would probably reply that it was a treatise in which Plato endeavours to prove that soul is immortal; and this is no doubt a correct account of one motive of the dialogue. But the demonstration of immortality is neither the express purpose nor the most important philosophical result; it holds a position more nearly corresponding to that of **διδασκαλία** in the *Sophist*. As to the main subject of the dialogue Plato leaves us in no uncertainty. Sokrates makes two statements, which appear to Kebes to be mutually conflicting: (1) in this life we are under the protection of good and wise gods, (2) the philosopher will be glad to quit this life. Simmias adds that it seems a little unkind of Sokrates to be pleased at leaving his friends. Sokrates admits that it is only fair that he should clear himself on both these charges. Then, after an interruption on the part of Kriton, which is clearly designed to mark that the serious business of the dialogue is now about to begin, Sokrates proceeds in the following words: 'Now I desire to render an account to you my judges and to show that it is reasonable for a man who has passed his life in the true love of wisdom to be of good cheer on the threshold of death and to be hopeful of enjoying the greatest blessings, when he is dead, in the other world. How this may be the case, Simmias and Kebes, I shall try to tell you (63 E).' Thus we see that the leading motive is to show that the wise and virtuous man will meet death with cheerfulness, on the ground that his lot will be happy in the world of the departed. And, as in the *Sophist*, Plato never once loses sight of this motive from beginning to end of the work.

Now let us observe how the other subjects are connected with this. The line of defence adopted by Sokrates is as follows : The philosopher is not concerned with the gratification of bodily appetites nor with the pomps and luxuries of this world ; the pleasures of the intellect alone are precious in his sight, and to the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom his whole life is devoted. Such being the case, the body which is his soul's constant companion not only brings him no advantage but is a positive hindrance and annoyance, impeding by its importunate affections the free action of the soul in her search for the truth. Accordingly he accustoms his soul to be as independent of the body as is possible, to withdraw from communion with it, and to act by herself—by processes of pure thought without aid of the senses. But this deliverance of the soul, her purification from all corporeal taint, can never be perfectly accomplished during this earthly life ; consequently in this life the perfect fruition of intelligence can never be attained. There is but one thing which separates soul from body altogether ; and this is death : death extricates the soul from her corporeal entanglement and sets her free to exert her unfettered powers upon the highest objects of cognition. Death then is the realisation of the philosopher's dream ; it is the fulfilment of that intellectual enfranchisement which by a lifelong struggle he has but in some scanty measure attained : how then can he fail to be of good cheer when the hour arrives of his release from the close confines of his bodily prison into the wide pure air of free intellectual life ?

Very well, replies Kebes ; but you are assuming that the soul continues to exist as a conscious and intelligent being after her separation from the body. How do we know that she is not extinguished at the moment of dissolution ? Before we can accept your defence it is absolutely necessary that you should satisfy us on this point. Sokrates freely admits the justice of this criticism and says he will do his best to fill up the lacuna in his theory.

We see then that immortality is a distinctly secondary issue, subordinate to the principal theme of the dialogue. The particular mode in which Sokrates has chosen to defend his main proposition demands a demonstration of the soul's immortality as a necessary condition, and that is all : so far as regards the purposes of this dialogue Plato is concerned to prove the soul immortal only in order to prove that the true philosopher will not fear death. It is to be noticed that as soon as ever the demonstration is, or seems to be, accomplished, Sokrates at once proceeds to enlarge on its ethical bearings in relation to the main proposition, 81 A foll., 107 C foll.

Having thus determined two motives, let us see whether an inspection of the pleadings for immortality will disclose any more. Sokrates begins with two arguments which are to be regarded as two halves of one proof. The first is based upon a law of alternation or reciprocity in nature : given two opposite states, all things which have come to be

in either state have passed into it from the opposite state ; thus what is now better has become so from being worse ; and between every such pair of opposites we have transition in either direction, between hotter and colder, greater and less, sleeping and waking, etc. Now the opposite to living is dead : between these two we daily see the process in one direction, from life to death, the other we do not see. But though we see it not, it must exist. For since living souls are continually being born into the world, and since they cannot come out of nothing, clearly they must come from the souls which have quitted this life. These then must exist after their departure from the body ; for if they ceased to be, they could not come again into being. Therefore our souls exist after death. The second argument rests upon reminiscence. All sensible objects remind us of certain ideal types, whereof they are likenesses : they are but adumbrations of these types, faintly reflecting them but incapable of representing them with perfect accuracy. We compare these objects with their types and judge that they fall short of them ; whence it is evident that at some time we must have had apprehension of the types. Now we cannot possibly have gained this knowledge since our birth ; we must then have possessed it before we were born. Therefore our souls possessed intelligent existence before birth. Putting these two arguments together, we find that our souls existed as intelligent beings before we were born and will continue so to exist after we are dead.

Seeing that his young friends are still doubtful whether the conditions for the operation of this law of reciprocity are necessarily satisfied in the case of soul, Sokrates pushes forward to new ground. He urges that if a thing is to be decomposed, it must first have been composed ; that which has no parts therefore cannot be subject to dissolution. This is the fundamental distinction between the objects of sense and the objects of intelligence ; the former are composite and perpetually suffering resolution into their constituent parts ; the latter are simple and therefore indissoluble. Ideas are changeless and eternal, particulars are ever-changing and transitory. To which of these natures is soul more akin ? clearly to the simple and changeless ideas, which are her proper object of cognition, and which she apprehends by virtue of her likeness to them. Moreover she is mistress over the body, being in her divine simplicity far more powerful. Yet even the body is under certain conditions very durable ; how much more lasting then shall the soul not be ?

Before proceeding let us pause to mark the stress laid on the affinity of the soul to the ideas, for this will presently play an important part.

We may pass over the objection of Simmias with its refutation as being immaterial to the main argument, and proceed at once to the criticism of Kebes on the foregoing theory. It amounts to this : the above reasoning only makes it probable that soul is much more durable

than body and may last a very long time ; it does not show that she is actually imperishable nor that she has in her own essence an inalienable principle of vitality. This takes us to the very heart of the matter ; Sokrates must trace the causes of generation and destruction down to their very roots.

I do not mean in this place to give any analysis of the marvellously subtle reasoning which serves for the final demonstration, but only to call attention to its fundamental principles. After pointing out the inadequacy of all previous and contemporary theories of causation, Sokrates declares the Ideas to be the sole causes of all things and the sole objects of knowledge. The truth of the Ideas is eternally sure, and whatever inference can be certainly drawn from the ideal theory is verily true. Now everything in nature is what it is by virtue of the immanence of some idea informing it : and so intimate is the connexion of particular with idea, that the former can never give admission to an idea incongruous with the latter. Accordingly if we take any pair of opposite and mutually exclusive ideas, a particular informed by such opposite, or by any idea involving such opposite, can never receive the other opposite : we cannot have cold fire or even three. But soul—vital principle—is soul by virtue of the idea of life inherent ; therefore she can never admit the opposite to life, which is death ; else we should have dead soul, which is no less impossible and irrational than even three. Soul therefore has in her inmost essence a source of life that can never fail her.

A very moderate familiarity with Plato's ways of working will now enable us to see where we are to look for the very heart of the dialogue. The assertion of the Ideas as the causes of existence and the objects of cognition ; the affirmation that they constitute the ultimate reality upon which all sound reasoning must be based—this is the most significant metaphysical result of the *Phaedo*, and this beyond doubt was Plato's dearest purpose in composing it. And yet, so far as form goes, this is only subsidiary to the establishment of a doctrine which has turned out to be necessary to the maintenance of the primary proposition. We saw however in the *Sophist* that the chief formal motive is by no means necessarily Plato's principal end ; and again we have to seek the chief end in what is technically but a means.

Such being the three strands intertwined in the thread of which the fabric of the *Phaedo* is woven, let us examine their relations a little more narrowly.

The question of immortality is interesting and important just so far as it is connected with the cognition of the ideas. True knowledge, says Plato, is concerned with the ideas alone, because they are simple, changeless, and abiding : concerning the complex, changeful, and fleeting objects of sense there can be nothing better than opinion. Soul alone, acting by processes of pure thought, can apprehend the

ideas, because of her likeness to them : she too is simple and self-identical ; and like is known by like. But during her association with the body she never has free play for her own activity : the body with its passions and appetites, its pleasures and pains, its maladies and weaknesses, is ever hampering and hindering the movements of the soul to such a degree that even the wisest of mankind can only in part rise superior to these influences. Consequently the joy of pure and untroubled contemplation can never be tasted by the soul while her union with the body continues ; only by release from its harassing companionship can she hope for the full fruition of knowledge. So if her existence is terminated at the dissolution of soul and body, she never can attain true knowledge at all : immortality then is an inevitable condition of the free cognition of the ideas. For this immortality she is justified in hoping by the very affinity to the ideas which enables her to apprehend them ; nay she is assured of it by the indwelling idea of life itself which informs her very essence. Thus are immortality and knowledge mutually interdependent. Schleiermacher, who has some excellent remarks on this subject, sums up as follows : ‘so ist denn die Ewigkeit der Seele die Bedingung der Möglichkeit alles wahren Erkennens für den Menschen, und wiederum die Wirklichkeit des Erkennens ist der Grund, aus welchem am sichersten und leichtesten die Ewigkeit der Seele eingesehen wird.’ In the words of Simmias, εἰς καλὸν γὰρ καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τὴν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἣν σὺ νῦν λέγεις.

Such then is the value of immortality, as promising us an existence under conditions more favourable to intellectual activity. I think, however, Plato intends to turn it to another not unimportant, though minor, use. In the true Platonic system of ethics immortality plays no part. Plato’s morality is founded in the very depths of his ontology ; for the principle of good and the principle of being are one and the same. It matters nothing whether we live or die : that alone is good which is like the idea of good. But to deduce ethical science from the αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν calls for a most consummate philosopher : for the great mass of mankind it is simply out of the question. So then, since they cannot frame a moral code for themselves because they do not know the idea of the good, the best they can do is to accept one from the philosopher who does know it, as Plato insists in the *Republic*. But the philosopher must hold out some inducement for the people to receive his teaching ; and this inducement may be derived from immortality. Sokrates himself says ‘if the soul is immortal, she needs our care not only during the period to which we give the name of life, but for all time ; and now it is that we see how grave is the danger of neglecting her.’ The philosopher will persuade the people to follow his precepts by showing that a life of intelligent virtue is the forerunner of free intellectual enjoyment in the invisible world, but a life of vice can only lead after death to helpless cravings for bodily

pleasures which are out of reach. So by deducing immortality from the ideal theory, Plato uses that theory to provide a working code of morals for those who are incapable of rising to the only true and rational virtue.

But while we affirm that the chief result of the *Phaedo* is the establishment of the ideas as the true principles of causation and objects of knowledge, in place of the superficial physical laws and incogitable phenomena which did duty for causes and realities with the Ionian philosophers; and while we recognise that the proof of immortality derives its sole value from its bearing on the cognition of the ideas, we must not leave out of sight the original proposition, that the wise man will cheerfully meet death. This, though overshadowed by the superior interest of the metaphysical issues to which it gives rise, is yet far from unimportant in Plato's sight; and this is what gives artistic unity to the dialogue. As a framework in which to set his vindication of the dignity of the ideas Plato could have chosen nothing better than a description of the cheerful fortitude displayed by a man whose life has been devoted to intellectual research. The lesson which Sokrates inculcates by his precepts and arguments he enforces still more vividly by his living example. From his first pleasant moralising on his own fetter-cramped limbs to the last half-conscious injunction to fulfil a pious duty, he shows us the very ideal of that character at which he would have us aim. Never was the Platonic Sokrates more genial and gentle, more ready and subtle in argument, more patient of opposition and skilful in encountering it, never more rich in poetry and imagination, than on that last day of his life. It seems as if Plato had determined to use all the resources at his command in bringing home to us the lesson that in philosophy lies the sovereign charm against the terror of death: he appeals to the intellect by the subtlety of his arguments, to the imagination by his fanciful and beautiful myth, and to the emotions by that death-scene which stands alone in all literature. It is in this way that we may recognise the connexion of the myth and the last scene with the main body of the dialogue. The myth is no mere poetical embellishment, nor does the death-scene share only the unity which belongs to the various stages of one coherent narrative. Both are linked by a deeper unity to the remainder of the work, being by different methods subservient to the same purpose. We see then in the *Phaedo* an affirmation of the ideas as causative and intelligible existences, from which, through the inference of immortality, the ethical deduction is drawn that the philosopher, secure of his well-being in the region of the departed, will meet death with calmness and confidence; and the impression thus conveyed is rendered more vivid by a description of the earth and the underworld and an account of the adventures of the disembodied soul; and finally it is yet more earnestly enforced by a picture of philosophic fortitude taken from actual history. All these

elements, argumentative, imaginative, and narrative, are harmonised by Plato in one consummate work of art and jointly directed to one common end.

§ 2. *The relation of the several arguments for immortality.*

How the several arguments are mutually related, and how many proofs of immortality are contained in the *Phaedo*, is a question on which most diverse opinions have been entertained: on one estimate all the proofs are reduced to one, while another reckons as many as seven. I do not propose to criticise these various enumerations, which have been ably treated by Bonitz in his admirable 'Platonische Studien': I shall simply examine the relation of the several arguments, and then from the results thus obtained consider whether they are to be regarded as constituting one or more demonstrations. With the views of Bonitz in the main I thoroughly agree; but I think it is possible to give a somewhat preciser statement than he has done.

First then as concerning the argument of ἀνταπόδοσις 70 C—72 E. This seeks to deduce the soul's immortality from a universal law of nature, or rather from two laws. The first is γένεσις ἐξ ἐναντίων, which is simply an application of a principle with which we are already familiar in preplatonian philosophy, e.g. the οὐδὲν ἄνω καὶ κάτω of Herakleitos. A γένεσις is a process between opposite states; whatever we see at one pole, as the result of a γένεσις, has passed over from the other pole. The two poles with which our argument is concerned are ζῶν and τεθηκός: ζῶν we define as a state of union between soul and body, τεθηκός as a state of separation. We know that the soul passes to the state τεθηκός from the state ζῶν, and we deduce from the law of alternations that she passes to the state ζῶν from the state τεθηκός. Therefore the soul must have existence in the state τεθηκός, in virtue of our second law, which is that the substantial things are constant; in Aristotle's words οὐδὲν γίγνεται ἐκ τοῦ οὐκ ὄντος. This principle, which the physicists, as Aristotle goes on to observe, agreed in affirming of matter, is here affirmed of thought by Plato, for whom matter is but a phase of thought. It is this which is the most important element in the present argument, and to which we shall hereafter have occasion to recur. The result we obtain then is that our soul in passing from ζῶν to τεθηκός is not annihilated in the process, but retains her existence in the state τεθηκός: in popular language ἔστιν ἐν ᾿Αϊδου.

The argument from ἀνάμνησις 72 E—77 A, in supplementing the former, introduces us to the ideal theory. By an ingenious process of reasoning Plato shows that our soul must have had cognition of the ideas, and that this cognition must have been attained before our present life: our soul then must have been in existence before she



was incarcerated in human form and born into this life. The result then is the antenatal existence of the soul.

But, it might be asked, what more do we gain by this argument of ἀνάμνησις? For though the only result which Plato expressly draws from ἀνταπόδοσις is that the soul exists after death, it would also be a perfectly fair inference that she existed before birth: for the soul that became ζῶν at a human birth must previously have been τεθηκός, that is, existent in a state of separation; else we should have γένεσις ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. This is true; but ἀνάμνησις makes two important contributions: (1) what we have to prove is ὥς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν ᾿Αΐδου καὶ δύναμιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχει: of this only the first half can be deduced from ἀνταπόδοσις, the latter is supplied by ἀνάμνησις, which shows that the soul had cognition of the ideas: ἀνταπόδοσις shows that τεθηκός is a mode of existence, ἀνάμνησις that it is a state of intelligence: (2) ἀνάμνησις attaches the demonstration of immortality to the theory of ideas, upon which it is finally to be based. Thus we see that the two arguments are mutually complementary.

In fact there is no more surprising feature in the literature to which the *Phaedo* has given occasion than the fact that many scholars, not only in the face of Plato's explicit declaration (77 c), but in the face of plain reason, have accounted these two arguments as two distinct proofs. For if we allow that ἀνταπόδοσις furnishes a proof ὥς ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν ᾿Αΐδου, and ἀνάμνησις a proof ὥς δύναμιν καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχε πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς, it is self-evident that the two must be combined in order to constitute a proof ὥς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν ᾿Αΐδου καὶ δύναμιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχει. We derive from ἀνταπόδοσις evidence that the soul exists in the same state (τεθηκός) before birth and after death; from ἀνάμνησις we have evidence that this is a conscious and intelligent state.

So then, whatever number of proofs we may finally decide to exist in the *Phaedo*, it is clear that the two foregoing arguments do not amount to more than one. But even before any objections have been urged, Sokrates proposes to offer further evidence, as though what he has already brought forward were inadequate. Let us see then in what particulars the demonstration seems to be incomplete, in order that we may know what we should expect to be supplied in the sequel.

A severer scrutiny will detect a weakness in each member of the proof. In the first the soul's continued existence is a simple deduction from a natural law, which is assumed to work with invariable uniformity. But we must recollect that the operation of any cause depends upon the conditions under which it acts: by the same law lead falls earthward and vapour streams upward; and it is conceivable that somewhere in the universe there might exist a set of conditions under which the same law might produce exactly the opposite results. Now if in addition to our knowledge of the law we had a perfect

and exhaustive acquaintance with the conditions under which it acts in every conceivable instance, we might be certain of its operation in all cases. But as a matter of fact we have not and never can have such an acquaintance with the conditions. An astronomer, from the data before him, calculates that a planet ought to revolve in an orbit of a certain shape in a certain time : observation, however, shows that the facts do not correspond to the calculation. Then comes another astronomer with a larger telescope and discovers that the irregularity is due to the proximity of another body which was invisible to his predecessor. And if his discovery exhausts the number of influences at work on the planet, he will be able to calculate its orbit with accuracy, but not otherwise. Similarly although the law of alternation may afford a strong presumption that our souls return from the dead, this does not amount to certainty, since we cannot tell that our knowledge of the conditions is complete. The very fact that in this case we are unable to perceive one of the twin processes, which elsewhere are both visible, is enough to awaken our suspicion : we do not know the conditions to which soul is subject after our dissolution, and they may be such as to nullify our calculations. We cannot then be satisfied with simply inferring this immortality of the soul from the uniformity of nature, we must prove that imperishability is a necessary and inseparable attribute of her being.<sup>1</sup>

Such I conceive to be the cause of the dissatisfaction felt with the argument from ἀνταπόδοσις. I have dwelt upon it at some length, because, though by no means obvious, it has hitherto, I believe, failed of being noticed. I now pass on to ἀνάμνησις.

We have already seen that ἀνάμνησις does not by itself prove the imperishability of the soul ; and now since ἀνταπόδοσις has proved insufficient to accomplish this satisfactorily, the original defect remains unsupplied. We may have enjoyed apprehension of the ideas before our birth, but it does not follow that we shall exist to apprehend them again after our death. But the point to which I would draw attention is that we have so far failed to make the proper use of the soul's cognition of the ideas : the only conclusion we have drawn is that the soul must have existed to apprehend them ; this is far short of the inference which on Platonic principles is not only justified but peremptorily required. What this is, we shall presently see.

We now perceive what we are to look for in the ensuing argument :

<sup>1</sup> That such is the defect of the argument is indicated by Plato himself at 77 D in the words μὴ ὥς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφύσῃ καὶ διασκεδάννουσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τύχῃ τις μὴ ἐν νηνευίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποσπένδων. That is to say, our law may be

perfectly sound, but there may yet be disturbing forces, on which we have not calculated, which interfere with its operation : the accident of a tempest at the time of the soul's egress may produce conditions which render the law null and void in the case of that particular soul.

(1) the establishment of the soul's immortality upon a necessity of her own nature and no mere external cause, (2) the deduction of the required inference from her cognition of the ideas.

In the argument extending from 78 B to 80 D we have the universe divided into the visible and invisible worlds: the former includes all sensible objects, which are composite, and therefore subject to dissolution and change; the latter contains the ideas, which are incomposite, and therefore changeless and indissoluble. Now the body is visible, and obviously belongs to the class of things which suffer change and dissolution; the soul, being invisible, should naturally seem to belong to the world of real existences, incomposite and indissoluble. This belief is confirmed if we consider the soul's attitude in regard to the sensible and intelligible worlds respectively. When dealing with sensible objects she is filled with bewilderment and strays giddily through the ever-fleeting stream of inconstant phantasms, where she can find no rest for the sole of her foot: but when she turns to the ideal world she feels herself at home; the ideas she can contemplate in serene repose, *seeing that she herself is akin to them*; and she then shares the constancy of the objects of her meditations. Additional confirmation is supplied by the observation that soul commands and body obeys; the former is the function of the divine, the latter of the mortal; therefore we infer that the soul most resembles this divine, deathless, simple, indissoluble, changeless, self-identical essence. Furthermore we know that parts of the body, inferior as it is, or the whole body when embalmed, may last for a practically unlimited time; *a fortiori* then the soul must be still more abiding.

With reference to this argument it is to be observed (1) that it is professedly a sequel to the preceding, **ὅθεν δὲ ἀπελπίομεν ἐπανέλθωμεν** 78 B: (2) that the requisite inference from cognition of the ideas is now expressed in the words I have italicised: (3) that the proof now rests upon the essential nature of the soul. Like knows like: therefore since the soul knows the ideas, she must be like the ideas. But the attributes of the ideas are simplicity, unchangeableness, and imperishability; the soul then must resemble them in these attributes. We are no longer dependent upon an external law, with whose workings we are imperfectly acquainted, to establish the soul's immortality; for we are able to class her with an order of substances to whose essence belongs eternity; and this we are enabled to do by realising that the soul's antenatal cognition of the ideas involves not merely her existence before our birth, but her likeness and affinity to the ideas themselves. Thus by following to its logical conclusion the train of thought suggested by **ἀνάμνησις**, Plato has raised the theory of immortality from the dim and doubtful twilight of physical speculation to the clear sunshine of metaphysical certainty. This present argument is in fact intended both as a correction and a development of the previous reasoning. We no longer put our trust in the physical law of

ΓΕΝΕCIC ΕΞ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΩΝ, which, although it may be perfectly sound and may afford a strong presumption of the soul's immortality, yet is incapable of offering us the assurance we require; and we have legitimately deduced from ΑΝΔΑΜΗCIC a result which may serve as a secure ontological basis for our proposition.

But now we are suddenly brought to a stand. The whole edifice which we have been at such pains to erect collapses in a moment before the criticism of Kebes: we have been building it upon sand. There can be no mistake about this: the objection raised by Kebes is utterly destructive of the theory in its present form. Let us put it to the test.

Surveying the demonstration which has last been summarised, we see at the first glance that it is purely tentative and approximate; it does not even pretend to be more than an argument from probability.

In the first place the eternal objects of intelligence are invisible, while the perishable objects of sense are visible; the soul is invisible, and therefore we have assumed that she belongs to the rank of intelligible and eternal existences. But this assumption is unwarrantable. All that is eternal is invisible; but it does not follow that all which is invisible is eternal. We may say that the soul's invisibility affords a certain presumption in favour of her eternity, but nothing more. Secondly, the soul apprehends the ideas, therefore she is like the ideas. True; but we are not justified in concluding that this likeness necessarily includes the attribute of eternity: she may, for aught we know, be sufficiently like the ideas to apprehend them and yet not possess all their properties. Thirdly, the plea that she is like the divine because she rules over the body is still less satisfactory: she may possess many divine qualities without sharing the divine attribute of eternity. Fourthly, when we argue that, since body may last a very long time and since soul is far more potent and permanent than body, soul must last a yet longer time, the conclusion is most inadequate of all. In fact the argument, considered as a proof, breaks down at every point: the most that can be obtained from it is in fact the very inference that Plato draws: προσέκει ψυχῇ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτω εἶναι ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου. But this is very different from the certainty we were seeking. Moreover since, as we saw, this argument corrected, summed up, and developed the previous reasoning, retaining all that was cogent in it and confirming it by fresh evidence, it follows that in losing this we lose all: our whole case utterly collapses. (As Kebes justly says, we have shown that the soul must have existed before her present incarnation; we have made out a case of strong probability that she is very durable and may survive many incarnations and dissolutions; but we are no whit the nearer to proving that she is imperishable: we are in fact just where we were. The whole demonstration must be begun over again ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

Is then all the discussion up to this point utterly fruitless? Most

assuredly not. The case stands, as I conceive, thus. The objection of Kebes divides the debate on immortality into two distinct portions, the former of which is purely preparatory to the latter. It would have been impossible to proceed at once to the actual demonstration, which on Platonic principles is conclusive, without clearing the way and preparing the ground for it by these preliminary investigations. In them we gradually feel our way to the right standpoint from which to attack the question. Starting from the notion of immortality as a consequence of a natural law, we soon make an advance so far as to connect it with the cognition of the idea—**ἀνάμνησις** gives us the germ of the principle which ultimately grows to reasoned certainty; and this nascent conception assumes form and substance in the psychological argument that immediately follows: thus, though we fail to gain the assurance of eternity which we seek, we now see pretty well in what direction to look for it. We do not flee all empty-handed from the ruins of our fallen theory; we carry with us two priceless possessions, first the principle that the sum of existence is constant, next the consciousness that the proof of the soul's immortality must stand or fall with the existence of the ideas. Still what I desire specially to emphasise is that not one of the arguments in the first half of the dialogue is a proof of immortality, and not one of them is intended by Plato to be so. Plato never wastes his words. Had he believed that any of these arguments in the first part demonstrated the soul's immortality, he would have stopped there; the addition of the final argument shows that the former were not conclusive. On the other hand Plato would not have introduced the preliminary arguments, had they not been necessary: they do not indeed directly demonstrate immortality, but they enable us to rise to that standpoint from which the demonstration is possible: they are a necessary propaedeutic for the proof which is based directly on the theory of ideas. The long interval which intervenes between the arguments I have been discussing and the ultimate proof serves to mark very clearly that they are to be taken by themselves as forming one division, while the final demonstration itself constitutes the other. Plato generally gives some tolerably plain external mark of his divisions: take, for instance, the criticism of Protagoras in the *Theaetetus*. The earlier objections urged against that philosopher's dogma are highly inconclusive, not to say frivolous; so much so, that Protagoras is at last provoked to put up his head from the shades below and to expostulate with Sokrates for condescending to such a method of controversy. After this the debate assumes quite a different character: the arguments put forward are all of a solid and substantial nature. Now there can in my judgment be no doubt that in that part of the criticism which precedes the remonstrance of Protagoras Plato is expressing merely popular objections, which might be urged, and perhaps had been urged, against the **μέτρον ἀνθρώπου** from the standpoint of ordinary common sense:

these he was unwilling to leave unnoticed, although he was conscious that they did not really invalidate the theory of Protagoras. But in the subsequent portion he is arguing from his own point of view and defining what he considers to be the limitations of the doctrine: while, to mark the distinction, he adopts the artistic device of bidding Protagoras emerge from the shades in order to make his own defence. The case of the *Phaedo* is not an exact parallel: for in the earlier part Plato is not bringing forward arguments which are not his own; the reasoning is sound so far as it goes; and though it does not amount to proof of immortality, it materially expedites the discovery of such a proof. But there is a similar reason for marking off the arguments into two separate divisions; and Plato has taken pains to make a broad and conspicuous line of demarcation.<sup>1</sup>

It remains to say a few words concerning the final proof. This depends directly upon the existence of the ideas as ἀρχαί, or principles of causation. Physical causes explain nothing: at best they are facts, not reasons. For a real cause we must pierce through the phantasmagoria of matter to that invisible essence, of which the sensible universe is the outward expression: we must look for the explanation of each thing in its idea. The whole existence of a particular thing is derived from the inherence of its idea; and so long as the thing exists it can never be severed from its idea, nor admit anything inconsistent with that idea: should it admit such an inconsistent idea, it ceases to be that which it is. Now in most cases this may occur: snow may melt, fire may be quenched; for their indwelling ideas do not involve indestructibility. But with soul this cannot be: informed by the idea of life she can only perish by admitting death; but this would be to admit the opposite of her inherent idea, which is impossible: her extinction would involve a direct contradiction in terms, namely dead vital principle.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The extent of this interlude and its varied character will be at once made obvious by a brief summary of its contents. After five chapters of ethical comment, 81 B—84 B, we have a narrative passage, describing how, amid the reverent silence that fell on the company when Sokrates had ceased, Simmias and Kebes were heard conversing apart. Interrogated by Sokrates they confess that they are not satisfied, but do not like to press their objections in his present situation. Sokrates replies with his famous simile of the swans, and exhorts them to speak out boldly, 84 C—85 D. Then Simmias states his objection, and Kebes follows with his, 85 E—88 B. After this a short conver-

sation between Echekrates and Phaedo is introduced, and the latter, resuming his narrative, describes the effect of these objections on the audience and upon Sokrates; after which follows the philosopher's warning against *μικρολογία*, 88 C—91 C. The refutation of Simmias occupies three chapters more, 91 C—95 A; next Sokrates restates the objection of Kebes, and not till 95 E does he begin the critique of physical speculation which is preliminary to the final demonstration starting from 99 E. In all this intermediate portion includes fifteen chapters, forming nearly one-fourth of the dialogue.

<sup>2</sup> A detailed analysis of this demonstration is reserved for the commentary upon the passage in question.

This demonstration, which is worked out with a completeness, clearness, and subtlety peculiarly Plato's own, is on Platonic principles perfectly incontrovertible: given the eternal ideas as causes of existence, the eternity of soul is an inevitable inference. But though complete in itself it utilises some of the materials of former arguments: the principle that the eternity of soul is inseparably bound up with the existence of the eternal ideas has been the chief feature of **ἀνάμνησις** and the psychological argument: in this last proof it is precisely formulated, handled in a new manner, and pushed to its logical conclusion. Secondly, the whole argument has for its ultimate premiss the constancy of the sum total of existence: **σολῆ γὰρ ἄν τι ἄλλο φεορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἴ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον αἰδῖον ὄν φεορὰν δέζεται**. And this we saw to be the fundamental proposition laid down in the argument of **ἀνταπόδοσις**. Moreover **ἀνάμνησις** is still valid to prove the existence of the ideas and the soul's intelligent activity apart from the body.

I conceive then that there are in the *Phaedo* three arguments, culminating in a single proof: but that a continuous connexion can be traced through all. The first, consisting of two portions, bases immortality partly on a natural law, partly on the soul's connexion with the ideas: the second, being a development of the first, drops the natural law and lays stress solely on the connexion with the ideas, but does not attempt to do more than make out a case of probability: the last takes up the same principle and treats it so as to evolve not a mere probability but a positive demonstration, which ultimately rests upon the law of conservation of energy as laid down in the first argument. So the dialogue proceeds like an advancing tide, each successive wave sweeping higher than the preceding. We must not regard any of the arguments as put forward and then discarded for a stronger; rather the argument is first offered in a tentative form, afterwards developed and corrected, and finally remoulded and brought to its consummation.

In conclusion I must briefly advert to two views which are in my opinion gravely erroneous and misleading. Steinhart treats the ethical passages, founded on the doctrine of immortality, as intended to furnish additional proof of that doctrine. The direct proofs, according to him, are in themselves inadequate, and require a surer foundation in ethics. This is a vicious circle so obvious that criticism is superfluous: we are establishing the soul's immortality in order to justify certain ethical principles, and then we employ these very principles as evidence for the theory whence they are deduced. Moreover this view involves a radical misconception of the purpose and structure of the dialogue.

The second opinion against which I feel bound to protest is that the refutation of the objection raised by Simmias constitutes an argument for immortality. This is propounded by Ueberweg, with

whom I am sorry to find Prof. Geddes agreeing. Surely nothing can be more untenable than such a proposition. Simmias suggests that all the facts established by Sokrates concerning soul—viz. that she is invisible, incorporeal, divine, etc.—are compatible with the theory that she is a harmony. Now if soul is a harmony, it is clear that she cannot be immortal: therefore it is absolutely necessary that Sokrates should show that this theory is inconsistent with the conclusions on which they are already agreed. But in disproving this proposition Sokrates does not prove the soul's immortality, nor is he one inch the nearer to proving it. If I wished to ascertain that a certain crystal was not soluble in water, I should gain very little by a chemical analysis which assured me simply that the substance was not saltpetre: and similarly it is no evidence for soul's immortality that she is not identical with one particular thing of which immortality can never be predicated. Even could we make an exhaustive list of all things known to be mortal, and could we prove that soul was not identical with any one of these, we should still not have established her immortality: she might yet be an additional kind of mortal existence, different from the rest. It is therefore illogical to regard the refutation of the harmonic theory as in any sense an argument for immortality. The proposition of Simmias is one which has some *prima facie* plausibility, and which would be absolutely fatal to the notion of immortality: its confutation is therefore imperative, but contributes nothing, even incidentally, to the main argument: this is in precisely the same position after the overthrow of Simmias as it was before his objection was propounded. The whole episode of harmony, though necessary, is in fact parenthetical. The criticism of Kebes, on the other hand, touches the most vital issue and tends directly to the reconstruction of the argument in that shape wherein alone, as I have tried to show, Plato regards it as a complete and final demonstration that soul is immortal.

### § 3. *Plato's attitude regarding immortality.*

(i) The form in which Plato upholds the soul's immortality next demands our attention: it is of all the most scientific and most philosophical: it is that for which there is the most to be said, and against it the least. His theory predicates eternity of universal soul, and of particular souls metempsychosis. 'The Metempsychosis,' says Hume, 'is the only system of this kind that Philosophy can hearken to':<sup>1</sup> and so too thought Plato, who does not deem any other theory worthy of consideration. Universal spirit neither has been nor shall be, but is eternally: particular souls have been without a beginning and shall be for ever. In the infinite lapse of their existence they have passed,

<sup>1</sup> *Essay on the immortality of the Soul.*



it may be, through manifold and diverse incarnations, rising and falling now to higher now to lower spheres of intelligence : but the substance, the conscious personality, is unchanged and unimpaired by all these mutations ; and though the shock of each successive embodiment destroys more or less the recollection of what has passed, still each life is haunted by memories of a former existence, ready to be awakened by the sights and sounds that fill our present consciousness.<sup>1</sup>

Thus Plato will have no one-sided immortality : the everlasting life of our soul extends backwards into the infinite past as well as forwards into the endless future. It is just herein that the strength of his position lies : thus he escapes the inextricable perplexities which beset the defenders of other views of immortality. The creational theory perhaps never presented itself to his mind ; certainly, if it did, he dismissed it as unworthy to be seriously entertained : it is in fact repugnant to the first principles of his argument. On this view the soul of every being that is newly born into the world is a fresh creation out of nothing ; and as all souls previously created exist for ever, the aggregate number of souls is for ever multiplying ; that is to say, the quantity of spirit in the universe is continually and ceaselessly on the increase. This is of course directly opposed to the great principles that the sum of force is constant and that generation out of nothing is impossible, which form the groundwork of Plato's arguments for immortality. Once allow that a soul has a beginning, and we lose our only guarantee that it shall not have an end : nay it must have an end, for only that which is without beginning is without end ; only the uncreate is imperishable. It is in fact impossible to bring forward any sound arguments for the future existence of the soul which do not also involve its previous existence, its everlasting duration. The creational theory is matter of dogmatic assertion, not of philosophical discussion.

Not only on metaphysical grounds has Plato's conception so great an advantage ; but from the standpoint of practical ethics its superiority is equally decided. The fundamental law of Platonic morals is **ἀπά-  
canti πάθειν**. There is indeed no such thing as vengeance in his scheme, but there is an immutable and inexorable sequence of cause

<sup>1</sup> In treating of this view which I have termed metempsychosis, it is to be observed that the actual transmigration is only an accident of it. All that is essential is the limitless duration of the soul's existence : her perpetual re-embodiment in various forms is not necessarily involved. If an individual soul can find some permanent and final mode of existence, the theory would

be satisfied as well as by a succession of incarnations. And in fact both in the *Phaedo* and in the *Phaedrus* Plato seems to hold out the hope that a soul that has successfully passed all her probationary trials will attain to a permanent state of the highest intellectual fruition possible for a finite existence.

and effect. No impunity exists for vice: every act of indulgence is another bar in the soul's prison-house; it drags her from the pure intellectual sphere which is rightfully hers down to the gross and pestilent atmosphere of sensual delight. From this doom none may escape; the consequences of every action are as inevitable as the laws of the universe. If a man sin, he shall pay for his sin in spiritual degradation; repentance avails nothing, reformation alone can slowly recover the lost position. Now within the span of a single life we know that a man often suffers in his latter days for the vices of his youth: how infinitely wider then is the application of this principle, if we regard that single life as but one out of an endless series. As Plato himself says, we have to consider the effects of our actions not only for this life but for all time: our present state is conditioned by causes stretching we know not how far back into the remotest past, and what we do now will influence our destiny throughout unknown cycles to come. The indestructibility of force comes terribly home to us here. Now it will be observed that in this reference metempsychosis supplies the Platonist with a ready explanation of the apparent injustice which prevails in the ordering of things—an answer to the question, if the gods are good and care for the affairs of men, why is virtue so often afflicted and vice triumphant? An advocate of the creational theory is forced to reply that the balance will be rectified in another life: suffering virtue will be rewarded, and the insolence of vice will be brought low. But such an answer is idle. No future recompense can undo injustice that has once been done: wrong may be redressed but never cancelled—**τῶν πεπραγμένων ἐν δίκῃ τε καὶ παρὰ δίκαν ἀποίητον οὐδ' ἂν χρόνος ὁ πάντων πατὴρ δύναιτο θέμεν ἔργων τέλος.** To the Platonist however the solution is easy. No injustice has to be atoned, for none exists. The conditions obtaining at any given time are the inevitable, and therefore perfectly just, result of an infinite series of causes: we must look for the antecedents not in this life only, but in a limitless cycle of prior existences; and what might be unjust relatively to a man's conduct in his present life may be the irresistible effect of his action in some bygone period. It is true that the answer is not complete without reference to ontological and physical principles, which however cannot here be entered upon.

Thus the theory of metempsychosis supplies not only an explanation of this inequality in human affairs but also a most powerful incentive to virtuous action. A man shall be what his deeds and thoughts make him: if he degrade himself by vice, his restoration must be effected, not by some deathbed repentance or compulsory purgation, but by his own laborious endeavour, by living according to the best of his lights in the inferior state to which he has fallen. For Plato never leaves him without hope. The fanciful description of the soul's migrations at the close of the *Timaeus* (92 A) represents a definite

ethical doctrine. The soul that has swerved from the course of pure intellectual virtue may inhabit forms of bird or beast, or even fish and mollusc, 'when it is defiled with all manner of iniquity and therefore in place of inhaling the fine and clear element of air is condemned to the turbid and gross respiration of water.' Yet even in this most degraded state there is a chance of retrieval: for these vicissitudes are determined **νοῦ καὶ ἀνοίας ἀποβολῇ καὶ κτήσει**. A life well spent according to the conditions of even the lowest rank may enable the soul to rise a step in the next incarnation; and the recovery of the whole intellectual inheritance is always possible. The hopeless reprobation of the incurable criminals described in the myth of the *Phaedo* belongs simply to the pictorial presentation: we find it only when Plato is pressing popular legend into his service; not when he is presenting his own views undisguised by this veil of tradition. I have said that a permanent mode of existence for the soul is not excluded by the Platonic theory. But such permanent mode is only possible when the soul has attained the highest perfection of which she is capable: good may be stable, but evil never.

Among theories then which maintain the personal immortality of particular souls it would seem that Plato's is metaphysically the most defensible and ethically the most fruitful; and while it attaches the heaviest penalties to immorality, it offers the strongest encouragement to any endeavour after improvement. It is not of course contended that this view is exempt from objections and difficulties; merely that these apply with greater force to any other method of defending individual immortality.

(ii) But how far do Plato's arguments tend to prove the immortality of particular souls, as distinct from the eternity of the universal soul? It must, I think, be replied that they go but a very short way indeed. If we examine the several demonstrations, we shall find that what they amount to is that vital principle is indestructible, not that its manifestation in this or that personality is permanent. The result of the argument from **ἀνταπόδοσις** is that, if all things are not to be brought to nought, the sum of vital essence can suffer no abatement; but it offers no shadow of proof that this constant amount of vitality will continue to be distributed into the same conscious personalities: we know by experience that separate conscious personalities continue to be produced in the world, and therefore we conclude that the vital force which constitutes them cannot perish at the dissolution of soul and body; but we have no right to conclude that these personalities retain their individual consciousness after death. Indeed from this argument we cannot infer that vital force will always continue to exist in the form of particular intelligences: that belongs to another aspect of Plato's metaphysics. As we proceed to **ἀνάμνησις**, although on a bare literal interpretation Plato's language may imply that the soul existed individually before birth, yet this is not at all involved in the principle

of the theory: the particular soul retains the knowledge of truths which are the possession of soul at large, not necessarily of this soul in a former personal existence. A similar examination of the remaining arguments of the *Phaedo* will show that individual immortality is not fairly deducible from any of them. The same applies to the brief but pregnant demonstration in *Phaedrus* 245 c foll. There the case for the eternity of soul is stated with unequalled force and clearness; but it applies to the universal soul alone, and nothing can be deduced from it regarding the permanence of particular souls. The strikingly subtle argument beginning *Republic* 608 E contains a remarkable expression (611 A), ἐννοεῖς ὅτι αἰεὶ ἂν εἴεν αἱ αὐταί, sc. αἱ ψυχαί. This seems at first sight like an assertion of the continued existence of the same personalities. A closer examination however shows that this is not the case. Plato simply means that if the whole vital force of the universe is distributed into a certain number of souls, no addition to this number is possible, else the sum total of vitality would be increased, which is inadmissible. We cannot draw from that argument the conclusion that this universal vitality must needs be for ever manifested in a given number of souls; and even if it must, that would not necessarily involve continuity of personality. The whole strength of Plato's reasoning is expended in demonstrating the eternity of soul as such: there is nothing to prove that particular souls on their departure from the body are not reabsorbed in the universal spirit, merging their proper consciousness in that common force of nature which is ever manifesting itself anew in the forms of individual life.

(iii) Such being the case, it is not irrelevant to raise the question, did Plato really and literally maintain the personal immortality of particular souls? This certainly would seem to be the teaching of the *Phaedo*, and this is the view of the vast majority of Platonic students: but the contrary opinion is supported by the great authority of Hegel and has recently been defended with much ingenuity by Teichmüller; it is not therefore to be dismissed without ceremony. I will discuss the statements of the two critics separately.

First however I must point out a difficulty under which an editor of the *Phaedo* labours in approaching this question: it does not belong to the treatment of the *Phaedo* at all, but to that of the *Timaeus*; and we can hope to attain a satisfactory solution only after a minute investigation of the profound and difficult metaphysics of the latter dialogue. Such an investigation is obviously out of place here, since ὁ λόγος πάρεργος ὢν πλέον ἂν ἔργον ὢν ἕνεκα λέγεται παράχκοι. At the same time it does not seem desirable to leave the subject altogether unnoticed, and I shall therefore treat it as briefly as I am able.

In his statement of the Platonic philosophy Hegel expressly assigns the permanence of particular souls to the region of the mythical. We think of the soul, he says,<sup>1</sup> as a physical thing possessing divers attri-

<sup>1</sup> Hegel's *Werke*, vol. xiv p. 207 foll.

butes, one of which is thinking—thinking determined as a thing that can pass away and cease. But with Plato the immortality of the soul is inseparably bound up with the fact that the soul is that which thinks—thought is not a mere attribute of it. We are addicted to thinking of the soul as if it were a thing that could exist without imagination or thought. To Plato, on the other hand, the significance of immortality consists in this, that thought is not an attribute of the soul but its substance—soul is just thought. Thought is the substance of soul as gravity is the substance, not an attribute, of body. Take away gravity and body is no more; take away thought and soul is no more. Thought is the activity of the universal, which reflects itself into itself and is identified with itself: this self-identity is the unalterable and abiding. Alteration is when one thing becomes another and does not hold fast by itself in the other. Soul on the other hand consists in the retaining itself in the other—in the process of apprehension the soul has to do with external matter, which is other, and yet it retains its self-identity. Immortality has not for Plato the interest it has for us in a religious aspect; it depends upon the nature of thought and its inner freedom. With reference to the *Phaedo* Hegel observes that we have hardly any line of demarcation between the outward representation and the inward idea, but this is far from sinking to the crudity of conception (Rohheit), that represents the soul as a thing, and inquires about its duration and existence, as concerning a thing.

Now it appears to me that the foregoing criticism amounts to something like this. Hegel, analysing the conception of immortality, seizes at once upon that which he regards as essential to the Platonic philosophy: this kernel he instantly drags to light, rejecting the husk of 'Vorstellung.' Whether an individual consciousness shall continue to exist as such is to Platonism of no metaphysical importance whatever: what is of importance is to grasp the true nature of eternity. The soul's real immortality lies in the operation of thought: eternity is in the nature of thought and has nothing to do with duration. Such, I conceive, is Hegel's point. Now that the duration of the individual is of no metaphysical importance I am willing to admit: Plato's philosophy in no way involves it. I do not however see that it is thereby excluded; provided the really essential point is maintained, it seems to me that the question of individual duration is an open one for Plato; whether a particular consciousness continues for one life, or for a score, or for an unlimited time, does not appear to affect the question.

Teichmüller however goes further, and declares that Plato could not maintain individual immortality without grave inconsistency; from which premiss he most justly draws the conclusion that Plato did not maintain it.<sup>1</sup> For I cordially agree with him that any inter-

<sup>1</sup> The works of Teichmüller which I have consulted on this subject are 'die platonische Frage' and 'Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe.'

pretation of Plato which attributes inconsistency to him stands self-condemned. It may be very well for writers of Cicero's philosophical calibre to talk of Plato as 'inconstans'; but when modern historians of philosophy impute to this greatest of philosophers self-contradictions of which the merest novice would be ashamed, one cannot but suspect them of seeking to lighten their own labours at Plato's expense: it is easier to accuse him of inconsistency than to work out his meaning.<sup>1</sup>

Teichmüller's criticism seems to resolve itself mainly into two points: (1) Plato's reasoning applies only to universal, not to particular soul, (2) the admission of individual immortality makes Plato's philosophy into a system of monadism, not monism. The first point has been already conceded; but it is no proof that Plato did not believe in the permanence of individual souls. The second objection, if sustained, I should regard as fatal, holding as I do that Platonism is essentially a monistic system. But I doubt whether it has been proved. The contention is that, if particular souls are eternal, we have as the ontological basis of the system not one universal thought, but a number of distinct and independent substances or forces, resembling the monads of Leibniz. But in the first place it must be remarked that eternity is not claimed for particular souls: the individual, *qua* individual, cannot possibly be eternal: all that is claimed is the indefinite prolongation of their existence in both directions; but no extent of prolongation is one step nearer eternity.<sup>2</sup> Severance from what we term our body can make no difference; if a particular soul continues her separate existence at all, the conditions of her limitation oblige her to remain in the sphere of **ῥένεσις**: did she pass to the **νοητὸν** she would necessarily be merged in the universal.<sup>3</sup> Finite intelligences are for Plato simply manifestations of the universal **νοῦς**: they are not self-existent monads, but evolved from the universal, a mode of whose existence they are. Now if, as we may gather from the *Timaeus*, the universal **νοῦς** has this mode of existence in

<sup>1</sup> As I shall presently have occasion to remark, Plato's dialogues indubitably show a development in his system. But this development involves no inconsistency, even though the expression of some thoughts needs modification: rather it brings to light the hidden connexion between ideas hitherto unharmonised.

<sup>2</sup> Plato most explicitly recognises this, *Timaeus* 37 Ε ταῦτα δὲ πάντα μέρη χρόνου, καὶ τό τ' ἦν τό τ' ἔσται χρόνου γεγονότα εἶδη, ἃ δὲ φέροντες λανθάνομεν ἐπὶ τὴν αἰδίων οὐσίαν οὐκ ὁρῶμεν. λέγομεν γὰρ δὴ ὥς ἦν ἔστι τε καὶ ἔσται, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἔστι μόνον κατὰ τὸν

ἀληθῆ λόγον προσήκει. And again 38 Β τὸ μὲν γὰρ παράδειγμα πάντα αἰῶνα ἔστιν ὄν, ὁ δ' αὖ διὰ τέλους τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν καὶ ἐσόμενος.

<sup>3</sup> Teichmüller's objection seems directed against the existence of a plurality of souls in the intelligible world: cf. *die platonische Frage* p. 23 'Vielheit aber in das intelligible Gebiet zu versetzen, heisst Atomismus, nicht Platonismus.' Very true; but the individual soul, as such, whether its continuance be perpetual or not, does not belong to the 'intelligibles Gebiet' at all.

perpetuity, can it matter to Plato's doctrine whether each finite intelligence preserves the same thread of consciousness throughout, or is merged in the universal on the conclusion of a given term of existence? One view may be more probable than the other, but neither seems to me to involve monadism. If souls are to be monads they must be as individuals eternal and self-existing; prolongation of their existence, even in perpetuity, will not suffice.

Moreover, although I am convinced as firmly as any one of Plato's consistency, I hold it for certain that we have represented in the dialogues a regular development of Plato's thought, whereof the *Phaedo* does not belong to the latest stage. We cannot therefore bring everything in the *Phaedo* into severe conformity with the matured pantheism of the *Timaeus*. In the latter it is probable that personal immortality does more or less recede into the region of the mythical: it enters only in an extremely allegorical guise. But while in the matured Platonism all is coherent and consequent, in the still maturing Platonism of the *Phaedo* there are to be found views, as we shall see, which Plato afterwards considerably modified: and even were it shown that personal immortality is inadmissible in the *Timaeus*, it does not follow that it is so in the *Phaedo*.

In the interpretation of a writer so much addicted to figurative speech as Plato there must needs be here and there difference of opinion as to where the line is to be drawn between symbolism and substance: and in this case I cannot but think that Teichmüller has drawn the line too high. And I cannot acquiesce in his naive assumption that the mere fact that a doubt exists is decisive in favour of a non-literal interpretation. The *onus probandi*, I take it, lies with those who do not interpret literally; and in general the proof is not hard to find. We have no hesitation in regarding the creation of the universe by the *δημιουργός* as purely mythical, because a literal acceptation would reduce Platonism to a chaos of nonsense: we pass a similar verdict on the endless punishment of criminals in the *Νέκυια* of the *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Gorgias*, because it is incongruous with the just and benevolent spirit that pervades Plato's ethics, and because it only appears when Plato is clothing his thoughts in a legendary form. In the present case however I do not think the incongruity is made out. Moreover the direct and circumstantial seriousness with which the doctrine of immortality is put forward is totally unlike any of the mythical or figurative representations of Plato's thought elsewhere: Hegel himself observes 'wir treffen hier am wenigsten geschieden die Weise des Vorstellens und des Begriffes'; and certainly if Plato is not here in earnest with individual immortality, he may fairly be charged with having passed from mysticism to mystification.

I have made this defence of the literal interpretation not because I consider that the continued existence of the individual is of any real importance in the Platonic system—I should not go so far as to affirm

that it was retained to the last—but because, in order that we may follow historically the development of Plato's thought, it is important for us to determine precisely what he means to set forth in each dialogue. And the conclusion which seems to me the soundest is that, although Plato knew very well that neither he nor any one else could demonstrate the immortality of individual souls, yet he was strongly disposed to believe, at least at the time the *Phaedo* was written, that every soul on its separation from the body will not be reabsorbed in the universal, but will survive as a conscious personality, even as it existed before its present incarnation.

§ 4. *Theory of Soul in the PHAEDO.*<sup>1</sup>

Adopting the view defended in the preceding section, we have next to deal with a question arising from a comparison between the psychology of the *Phaedo* and that of some other Platonic dialogues. Such a comparison will bring to light two points wherein Plato's teaching is at first sight inconsistent and is regarded by Grote and others as distinctly self-contradictory. The object of the present section is to show that no such inconsistency exists.

In the *Phaedo* (α) the soul is essentially simple and incomposite; and this simplicity is urged as an argument for her imperishability (compare 80 B with 78 C foll.): (β) ἔρωτες ἐπιθυμίαι φόβοι and the like are referred to the body as their origin, whence arising they intrude upon the soul and trouble her contemplations (66 C). On the other hand (α) in certain passages of the *Phaedrus*, *Republic*, and *Timaeus* the soul is represented not as a simple but as a triple nature (*Phaedrus* 246 A, *Republic* 439 D, *Timaeus* 69 C): (β) in the *Philebus* it is expressly declared that all passions have their origin in the soul, body being in itself incapable of giving rise to any sensation; and this position is also consistently maintained in the *Timaeus* (*Philebus* 35 C, *Timaeus* 64 B, C). The problems we have to solve then are (i) how can we reconcile the simplicity of soul in the *Phaedo* with her tripartite nature in the other three dialogues, and how does the argument for immortality affect the three parts severally? (ii) how can we reconcile the assignment of passions to body in the *Phaedo* with their assignment to soul in the *Philebus*?

(i) Of the first problem only two solutions seem possible, (α) that two distinct views were entertained by Plato at different periods, (β) that the tripartition of the soul is purely metaphorical.

The first alternative cannot be accepted. For reasons which will be discussed hereafter it is impossible to regard the *Phaedo* as belonging

<sup>1</sup> The substance of this section appeared in a paper printed in the *Journal of Philology*, vol. x, p. 120, to which I may refer the reader for a more detailed statement.



to a different period from the *Republic*; and there are good grounds for assigning the *Phaedrus* to the same group. We are bound therefore to expect that these dialogues will agree in all important doctrines.

Moreover there is a remarkable fact to be noticed. The simplicity of **ψυχή**, so far from being a theory peculiar to the *Phaedo*, is one which pervades the whole series of the Platonic dialogues from beginning to end, not even excepting those in which the triform nature appears. This is not only conclusive evidence that we are not dealing with doctrines held at successive periods, but it affords strong presumption that the tripartition of **ψυχή** is a figurative expression.

Let us examine the nature of this tripartition. In the myth of the *Phaedrus* the soul is likened to a car driven by a charioteer and drawn by two winged steeds. Of this pair one is vicious and unruly, the other generous and docile, aiding the charioteer in subduing his refractory companion. This parable is thus explained in the *Republic*. In every soul there are two **εἶδη** or **μέρη**, **λογιστικὸν** and **ἄλογον**, the latter being subdivided into **θυμοειδὲς** and **ἐπιθυμητικόν**. So we have the soul distinguished into three parts or kinds, rational, emotional, appetitive. We see however that the main division is dual not triple; the three parts are not co-ordinate but made out by the subdivision of the **ἄλογον**: this it will be well to bear in mind.

But if this analysis is to be understood as literally signifying that the soul is composed of three distinct parts, the results are truly bewildering. The entire argument of the *Phaedo* is not merely demolished root and branch, but is shown utterly unmeaning and irrelevant. For when we dreaded lest the soul on quitting the body should be scattered to the winds and dissolved, we were comforted by the assurance that as she had no parts she could not be divided; simplicity cannot admit dissolution. But now she has three distinct parts, therefore into those parts she can be resolved: and what is to become of them? do they continue to exist separately? or does one of them, or two, or all perish? And what becomes of the soul's likeness to the ideas, in virtue of which she claimed to apprehend them and to belong to the region of the invisible and eternal? All this is swept away at one stroke. If we answer that it is the **λογιστικὸν** alone with which the argument of the *Phaedo* is concerned, we are shutting our eyes to the fact that there is not a single passage in Plato where the term **ψυχή** is applied to the highest **εἶδος** as distinguished from the two lower: nor have we a right so to apply it here. And if the three **εἶδη** all are classed as **ψυχή**, it must be in virtue of some common principle: what then is this principle? what is the bond of union, what the differentiation of the three? The fact that we are led into so helpless a maze of perplexity is ample cause for deciding that the literal interpretation is entirely inadmissible.

But the case is still further strengthened by the statement in the *Timaeus*. The created gods are described as implanting in a body the

human soul, imitating the manner of their own creation by the **δημιουργός**. The divine element, **θεῖον**, which they received from the hands of the creator, they placed in the head : this is the **λογιστικόν** of the *Republic*. Then, Plato proceeds to tell us, they fashioned another kind of soul, to which he applies the remarkable term **ἐννητόν**. This is the abode of vehement passions, pleasure and pain, confidence and fear, wrath and hope and love, and all unreasoning sensations. And lest they should sully the divine principle, they placed this mortal soul in another region of the body : and since it was twofold, they divided the two kinds by a partition, setting the spirited portion in the heart, that it might readily hear and obey the commands of the reason ; while the appetitive they set in the belly, that it might care for the nourishment of the body. Here the **ἐννητόν εἶδος** corresponds to the **ἄλογον** of the *Republic* and includes the **θυμοειδές** and **ἐπιθυμητικόν**.

If this too is to be understood literally, confusion is tenfold worse confounded. For to the three parts are assigned different habitations in the body ; all three therefore have extension in space : yet we know very well that for Plato **ψυχὴ** is unextended and immaterial. Again the lower **εἶδη** are mortal ; that is, vital principle can admit destruction : a declaration not only subversive of all the reasoning in the *Phaedo*, but flatly opposed to the whole of Plato's convictions concerning soul : nay it extinguishes once for all his hope of discovering a sure basis of knowledge ; for if the principle of life and thought can under any conditions cease to be, what is there that shall abide ? **ὀνητὴ ψυχὴ**, understood literally, is indeed the most absolute contradiction in terms that his vocabulary could furnish. And, as if to bring out this contradiction in the most glaring light, Plato declares (*Phaedrus* 245 D) **πάντα ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος**, all soul, without reservation, is immortal ; and presently we have an elaborate statement of the tripartite nature, that is of a mortal and an immortal soul conjoined.

All this constitutes not merely justification but positive necessity for treating the tripartition of soul as wholly metaphorical ; and the interpretation of the metaphor is simple enough. The three **εἶδη** of the soul are not different parts or kinds, but only different modes of the soul's activity under different conditions. The two lower **εἶδη** are consequent upon the conjunction of soul with matter,<sup>1</sup> and their operation ceases at the separation of soul from matter. Soul, as such, is simple, she is pure thought ; and her action, which is thinking, is

<sup>1</sup> This is indubitable. In the myth of the *Phaedrus* the gods have the three **εἶδη**, but the gods are corporeal (246 D). That they are so is interesting : it shows how fully Plato recognised that the limitations of individual consciousness preclude a purely immaterial existence.

The conditions of individual existence are not necessarily identical with ours ; e.g. the gods and superior spirits have **σώμα**, but not **σώμα γήινον** : but such an existence involves in some sense materiality : the individual belongs to **γένεσις**.

simple. But soul immanent in matter has a complex action ; she does not lose, at least in the higher organisms, all the faculty of pure thought ; but she has another action consequent on her implication with matter : this action we call perception or sensation. The main division is, as we have seen, dual : **λογιστικὸν** expressing the action of soul by herself, **ἄλογον** her action through the body. The **πάθος** belonging to **ἄλογον** Plato classifies under the heads of **θυμοειδὲς** and **ἐπιθυμητικόν**. We see too that the terms of the *Timaeus*, **εἶον** and **ἐνητόν**, are abundantly justified. Soul is altogether imperishable : but when she enters into relation with body she assumes certain functions which are terminable and which cease when the relation comes to an end. **ὀνητόν** then is the name given to soul acting under certain material conditions ; and soul may in that sense admit the appellation, not because she ever ceases to exist *qua* soul, but because she ceases to operate *qua* emotional and appetitive soul. Soul exists in her own essence eternally, in her material relations but for a time.

Soul then is simple and uniform, the one and only principle of life. All forms of life are manifestations of her, from the highest to the lowest ; from the activity of the noblest intellect to the faintest vestiges of vegetable growth.<sup>1</sup> The degree of intelligence varies inversely according to the degree of implication with matter. In the highest forms of individual existence thought has free scope for its activity, and the lower modes of consciousness are in due subordination : but as the material bonds grow tighter, the supremacy of thought wanes, and the dominion of sensation and appetite strengthens ; finally reason and thought, even the higher modes of sensation, vanish, and nutrition and growth alone remain. But all these organisms are vitalised by one sole principle of life.

We now have reached a standpoint whence it is easy to solve the difficulties which we encountered at the outset. Once recognise that Plato knew of but one kind of soul, and all is smooth. The essential nature of soul is simple, as much in the *Phaedrus*, *Republic*, and *Timaeus* as in the *Phaedo*. Hence it is beside the point to ask which of the three parts is immortal : Plato is seeking to prove that soul herself is eternal, not that certain relations and functions of soul are perpetual. The vital principle which manifests itself in these modes is imperishable, but the modes themselves are temporary and transient.

(ii) The answer to the second question is to be found with no less ease. The whole argument of the *Phaedo*, as we have seen, deals with soul *qua* soul. With this of course bodily appetites have nothing to do : accordingly Plato assigns them to the body, because they only belong to soul in her bodily relation and through this affect her. Nothing would be gained by pursuing the analysis further ; rather the course of the discussion would be hampered by the introduction of matter

<sup>1</sup> See *Timaeus* 77 A foll.

which had no bearing on the question at issue. In the *Philebus* it is different; there it is Plato's business to give a psychological analysis of the passions in question: accordingly they are assigned to soul, which is the only seat of consciousness. Each dialogue is justified from its own standpoint: the *Phaedo* in attributing passions to the body, because they arise from the corporeal relation of soul; the *Philebus* in giving them to the soul, because body, as such, has no consciousness. There only appears to be a discrepancy, because the analysis of the *Phaedo* is in the *Philebus* carried out more thoroughly: these passions belong to body, because without the bodily environment they could not arise; to soul, because it is by soul alone that they can be felt.

Thus it appears that if we insist upon treating Plato's allegorical language as plain prose, we are lost in helpless perplexity; while by a reasonable interpretation of the metaphor we are released from all difficulty and show Plato's teaching to be perfectly consistent and philosophical. There cannot, I think, be much doubt which method to choose. As Hegel observes, 'wenn er [sc. Plato] von der Seele des Menschen sagt, dass sie einen vernünftigen und unvernünftigen Theil habe: so ist dies ebenso im Allgemeinen zu nehmen: aber Plato behauptet damit nicht, dass die Seele aus zweierlei Substanzen, zweierlei Dingen zusammengesetzt sey.'

I conclude this section with a brief summary borrowed from the paper to which I have already referred.

In *Timaeus* 69 C—72 D we have a **εἶον εἶδος** and a **ἐνντὸν εἶδος** of **ψυχῇ**: of which **εἶον** = **λογιστικόν**, **ἐνντὸν** = **θυμοειδὲς** + **ἐπιθυμητικόν**. Now **ψυχῇ**, as such, is **ἀθάνατον**: therefore the word **ἐνντὸν** can only refer to a particular relation of **ψυχῇ** and **σώμα**, or operation of **ψυχῇ** through **σώμα**. **Θυμοειδὲς** therefore and **ἐπιθυμητικόν** are not different parts of **ψυχῇ**, but only names for different modes of its action through **σώμα**: thus **θυμοειδὲς** and **ἐπιθυμητικόν** are **ἐνντά**, because, when the conjunction between **ψυχῇ** and **σώμα** ceases, they cease also.

Thus the apparent discrepancy between the *Phaedo* and *Philebus* is reconciled. In the one **ἐπιθυμῆσαι** are ascribed to **σώμα**, as arising from conjunction of **ψυχῇ** and **σώμα**: in the other they are more accurately ascribed to **ψυχῇ**, because they are an affection of **ψυχῇ** through **σώμα**. Also the argument of the *Phaedo* is entirely unaffected by the threefold division. All soul is simple, uniform, and indestructible; but in connexion with body it assumes certain phases which are temporary and only exist in relation to body. Thus though the **ἐπιθυμητικόν** and **θυμοειδὲς**, as such, are not immortal, because they depend for their continuance upon body, which is mortal; yet the vital principle, which under such conditions assumes these forms, is immortal and continues to exist, though not necessarily in the same mode. For the modes in which vital force acts under temporary conditions are transitory, but the acting force itself is changeless and eternal.

§ 5. *Position of the PHAEDO in the Platonic system.*

The whole philosophy of Plato is, as I am fully convinced, set forth in his extant dialogues. It is a system which in its final development forms a harmonious and consistent whole, worked out with unflinching logical precision from its fundamental principles. But we can hardly suppose that this system sprang all at once in its mature completeness, like a new Athene, from its creator's brain. Plato is not indeed wont to write down his ideas before they are well thought out: but when we reflect where he took philosophy up and where he left it, it would seem wonderful indeed if a series of compositions extending over a long life belonged to one and the same stage of thought. Of philosophy, properly so called, Plato is the originator and creator. The earlier Greek thinkers in their struggles up to the light had struck upon divers principles of profound and vital importance: the names of Herakleitos, Parmenides, and Anaxagoras are associated with truths which form the very framework of philosophy. But each of the earlier philosophers dwelt exclusively on his own peculiar principle, till in its isolation a truth became a falsehood; they advanced one aspect of the truth as if it were the whole: those on one side of the shield declared that all is convex; those on the other, all is concave. Philosophy first became possible when there arose a *συνοπτικὸς ἄνθρωπος*, who saw that these truths are complementary, that each is realised in the others. And here I cannot forbear once more to quote a remark of Hegel's: 'We are not to look upon Plato's dialogues as if it were his concern to give expression to sundry philosophies, nor must we suppose that his philosophy was an eclectic system constructed out of the former: it rather forms the knot in which these one-sided abstract principles are truly unified in concrete form. . . . In the Platonic philosophy we see manifold philosophemes of earlier times, but taken up into Plato's principles and therein unified.' Platonism in fact realises by conciliation principles which in their separation were null and void.

From this point of view we should expect to find in Plato's exposition of his system (1) a phase wherein the necessity of such a conciliation is recognised and its accomplishment more or less effected, while at the same time imperfections and gaps yet remain, (2) a phase in which Plato's severe self-criticism has revealed to him the weak points in his earlier theory, and his unparalleled metaphysical insight has suggested to him the remedy. To leap at once from the one-sided crudeness of preplatonic thought to so profound and comprehensive a philosophy as the later Platonism would seem beyond the power even of such a genius as Plato's: there are few indeed who could have reached the intermediate stage. We may expect to see, and I believe we do see in the dialogues evidence of development in Plato's thought, which passes through definite stages,

enabling us to distribute the Platonic writings into three distinct periods, which I shall term the Sokratic, the middle, and the later.

Upon the precise nature of this development an entirely new and most important light has been thrown by Dr. Jackson in a masterly series of essays recently published in the *Journal of Philology*, vols. x and xi. His results, so far as he has yet proceeded, I cordially accept in the main; and it is from the standpoint which his researches have empowered us to reach that I now propose to indicate a classification of the Platonic dialogues. I am only concerned to give such a general outline as will enable me to define the period to which I conceive the *Phaedo* to belong; a full analysis would not serve the present purpose.

At the time he first met Sokrates, the unsatisfactory result of previous speculation had in all probability inclined the young Plato, like most of his contemporaries, towards philosophic scepticism. Sokrates gave a new impetus to his thought; it was from him that Plato derived, along with the interrogatory method, the principle which afterwards bore such abundant fruit—the principle that knowledge is of universals. This is the great contribution of the unmetaphysical Sokrates to metaphysics; but it is in the hands of Plato, not of Sokrates, that it attained its true significance. And even with Plato it at first remained barren. In his earlier dialogues Plato exercises the exuberant strength of his growing thought in the Sokratic method of definition: we find abundant promise of the matchless artistic power that is to come, but little or no advance on the position of Sokrates. Such dialogues are the *Euthyphron*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, and others, mostly of small compass and of slight philosophical importance. They culminate in the *Protagoras*, the longest and most brilliant of the series. These dialogues constitute the Sokratic period; in them we do not yet find Plato.

But Plato was a true scholar of Herakleitos: he saw that in things which abide not, but ever fluctuate and fleet away, there can be no stable truth nor basis of knowledge. Knowledge is of that which abides firm and changes not, if there exists such in the universe. And now Plato despairs no longer of finding this existence, he sees it in the principle of universals. But not in the universals as he received them from Sokrates; a change must pass upon them before they will serve his end. Sokrates had said, if we would know a thing we must clear our conception of it from all accidental attributes which may be peculiar to particular specimens of the class: if we would know what is a tree, we must obtain from the completest comparison that our experience enables us to make an exhaustive catalogue of those attributes which are not peculiar to any particular tree but which are common to all, and lacking any one of which a thing would not be a tree. Thus we shall have framed in our mind the definition or concept of a tree, and now we have such knowledge

of it as is attainable. But this concept is simply a thought in our own mind, it has no existence of its own: it is, as Protagoras might tell us, doubly unsubstantial; for it is formed from the impressions produced by an ever-changing object upon a subject that is never constant: the image of a flitting insect in running water is not more shadowy than the perceptions from which our definition is formed. Knowledge demands for its object a constant self-existent verity. This led Plato to the hypostatisation of the universal. In place of a mental concept derived from particulars he gives us an essential idea prior to the particulars, whereof it is the cause. These ideas, being veritably existent, can be objects of true knowledge; and they served Plato as a **δεσμιός** wherewith to mediate between the immovable unity of Parmenides and the limitless plurality of Herakleitos. We cannot, says Plato, clear at one bound the gulf between **ἐν** and **ἄπειρα**, between the primal unity and the infinite multitude of particulars; we need, as intermediates, **πολλά**, *i.e.* a definite number of classes, proceeding by gradually widening generalisations from the *infimae species* to the all-embracing unity: and each of these classes represents an idea.

This is the stage of the middle Platonism: as yet the ideas are simply hypostatisations of every logical concept. Consequently we find in the *Republic* an idea of every group of objects denoted by a class-name. We have at the top of the scale the **αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν**, we have ideas of **καλὸν δίκαιον**, etc., ideas of natural objects, ideas of **σκευστά**, beds, tables, etc., ideas of relations, great, small, equal, etc., and ideas of **κακὸν ἄδικον** and the like. The particulars in every group derive their nature and existence from the immanence, **παρουσία**, of the idea. The *Republic* is the chief exponent of this phase of Plato's metaphysics: it is also represented by the *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, and others: its main distinguishing characteristics are the assumption of an idea for every group of particulars, and the inherence of the idea in the particulars, also expressed as the participation, **μέθεξις**, of the particular in the idea.

But Plato presently finds reason to be dissatisfied with this expression of his theory: the difficulties and deficiencies he sees therein are stated with overwhelming force in the earlier part of the *Parmenides*. The points which chiefly demanded correction were the contents of the ideal world and the relation between ideas and particulars. The list of ideas is largely reduced, though it is not easy to say precisely to what extent: instead of an idea corresponding to every group of particulars we now have only an idea for every group which is naturally and not artificially determined; thus all ideas of **σκευστά** are abolished. Next relations are reduced from the rank of ideas to that of universal predicates, or, as Aristotle would say, categories; so that we no longer have ideas of great and small, equal and double, and so forth. Finally ideas of negations are

abolished, such as evil, unjust, etc. Therefore one great criterion of the stage to which a dialogue belongs will be the nature of the ideas that are assumed in it.

The second point is no less important, the relation between the ideal and the material world. In the middle period the idea exists (α) transcendently, **ἐν τῇ φύσει**, (β) immanent in the particulars. In the period to which we have now come, the transcendental existence of the idea alone is allowed: the particulars no longer participate in the idea, but are regarded as copies, **μιμήματα**, of the ideal type, **παράδειγμα**. In this way the objections formulated in the *Parmenides* against the earlier account of the relation between idea and particular are avoided. Other characteristics of the later Platonism, as the analysis of **ὄντα** into **πέρασ** and **ἄπειρον** in the *Philebus*, and the still subtler analysis of the *Timaeus*, need not detain us here; since the object of the foregoing statement is merely to indicate the development of Plato's system so far as is necessary for fixing the position of the *Phaedo*. The later metaphysic is unfolded in the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Philebus*, and consummated in the *Timaeus*.

Guided by these landmarks we shall find it no hard matter to determine the bearings of the *Phaedo*. In this dialogue we have an idea of **ἴσον** (74 A), **μέγα** (100 B), **σμικρότης** (100 E), etc. Also we have the idea described as **ἐν ἡμῖν** as well as **ἐν τῇ φύσει** (102 D). That is to say, in the *Phaedo* (1) we see ideas of relations, though ideas of **σκευαστὰ** do not occur, and (2) the ideas are immanent in particulars. These are two unmistakable marks that the dialogue belongs to the Platonism of the *Republic*.

The metaphysical doctrine of the *Phaedo* is in fact identical with that of the *Republic*. The cardinal point in each dialogue is the existence of the ideas as the sole principle of causation and the one object of true knowledge. In the *Phaedo* indeed Plato does not bring out in definite language the subordination of the other ideas to the **αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν** as the supreme source of all existence. But this is not due to any discordance of theory, but only to a difference in the immediate object. The supremacy of the **αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν** in the *Phaedo* is plainly indicated in the fact that **τὸ βέλτιστον** is postulated as the ultimate **αἰτία**, to which all other causes are merely subsidiary. Moreover a synthesis of these two dialogues will show us that Plato is working on precisely the same lines which he afterwards follows in the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*. In the *Phaedo* he declares that all things are ordered by **νοῦς** working **ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον**. But what is the 'best'? by what standard are we to determine it? The answer is indicated in the *Republic*: the efficient and final causes are indistinguishably blended in the **αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν**. This identification is pregnant with a significance which is not fully brought to light until we come to the *Timaeus*; where, behind the veil of poetical embroidery, we



behold the universe as the self-evolution of absolute **νοῦς**, according to the immutable laws of its own nature. The standard of **τὸ βέλτιστον** then lies in the nature of **νοῦς**: and **νοῦς** in operating **ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον** is working out its own being. This is why the philosopher must seek to base his morality upon cognition of the **ἀγαθὸν** itself; for there is no other standard of excellence than the laws of true Being.

The thoroughly Herakleitean conception of the phenomenal world is also quite in keeping with the *Republic*. In the shadowy realm of the sensible the soul goes astray bewildered and befogged in the whirling eddy of unsubstantial phantoms—**ἀμειννὰ κάρηνα**—that throng around her. In this doubtful region, midway between being and not-being, she can only grope her way under the treacherous guidance of opinion. And here we may note another characteristic of the middle period, in the absence of any really serious attempt to account for the existence or apparent existence of phenomena. Plato does not flatly deny the existence of the visible world, as the Eleatics did; he assigns it a sort of ignominious half-existence: but he gives us no explanation of it beyond such vaguely metaphorical phrases as ‘participation in the ideas.’ It is not until his latest dialogues that he sets himself resolutely to deal with this problem. He never recedes from his Herakleitean view of phenomena; but he recognises that their appearance is a fact requiring the most thorough investigation.

The position of the *Phaedo* with respect to the vexed question of predication is very interesting. In the earlier days of philosophy, for fault of adequate logical analysis, the perplexity surrounding this subject was so great that thinkers of most opposite tendencies had been forced to deny the possibility of predication altogether—at most identical propositions could be admitted. From the first Plato perceived that there could be no sound logical or metaphysical basis for a dogma which would render reason useless and language impossible. In *Phaedo* 102 B, we have his earlier view on the subject. Whatever we predicate of an object is predicable of such object by virtue of the immanence of the idea therein; we call it by a name denoting the attribute of the idea: **τούτων τὰλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν**. In fact when we say ‘Simmias is small,’ this is merely a convenient expression for ‘Simmias partakes of the idea of smallness.’ Accordingly the two statements ‘Simmias is small,’ ‘Simmias is great,’ though contradictory **ὥς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται**, are not contradictory in fact; for they only signify that Simmias participates in both ideas: in comparing him to Sokrates we designate him by the **ἐπωνυμία** of **μέγεθος**, to Phaedo by that of **σικρότης**. Moreover the expression ‘Simmias is smaller than Phaedo’ is only a conventional phrase signifying that the **σικρότης** in Simmias is smaller than the **μέγεθος** in Phaedo.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A confusion of course arises from but with this we are not at present the assumption of ideas of relation: concerned.

Now however superior this conception may be to that of Antisthenes and others who denied predication, it is plain that it does not really touch the vital point. The whole puzzle arose from erroneous notions about  $\delta\mathbf{\bar{n}}$  and  $\mu\mathbf{\bar{n}}\ \delta\mathbf{\bar{n}}$ ; the copula  $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}$  was conceived to denote identity and veritable existence, while  $\omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}$  implied absolute negation—abstract non-existence. This is the problem which is handled with such consummate skill in *Sophist* 240 B onwards. But in the *Phaedo* Plato is so far from approaching this question that he does not even betray the slightest consciousness that just herein lies the difficulty; he has in fact evaded, not solved, the  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha$ . Here again the *Phaedo* ranks itself with the *Republic*. In the latter (477 A foll.) we have the division into  $\delta\mathbf{\bar{n}}$ ,  $\mu\mathbf{\bar{n}}\ \delta\mathbf{\bar{n}}$ , and  $\tau\omicron\ \mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\epsilon\upsilon$ , being respectively the objects of  $\gamma\mathbf{\bar{n}\omega}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ,  $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\mathbf{\bar{n}\omega}\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ , and  $\delta\acute{\omicron}\xi\alpha$ . In this classification  $\delta\mathbf{\bar{n}}$  signifies absolute existence,  $\mu\mathbf{\bar{n}}\ \delta\mathbf{\bar{n}}$  absolute non-existence, while  $\tau\omicron\ \mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\epsilon\upsilon$  comprehends all phenomena. Now although a sensible object is declared to be  $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\ \delta\mathbf{\bar{n}}\ \tau\epsilon\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \mu\mathbf{\bar{n}}\ \delta\mathbf{\bar{n}}$  (478 D), this is simply because it lies  $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\epsilon\upsilon\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \epsilon\iota\lambda\iota\kappa\rho\iota\mathbf{\bar{n}\omega}\varsigma\ \delta\mathbf{\bar{n}}\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\mathbf{\bar{n}}\tau\omega\varsigma\ \mu\mathbf{\bar{n}}\ \delta\mathbf{\bar{n}}\tau\omicron\varsigma$ —it is an ambiguous semi-reality: but there is no glimmer of the significance in which Plato afterwards declares (*Sophist* 259 B) that it  $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\alpha\chi\acute{\eta}\ \mu\epsilon\mathbf{\bar{n}}\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota$ ,  $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\alpha\chi\acute{\eta}\ \delta'\ \omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota$ . When the *Sophist* was written, he did not shrink from affirming that  $\tau\omicron\ \delta\mathbf{\bar{n}}$ ,  $\acute{\omicron}\sigma\alpha\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\ \tau\grave{\alpha}\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ ,  $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \tau\omicron\sigma\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha\ \omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\mathbf{\bar{n}}$ .  $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\iota\mathbf{\bar{n}}\alpha\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \delta\mathbf{\bar{n}}\ \acute{\epsilon}\mathbf{\bar{n}}\ \mu\epsilon\mathbf{\bar{n}}\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\mathbf{\bar{n}}$ ,  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\mathbf{\bar{n}}\tau\alpha\ \delta\epsilon\ \tau\omicron\mathbf{\bar{n}}\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\epsilon\mu\omicron\mathbf{\bar{n}}\ \tau\grave{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha\ \omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\mathbf{\bar{n}}\ \alpha\upsilon\mathbf{\bar{}}$  (257 A). But in the *Republic* and *Phaedo* there is not the slightest evidence either that Plato had made the logical analysis which led him to this conclusion or that he was alive to the necessity of making it.<sup>1</sup>

On this ground also then the *Phaedo* must be classed along with the *Republic* in the middle period. Which of these two dialogues was prior in order of composition is a question which I think is hardly possible to determine. Plato's voice in the *Republic* is clearer, fuller, and more confident. The ontological theory which is somewhat vaguely sketched in the *Phaedo* is in the *Republic* very precisely formulated. But this admits of a double interpretation. We may either suppose that the *Phaedo* contains as it were the first draft of a scheme which is afterwards fully matured; or else that Plato is briefly adverting to a theory which he has already thoroughly expounded. We might point to the more confident tone of the *Republic* with regard to the attainment of knowledge as arguing an advance upon the *Phaedo*: but, it must be remembered, Plato recognises in the *Timaeus* that an approximation to knowledge is all for which the human intellect can hope: albeit the *Phaedo* does not strike one as intermediate between the *Republic* and *Timaeus* in this respect.

<sup>1</sup> The difference between Plato's son in his paper on the *Parmenides*, earlier and later views on predication *Journal of Philology*, vol. XI p. 287 is very clearly brought out by Dr. Jack- · foll.

The doctrine of ἀνάμνησις, though it does not occur in the *Republic*, is conspicuous in two other dialogues of the middle period, to wit the *Meno* and *Phaedrus*. It is remarkable that this thought, dormant through nearly all the later period, finally reappears, under an altered form, but still easily recognisable, in the *Timæus*.

So much for the metaphysical relations of the *Phaedo*, which enable us with perfect certainty, if we accept the theory of development which I have indicated, to assign it to the middle Platonism; in fact it constitutes, along with the *Republic*, our chief source of information upon the fundamental principles of that period. Its ethical relations are discussed in Appendix I, and therefore need not here be dwelt upon: moreover they are of very slight comparative importance for our present purpose. It is absolutely impossible to fix the position of any Platonic dialogue by its ethical contents: the metaphysical significance alone constitutes the very soul of Plato's works; and this is the guide we must follow, if we would determine the order of their development.

#### § 6. *Persons of the dialogue.*

(i) ECHEKRATES the Phliasian is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (VIII 46), along with his countrymen Phanton Diokles and Polymnastos and the Chalkidian Xenophilos, as the last of the Pythagoreans. These men, according to the same authority, were scholars of Philolaos and Eurytos, and were still alive in the time of Aristoxenos, the musician and Peripatetic, who was a contemporary of Theophrastos. An Echekrates, the son of Phrynion, is mentioned in the 9th Platonic epistle, 358 B, but there is nothing to show whether he is identical with the Echekrates of the *Phaedo*: there was, according to the catalogue given by Iamblichos, a Tarentine Pythagorean of that name; Principal Geddes suggests that Echekrates may have been an Italian by birth who settled at Phlius; but the Phliasian occurs as a distinct person in Iamblichos' list of Pythagoreans.<sup>1</sup>

Plato's choice of Echekrates as the auditor of Phaedo's narrative is judicious. A hearer was required who should be in sympathy not only with the character and fate of Sokrates, but also with his teaching. The theory of ideas plays the most important part in the arguments ascribed to Sokrates, and none would be so likely as a Pythagorean philosopher to turn a friendly ear to this theory. The Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, as Aristotle tells us, bore a considerable resemblance to Plato's ideal theory: and we may well

<sup>1</sup> Echekrates, a Lokrian Pythagorean, one of Plato's teachers, he is obviously occurs in Cicero *de finibus* v § 87: if a different man. Cicero is correct in saying that he was

suppose that a due amount of **κέψις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις** would render an intelligent Pythagorean a ready recipient of Platonism.

(ii) PHAEDO was a man of much greater note. A native of Elis, he was taken prisoner in the war waged by Sparta and Athens upon his country, B.C. 401. He is said to have been brought as a slave to Athens; but his servitude cannot have been of long duration, since in 399 we find him a member of the Sokratic circle: according to Aulus Gellius (II 18) he was ransomed by Kebes, and, in the words of Diogenes, **τούντεῦθεν ἐλευθερίως ἐφιλοσόφει**. He seems to have possessed genuine philosophic ability; and after the death of Sokrates he returned to his own country, where he founded the Elean school; the same which, after its transplantation by Menedemos, became better known as the Eretrian. Nothing definite seems to have been recorded regarding the views of Phaedo; but probably they bore a considerable resemblance to those of Eukleides, with whom he is classed by the satirist Timon in a passage quoted in Diog. Laert. II 107:

ἀλλ' οὐ μοι τούτων φλεθόνων μέλει· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλου  
οὔτενός, οὐ Φαίδωνος, ὅτις γε μέν, οὐδ' ἐριδάντεω  
Εὐκλείδου, Μεγαρεῦσιν ὃς ἔμβαλε Λύσαν ἐριμῶ.

A tendency to **ἐριμῶς** certainly characterised his Eretrian successor Menedemos. Phaedo composed dialogues, whereof the names of several are given by Diogenes Laertius II 105: of these however only two are said by Diogenes to be undoubtedly genuine, **Ζῶπυρος** and **Κίμων**. A fragment from one of his works is thus translated by Seneca *Epist.* XCIV 41: *minuta quaedam animalia, cum mordent, non sentiuntur: adeo tenuis illis et fallens in periculum [pelliculam, Dr. Verrall] vis est: tumor indicat morsum, et in ipso tumore nullum vulnus apparet. idem tibi in conversatione virorum sapientium eveniet: non deprehendes, quemadmodum aut quando tibi prosit, profuisse deprehendes.* The neatness of this simile would lead us to suppose that Gellius was justified in the epithet 'admodum elegantes,' which he applies to Phaedo's writings.

Phaedo was evidently a special favourite with Sokrates and seems to have been highly esteemed by the other Sokratists: of whom Aischines is said to have composed a dialogue called by his name. The chronology of his life is unknown; at the death of Sokrates however he appears to have been little more than a youth.

(iii) Concerning APOLLODOROS of Phaleron we know little beyond what Plato has told us. He was a man of impulsive and passionate temperament, which had gained him the name of **ὁ μανικός** (cf. *Symposium* 173 D), fervently attached to Sokrates, but frequently, it would seem, not very good company to others (*Symp.* I. I. **αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγριαίνεις πλὴν Σωκράτους**). Xenophon refers to

him twice: once in *Memorabilia* III xi 17, where he is said to be inseparable from Sokrates; and again in the *Apology* § 28, where Xenophon again testifies to his strong affection for his master, but stigmatises him as ἄλλως εὐήθης. He is of no philosophical importance.

(iv) SIMMIAS was a native of Thebes, where he attended the lectures of the Pythagorean Philolaos. How long he had been a companion of Sokrates is unknown, but both he and his friend Kebes were at the time of their residence in Athens very young men (νεανίσκων, 89 A): afterwards he seems to have acquired a considerable reputation. He is mentioned in the *Phaedrus* 242 B: Sokrates vows that no one has caused the production of more λόγοι, whether composed by himself or by others, than Phaedrus; always excepting Simmias—Σιμμίαν Θηβαῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγου. In *Crito* 45 B Simmias is said to have brought to Athens a sufficient sum to effect the release of Sokrates. The meagre notice of him in Diogenes Laertius II 124 is merely a catalogue of twenty-three dialogues of which he was said to be the author. In Plutarch *de genio Socratis* § 7 Simmias is made to say that he studied philosophy at Memphis in company with Plato and Ellopion of Peparethos. This is pretty nearly the sum total of our information concerning him.

(v) Of KEBES equally little is known, beyond what we learn from the *Phaedo*. Diogenes says merely Κέβης ὁ Θηβαῖος. καὶ τούτου φέρονται διάλογοι τρεῖς: Πίνας, Ἐβδόμη, Φρύνιχος. A composition purporting to be the Πίνας of Kebes is still extant; but there can be no doubt that it is spurious. Xenophon mentions him twice (*Mem.* I ii 48, III xi 17), but adds nothing to our knowledge. He, like Simmias, offered to furnish funds to secure the release of Sokrates (*Crito* 45 B). And this is all there is to tell of him.

Yet this Theban pair, little as is known of their lives, will always be full of interest in our eyes, because of the important part they play in this dialogue. They are both alike painted as ardent lovers of philosophy, keen and eager searchers after truth. Both evidently enjoyed the esteem of Plato in a high degree; but the philosopher has succeeded with a few light and subtle touches in thoroughly individualising the two men: we cannot read the *Phaedo* without being conscious of a marked difference in their temperament. Simmias is somewhat dreamy and prone to mysticism; he is intelligent and sympathetic, but not free from vagueness; he is apt to be misled by superficial likenesses, *e.g.* on the subject of harmony; and he sometimes λαθεῖναι ἑαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών, as in 76 D. But the intellect of Kebes is bright and keen as a sword: he has an admirable faculty of seeing the point and making straight towards it; all his criticisms are definite and precise and aimed at the heart of the matter; he possesses the invaluable quality of always knowing exactly what he himself means, and he will not put up with any haziness of thought in

others. He is notable for his **πραγματεία**, for tenaciously clinging to the question until it is sifted to the very bottom: he is the hardest of all mortals to convince, yet perfectly open to conviction when once a satisfactory argument has been found. It is always Kebes who at every important point influences the course of the dialogue: he gives the message from Euenos which starts the whole discussion (60 D); he insists on being told why suicide should be unlawful (61 D), and how Sokrates can welcome death without contradicting his own principles (62 C); he points out that the question of the soul's immortality must be raised (70 A); he suggests the theory of **ἀνάμνησις** (72 E); and finally he brings forward the objection in 87 A, which shows that he has fully grasped the previous argument in all its bearings and perceives exactly what is required for its completion. Thus every important issue turns upon some pertinent remark of Kebes. The chief contribution of Simmias is the discussion on harmony; which is indeed a theory that must needs be debated, but which, as I have shown, does not affect the position of the demonstration; nor does it show that he has mastered the argument like his clearer-headed companion. Yet, as Sokrates says of him, **οὐ φαύλως ἔοικεν ἀπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου**: he is a sincere and zealous lover of truth, and not unworthy to share the immortality which Plato has bestowed at least upon the fame of these two Theban friends.

(vi) Of a personage so well known as KRITON it is needless for me to say much: a few words concerning him will complete this account of the interlocutors. He was the oldest and dearest friend of Sokrates, a man of wealth and position and of high character. His sympathy with Sokrates was probably much more personal than intellectual; Plato's picture of him is as of a sensible and kindly man of the world, looking upon life from the point of view of an honest Athenian gentleman, but without any capacity for philosophy. Indeed, if the anecdote in *Euthydemus* 304 D foll. has any foundation on fact, he may sometimes have remonstrated with his friend for his philosophical eccentricities. Diogenes Laertius however (II 121) gives a list of seventeen dialogues attributed to him, some of which have such ambitious titles as **περὶ τοῦ γινῶναι, τί τὸ ἐπίστασθαι**: we can hardly suppose that they contributed much to the solution of these problems. Diogenes sums up the true interest of the man when he says **οὗτος μάλιστα φιλοστοργότατα διέτεον πρὸς Σωκράτην, καὶ οὕτως ἐπεμελείτο αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μηδέποτε λείπειν τι τῶν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν**.

(vii) The other companions of Sokrates who were with him at the last, but who do not speak, are Kritobulos, the son of Kriton; Hermogenes, son of Hipponikos, a speaker in the *Cratylus*; Epigenes, son of Antiphan; Aischines, son of Charinos a sausage-seller, or, by another account, of Lysanias; he was a noted Sokratic and the

author of eight dialogues (Diog. Laert. II 64); Antisthenes, founder of the Cynics; Ktesippos, a youth introduced in the *Euthydemus*; Menexenos, son of Demophon, who gives his name to a dialogue; Phaidondes, of whom we know only that he was a Theban; Eukleides, founder of the Megarian school; and his friend Terpsion, also a Megarian. Of these all but the last three are Athenians.

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I append a list of editions of the *Phaedo* and other works of which I have made use.

- Platonis *Phaedo* ed. Wyttenbach.  
 " " " Heindorf.  
 " " " Ast.  
 " " " Geddes.  
 " " " W. Wagner.  
 " " Stallbaum's edition as remodelled by  
 Wohlrab. This is really a variorum  
 edition, containing notes by most  
 previous editors and by Wohlrab  
 himself.
- Platon's *Phaedon* für den Schulgebrauch erklärt von  
 Martin Wohlrab.
- Schanz's critical edition of the *Phaedo*.  
 Hirschig's " " "
- Schleiermacher's introduction, translation and notes.  
 Plato's *Phaedo* literally translated by E. M. Cope.  
 Olympiodori Scholia in *Phaedonem*.  
 Hermann Schmidt. Kritischer Commentar zu Plato's  
*Phaedon*.  
 Bonitz. Platonische Studien.  
 Ast. Plato's Leben und Schriften.  
 Hegel. Geschichte der Philosophie, Plato.  
 Zeller. Philosophie der Griechen.  
 Teichmüller. Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe, and  
 Die platonische Frage.  
 Schanz's critical writings on Plato's text.

Since this in no wise pretends to be a critical edition I have thought it needless to give the mss. readings in full: this would have

been merely a reproduction of other men's work. For all who are interested in the text of Plato the edition of Schanz is indispensable; and the readings of other mss. are given by Stallbaum and Bekker. Remembering nevertheless how much it is to the reader's convenience that he should know exactly how far he can trust the text before him, I have drawn attention in the notes to every case in which my reading materially differs from the mss. I have also marked all noteworthy points of difference from two of the editions which are in most common use, viz. those of Stallbaum and of the Zürich editors. Also, seeing that my text is based upon that of Schanz, I have noted all my departures from his readings. Wherever I have had occasion to refer to the four mss. quoted by him, I have adopted the symbols which he has employed to denote them; these are as follows:

B = Clarkianus sive Oxoniensis sive Bodleianus.

C = Crusianus sive Tubingensis.

D = Venetus 185.

E = Bessarionis liber sive Venetus 184.

Stallbaum and the Zürich edition are denoted by St. and Z. respectively. Where I have deserted Schanz, it has usually been in the direction of a return to the mss. The chief blemish in the text of the *Phaedo* is interpolation, which is not wonderful, considering that few products of Greek philosophy have been read more widely and less intelligently. There are no small number of instances in which words or sentences have indubitably been inserted by some copyist or annotator out of sheer inability to grasp the connexion. But this cannot justify the reckless handling of Hirschig, who cancels or rewrites passages wholesale, for no apparent reason but that they are not such Greek as he would have written himself. The result in many such cases is a deep thankfulness in the reader's soul that Plato, not Hirschig, was the author of the dialogues. Schanz, though a far sounder critic, has, I think, in several cases unduly deferred to Hirschig; and in others has himself bracketed passages without having in my opinion sufficient cause. In matters of orthography I have for the most part followed his guidance. And I cannot conclude without an expression of gratitude for the invaluable work he has given us: indeed only those who have engaged in the task of editing any of the dialogues can fully appreciate the boon which has been bestowed on Platonic students by Martin Schanz.



ΦΑΙΔΩΝ



# ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

[ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς, ἠθικός]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΦΑΙΔΩΝ, ΑΠΟΛΛΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ,  
ΚΕΒΗΣ, ΣΙΜΜΙΑΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ,

Ο ΤΩΝ ΕΝΔΕΚΑ ΤΠΗΡΕΤΗΣ

St. p.  
57

Α. Ι. Αὐτός, ὦ Φαῖδων, παρεγένου Σωκράτει ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ,  
ἢ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλου του ἤκουσας;  
ΦΑΙΔ. Αὐτός, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες.

ΕΧ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐστὶν ἅττα εἶπεν ὁ ἀνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου;  
καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα; ἠδέως γὰρ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀκούσαιμι. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε  
τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων οὐδεὶς πάνυ τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν  
Β Ἀθήναζε, οὔτε τις ξένος ἀφίκεται χρόνου συχνοῦ ἐκεῖθεν, ὅστις

57 A—59 c, cc. i, ii. Prologue. Echekrates, the Phliasian, begs for information respecting the last moments of Sokrates. Phaedo assents, and, after explaining the circumstances which delayed the execution, gives a list of the friends who were present at that last meeting, where sorrow and gladness were so strangely mingled.

1. αὐτός] Echekrates merely desires to know whether he can depend upon the account of Phaedo as that of an eye-witness: this remark would have been needless, but for the strange

comment of Hermogenes the rhetorician: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἤρετο ὡς θανμάζων καὶ μακαρίζων τὸν παραγενόμενον, ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο σεμνυνόμενος καὶ μέγα φρονῶν.

6. Φλιασίων] in apposition to τῶν πολιτῶν. The insertion of τῶν is altogether needless; the article is continually omitted before national names by all Attic writers. Stallbaum compares *Apology* 32 B, *Meno* 70 B.

7. ὅστις ἂν] 'who would have been able to tell us.' In a phrase of this sort I conceive that no definite

B

ἂν ἡμῖν σαφές τι ἀγγεῖλαι οἶός τ' ἦν περὶ τούτων, πλήν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πιὼν ἀποθάνοι· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἶχεν φράζειν.

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄρα ἐπύθεες δὴν τρόπον 58  
5 ἐγένετο;

ΕΧ. Ναί, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἤγγειλέ τις, καὶ ἐσαυμάζομένη γε ὅτι πάσαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῶ ὕστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανών. τί οὖν ἦν τοῦτο, ὦ Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχη τις αὐτῶ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη· ἔτυχε γὰρ 10 τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἡ πρύμνα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν.

ΕΧ. Τοῦτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστίν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλοῖον, ὥς φασιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ᾧ 15 Θησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δις ἐπτὰ ἐκείνους ῥῥετο ἄγων B καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῶ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι εὖξαντο, ὥς λέγεται, τότε, εἰ σωθεῖεν, ἐκάστου ἔτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον· ἦν δὲ αἰεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τῶ θεῶ πέμπουσιν. ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἄρζωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος 20 ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῶ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτιννύναι, πρὶν ἀνεῖς Δῆλόν τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεῦρο· τοῦτο δ' ἐνίστε ἐν πολλῶ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχῳσιν ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες αὐτούς. ἀρχὴ δ' C ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας, ἐπειδὴν ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψη τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου· τοῦτο δ' ἔτυχεν, ὥσπερ λέγω, τῇ προ- 25 τεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης γεγονός. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῶ Σωκράτει ἐν τῶ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὃ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

II. ΕΧ. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, ὦ Φαίδων; τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι

protasis is in the mind of the writer. I cannot see what is gained by supplying 'si venisset' with Rückert, or 'wenn er gefragt worden wäre' with Wohlrab. The words which follow show that communication between Athens and Phlius did exist, for some Athenian visitor brought the news of Sokrates' death. It seems needless, therefore, to speculate whether intercourse was suspended by the war with Elis (Stallbaum), which ended in the year Sokrates

died; or by the Corinthian war (C. F. Hermann), which began five years afterwards. The events of the last day in prison were of course known but to a small circle.

7. πολλῶ ὕστερον] Thirty days: Xen. Mem. iv viii 2.

14. τοὺς δις ἐπτὰ] the seven maidens and seven youths, according to the legend, who were delivered every nine years to the Minotaur.

20. μηδένα ἀποκτιννύναι] So Xenophon *l.l.*

τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῷ ἀνδρί; ἢ οὐκ εἴων οἱ ἄρχοντες παρεῖναι, ἀλλ' ἔρῃμος ἐτελεύτα φίλων;

D ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρῆσαν τινες, καὶ πολλοὶ γε.

ΕΧ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προεϋμήθητι ὥς σαφέστατα ἡμῖν ἀπαγγεῖλαι, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυγχάνει οὐσα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἄλλὰ σχολάζω γε καὶ πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διηγέσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνήσθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε ἀεὶ πάντων ἥδιστον.

ΕΧ. Ἄλλὰ μήν, ὦ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσόμενους γε τοιούτους ἐτέρους ἔχεις· ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὥς ἂν δύνῃ ἀκριβέστατα 10 διεξελεῖν πάντα.

E ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἔπαθον παραγενόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ὥς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσχεῖ· εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὥς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, ὥστε 15 μοι ἐκεῖνον παρίστασθαι μὴδ' εἰς Ἄιδου ἰόντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας ἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενον εὖ πράξειν, εἴπερ τις πώποτε 59 καὶ ἄλλος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἔλεεινόν εἰσχεῖ, ὥς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι παρόντι πένθει· οὔτε αὖ ἡδονὴ ὥς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων, ὥσπερ εἰώθειμεν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι 20 τοιοῦτοί τινες ἦσαν· ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἄτοπόν τί μοι πάθος παρῆν καὶ τις ἀήθης κρᾶσις ἀπὸ τε τῆς ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνεθυμουμένῳ ὅτι αὐτίκα ἐκεῖνος ἔμελλε τελευτᾶν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδὸν τι οὕτω διεκείμεθα, ὅτε 25 μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ δακρύοντες, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως, B Ἀπολλόδωρος· οἶσα γάρ που τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

10. τοιούτους ἐτέρους] *i.e.* they take equal pleasure in the recollection of Sokrates: compare below 59 A καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινες ἦσαν, referring to ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων: and 79 C καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ἰλιγγιᾷ ὥσπερ μεθύουσα, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη.

14. εὐδαίμων γάρ] Here the key-note of the dialogue is struck. Its express object is to show ὡς εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι: and at the very outset we are introduced to Sokrates as a living illustration of his own belief.

19. παρόντι πένθει] 'as would seem natural for one who was present at a scene of mourning.' For the two datives compare *Phaedrus* 234 C τῷ λόγῳ λαμβάνοντι, 'to one who takes a rational view.'

ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ] The nearest parallel in Plato to this remarkable phrase seems to be *Protagoras* 317 C καίτοι πολλά γε ἤδη ἔτη εἰμὶ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ: cf. *ibid.* 319 C, *Phaedo* 84 A, *Republic* 581 E, *Meno* 91 E. But in all these passages the phrase expresses devotion to some particular pursuit; not, as here, the occupation of a certain time.

ΕΧ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐκεῖνός τε τοίνυν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἶχεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔγωγε ἐτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

ΕΧ. Ἐτυχον δέ, ὦ Φαίδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;

5 ΦΑΙΔ. Οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπικωρίων παρῆν καὶ ὁ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ Ἑρμογένους καὶ Ἐπιγένους καὶ Αἰσχίνους καὶ Ἀντισθένης· ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεὺς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπικωρίων· Πλάτων δὲ οἶμαι ἡσέθηναι.

10 ΕΧ. Ξένοι δέ τινες παρῆσαν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ναί, Σιμμίας τέ γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδῶνδης, καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.

ΕΧ. Τί δέ; Ἀρίστιππος καὶ Κλεόμβροτος <οὐ> παρεγένοντο;

15 ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐ δῆτα· ἐν Αἰγίνῃ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.

ΕΧ. Ἄλλος δέ τις παρῆν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Σχεδὸν τι οἶμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.

ΕΧ. Τί οὖν δὴ; τίνες φῆς ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;

III. ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάντα πειράσομαι διηγή-  
20 σασθαι. αἰεὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθειμεν φοιτᾶν D  
καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, συλλεγόμενοι ἔωθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο· πλησίον γὰρ ἦν

5. Ἀπολλόδωρος] Compare 117 D.

9. Πλάτων δέ] There are but two other passages in which Plato mentions himself, *Apology* 38 B: Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσίν με τριάκοντα μῶν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι: also 34 A. Forster suggests that the present language implies that Plato's sickness was due to excessive grief. I see nothing, however, to justify the inference; but doubtless Plato was anxious to explain his absence.

11. Φαιδῶνδης] I have retained this form on the analogy of other Theban names and on the authority of Xenophon *Mem.* i ii 48: perhaps too the Theban termination ας should be restored.

13. <οὐ> παρεγένοντο] οὐ is not in the best mss, but is inserted by Schanz after Cobet. St. and Z. omit it.

15. ἐν Αἰγίνῃ] This has usually been considered to convey a reproach: see Diog. Laert. iii 36; cf. ii 65.

59 c—60 c, c. iii. On the morning after the return of the sacred vessel from Delos, the friends meet earlier than usual at the court-house near the prison. After some delay they are admitted and find Sokrates relieved of his fetters and in company with his wife and child. Xanthippe, unable to control her grief, is led out; and Sokrates chafing his cramped leg falls to moralising on the intimate union of pain and pleasure, which he says would have made a good subject for Aesop.

τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. περιεμένομεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε, ἕως ἀνοιχθεῖν  
 τὸ δεσμωτήριον, διατρίβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἀνεῳγετο γὰρ οὐ  
 πρό· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθεῖν, εἰσῆμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ  
 πολλὰ διημερεύομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωϊαίτερον  
 συνελέγημεν. τῇ γὰρ προτεραίᾳ [ἡμέρᾳ] ἐπειδὴ ἐξήλομεν ἐκ 5  
 τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἐσπέρας, ἐπυθόμεθα ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου  
 ἀφигμένον εἴη. παρηγγείλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλοις ἥκειν ὡς πρωϊαί-  
 τατα εἰς τὸ εἰωθός. καὶ ἥκομεν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελεῶν ὁ θυρωρός,  
 ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν, εἶπεν περιμένειν καὶ μὴ πρότερον  
 παριέναι, ἕως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ· λύουσι γάρ, ἔφη, οἱ ἔνδεκα 10  
 Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως ἂν τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτήσῃ.  
 οὐ πολὺν δ' οὖν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν ἦκεν καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἡμᾶς  
 εἰσιέναι. εἰσελθόντες οὖν κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη  
 ἄρτι λελυμένον, τὴν δὲ Ξανθείππην, γιγνώσκεις γάρ, ἔχουσάν τε 15  
 τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακασθημένην. ὡς οὖν εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ  
 Ξανθείππη, ἀνευφήμησέ τε καὶ τοιαύτ' ἄττα εἶπεν, οἷα δὲ εἰώ-  
 θασιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, ὕστατον δὴ σε προσερούσι  
 νῦν οἱ ἐπιτήδαιοι καὶ σὺ τούτους. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέψας εἰς  
 τὸν Κρίτωνα, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, ἀπαγέτω τις αὐτὴν οἴκαδε. καὶ  
 ἐκείνην μὲν ἀπῆγόν τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσάν τε καὶ 20  
 κοπτομένην· ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακασιζόμενος εἰς τὴν κλίνην  
 συνέκαμψέ τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτριψε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἅμα,  
 ὡς ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο, ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ  
 ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ· ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον  
 εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τὸ ἅμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι 25

9. περιμένειν] This reading seems to me certainly right. Bonitz, quoted by Wohlrab, accurately distinguishes between the usages of περιμένειν and ἐπιμένειν in Plato: the former means 'to await,' the latter 'to remain' in a given condition. Cf. below 80 c, and *Theaetetus* 179 E. So far as I am aware, the nearest approach of ἐπιμένειν to the meaning of περιμένειν is in *Republic* 361 D ὄντων δὲ τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἔτι, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, χαλεπὸν ἐπεξελθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ, οἷος ἐκάτερον βίος ἐπιμένει. If ἐπιμένειν be read with Hermann, we should translate: 'he bade us stay where we were and not come in until he summoned us.'

11. παραγγέλλουσιν] I agree with Prof. Geddes in taking these words: 'are giving directions that he may be put to death to-day'; the directions being given to the officers of the prison. If, as is usually done, we take Sokrates to be the object of παραγγέλλουσιν, the clause ὅπως ἂν . . . τελευτήσῃ becomes nonsense. Wohlrab (in his Latin edition) has a note which is utterly beyond my comprehension.

15. τὸ παιδίον] no doubt his youngest son Menexenos.

25. τὸ ἅμα μὲν] The usual reading is τῷ, and this is confirmed by Stobaeus, who cites this passage, *Ecl.* I 1104. This would be 'by re-

τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δέ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδόν  
 τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς  
 συνημμένῳ δὴ ὄντε. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ C  
 Αἴσωπος, μῦθον ἂν συνεεῖναι, ὥς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ  
 5 διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο, συνηψεν εἰς ταῦτον  
 αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ᾧ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται  
 ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι  
 ἔοικεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει τὸ ἀλγεινόν,  
 ἥκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθεῖν τὸ ἡδύ.

10 IV. 'Ο οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν Νῆ τὸν Δία, ᾧ Σώκρατες,  
 ἔφη, εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν ποιημάτων D  
 ὧν πεποίηκας ἐντέINAS τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν

fusing.' But τὸ is found in the Bodleian and two other mss. and is abundantly justified by Riddell, *Digest of Idioms* § 85. I have therefore followed Schanz in retaining it. 'How wondrous is the relation between pleasure and its seeming contrary, pain; that the pair will never come to a man together.'

4. Αἴσωπος] It is worth while here to notice the consummate skill with which Plato allows the dialogue to unfold itself as in the natural course of conversation. By this simple reference to Aesop Kebes is reminded that Euenos was anxious to know what was the object of Sokrates in versifying the fables of Aesop. In answering the question Sokrates sends a kindly message to Euenos and bids him follow to Hades as soon as he may. The surprise of Simmias at this message draws from Sokrates an expression of his belief that the true philosopher will meet death gladly in the hope of being happier in Hades than on earth; and in support of this opinion, as we shall see, the whole argument that occupies the remainder of the dialogue is evolved.

7. ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον] In these observations of Sokrates we may find the germ of the Platonic

theory of pleasure as a *κατάστασις*. See for instance *Timaeus* 64 c τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίαιον γιγνόμενον ἀθρόον παρ' ἡμῖν πάθος ἀλγεινόν, τὸ δ' εἰς φύσιν ἀπὸν πάλιν ἀθρόον ἡδύ. Cf. *Philebus* 31 D etc. The *καθαυαὶ ἡδοναὶ* are exceptions, *Philebus* 51 B; but, so far as concerns physical pleasures, only apparent exceptions, *Timaeus* 65 A.

60 D—61 C, cc. iv, v. *Kebes*: This reminds me that Euenos and others desire to know what led you to compose verses during your confinement in prison? *Sokrates*: It was not with any thought of rivalling Euenos as a poet, but because I have been frequently warned in a dream to practise 'music.' This I always understood as an encouragement to persevere with philosophy; but in case music in the popular sense might be meant, I thought it well to be on the safe side. So I took the fables of Aesop, because I knew them best, and turned them into verse. Tell this to Euenos and bid him farewell and follow me as soon as he can.

12. ἐντέINAS] 'putting into verse.' The term is used of 'setting words to music, *Protagoras* 326 B; of putting thought into words, *Philebus* 38 E. The last example seems



Ἀπόλλω προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινές με ἤδη ἤροντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ  
 Εὐήνος πρόφην, ὃ τί ποτε διανοηθείς, ἐπειδὴ δεῦρο ἦλθες, ἐποίησας  
 αὐτά, πρότερον οὐδὲν πώποτε ποιήσας. εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ  
 ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐήνω ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅταν με αὖθις ἐρωτᾷ, εὖ οἶδα  
 γὰρ ὅτι ἐρήσεται, εἰπέ, τί χρὴ λέγειν. λέγε τοίνυν, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, 5  
 ὦ Κέβης, τάληθε, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνω βουλόμενος οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιή-  
 Ⓜ μασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα· ἤδειν γὰρ ὥς οὐ  
 ῥάδιον εἶν· ἀλλ' ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειρώμενος τί λέγει, καὶ  
 ἀφοσιούμενος, εἰ πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικὴν μοι ἐπιτάττοι  
 ποιεῖν. ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἅττα τοιάδε· πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ 10  
 ἐνύπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὅψει φαινό-  
 μενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ  
 ἐργάζου. καὶ ἐγὼ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ ἔπραττον  
 61 τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι παρακελεύεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν,  
 ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θεοῦσι διακελευόμενοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον 15

to me conclusive that the notion of the word is not, as Prof. Geddes considers, derived from stretching a string, but implies fixing in a certain form or position. Cf. *Meno* 87 A, where it is used of inscribing a triangle in a circle.

1. **προοίμιον**] This word is applied by Thucydides, III 104, to the Homeric hymn to Apollo: such *προοίμια* were strictly speaking pre-ludes either to a longer poem (*οἶμη*) or to a religious celebration. Specimens of verses attributed to Sokrates are to be found in Diog. Laert. II 42.

2. **Εὐήνος**] Euenos of Paros was a sophist and poet. From *Apology* 20 B we learn that he taught ἀρετή for five minas; from *Phaedrus* 267 A that he was the inventor of new rhetorical figures: τὸν δὲ κάλλιστον Πάριον Εὐήνον εἰς μέσον οὐκ ἄγομεν, ὃς ὑποδήλωσιν τε πρῶτος εἶρε καὶ παρεπαίνους; οἱ δ' αὐτὸν καὶ παραψόγους φασὶν ἐν μέτρῳ λέγειν, μνήμης χάριν· σοφὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ: where see Dr. Thompson's note. From both passages we may infer that Plato did not think much of him. The few fragments that

remain of his elegiac poems are given in Bergk's *Poetae Lyrici*. Bergk however remarks 'quae hic unius Eueni nomine comprehendi, rectius duobus attribui videntur'; and the other epigrams, chiefly erotic, given in the Anthology under the name Euenos, are undoubtedly the work of different authors.

7. **ὥς οὐ ῥάδιον**] After ὥς BD give ὅτι, which Schanz brackets and I omit.

9. **εἰ πολλάκις**] 'if perchance'; as in 61 A.

14. **παρακελεύεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν**] 'to urge and cheer me on.' Each of the three compounds used by Plato in this passage has its distinct shade of meaning. *παρακελεύεσθαι*, which is the term frequently applied by Thucydides to a general's address to his soldiers, means 'urge to make an effort'; *ἐπικελεύειν*, which is a much rarer word and occurs nowhere else in Plato, 'encourage while the effort is being made'; as in Euripides *Electra* 1224. In *διακελευόμενοι* the preposition has a distributive force: 'as the partisans of different runners

ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας  
 μὲν οὐκ ἔστις μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος· νῦν  
 δ' ἐπειδὴ ἢ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑορτὴ διεκώλυέ με  
 ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔδοξε χρῆναι, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ  
 5 ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημώδη μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθᾶσαι  
 αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν. ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπιέναι πρὶν  
 ἀφοσιώσασθαι ποιήσαντα ποιήματα καὶ πειθόμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ. Β  
 οὕτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα, οὐ μὲν ἢ παρούσα  
 εὐσία· μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴπερ  
 10 μέλλοι ποιητὴς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς  
 οὐκ ἢ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οὐς προχείρους εἶχον μύθους

cheer on their favourites.' Cf. Herodotus ix 5 διακελευσαμένη δὲ γυνὴ γυναικί.

1. ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὐκ ἔστις μεγίστης μουσικῆς] Wagner well quotes *Laches* 188 c foll. See also *Laus* 689 d ἡ καλλίστη καὶ μεγίστη τῶν ξυμφωνῶν μεγίστη δικαιοτάτ' ἂν λέγοιτο σοφία. Cf. *Republic* 411 c foll., 548 b διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης τῆς μετὰ λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἡμεληκέναι.

5. τὴν δημώδη μουσικὴν] in the ordinary Greek sense of artistic and literary culture; whereas Sokrates understood by μουσικὴ the philosophic life.

7. ἀφοσιώσασθαι] 'to satisfy my conscience.' This anecdote well displays the simply religious character of Sokrates not without a tinge of superstition. ἀφοσιώσασθαι is to clear oneself from all taint of impiety; cf. *Phaedrus* 242 c; *Philebus* 12 b ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀφοσιούμαι, 'I wash my hands of it.'

καὶ πειθόμενον] Schanz brackets καί.

8. εἰς τὸν θεόν] Another mark of Sokrates' old-fashioned piety. Prof. Geddes has some interesting remarks on the special connexion between Sokrates and Apollo; cf. 85 A. I cannot, however, agree with his sug-

gestion that the προοίμιον was a thanksgiving for the thirty days' reprieve; which would be totally inconsistent with the attitude of Sokrates in the face of death: cf. 116 E.

10. μύθους ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους] 'fiction and not fact.' This distinction is established by *Gorgias* 523 A, ἄκουε δὴ, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγῆσαι μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθὴ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν: then follows the myth about the judgment of souls; cf. *Laus* 872 D. μῦθος is defined by Aphthonios, quoted by Wytttenbach, as λόγος ψευδὴς εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν. Plutarch, *de gloria Atheniensium* § 4, says that Pindar was rebuked by Korinna, ὡς ἄμουνον ὄντα καὶ μὴ ποιούντα μύθους, ὃ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἔργον εἶναι συμβέβηκε; farther on he says ὃ δὲ μῦθος εἶναι βούλεται λόγος ψευδὴς εἰκὼς ἀληθινῷ. Compare Aristotle's distinction between ἱστορία and ποίησις, *Poetica* 1451<sup>b</sup> 4, τούτῳ διαφέρει τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. Of course λόγος in its wider sense includes μῦθος, as we have in 60 D τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους.

11. οὐς προχείρους εἶχον] i.e. in his memory; there is no evidence that the fables of Aesop had been

καὶ ἡπιστάμην τοὺς Αἰσώπου, τούτους ἐποίησα, οἷς πρώτοις ἐνέτυχον.

V. Ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Κέβης, Εὐήνω φράζε, καὶ ἐρρώσθαι καί, C ἂν σωφρονῇ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὥς τάχιστα. ἄπειμι δέ, ὥς ἔοικε, τήμερον· κελεύουσι γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Οἷον παρα- 5 κελεύει, ἔφη, τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, Εὐήνω; πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρί· σχεδὸν οὖν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ἤσθημαι οὐδ' ὁπωστίουν σοι ἐκὼν εἶναι πείσεται. Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς· οὐ φιλό- σοφος Εὐήνος; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἐεελήσει τοίνυν καὶ Εὐήνος καὶ πᾶς ὄτῳ ἀξίως τούτου τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν. 10 οὐ μέντοι ἴσως βιάσεται αὐτόν· οὐ γάρ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι. καὶ

published in writing up to this time. Aesop is said to have been a contemporary of Solon; and the story of his death is told by Plutarch, *de sera numinis vindicta* § 12: there is also an allusion to it in Herodotus II 134.

4. ἐμὲ διώκειν ὥς τάχιστα] This injunction must be considered as modified by the proviso added below, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως βιάσεται αὐτόν. Schmidt finds a 'dilogia' in the words, and Prof. Geddes takes the same view. But it appears to me that such a premature reference to the μελέτη θανάτου is thoroughly unplatonic. It is futile to omit the words ὥς τάχιστα with Heindorf; in any case they must be implied, else we make Sokrates give Euenos the superfluous advice to die some time or other.

61 c—62 c, cc. v, vi. *Simmias*: Euenos is not likely to take such advice as that. *Sokrates*: Yes he is, if he is a real philosopher; not that he ought to take his own life. *Kebes*: This seems inconsistent; you first say that the philosopher will be glad to die, and then that he may not kill himself: why may he not? *Sokrates*: I only know what I have been told. According to one account we are in custody here and may not make our escape. This is

a hard saying; but there is a more obvious reason, that we are the property of the gods, who are as justly indignant if we destroy ourselves as you would be, should one of your slaves do so.

10. τούτου τοῦ πράγματος] Sc. φιλοσοφίας.

11. οὐ γάρ φασι] It is worthy of note that the whole of this rather superficial reasoning against suicide, which is quite outside the main argument of the dialogue, is carefully and repeatedly marked as secondhand. It seems as if Plato wished to avoid any prejudice and misrepresentation which his panegyric of death might bring upon him; while his slight and rapid treatment of this subject would show that he did not feel strongly upon it. That he did not in all cases disapprove suicide is certain: cf. *Laws* 854 c καὶ ἐὰν μὲν σοι δρῶντι ταῦτα λωφῇ τι τὸ νόσημα—εἰ δὲ μή, καλλίω θάνατον σκεψάμενος ἀπαλλάττον τοῦ βίου. Also 873 c ὅς ἂν ἑαυτὸν κτείνει, μήτε πόλεως ταξάσης δίκη, μήτε περιωδύνῃ ἀφύκτῳ προσπεσούσῃ τύχῃ ἀναγκασθεὶς, μηδὲ αἰσχύνῃς τινὸς ἀπόρου καὶ ἀβίου μεταλαχόν, ἀργίᾳ δὲ καὶ ἀνανδρίας δειλία ἑαυτῷ δίκην ἄδικον ἐπιθῇ.

ἅμα λέγων ταῦτα καθῆκε τὰ σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεζόμενος οὕτως ἦδ' ἡ τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο. ἤρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης· Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι, ἐθέλειν δ' ἂν τῷ ἀποθνήσκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον  
 5 ἔπεσθαι; Τί δέ, ὦ Κέβης; οὐκ ἀκηκόατε σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάῳ συγγεγονότες; Οὐδέν γε σαφῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω· ἃ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοώς, φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ ἴσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκεῖσε ἀποθνήμεϊν διασκοπεῖν  
 10 τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποθνήμιας τῆς ἐκεῖ, ποῖαν τινὰ αὐτὴν οἴομεθα εἶναι· τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοῖ ἄλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρ' ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρόνῳ;

VI. Κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν ποτε οὐ φασὶ θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἦδ' ἡ γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ  
 15 σὺ ἤρου, καὶ Φιλολάου ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ' ἡμῖν διητᾶτο, ἦδ' ἡ δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, ὥς οὐ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν· σαφές δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐθενὸς πρόποτε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα. Ἀλλὰ προθυμεῖσθαι χρή, 62 ἔφη· τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀκούσαις. ἴσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανεῖται, εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀπλοῦν ἐστίν

6. Φιλολάῳ] From this it is evident that Philolaos spent some time at Thebes, where Kebes and Simmias attended his lectures. We have absolutely no authentic information about the life of this eminent Pythagorean; and the genuineness of the fragments ascribed to him has, I think, been once for all disposed of by Mr. Bywater, *Journal of Philology*, vol. I p. 21 foll.

οὐδέν γε σαφῶς] ἔθος ἦν τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις δι' αἰνιγμάτων λέγειν, says Olympiodoros, whom the editors all repeat. I think Plato's meaning is that the arguments of Philolaos against suicide were not conclusive enough to satisfy the *πραγματεία* of Kebes.

9. διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν] This is an accurate description of the conversation that is to come: when reason has done all she can, fancy comes to her aid with a myth.

10. τῆς ἐκεῖ] Schanz brackets these words: Hirschig proposes ἐκεῖσε.

11. μέχρ' ἡλίου δυσμῶν] before which execution was not legal; cf. 116 E.

19. εἰ τοῦτο μόνον] Of this *locus vexatus* I shall first give my own interpretation before mentioning other views that are held upon it. I accept the text precisely as it stands without alteration or omission. The first thing to be done is to fix the meaning of τοῦτο. It can hardly be doubted that τοῦτο means here exactly what it does in 62 c, ἀλλ' εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτό γε φαίνεται: where the context clearly requires that τοῦτο = μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι. Taking it in that sense here I should translate: 'perhaps you will be surprised if this question alone of all admits a simple answer—if the same thing does not happen to man

καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θαυμαστὸν ἴσως σοι φανεῖται, εἰ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὅσιον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐεργέτην. καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἡρέμα ἐπιγέλᾳς, Ἰττω Ζεὺς, ἔφη, τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ 5  
 B εἰπών. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ' εἶναι ἄλογον· οὐ μέντοι ἄλλ' ἴσως γ' ἔχει τινὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος ὥς ἐν τινι φρουρᾷ

in this as in all other cases; I mean that to some men at some time death is better than life: and for whom death is better, you will perhaps think it strange that they may not do themselves a good turn but must wait for some other helper.' I conceive the clause καὶ οὐδέποτε . . . ζῆν to show how it is that the question is not ἀπλοῦν. Unless death were sometimes better than life the question whether suicide were sometimes lawful would never be raised, for no one would dream of committing it. ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα, i.e. as in other cases either of two opposites may be better according to circumstances. The whole sentence amounts to this: you will think it strange if in the case of suicide we can lay down an invariable rule; that there are no persons for whom it is better to die than live; and if there are, that they may not release themselves from life.

Dr. Jackson, in a paper read before the Cambridge Philological Society Dec. 1, 1881, has a most searching examination of this passage. Understanding τοῦτο as I do, he is of opinion that the clauses καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει . . . ζῆν and θαυμαστὸν ἴσως . . . ἀνθρώποις are interpolations. My interpretation, which differs from all those that he criticises, seems to me to meet many of his objections; and though I am far from affirming that he may not be right in rejecting these words, I

am loth to do so when I believe they afford a reasonable sense. As regards certain phrases to which he objects, I think οὐδέποτε is simply in antithesis to ἔστιν ὅτε; and may we not with Mr. Cope translate τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ 'mankind,' a universal expression which is afterwards qualified by ἔστιν οἷς?

Prof. Geddes has an elaborate note, but I am entirely unable to agree with his view. He seems to regard καὶ οὐδέποτε as beginning an independent sentence. There is no difficulty about οὐ after θαυμαστὸν εἶ; cf. 97 A.

Schanz places a full stop after τᾶλλα and inserts ἀλλὰ before ἔστιν. If the text is to be altered, I should prefer Dr. Jackson's plan.

3. Μὴ ὅσιον] Z. and St. add ἔστιν, which is wanting in B pr. m.

5. Ἰττω Ζεὺς] This little provincialism was doubtless a favourite mode of emphasis with Kebes, and well known to his friends as characteristic.

8. ἐν ἀπορρήτοις] The ancient commentators explain that the Orphic traditions are meant. This seems more probable than any reference to the Eleusinian mysteries.

ἐν τινι φρουρᾷ] 'in ward.' We might translate 'on a sort of garrison duty,' following Cicero, *Cato maior* 20: vetatque Pythagoras iniussu imperatoris, id est dei, de praesidio et statione vitae decedere. But the common Pythagorean notion

ἐς μὲν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τις μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾷδιος διιδεῖν· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώ-  
 5 πους ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι· ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως;  
 "Ἐμοιγε, φησὶν ὁ Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν C  
 καυτοῦ κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτιννύοι, μὴ σιμῆναντός  
 σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἂν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἴ τινα  
 ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. "Ἰσως τοίνυν  
 10 ταύτῃ οὐκ ἄλογον, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι δεῖν, πρὶν  
 ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παρ-  
 οὔσαν.

VII. 'Ἄλλ' εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτό γε φαίνεται. ὁ μέντοι  
 νῦν δὴ ἔλεγε, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥαδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνή-  
 15 σκειν, ἔοικεν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀτόπῳ, εἴπερ ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγο- D

was that the body is the soul's prison, whence she may not come forth until her term is fulfilled: compare Athenaeus iv xlv 157 c πρὸς ἣν ὁ Καρνεῖος ἔφη, Εὐξίθεος ὁ πυθαγορικός, ὦ Νίκιον, ὡς φησι Κλέαρχος ὁ περιπατητικὸς ἐν δευτέρῳ βίῳ, ἔλεγεν ἐνδεδέσθαι τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ τῇδε βίῳ τὰς ἀπάντων ψυχὰς τιμωρίας χάριν, καὶ διείπασθαι τὸν θεὸν ὡς, εἰ μὴ μενοῦσιν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἕως ἂν ἐκὼν αὐτοὺς λύσῃ, πλέοσι καὶ μείζουσιν ἐμπεσοῦνται τότε λύμασι. διὸ πάντας εὐλαβουμένους τὴν τῶν κυρίων ἀνάτασιν φοβεῖσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἐκόντας ἐκβῆναι μόνον τε τὸν ἐν τῷ γήρῳ θάνατον ἀσπασίως προϊστασθαι, πεπεισμένους τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τῆς τῶν κυρίων γίγνεσθαι γνώμης. Cf. *Phaedrus* 250 c, with Dr. Thompson's note; *Cratylus* 400 c, *Gorgias* 493 A.

2. οὐ ῥᾷδιος διιδεῖν] 'not easy to see through.' Sokratic εἰρωνεία: evidently he does not think this theory worth much. Olympiodoros, with perhaps unconscious sarcasm, observes ἀνάγκη οἷν μῦσαι τὸν μέλλοντα θεάσασθαι αὐτόν.

5. ἐν τῶν κτημάτων] Cf. *Laws*

906 A ξύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοὶ τε ἅμα καὶ δαίμονες, ἡμεῖς τ' αὖ κτήματα θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων: also 902 B. Elsewhere man is called the plaything of the gods: *Laws* 803 c ἄνθρωπον δέ, ὅπερ εἴπομεν ἔμπροσθεν (644 D, E), θεοῦ τι παίγνιον μεμηχανημένον, τοῦτο αὐτοῦ τὸ βέλτιστον γεγονέναι.

10. πρὶν ἀνάγκην] Although ἂν may very easily have dropped out before ἀνάγκην, I have not thought proper to insert it against all the mss. I am not satisfied that Plato could not write πρὶν alone with the subjunctive; and in *Timaeus* 57 B it is not easy to account for the loss of ἂν: λνόμενα οὐ παύεται, πρὶν ἢ παντάπασιν ὠθούμενα καὶ διαλυθέντα ἐκφύγῃ πρὸς τὸ ξυγγενές, ἢ νικηθέντα, ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν ὁμοίον τῷ κρατήσαντι γενόμενον, αὐτοῦ ξύνοικον μείνῃ. Cf. *Laws* 873 A.

62 c—63 E, cc. vii, viii. If this be so, replies Kebes, it seems inconsistent to say that the wise man will be glad to die. For only a fool would desire to run away from wise and good masters and guardians, such as the gods are to us. To this

μεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπέας ἀπιόντας, ἐν ᾗ ἐπιστατούσιν αὐτῶν οἵπερ ἄριστοί εἰσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται θεοί, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον. οὐ γάρ που αὐτός γε αὐτοῦ οἴεται ἄμεινον ἐπιμελῆσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος· ἀλλ' ἀνόητος μὲν ἄνθρωπος τάχ' ἂν οἰθεῖν ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ  
 Ε οὐκ ἂν λογίζοιτο ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπὸ γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίτως ἂν φεύγοι, ὁ δὲ νῦν ἔχων ἐπιεுμοῖ που ἂν αἰεὶ εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὐτοῦ βελτίονι. καίτοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸνναντίον εἶναι εἰκὸς ἢ ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποσνήσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δὲ ἄφρονας χαίρειν. ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἠσθῆναι τέ μοι  
 63 ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματείᾳ, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς Ἀείτοι, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾷ, καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι ὅτι ἂν τις εἴπῃ. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γέ μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης· τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὥς ἀληθῶς δεσπότης ἀμείνους αὐτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπαλλάττοιεν αὐτῶν; καί μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω ῥαδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς  
 Β ἀπολείπων καὶ ἄρχοντας ἀγαθοῦς, ὥς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς, θεοῦς.

Simmias agrees, and upbraids Sokrates for being too ready to leave his friends. Well then, answers Sokrates, since I am thus arraigned, I must try to defend myself before you more persuasively than I did before the jury. As he is beginning his defence he is interrupted by Kriton: the attendant, says he, has been warning me that talking is apt to hinder the operation of the poison. Never mind, replies Sokrates; only let him be prepared to repeat the potion as often as may be required.

1. τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι] Sokrates had used the plural, as Kebes himself does directly afterwards. Plato, when he uses the word popularly, without any metaphysical significance, seems to employ θεός or θεοὶ indifferently.

7. φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσ-

πότου] Schanz brackets these words.

14. πραγματεία] 'insistence.' The word is used in a somewhat unusual manner here. Plato frequently denotes by it a pursuit followed with care and earnestness, generally philosophy, but sometimes the ordinary business of life, as in *Republic* 500 c. Compare *πραγματεύωδη παιδιάν*, *Parmenides* 137 B.

15. λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾷ] 'he is always hunting for some principle or other.'

18. ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὥς ἀληθῶς should be taken together.

20. εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον] Olympiodoros remarks, not without acuteness, ἀναφαίνεται ἐντεῦθεν ὅτι τελειότερος Κέβης Σιμμίου, because Kebes raises a universal question, while Simmias συνάγει ἐπὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους.

Δίκαια, ἔφη, λέγετε. οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι χρή με πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὥσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

VIII. Φέρε δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, πειραθῶ πιθανώτερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς  
 5 ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία  
 τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ᾧμην ἥξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς  
 ἄλλους σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς, ἔπειτα καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπους τετε-  
 λευηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἐνεάδε, ἠδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν  
 τῷ θανάτῳ· νῦν δὲ εὖ ἴστε ὅτι παρ' ἀνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξε- C  
 10 σθαι ἀγαθοὺς· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ διςχυρισαίμην· ὅτι  
 μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότης πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς ἥξειν, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι,  
 εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, διςχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο. ὥστε  
 διὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ὅπως ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλ' εὖελπίς εἰμι εἶναι τι τοῖς  
 τετελευτηκόσι καί, ὥσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεινον  
 15 τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς. Τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες;  
 αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, ἢ κἂν  
 ἡμῖν μεταδοίης; κοινὸν γὰρ δὴ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι D  
 ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, καὶ ἅμα σοι ἀπολογία ἔσται, ἐὰν ἄπερ λέγεις ἡμᾶς  
 πείσης. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἔφη. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τόνδε  
 20 σκεψώμεθα, τί ἐστὶν ὃ βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. Τί, ὦ  
 Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων

6. παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους] Sokrates follows the popular distinction between the οὐράνιοι and χθόνιοι θεοί. Mr. Cope translates 'in the company not only of gods wise and good, but next also of men.' I think, however, the meaning is settled by *Laws* 958 D τὰ μὲν περὶ τὰ θεῖα νόμιμα τῶν τε ὑπὸ γῆς θεῶν καὶ τῶν τῇδε; and soon afterwards, 959 B, we have exactly the same phrase as here: παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους ἀπιέναι δόσοντα λόγον, where θεοὺς ἄλλους can only mean 'other gods.'

9. παρ' ἀνδρας τε] The proper apodosis to the τε has been displaced by the parenthesis καὶ τοῦτο . . . διςχυρισαίμην, which modifies the form of the succeeding clause. The meaning of the parenthesis seems to be that Sokrates does not feel sure enough as to the exact condition of souls after death to make any posi-

tive statement about their association with one another; all he is quite sure of is that, whatever their condition, they are under the care of good and wise gods.

11. ἥξειν] We cannot supply ἐλπίζω, because Sokrates is confident that he will be in the company of gods, not that he hopes to be. But the infinitive construction is carried on from the previous sentence, although the particular force of the governing verb is no longer appropriate. Perhaps, however, Schanz is right in bracketing ἥξειν.

14. πάλαι λέγεται] in the current traditions of Greek religion.

16. αὐτὸς ἔχων] 'are you minded to depart keeping this persuasion to yourself?'

19. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα] This little episode serves to mark the conclusion of the introductory matter.



σοι δώσῃ τὸ φάρμακον, ὅτι χρή σοι φράζειν ὥς ἐλάχιστα δια-  
λέγεσθαι; φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μάλλον διαλεγομένους, δεῖν δὲ  
Ε οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον προσφέρειν τῷ φαρμάκῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνίστε  
ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δις καὶ τρίς πίνειν τοὺς τι τοιοῦτον ποιοῦντας.  
καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἔα, ἔφη, χαίρειν αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἑαυ- 5  
τοῦ παρασκευάζετω ὥς καὶ δις δώσων, ἔαν δὲ δέῃ, καὶ τρίς.  
Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν μὲν τι ἤδη, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλά μοι [πάλαι]  
πράγματα παρέχει. Ἔα αὐτόν, ἔφη. ἀλλ' ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς  
βούλομαι ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὥς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως  
ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν μέλλων 10  
64 ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὐελπὶς εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴεσθαι ἀγαθὰ, ἐπει-  
δὲν τελευτήσῃ· πῶς ἂν οὖν δὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχοι, ὦ Σιμμία τε  
καὶ Κέβης, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.

ΙΧ. Κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὁρεῶς ἀπτόμενοι  
φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοῖ ἐπιτη- 15  
δεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνήσκειν. εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθές,

5. τὸ ἑαυτοῦ is needlessly bracketed by Schanz.

7. [πάλαι] The mss. are uncertain about this word, which Schanz brackets. Z. and St. retain it.

63 E—64 A. After the interruption Sokrates restates the thesis which he has to defend: that the philosopher will meet death with good courage, in the confident hope that he will enjoy the greatest blessings in the other world.

9. ὥς μοι φαίνεται] At this point the main business of the dialogue begins: all that precedes has been merely preparatory to this thesis, and all that follows is logically evolved in its defence.

64 A—67 B, cc. ix-xi. The philosopher's whole life is nothing else than the study and practice of death; how then shall he be dismayed when that comes for which he has always been striving? This paradox is explained as follows. First we define death as the state of separation of soul and body. Now the philosopher's aim is the attainment of knowledge and wisdom. But the

body is for ever thwarting his endeavours: (1) by its pleasures and appetites, (2) by the intrusion of sensual perceptions, (3) by its weaknesses and maladies. All these hinder the free action of the soul and prevent her from gazing calmly on the truth. Accordingly so long as the soul is in union with the body, she can never attain to perfect wisdom; only death, by setting her free, enables her, if ever, to reach the truth. But the true philosopher will do all he can during life to anticipate this condition: he will withdraw his soul, so far as may be, from all communion with the body; its pleasures and pains he will scorn, its perceptions he will ignore; and so when the hour of release arrives the soul will be pure and unsullied by material taint; she will be fit to enjoy the free life of intelligence that is now before her.

16. ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνήσκει] 'dying and being dead.' ἀποθνήσκειν represents the philosophic training, the gradual emancipation of the soul from bodily passions;

ἄτοπον δῆπου ἂν εἴη προεμμεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μὴδὲν  
 ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, ἥκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὃ πάλοι προεμ-  
 μοῦντό τε καὶ ἐπετήδευον. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας Νῆ τὸν Δία,  
 ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάνυ γέ με νῦν δὴ γελασέοντα ἐποίησας B  
 5 γελάσαι. οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας  
 δοκεῖν εὖ πάνυ εἰρῆσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφούντας καὶ συμφάναι  
 ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οἱ  
 φιλοσοφούντες θανατῶσι καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λελήθασιν ὅτι ἄξιοί εἰσιν  
 τοῦτο πάσχειν. Καὶ ἀληθεῖ γ' ἂν λέγοιεν, ὦ Σιμμίας, πλήν γε τοῦ  
 10 σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι. λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἢ τε θανατῶσι καὶ ἢ  
 ἄξιοί εἰσιν θανάτου καὶ οἷου θανάτου οἱ ὥς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι. εἵ-  
 πωμεν γάρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις· C  
 ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι; Πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ  
 Σιμμίας. Ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος  
 15 ἀπαλλαγὴν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς  
 ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ  
 τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν  
 εἶναι; ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι [ἢ] ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο; Οὐκ ἄλλα τοῦτο,  
 ἔφη. Σκέψαι δὴ, ὦ ἀγαθέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ εὐνδοκῇ ἅπερ ἐμοί.  
 20 ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦμεν. D  
 φαίνεται σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς  
 ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιάδες, οἷον σίτων καὶ ποτῶν; Ἦκιστα,  
 ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Τί δέ; τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων;  
 Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δέ; τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπέας δοκεῖ  
 25 σοι ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἷον ἱματίων διαφερόντων

τεθνάναι the perfected philosophic  
 ἔξις, the complete independence of  
 soul, so far as is permitted by the  
 conditions of corporeal life.

7. τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν] In the  
 mouth of Simmias I think these  
 words must refer to the Thebans:  
 cf. *Sophist* 242 D τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν  
 Ἑλεατικὸν ἔθνος. 'The majority  
 would think what you say of philo-  
 sophers excellent—my countrymen  
 would give an especially cordial  
 assent.' Simmias is glancing at the  
 proverbial dulness of the Boeotian  
 mind.

8. καὶ σφᾶς] Sc. τοὺς παρ' ἡμῖν.

16. γεγονέναι . . . εἶναι] Note  
 the significant change of word.

18. ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι] If ᾗ  
 be right, it can only be a 'delibera-  
 tive' subjunctive. For in a question  
 we can hardly accept Heindorf's  
 suggestion, 'ante μὴ intelligi potest  
 δεδοίκατε.'

21. περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς] Olym-  
 piodoros classifies those here men-  
 tioned as (1) ἐνεργεῖαι φυσικαὶ καὶ  
 ἀναγκαῖαι, (2) φυσικαὶ μὲν οὐκ  
 ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, (3) οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε  
 ἀναγκαῖαι. This however, as Wyt-  
 tenbach points out, is an Epicurean  
 distinction: cf. Cicero *de finibus* I  
 xiii § 45, and Diog. Laert. x 149,  
 where the examples do not corre-  
 spond with the present passage.

κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς  
περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν δοκεῖ σοι ἢ ἀτιμάζειν, καθ' ὅσον  
Ε μὴ πολλὴν ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν; Ἀτιμάζειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ,  
ἔφη, ὃ γε ὡς ἀληθεῶς φιλόσοφος. Οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη,  
ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ' 5  
ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι;  
ἔμοιγε. Ἄρ' οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ  
65 φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὃ τι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ  
σώματος κοινωνίας διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; Φαί-  
νεται. Καὶ δοκεῖ γε δήπου, ὦ Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, 10  
ὥς μὴδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων μὴδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἄξιον  
εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ' ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μὴδὲν φρον-  
τίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἷ διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν  
ἀληθὲς λέγεις.

Χ. Τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτήσιν; 15  
πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὐ, εἴαν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει  
Β κοινωνὸν συμπαλαμβάνῃ; οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω· ἄρα ἔχει  
ἀλήθειάν τινα ὅψις τε καὶ ἀκοὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τά γε τοιαῦτα  
καὶ οἱ ποιεῖται ἡμῖν αἰεὶ ἐρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὐτ' ἀκούομεν ἀκριβές

6. ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ] With the whole of these three chapters should be compared *Timaeus* 87 c—90 d. It would be an error to suppose that Plato, with all his contempt for the body, was a friend of asceticism. In the passage of the *Timaeus* above mentioned he says that a due balance should be maintained between soul and body; a vigorous soul ought to have a vigorous body for its vehicle. Accordingly the body should be kept in good health and condition for the sake of the soul: for no less emphatically than in the *Phaedo* he declares that all is to be subordinate to the free exercise of intelligence; see especially 90 A foll.

12. ἐγγύς τι τείνειν] 'verges pretty closely on the state of death,' COPE. Here Plato marks the vulgar error already referred to in 64 B λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς κ.τ.λ. The majority have no conception of the philosophic τεθνάναι; if one lives

without bodily pleasures, they think he may as well be dead. Such is the judgment of Kallikles, *Gorgias* 492 Ε οἱ λίθοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονέστατοι εἶεν. Sokrates retorts that the life of the pleasure-seeker is a *πίθον βίος* and afterwards *χαραδριοῦ*, 494 B. Cf. *Philebus* 21 c. For the phrase ἐγγύς τι τείνειν compare *Republic* 548 D ἐγγύς τι αὐτὸν Γλαύκωνος τουτουὶ τείνειν: see also *Theaetetus* 169 A σὺν δέ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκίρρωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν.

13. διὰ τοῦ σώματος] This phrase would indicate that there is no real discrepancy between the doctrine of the *Phaedo* and of the *Philebus* on the subject of pleasure. For the preposition διὰ implies 'those pleasures [which the soul feels] by means of the body': see introduction § 4.

19. οἱ ποιεῖται ἡμῖν αἰεὶ ἐρυλοῦσιν] e.g. Empedokles 49 — 53 (Karsten):

οὐδὲν οὔτε ὁρώμεν; καίτοι εἰ αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθή-  
 σεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσιν μὴδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῇ αἴ γε ἄλλαι· πᾶσαι  
 γάρ που τούτων φαυλότεραί εἰσιν· ἢ τοὶ οὐ δοκοῦσιν; Πάνυ  
 μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πότε οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἅπτεται;  
 5 ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῇ τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι  
 τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. Ἀληθὴ λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν C  
 τῷ λογίζεσθαι, εἴπερ που ἄλλοι, κατὰ δῆλον αὐτῇ γίγνεται τι  
 τῶν ὄντων; Ναί. Λογίζεται δέ γε που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν  
 αὐτὴν τούτων μὴδὲν παραλυπῇ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὄψις μήτε  
 10 ἀλγηδὼν μὴδὲ τις ἡδονή, ἀλλ' ὅ τι μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν  
 γίγνηται ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύναται μὴ  
 κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μὴδ' ἀπτομένη ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὄντος. Ἔστι  
 ταῦτα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλιστα  
 ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτὴ καθ' D  
 15 αὐτὴν γίνεσθαι; Φαίνεται. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὦ Σιμμία;  
 φασί μιν εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν; Φασί μιν μέντοι καὶ Δία.  
 Καὶ καλόν γε τι καὶ ἀγαθόν; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ἦδὴ οὖν πώποτε τι  
 τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες; Οὐδαμῶς, ἢ δ' ὅς. Ἀλλ'  
 20 δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μετέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν

ἀλλ' ἔγωγε, ἄθρει παμπαλάμῃ πῇ δῆλον  
 ἕκαστον,  
 μήτε τιν' ὄψιν ἔχων πίστει πλέον ἢ κατ'  
 ἀκοὴν,  
 μήτ' ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώματα  
 γλώσσης,  
 μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων ὅππῃ πόρος ἐστὶ  
 νοῆσαι·  
 γυῖων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ' ἢ δῆλον  
 ἕκαστον.

Cf. 108 :

τήν συ νόω δέρεκεν, μήδ' ὀμμασιν ἥσο  
 τεθηπώς,

also the line of Epicharmos :

νοῦς ὀρῇ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει· τᾶλλα κωφὰ καὶ  
 τυφλά.

3. φαυλότεραι] Sight is distinguished as the noblest of the senses in *Timaeus* 47 A ὄψις δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον αἰτία τῆς μεγίστης ὀφελείας γέγονεν ἡμῖν: hearing comes next, 47 C, D. Cf. *Phaedrus* 250 D ὄψις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων.

9. παραλυπῇ] 'annoys by its

intrusion': this sense of *παρὰ* is not uncommon in Plato: cf. below 66 D *παραπίπτον*; *Timaeus* 50 E *παρεμφαίνον*.

10. μὴδὲ τις ἡδονή] This is the reading of the Bodleian, and seems to me right. ἀλγηδὼν μὴδὲ τις ἡδονή all belong to the last *μήτε*. Z. has *μήτε τις*.

12. ὀρέγεται] 'reaches after.'

17. καλόν γε τι καὶ ἀγαθόν] Here the αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν seems placed on the same level as the other ideas. This however is merely because for the present purpose Plato is not concerned to differentiate it: the criticism of Anaxagoras, 98 c foll., shows that in the *Phaedo* the αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν must occupy the same position as in the *Republic*. In the *Republic* itself ἀγαθὸν is several times apparently classed with the inferior ideas, e.g. 476 A.

20. μετέθους πέρι] Here is

- Ε ἄλλων ἐνὶ λόγῳ ἀπάντων τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν· ἄρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ ὥδε ἔχει· ὅς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσῃται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὗ σκοπεῖ, οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γνῶναι ἕκαστον; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο 5 ποιήσῃε καθαρώτατα, ὅστις ὃ τι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ' ἕκαστον, μήτε τὴν ὅψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε 66 τινὰ ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλ- 10 λαγεῖς ὃ τι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὥτων καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν εὐμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ταραττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐώντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, ὅταν κοινωνῇ, ἄρ' οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν, ὦ Σιμμία, εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος, ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος; Ὑπερφύως, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἀληθεῖ λέγεις, ὦ 15 Σώκρατες.
- Β ΧΙ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιαῦτα ἅττα λέγειν, ὅτι κινδυνεύει τοι ὥσπερ ἀτραπός τις

the first decisive indication that the *Phaedo* belongs to the middle phase of Platonism, along with the *Republic*. For μέγεθος is τῶν πρὸς τι, ὧν οὐ φαμεν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ γένος. (Arist. *Metaph.* A ix.)

4. διανοηθῆναι] is opposed to αἰσθάνεσθαι: 'to apprehend intellectually the essence of each object of his investigation.'

6. αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ] The distinction of the *Republic* between νοῦς and διάνοια is not drawn here, since for our present purpose it is unnecessary.

13. ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν] ἀλήθεια is objective truth, φρόνησις the mental πάθημα which apprehends it; cf. *Republic* 511 B.

19. ὥσπερ ἀτραπός] Olympiodoros insists that this refers to a Pythagorean maxim φεύγειν τὰς λεωφόρους, whereby he has largely contributed to the perplexity of this passage. I believe ἀτραπὸς properly

means not so much a byway as a short cut: what then is this short cut? We are here drawing an inference ἐκ πάντων τούτων, i.e. from the various considerations which induce the philosopher to withdraw his soul from communion with the body. Now to this state of separation, towards which the philosopher struggles during life by a long and tedious process, there is but one short cut, namely death; which therefore I hold with Schleiermacher is meant by the ἀτραπός. So far then we get a perfectly good sense: 'the inference which genuine philosophers will draw from the foregoing considerations is this: it seems that death is a short cut to the goal of our life's endeavour.' But what of μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει which in the mss. follow ἐκφέρειν? The unmeaning superfluity and intolerable clumsiness of this addition surely ought not to be laid to the

ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς, ὅτι, ἕως ἄν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν μετὰ τοῦ λόγου  
ἐν τῇ σκέψει, καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ἢ ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῇ μετὰ τοιού-  
του κακοῦ, οὐ μή ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν·  
φανερόν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές. μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας  
5 παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν· ἔτι δὲ ἄν τινες C  
νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος εἴραν.  
ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν  
καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς  
ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέ-  
10 ποτε οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν  
ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν  
τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίνονται, τὰ δὲ χρή-  
ματα ἀναγκασμέα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου D  
θεραπείᾳ· καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας περὶ διὰ  
15 πάντα ταῦτα. τὸ δ' ἔσχατον πάντων ὅτι, εἰάν τις ἡμῖν καὶ  
σχολὴ γένηται ἅπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι,

charge of Plato. A glance at the notes of the various editors is enough to show the hopelessness of extracting any sense from the phrase as it stands in the texts. Again, as I think, the acuteness of Schleiermacher has solved the difficulty. If, as he proposes, we place the words after ἔχωμεν, they are perfectly appropriate and restore the balance of the sentence, which will then run 'it seems that a kind of short cut brings us to our goal; because, so long as we have the body as a partner with the reason in our search for truth, and our soul is mixed up with this plague, we shall never fully attain the object of our desires.' Cf. 65 ε μῆτε τὴν ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μῆτε τινὰ ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ. As evidence of confusion in the mss. it may be noted that the position of ἡμᾶς varies; on which account Hermann brackets it. Possibly we should translate τοῦ λόγου 'our theory,' not 'reason,' because in the latter sense Plato usually says

μετὰ λόγον, not μετὰ τοῦ λόγου: cf. *Timaeus* 28 A, *Protagoras* 324 B. But in *Timaeus* 70 A we have τοῦ λόγου κατήκοον. It still feels doubtful whether some words have not fallen out: ἀτραπὸς seems to require definition; and possibly the misplaced phrase extruded something like ὁ θάνατος after ἐκφέρειν. For the use of ἐκφέρειν Heindorf quotes *Soph. Ai.* 7: and somewhat similar is the use of the passive in *Cratylus* 386 A.

5. διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν] Compare *Timaeus* 43 B—44 A.

9. οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι] This, as indicated by τὸ λεγόμενον, was no doubt a common phrase, to which Plato has given a turn of his own. Wytttenbach observes 'nondum satis cognitum, ὡς ἀληθῶς et item τῷ ὄντι citatis locis addi.' He might have added that Plato uses these words when he is giving the popular phrase a deeper meaning, as here and in *Phaedrus* 256 B τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν.

11. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν] cf. *Republic* 373 D.

ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν αὐτῷ πανταχοῦ παραπίπτον θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ  
 ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν  
 τὰληθές, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε  
 καθαρῶς τι εἶσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ  
 Ε θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὐ 5  
 ἐπιουμοῦμέν τε καὶ φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὴν  
 τελευτήσωμεν, ὥς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζώσιν δὲ οὐ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ  
 οἷόν τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μὴδὲν καθαρῶς γινώσκειν, θυοῖν θάτε-  
 ρον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστιν κτήσεσθαι τὸ εἶδέναι ἢ τελευτήσεσιν· τότε  
 67 γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, πρό- 10  
 τερον δ' οὐ. καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζώμεν, οὕτως, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω  
 ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἶδέναι, ἔαν ὅ τι μάλιστα μὴδὲν ὁμιλώμεν τῷ  
 σώματι μὴδὲ κοινωνώμεν, ὅ τι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μὴδὲ ἀναπιμ-  
 πλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ,  
 ἕως ἄν ὁ θεὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς· καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλα- 15  
 τόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὥς τὸ εἶδος, μετὰ τοιού-  
 των τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές.  
 Β [τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές.] μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαρῷ  
 ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐθεμιτὸν ἦ. τοιαῦτα οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, ἀναγ-  
 καῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς 20  
 ὁρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως; Παντός γε μᾶλλον,  
 ὦ Σώκρατες.

XII. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ ἐταῖρε,  
 πολλὴν ἐλπίς ἀφικομένῳ οἷ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἱκανῶς, εἴπερ  
 που ἄλλοι, κτήσεσθαι τοῦτο οὐ ἔνεκα ἢ πολλὴν πραγματείαν ἡμῖν 25

5. αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα] 'the realities of things,' i.e. the ideas. For this use of *πράγματα* compare 99 D βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα.

15. ὁ θεός] Z. and St. add αὐτός.

16. μετὰ τοιούτων] sc. *καθαρῶν*. I take this to be neuter; i.e. the contents of the ideal world. Cf. *Phaedrus* 249 C πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνους αἰεὶ ἐστὶ μνήμη πρὸς οἷσπερ θεὸς ὢν θεὸς ἐστὶ.

18. [τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές] I have bracketed these words, which I believe to be a mere gloss on *εἰλικρινές*, derived from 66 B φαιμέν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές.

μὴ καθαρῷ] 'for I doubt it

is not lawful for the impure to reach the pure.'

67 B—68 B, c. xii. So then he will meet death with a good heart who has purified his soul by withdrawing her from contact with the body and accustoming her to dwell apart by herself; for death is the consummation of her release from body. Were it not strange if the wise man shrank from that which all his life long he sought: freedom from his foe the body, and fruition of wisdom his love? Shall a man meet death gladly in hope of reunion with some earthly love, and for the sake of his divine love shall he fear to die?

ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε ἢ γε ἀποδημία ἢ νῦν μοι  
 προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρί, ὃς C  
 ἡγεῖται οἱ παρεσκευάσαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὥσπερ κεκασαρμένην.  
 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Κάθαραι δὲ εἶναι ἄρα οὐ τοῦτο  
 5 συμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάσαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὃ τι  
 μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ εἶσαι αὐτὴν καθ'  
 αὐτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγεῖρεσθαι τε καὶ ἀερίζε-  
 σθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν  
 τῷ ἔπειτα μόνῃν καθ' αὐτήν, ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ δεσμῶν ἐκ D  
 10 τοῦ σώματος; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε εἴη ἀνάτος  
 ὀνομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος; Παντάπασί  
 γε, ἢ δ' ὅς. Λύειν δὲ γε αὐτήν, ὥς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ  
 μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφούντες ὁρεῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα  
 αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς  
 15 ἀπὸ σώματος, ἢ οὐ; Φαίνεται. Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον,  
 γελοῖον ἂν εἴη ἀνδρὰ παρασκευάζοντο· ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅτι  
 ἐγγυτάτω ὄντα τοῦ τεθνάναι οὕτω ζῆν, κάπειο· ἥκοντος αὐτοῦ E  
 τούτου ἀγανακτεῖν; [οὐ γελοῖον;] Πῶς δ' οὐ; Τῷ ὄντι ἄρα,  
 ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμίας, οἱ ὁρεῶς φιλοσοφούντες ἀποενηύσκουν μελετῶσι,  
 20 καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἥκιστα αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερόν. ἐκ τῶνδε  
 δὲ σκόπει. εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληνται μὲν πανταχὲ τῷ σώματι, αὐτὴν  
 δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τούτου δὴ γιγνο-  
 μένου εἰ φοβοῖντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῖεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη,  
 εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκεῖσε ἴοιεν, οἱ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπίς ἐστίν οὐ διὰ 68  
 25 βίου ἥρων τυχεῖν· ἥρων δὲ φρονήσεως· ὅς τε διεβέβληντο,  
 τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντος αὐτοῖς; ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδι-  
 κῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ υἱέων ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἐκόντες  
 ἠθέλησαν εἰς Αἰδοῦ ἐλθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι τῆς ἐλπίδος,  
 τῆς τοῦ ὄψεσθαι τε ἐκεῖ ὧν ἐπεθύμουν καὶ συνέσεσθαι· φρονή-  
 30 σεως δὲ ἄρα τις τῷ ὄντι ἐρώων, καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν  
 ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μνησμοῦ ἄλλοι ἐντεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ ἀείως λόγου

9. ἐκλυομένην] notice the present: 'working out her deliverance.'

ὥσπερ δεσμῶν] Z. has ἐκ δεσμῶν.

13. μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι] 'chiefly, nay only, the philosophers.'

22. τούτου δὴ] mss. δέ, corr. Madvig. I follow Schanz in adopting δὴ, since the vulgate gives a somewhat ill-balanced sentence: thus we may translate, 'if they are at feud with

the body on every issue and desire to keep the soul to herself, then, should they fear and fret on the attainment of this object, were it not the height of perversity not to go thither with gladness, where on their arrival they hope to possess that which they loved all their life long?' Z. and St. retain δέ.



B ἢ ἐν ᾧ αἰδοῦ, ἀγανακτήσει τε ἀποθηνήσκων καὶ οὐκ ἄσμενος εἶσιν αὐτόσε; οἷεσθαι γε χρή, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι γε ἦ, ὃ ἐταίρε, φιλόσοφος· σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδ' αὐτοῦ ἄλλοι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὴν ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ φοβοῖτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ 5 τοιοῦτος; Πολλὴ μέντοι νῆ Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς.

XIII. Οὐκοῦν ἱκανὸν σοι τεκμήριον, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἀνδρὸς ὅν ἂν ἴδῃς ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν 10 φιλόσοφος, ἀλλὰ τις φιλοσώματος; ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ που οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἦτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ 10 ἀμφοτέρω. Πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔχει οὕτως ὥς λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὃ Σιμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσήκει; Πάντως δήπου, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἦν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἄρ' 15 οὐ τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει, τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλιγωροῦ- D σίν τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῖσθαι τήν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι ἄτοπος. Πῶς δὲ, ὃ Σώκρατες; Οἶσθα, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὅτι τὸν θάνατον ἡγοῦνται πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν; 20 Καὶ μάλ' ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν φόβος μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένωσιν; Ἔστι ταῦτα.

4. ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον] referring to οὐ πολλὴν ἂν ἀλογία εἴη.

68 B—69 E, c. xiii. Therefore the philosopher alone is truly brave and temperate. The courage and temperance of the multitude are spurious: for they endure evils only to avoid greater evils, they forego greater pleasures; thus fear is the source of their courage, indulgence the source of their temperance. But the fount of all real virtue is wisdom: this is the only true currency; virtues that arise from balancing pleasure against pleasure and pain against pain, apart from wisdom, are worthless and slavish. Virtue is the purification of the soul; the true philosopher is he whose soul is purified and initiated into the holy

mysteries of wisdom, and he it is who shall dwell with the gods in the other world. Such is the defence of Sokrates.

10. φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος] Cf. 82 c: these correspond to the ὀλιγαρχικὸς and τιμοκρατικὸς ἀνὴρ of *Republic* IX.

12. ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία] The philosopher faces death with calmness and abstains from bodily indulgence; therefore he is courageous and temperate even in the popular sense, although his courage and temperance arise from a widely different source from that of the vulgar. τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις, i.e. the character described in the preceding chapter, τοῖς τῷ σώματι διαβεβλημένοις.

17. ἐθέλεις] Z. has ἐθελήσεις.

Τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δεῖ ἀνδρεῖοι εἶναι πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι. καίτοι ἄλογόν γε δεῖ τινὰ καὶ δειλίᾳ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι. Πάνυ μὲν Ε οὖν. Τί δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν; οὐ ταύτῃ τοῦτο πεπόνθεασι· ἀκολασία τινὶ σῶφρονές εἰσιν; καίτοι φαμέν γε ἀδύνατον εἶναι, 5 ἄλλ' ὅμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὅμοιον τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐνήν σωφροσύνην· φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἐτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ' ἄλλων κρατούμενοι. καίτοι καλοῦσί γε ἀκολασίαν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν 69 ἡδονῶν ἄρχειν· ἄλλ' ὅμως συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατούμενοις 10 ὑπ' ἡδονῶν κρατεῖν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν. τοῦτο θ' ὁμοίον ἐστὶν ᾧ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο, τῷ τρόπῳ τινὰ δι' ἀκολασίαν αὐτοὺς σεσωφρονίσαι. Ἔοικε γάρ. Ὡ μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὁρὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγή, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, καὶ μεῖζω πρὸς 15 ἐλάττω, ὥσπερ νομίσματα, ἄλλ' ἢ ἐκείνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὁρεόν, ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ ἅπαντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις, καὶ τούτου Β μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἢ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ εὐλλήβδην ἀληθοῦς ἀρετὴ ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ

1. τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δεῖ] Schanz well compares 78 B τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέντι.

10. ἄλλων ἡδονῶν] Schanz brackets ἄλλων, which, he says, is omitted in the citation of this passage by Iamblichos. I think, however, it is wanted.

13. πρὸς ἀρετήν] 'in respect to virtue': the preposition is not used in quite the same sense as in the words that follow.

16. καὶ τούτου μὲν] 'for this and with this are all things in reality being bought and sold.' μετὰ τούτου = 'along with this': it is the presence of φρόνησις which gives all virtue its value. If we press the metaphor too hard, it breaks down; for money is of value only for the sake of what it can buy. Plato however merely means that φρόνησις is the only true currency; all else is base coin. Cf. Euripides *fr. Oedipus* (546 Dindorf):

οὐ τοι νόμισμα λευκὸς ἀργυρὸς μόνον καὶ χρυσὸς ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ χάρετ' ἡ βροτοῖς νόμισμα κεῖται πᾶσιν ἢ χρῆσθαι χρεῶν.

19. ἀληθοῦς ἀρετὴ ἢ] I have followed Schanz, after Heindorf, in adding ἢ after ἀρετῇ, although it is not in B, and is not absolutely required. But the ἢ of CD is in favour of it, and it certainly improves the sentence. St. omits it.

μετὰ φρονήσεως] The true nature of the philosophic ἀρετῇ can only be understood by studying the latter part of the sixth book of the *Republic*. φρόνησις is cognition of the truth, that is, of the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. Plato found his escape from utilitarianism by identifying the source of morality with the source of existence; his ethics are the outcome of his ontology. All things are good in so far as they are like the idea of the good; therefore to him that would be really good knowledge of the idea is indispensable. With the concep-

ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων  
 τῶν τοιούτων· χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ  
 ἀλλήλων μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι  
 ἀνδραποδῶδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχει, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς  
 C τῷ ὄντι ἢ κάθαρσις τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη 5  
 καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ αὕτη ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις  
 ἢ· καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες

tion of ἀνδρεία in this passage compare the definition in *Republic* 442 B καὶ ἀνδρεῖον δὴ, οἶμαι, τούτῳ τῷ μέρει καλοῦμεν ἕνα ἕκαστον, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ θυμοειδὲς διασφύζῃ διὰ τε λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παραγγέλθεν δεινὸν καὶ μῆ.

3. σκιαγραφία] 'a rough sketch.' σκιαγραφία was a kind of painting meant to produce its effect at a distance and not to be inspected close at hand: see *Theaetetus* 208 E ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, ξυνίημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν· ἕως δὲ ἀφιστήκη πόρρωθεν ἐφαίνετό τι μοι λέγεσθαι. Also *Parmenides* 165 C οἷον ἐσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστάντι μὲν ἐν πάντα φαινόμενα ταῦτ' οὖν φαίνεσθαι πεπονθέναι καὶ ὁμοία εἶναι. πάνν γε προσελθόντι δέ γε πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα καὶ τῷ τοῦ ἑτέρου φαντάσματι ἑτεροῖα καὶ ἀνόμοια ἐαντοῖς. Compare *Republic* 523 B, 583 B. From Aristotle *Rhetoric* III xii 1414<sup>a</sup> 8 it seems to have been a sort of scene-painting, as Mr. Cope translates it: ἡ μὲν οὖν δημηγορικὴ λέξις καὶ παντελῶς ὅμοια τῇ σκιαγραφίᾳ· ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλείων ᾖ ὁ ὄχλος, πορρωτέρω ἢ θέα, διδὸν τὰ ἀκριβῆ περιέργα καὶ χεῖρω φαίνεται ἐν ἀμφοτέροις. Cf. *Metaph.* Δ xxix 1024<sup>b</sup> 23 τὰ δὲ ὅσα ἐστὶ μὲν ὄντα, πέφυκε μέντοι φαίνεσθαι ἢ μὴ οἶά ἐστιν ἢ ἀμύχ' ἐστιν, οἷον ἡ σκιαγραφία καὶ τὰ ἐνύπνια· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶ μὲν τι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὧν ἐμποιεῖ τὴν φαντασίαν. The meaning therefore is that on a superficial view the popular virtue seems identical with

the philosophic, but on closer examination is found to fall far short of it.

4. ἀνδραποδῶδης] cf. *Republic* 430 B δοκεῖς μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἀνευ παιδείας γεγονυῖαν τὴν τε θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραποδῶδη οὔτε πάνν νόμιμον ἡγεῖσθαι ἄλλο τέ τι ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖν. Olympiodoros says καλεῖ δὲ ὁ Πλάτων τὰς μὲν φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς ἀνδραποδῶδεις, ὡς καὶ ἀνδραπόδοις δυναμένας ὑπάρχειν, τὰς δὲ ἠθικὰς σκιαγραφίας· τὸ ὅτι γὰρ μόνον ἔχουσιν, σκιά δὲ τὸ ὅτι τοῦ διότι. The distinction between ἠθικαὶ and φυσικαί, however, is not made in the present passage. For a discussion of this whole subject of popular virtue see appendix I.

οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς] After this some mss. insert εἶναι, which Schanz retains within brackets. It is obviously wrong and ought not to cumber the text.

τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς] 'but the reality is actually a process of purification from all such things, and temperance and justice and wisdom itself are a completed purification.' τῶν τοιούτων, i.e. the worldly considerations on which the δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ is based. κάθαρσις is explained above in 67 C; καθαρμός is a completed κάθαρσις. τὸ ἀληθὲς is opposed to σκιαγραφία.

7. τὰς τελετὰς] It seems probable, as Stallbaum says, that the Orphic traditions are in Plato's mind, not the Eleusinian mysteries. The line πολλοὶ μὲν νερθηκοφόροι βάρχοι δὲ

οὐ φαῦλοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάσαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὅς ἂν ἀμύητος  
καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἄιδου ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ  
κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν  
οἰκῆσει. εἰσὶν γὰρ δὴ, ὡς φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετάς, νάρηκο-  
5 φόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δὲ τε παῦροι· οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν κατὰ τὴν D  
ἐμὴν θόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὁρεῶς. ὦν δὲ  
καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ γέ τοι δυνατόν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλὰ  
παντὶ τρόπῳ προϋευμήθη γενέσθαι· εἰ δ' ὁρεῶς προϋευμήθη  
καὶ τι ἠνύσαμεν, ἐκεῖσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰκόμεθα, ἂν θεὸς  
10 ἐθέλῃ, ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ, ἔφη, ὦ  
Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογοῦμαι, ὡς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολεί-  
πων καὶ τοὺς ἐνεῶδε δεσπότης οὐ χαλεπῶς φέρω οὐδ' ἀγανακτῶ,  
ἡγούμενος κακεῖ οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ ἐνεῶδε δεσπότης τε ἀγαθοῖς E  
ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ ἐταίροις [τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει]· εἴ  
15 τι οὖν ὑμῖν πιθανώτερός εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίων  
δικασταῖς, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι.

XIV. Εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Κέβης  
ἔφη· ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι,  
τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, 70  
20 μὴ ἐπειδὴν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ἤ, ἀλλ' ἐκέκινῃ

τε παῦροι is said by Olympiodoros to be Orphic; it occurs, slightly changed, in *Anthology* x 106. Plato is fond of borrowing terms of ritual, as in *Phaedrus* 250 c, *Laws* 759 c, *Timaeus* 44 c.

2. ἐν βορβόρῳ] cf. *Republic* 363 D τοὺς δὲ ἀνοσίους αὖ καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλὸν τινα κατορύττουσιν ἐν Ἄιδου.

6. ὦν] 'of whose number.'

9. ἠνύσαμεν] I have retained the reading of the best mss., which also seems to give the best sense: 'if I have been right in my desire to join the company of philosophers, and if we (οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες) have profited aught by our philosophy.' In this way we avoid any harshness in the change from singular to plural. Schanz and Z. give ἡνυσάμεν.

14. [τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει] Ast is undoubtedly right in bracketing these words, which are

utterly pointless, and clearly interpolated from 70 A.

69 E—70 c, c. xiv. All this were very well, replies Kebes, if we were sure that death did no more than release the soul from her bodily prison. But how do we know that on quitting the body she does not vanish away like a breath? we need some strong assurance that the soul has a conscious and intelligent existence after death. True, says Sokrates, and no more fitting subject of discourse could be found for one so near to death as I am.

Thus we distinctly see that the question of the immortality of the soul turns up, not as the main subject of the dialogue, but as arising out of the principal thesis.

20. μὴ ἐπειδὴν] Various devices have been resorted to by several editors to avoid the intolerably harsh

τῇ ἡμέρᾳ [διαφθείρηται τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται], ἥ ἂν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀποθνήσκῃ, εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα οἴχεται διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἦ. ἐπεὶ, εἴπερ εἴη που αὐτὴ κατ' αὐτὴν συνηροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν κακῶν ὧν εὖ 5  
 B νῦν δὲ διήλθες, πολλὴ ἂν ἐλπίς εἴη καὶ καλή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς ἀληθεὶ ἐστὶν ἃ εὖ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγης παραμυθείας δεῖται καὶ πίστεως, ὥς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν. Ἀληθεῖ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κέβης· ἀλλὰ τί δὲ ποιῶμεν; ἢ 10  
 περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μή; Ἐγὼ γε οὐκ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι, ἥτινα δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν. Οὐκ οὐκ γ' ἂν οἶμαι, ἢ δ' ὅς  
 C ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τίνα νῦν ἀκούσαντα, οὐδ' εἰ κωμωδιοποιὸς εἴη, ὥς ἀδολεσχῶ καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦ- 15  
 μαι. εἰ οὐκ ἔστι, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι.

asyndeton in this sentence. The mildest remedy is that of Heindorf, who puts a comma after τοῦ σώματος, thus joining ἀπαλλαττομένη with the previous clause. But it seems to me that we cannot divorce ἀπαλλαττομένη and ἐκβαίνουσα. Schanz brackets οἴχεται . . . οὐδαμοῦ ἦ, the last words closely resembling οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ἦ just above and being repeated verbatim at 84 B. But this subsequent repetition seems really in their favour, where Sokrates is expressly referring to the apprehension which is uttered here and which then seems to have been lulled to rest. Moreover if these words are omitted the rhythm of the sentence halts lamentably. I agree with Hirschig in suspecting διαφθείρηται τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται to be the intruders: the words are superfluous and suspiciously like a gloss.

8. παραμυθείας] 'reassurance.' Cf. 115 D ταῦτά μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἅμα μὲν ὑμᾶς ἅμα δ' ἑμαυτόν. And see *Euthydemus* 290 A, *Laws* 720 A, 773 E.

8. ὥς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ] Note that there are two distinct propositions to be proved, (1) that the soul exists in Hades, (2) that she has faculties and intelligence.

14. κωμωδιοποιός] Notwithstanding the friendly treatment of Aristophanes in the *Symposium* we see in *Apology* 18 B foll. how deeply Plato resented the attacks made by the comedians upon Sokrates: cf. especially the reference to the *Clouds* in 19 C.

15. ἀδολεσχῶ] Eupolis, quoted by Olympiodoros, calls Sokrates τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολεσχῆν, and no doubt it was a favourite epithet with the comic poets. Plato has adopted the word, apparently in sheer defiance; and wherever ἀδολεσχεῖν, ἀδολεσχῆς, ἀδολεσχία occur in the dialogues, we may be sure the term is applied to the genuine philosopher. A very notable instance is *Sophist* 225 D, where in seeking the sophist we stumble upon somebody very like Sokrates: compare too *Theaetetus* 195 B, C, *Phaedrus* 269 E (where see Dr. Thompson's admirable note),

XV. Σκεψώμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῆδε πῃ, εἴτ' ἄρα ἐν "Αἰδου εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὐ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος, οὗ μεμνήμεθα, ὥς εἰσὶν ἐνεέθενδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνούνται καὶ γίνονται ἐκ 5 τῶν τεθνεώτων· καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας, ἄλλο τι ἢ εἶεν ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ D ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἂν πάλιν ἐγίγνοντο μὴ οὐκαί, καὶ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι φανερὸν γίγνωιτο ὅτι οὐδαμῶθεν ἄλλοθεν γίνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν 10 τεθνεώτων· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, ἄλλου ἂν τοῦ δέοι λόγου. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Μὴ τοίνυν κατ' ἀνθρώπων, ἢ δ' ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥῆον μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ

*Cratylus* 401 B, *Parmenides* 135 D, *Republic* 488 E, *Politicus* 299 B. The strict meaning of the word is fairly given in οὐ περὶ προσηγόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιούμεαι.

70 C—72 D, cc. xv—xvii. Tradition says that the souls of the dead come back from Hades and live again on earth. That this belief is reasonable we may argue in the following way. All nature shows the generation of opposite from opposite; thus greater arises from less, worse from better, swifter from slower. And between each of such pairs of opposites there are two processes, one in either direction; as between greater and less are increase and decrease, and similar processes between every other pair. Therefore since life and death are such a pair of opposites, we shall expect to find two similar processes between the living and the dead. We see one such process take place before our eyes; the living pass over to the dead: if then nature's work is not here left incomplete, there must be the other process that we do not see, and the dead pass over to the living. A yet stronger confirmation is this: did all things travel in one direction and were there no return, in the end all living

things would die and remain dead, and life would be swallowed up in death. But if it be true that souls return again from the dead, they must be somewhere after their departure from the body; for certainly if they perished utterly, they could return again no more.

We have here one half of the first stage of the argument, which is complemented by the inference from reminiscence that follows. It is true, this argument of ἀνταπόδοσις implies the ante-natal existence of the soul, but it is used mainly as evidence of her existence after death. Note also that it proves ὡς ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν "Αἰδου, not ὡς δύναμιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχει.

2. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος] Herodotus II 123 states that the Egyptians believed in the immortality and transmigration of the soul, and adds: τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶ οἱ Ἕλληνων ἐχρήσαντο, οἱ μὲν πρότερον οἱ δὲ ὕστερον, ὡς ἰδίῳ ἑωυτῶν ἐόντι· τῶν ἐγὼ εἰδὼς τὰ οὐνόματα οὐ γράφω. He doubtless refers, as Grote says, to the Orphic and Pythagorean sects; to whom may be added Empedokles.

12. ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζώων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν] It is true, as Olympiodoros remarks, that we cannot from

κατὰ ζώων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ ἐυλλήβδην ὅσα περ ἔχει γένεσιν,  
 Ε περὶ πάντων ἴδωμεν, ἄρ' οὕτως ἰγίνεται πάντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ  
 τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὃν τοιοῦτόν τι, οἷον  
 τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχυρῷ ἐναντίον που καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, καὶ ἄλλα  
 δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. τοῦτο οὖν σκεψώμεθα, ἄρα ἀναγκαῖον, 5  
 ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμῶθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ  
 τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου. οἷον ὅταν μείζον τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη που

this particular sentence infer τὸν Πλάτωνα πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀθανατίζειν. But since Olymp. implies that Plato did not hold all soul to be immortal, it may be as well to point out that he did; cf. *Phaedrus* 245 c. Moreover a glance at any passage treating of metempsychosis (e.g. *Phaedrus* 249 b) will show us that Plato was not so irrational as to deny immortality to the souls of beasts, while conceding it to those of men; and *Timaeus* 77 A foll. proves that he was not so unscientific as to draw a hard and fast line between animal and vegetable life.

In the present passage Plato appeals to the uniformity of nature. If the presence of a given condition in any of the *γινόμενα* is the result of a *γένεσις*, it must be a *γένεσις* from the opposite condition, where such an opposite exists: if a thing has become cold it must have been warm and so forth. We observe moreover that in all instances there exist *γενέσεις* in both directions, whence we infer that alternation is a law of nature. And since we see that this law is in force in all cases which fall under our experience, it is fair to assume that it is in force in all cases where our experience fails us. Accordingly when between a pair of opposites we observe one *γένεσις* occurring, while the other *γένεσις* is from the nature of things beyond our observation, we may infer that the latter also occurs though we cannot perceive it.

7. τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου] I see no necessity to read αὐτῷ, with Z. from Baiter's conjecture.

μείζον] The use of the comparative throughout denotes that the condition is the result of a *γένεσις*. We shall presently see the application of this. The positive, in such terms as μέγα—σμικρόν, ταχύ—βραδύ, though these all express relations, implies no self-regarding relation. We must therefore use the comparative to denote a relation between two successive conditions of the same object. But any positive which necessarily implied a relation of one and the same object to itself in another condition would answer just the same purpose as the comparative. Such a positive we actually find in the word τεθνηκός, which logically implies ζῶν as a previous condition of the object. Therefore whatever generalisation we establish between μείζον—ἐλαττον, θάπτον—βραδύτερον etc., holds good also of ζῶν and τεθνηκός. And since we affirm that between every pair of these comparatives two *γενέσεις* take place, therefore between ζῶν and τεθνηκός, besides the *γένεσις* that we see, viz. ἀποθνήσκειν, there must be another *γένεσις* that we do not see, viz. ἀναβιώσκεισθαι; if we are to suppose that the operation of nature is uniform. The comparatives in fact show under what circumstances *γενέσεις* take place, i.e. between opposite conditions of the same thing.

ἐξ ἐλάττονος ὄντος πρότερον ἔπειτα μείζον γίνεσθαι; Ναί.  
 Οὐκοῦν κἂν ἔλαττον γίγηται, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον  
 ὕστερον ἔλαττον γενήσεται; Ἔστιν οὕτω, ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν ἐξ 71  
 ἰσχυροτέρου τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θαττον;  
 5 Πάνυ γε. Τί δέ; ἂν τι χεῖρον γίγηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνονος, καὶ  
 ἂν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ἰκανῶς οὖν,  
 ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ  
 ἐναντία πράγματα; Πάνυ γε. Τί δ' αὖ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν  
 αὐτοῖς, οἷον μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν  
 10 ὄντοιν δύο γενέσεις, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἐτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀπὸ δ'  
 αὖ τοῦ ἐτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον· μείζονος μὲν πράγματος  
 καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ αὖθις καὶ φείσις, καὶ καλούμεν οὕτω τὸ  
 μὲν αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φείνειν; Ναί, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνε-  
 σθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα  
 15 οὕτω, κἂν εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ  
 γοῦν πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον, γίνεσθαι τε αὐτὰ ἐξ  
 ἀλλήλων γενέσιν τε εἶναι ἐξ ἐκατέρου εἰς ἄλληλα; Πάνυ μὲν  
 οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

XVI. Τί οὖν; ἔφη, τῷ ζῆν ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, ὥσπερ τῷ ἐγρη- C  
 20 γορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί; Τὸ τεθνήσκειν,  
 ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἀλλήλων τε γίγνεται ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἐναντία  
 ἐστίν, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο δυοῖν ὄντοιν;  
 Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Τὴν μὲν τοίνυν ἐτέραν συζυγίαν ὧν νῦν δὴ  
 ἔλεγον ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέ-  
 25 σεις· σὺ δέ μοι τὴν ἐτέραν. Λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν, τὸ  
 δὲ ἐγρηγορέναι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ ἐγρηγορέναι γίνεσθαι  
 καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτοῖν D  
 τὴν μὲν καταδραράναι εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι. Ἰκανῶς σοι,  
 ἔφη, ἦ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Λέγε δὴ μοι καὶ σύ, ἔφη, οὕτω  
 30 περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φησὶ τῷ ζῆν τὸ  
 τεθνήσκειν εἶναι; Ἐγώ γε. Γίνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων; Ναί. Ἐξ  
 οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γιγνόμενον; Τὸ τεθνηκός, ἔφη. Τί δέ,  
 ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεώτος; Ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ

15. κἂν εἰ μή] *i.e.* the processes exist, even in those cases where we have no names to describe them. The argument is that were there no alternation of processes we should have all things at last stationary on one side or the other.

17. ἐξ ἐκατέρου] Schanz brackets

these words: they are not indeed necessary but the pleonasm seems to me Platonic, and their omission seriously impairs the rhythm.

24. ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ] Sokrates pursues the same plan in 105 B foll. καὶ μὴ μοι ὁ ἄν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ.



ζών. Ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ὦ Κέβης, τὰ ζώντά τε καὶ οἱ  
 ζῶντες γίγνονται; φαίνεται, ἔφη. Εἰςὶν ἄρα, ἔφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ  
 ἡμῶν ἐν Ἄϊδου. Ἔοικεν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖν γενεσέοιν τοῖν  
 περὶ ταῦτα ἢ γ' ἑτέρα σαφὲς οὐσα τυγχάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνή-  
 σκειν σαφὲς δῆπου, ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πῶς οὖν, ἢ 5  
 δ' ὅς, ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν,  
 ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ χωλὴ ἔσται ἢ φύσις; ἢ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ  
 ἀποθνήσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν; Πάντως που, ἔφη. Τίνα  
 ταύτην; Τὸ ἀναβιώσκεισθαι. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ  
 72 ἀναβιώσκεισθαι, ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἂν εἴη γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζών- 10  
 τας αὐτῇ, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεισθαι; Πάνυ γε. Ὁμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν  
 καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι οὐδὲν  
 ἥττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεώτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων· τούτου δὲ ὄντος  
 ἱκανόν που ἑδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς τῶν τεθνεώ-  
 των ψυχὰς εἶναί που, ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι. Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, 15  
 ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν.

XVII. Ἴδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδίκως

1. ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων] It is necessary to remember the exact sense of the two opposites, according to the definition given in 64 c καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγέναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγείσαν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι. ζῶν then is applied to soul and body united, τεθνηκὸς to soul and body asunder. A very similar use of the word ζῶν is to be found in *Soph. Oed. Col.* 999 οἷς ἐγὼ οὐδὲ τὴν πατρὸς | ψυχὴν ἂν οἶμαι ζῶσαν ἀντειπεῖν ἐμοί. The soul of Laios is certainly not regarded as extinct, therefore ζῶσαν can only mean 'if it returned to bodily life.'

12. καὶ ταύτῃ] i.e. by demonstration as well as by tradition; cf. 70 c.

14. ἑδόκει] 70 d.

17. ἰδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως] In this chapter we have a statement of the fundamental principle on which not only the foregoing argument but all

Plato's reasoning in favour of immortality is based: viz. that the sum total of spirit is a constant quantity. Plato has seized upon this principle of 'conservation of energy' as the only rational method of defending the indestructibility of soul; he has applied to spirit the axiom which previous philosophers laid down for matter; as Anaxagoras expresses it, γινώσκειν χρὴ ὅτι πάντα οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω ἔστιν οὐδὲ πλέω· οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστὸν πάντων πλέω εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἴσα αἰεῖ. Similarly the πύκνωσις καὶ ἀραίωσις of Anaximenes, the ὁδὸς ἄνω καὶ κάτω of Herakleitos, the σύγκρισις καὶ διάκρισις of Empedokles, all implied that γένεσις was not creation out of nothing but a passing from one form into another. Cf. Aristotle *Metaph.* K vi 1062<sup>b</sup> 23 τὸ γὰρ μηθὲν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος γίγνεσθαι πᾶν δ' ἐξ ὄντος, σχεδὸν πάντων ἐστὶ κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν περὶ φύσεως.

The connexion between this chapter and the preceding may be

ὁμολογήκαμεν, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ αἰ ἀνταποδιδόη τὰ  
 ἕτερα τοῖς ἐτέροις γιγνώμενα ὥσπερ κύκλῳ περιπόντα, ἀλλ' ὅ  
 εὐθεία τις εἴη ἡ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἐτέρου μόνον εἰς τὸ καταπτικρὺ  
 καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτει πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲ καμπὴν ποιοῖτο,  
 5 οἷον ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἂν σχοίη καὶ τὸ  
 αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι καὶ παύσαιτο γιγνώμενα; Πῶς λέγεις;  
 ἔφη. Οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι ὃ λέγω· ἀλλ' οἷον  
 εἰ τὸ καταδαρθέειν μὲν εἴη, τὸ δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταπο-  
 διδοίη γιγνώμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος, οἷον ὅτι τελευτῶντα  
 10 πάντ' <ἂν> λήρον τὸν Ἐνδυμῖωνα ἀποδείξειεν καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν C  
 φαίνοιτο, διὰ τὸ καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ταύτων ἐκείνῳ πεπονημένοι,  
 [καθεύδειν]. καὶ εἰ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ μή,  
 ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα.  
 ὡσαύτως δέ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, εἰ ἀποθηήσκοι μὲν πάντα, ὅσα τοῦ

stated thus. The condition denoted by either of the opposite epithets, such as *μείζον*, *ἔλαττον*, etc., has been attained by means of a transition from the opposite condition. Now, taking the two poles denoted by *ζῶν* and *τεθνηκός*, we have seen that a thing which is at the pole *τεθνηκός* has arrived there by a *γένεσις* from the pole *ζῶν*, and a thing at the pole *ζῶν* by a *γένεσις* from the pole *τεθνηκός*. But so far as the argument in chapters xv, xvi is concerned, there is nothing to show that what is now at one pole shall swing back to the other. We know that what is now *μείζον* has been *ἔλαττον*, and *vice versa*. Similarly we know that what is now *ζῶν* has been *τεθνηκός*, and what is now *τεθνηκός* has been *ζῶν*. But, so far, what is now *τεθνηκός* may remain so for ever. The proof that this cannot be is not reached until the present chapter, where it is shown (as concerns *ζῶν* and *τεθνηκός* only) that what is at a given time at one pole must swing back to the other—that what is now *τεθνηκός* must again be *ζῶν*, else all things would in the end be *τεθνηκότα*.

1. εἰ γὰρ μὴ αἰ] 'for if there

were not a perpetual correspondence between the two in generation, just as if they revolved in a circle.'—COPE. *ἀνταποδιδόη* is here intransitive, as in Aristotle *Meteor.* I xi 347<sup>b</sup> 32 ὥς δ' ἐκεῖ χάλασα, ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἀνταποδίδωσι τὸ ὅμοιον. Cf. below 72 B.

3. εὐθεία τις] This of course implies that the straight line is finite, i.e. there is not an indefinite quantity of soul in existence, nor can fresh souls be created out of nothing. Plato has taken his metaphor from the *διάνυλος δρόμος*.

5. τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα] compare *Phaedrus* 245 D ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσαν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στήναι καὶ μήποτε αὐθις ἔχειν ὅθεν κινηθέντα γενήσεται.

10. πάντ' ἂν] I have followed Schanz and others in supplying *ἂν*. *ἀποδείξειεν* could hardly stand without it, since the subject of *φαίνοιτο* is different. Z. omits it.

12. [καθεύδειν] This seems to be a gloss, and it was condemned by Dobree: the editors, however, retain it.

13. ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα] The *ὁμοιομερῆ* of Anaxagoras, infinite in

Ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀποθάνοι, μένοι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι  
 τὰ τεθνεώτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώσκοιτο, ἄρ' οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη  
 D τελευτῶντα πάντα τεθνάναι καὶ μὴδὲν Ζῆν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν  
 ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θνήσκοι, τίς μηχανὴ μὴ  
 οὐ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι; Οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, 5  
 ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθεῖ  
 λέγειν. Ἔστιν γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, παντὸς  
 μᾶλλον οὕτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατώμενοι ὁμολο-  
 γοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεισθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν  
 τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς 10  
 εἶναι.

number and infinitely divisible, were mixed in formless confusion until νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησεν.

3. ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων] *i.e.* ἐκ τῶν μὴ τεθνεώτων, as Heindorf saw. If τὰ ζῶντα were derived from a reserve store of existence which had not passed through life and death, in time this store would be exhausted and all be absorbed in death. The converse is stated in *Republic* 611 A τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτως ἐχέτω. εἰ δ' ἔχει, ἐννοεῖς ὅτι [αἱ ψυχαί] ἀεὶ ἂν εἶεν αἱ αὐταί. οὐτε γὰρ ἂν ἐλάττους γένοιοντο μηδεμιᾶς ἀπολλυμένης οὐτε αὖ πλείους· εἰ γὰρ ὅτιοῦν τῶν ἀθανάτων πλεον γίγνοιτο, οἶσθ' ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ θνητοῦ γίγνοιτο καὶ πάντα ἂν εἴη τελευτῶντα ἀθάνατα.

10. τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι] After these words the mss. have καὶ ταῖς μέν γ' (or μὲν) ἀγαθαῖς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον. The inconsequence of this stupid interpolation is so glaring that I have ejected the clause bodily from the text: its author, whose memory is sounder than his logic, was doubtless prompted by 63 C πολλὰ ἄμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς. The words are retained by Hermann and the Zürich editors, bracketed by Stallbaum and Schanz.

72 E—76 D, cc. xviii—xxi. Kebes

observes that another line of argument tends to show that our souls are immortal, the theory that learning is reminiscence. If questions are properly put, the right answers are elicited, showing that the knowledge sought exists in the mind of the respondent; as we see in the case of geometrical truths. For the satisfaction of Simmias Sokrates adds the following demonstration. Reminiscence we define as recalling to mind something we formerly knew but had forgotten. For instance, a lover on seeing a lyre thinks of his beloved who used the lyre; similarly a picture of a lyre or a horse may remind us of a man, a picture of Simmias may remind us of Kebes, or finally a picture of Simmias may remind us of Simmias himself: so that we see reminiscence may be effected either directly or indirectly. Now if it is effected directly, that is, if the object we perceive is similar to that which it calls to our minds, we cannot fail to notice how far the resemblance is exact. For example: we affirm that there is an idea of equality, which is called to our minds by our perception of sensibles which are equal. That this idea is something distinct from the equal sensibles is clear; for the sensibles may appear equal to one observer,

XVIII. Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν, καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνόν <sup>Ε</sup>  
 γε τὸν λόγον, ὥς Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθὲς ἐστίν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ  
 λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει  
 οὖσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ  
 5 μεμασθῆκέναι ἢ νῦν ἀναμνησκόμεθα· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ  
 μὴ ἦν που ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἶδει 73  
 γενέσθαι. ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχὴ τι ἔοικεν εἶναι.  
 Ἀλλὰ, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπολαβὼν, ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀπο-  
 δείξεις; ὑπόμνησόν με· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι.  
 10 Ἐνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ  
 ἄνθρωποι, ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ἣ  
 ἔχει· καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὁρθὸς  
 λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἶοί τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι· ἐπεὶ τοι ἐάν τις ἐπὶ

unequal to another; but about the idea of equality no difference of opinion can exist. Now we are to observe that all sensible equals appear to us as falling short of the standard of absolute equality, which plainly shows that our knowledge of absolute equality is prior to our perception of the sensibles. And whereas (1) this sense of deficiency in the sensibles has been present so long as we have had any perceptions of them, (2) our perceptions of them date from the moment of our birth, it inevitably follows that our knowledge of the idea must have been acquired before our birth (75 c). Now this of course applies to all ideas as well as to that of equality. Since then we have obtained this knowledge, two alternatives are open: either we are born in full possession of it and retain it through life, or we lose it at birth and gradually regain it. The first must be dismissed on this ground: if a man knows a thing he can give an account of it, but we see that men cannot give an account of the ideas: it follows then that the second alternative is true; we lose it, and all learning is but the recovery of it.

And since our souls certainly did not acquire this knowledge during their human life they must have gained it before our birth and at birth lost it.

The argument from ἀνάμνησις proves the existence of the soul before birth; thus supplementing ἀνταπόδοσις which is chiefly used to show her existence after death. Moreover ἀνάμνησις shows, what ἀνταπόδοσις did not, that the soul δύναμιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχει apart from the body.

2. <sup>2</sup> **ὃν σὺ εἴωθας**] This must not be regarded as true of the historic Sokrates; although, like Plato, he regarded knowledge rather as something to be elicited from the pupil than introduced into him.

11. <sup>11</sup> **ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ**] Olympiodoros' explanation of καλῶς deserves perpetuation: ὁρθῶς καὶ Πλατωνικῶς καὶ μὴ Περιπατητικῶς καὶ μὴ βωμολόχως. Plato's views will be best understood by comparing *Theaetetus* 149 A—151 D with *Republic* 518 B—D.

13. <sup>13</sup> **ποιῆσαι**] I have followed Schanz in adopting Hirschig's emendation. I cannot believe in such a construction as οἶοί τε ποιή-

- Β τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα  
κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ γε, ἔφη, πείθει,  
ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι δὴ τῇδέ πῃ σοι ἂν σκοπούμεν  
συνδόξῃ. ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δὴ, πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησις  
ἐστίν; Ἀπιστῶ μέν σοι ἔγωγε, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σιμμίαις, οὐ, αὐτὸ δὲ 5  
τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι. καὶ  
σχεδὸν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ἦδη μέμνημαι καὶ  
πειθόμαι· οὐδὲν μὲν τῶν ἡττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν, πῃ δὲ ἐπεχείρησε  
C λέγειν. Τῇδ' ἔγωγε, ἢ δ' ὅς. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δήπου, εἴ τις  
τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίσταςθαι. 10  
Πάνυ γ' ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τότε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη  
παραγίγνηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι; λέγω δέ τίνα  
τρόπον τόνδε· ἐάν τις τι [πρότερον] ἢ ἰδῶν ἢ ἀκούσας ἢ τίνα  
ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γινῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον  
ἐννοήσῃ, οὐ μὴ ἢ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἄλλ' ἄλλη, ἄρα οὐκὶ τοῦτο 15  
D δικαίως ἐλέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οὐ τὴν ἐννοιαν ἔλαβεν; Πῶς  
λέγεις; Οἷον τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἄλλη που ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας.

σειν, and not a single instance has been adduced in its defence. The fact that *κινδυνεύειν* sometimes is followed by the future infinitive is quite irrelevant. Z. and St. have *ποιήσεν*.

ἐπεῖ τοι] So Heindorf for *ἔπειτα*. This seems absolutely required by the sense: surely the geometrical demonstrations are meant to furnish an instance of what Kebes has just been saying, not an additional piece of evidence for *ἀνάμνησις*. H. Schmidt has much to say against Heindorf and for the vulgate; but the cogency of his argument is not proportionate to its length. *ἔπειτα* is retained by Z. St. and Schanz.

1. τὰ διαγράμματα] mathematical diagrams. The interrogation of the slave in *Meno* 82 B foll. is of course a case in point.

2. κατηγορεῖ] Subject the same as of *ἄγῃ*: it has been suggested that *κατηγορεῖ* is impersonal, but there is not a shadow of authority for such a use.

6. παθεῖν] mss. *μαθεῖν*, which is

retained by Wohlrab and defended by Schmidt. But *παθεῖν* is so much more pointed and the alteration is so slight, that I have followed Schanz and most of the later editors in adopting it. 'I desire personal experience of the very thing we are talking about.'

13. ἐάν τις τι [πρότερον] It is possible to defend *πρότερον*, since the perception must precede the reminiscence. But there is no point in this, and the word seems to have crept in from *πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίσταςθαι* above.

14. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ] This is probably the earliest mention of what has been known since Locke as 'association of ideas.' Compare Aristotle *περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως* II 451<sup>b</sup> 16, where he refines upon the simple classification of Plato (*ἀφ' ὁμοίων καὶ ἀνομοίων*) by starting the sequence *ἀφ' ὁμοίου καὶ ἐναντίου καὶ τοῦ σύνεγγυς*: he deals too with the process as an act of volition.

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν οἶσα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν ἴδωσιν λύραν ἢ ἱμάτιον ἢ ἄλλο τι οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἶωθε χρῆσθαι, πάσχοιςι τοῦτο· ἔγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδός, οὗ ἦν ἡ λύρα; τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις·  
 5 ὥσπερ καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη. Μυρία μέντοι νῦν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησις τίς ἐστι; Εἰ μάλιστα μέντοι, ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάσῃ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπελέληστο; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.  
 10 Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς· ἐστὶν ἵππον γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνήσθηναι, καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνήσθηναι; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου ἀναμνήσθηναι; Ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη.

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15 XIX. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων; Συμβαίνει. Ἄλλ' ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμνησκηταί τις τι, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὐ ἀνεμνήσθη;  
 20 Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Σκόπει δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φημέν πού τι εἶναι ἵσον, οὐ ζύλον λέγω ζύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἵσον· φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν; Φῶμεν μέντοι νῦν Β

9. ἐπελέληστο] Compare the definition in *Laws* 732 B ἀνάμνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἐπιρροή φρονήσεως ἀπολείπουσας.

12. οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα] The order in which these illustrations are arranged seems at first sight strange. For instead of working up from the simpler and more direct cases of association to the more complex, we have, as it were, a descending scale: it is surely more remarkable that the picture of a lyre should remind us of some particular human being than that a picture of Simmias should remind us of the living Simmias. But the explanation is simple, if we remember how Plato intends to apply his analogy. The particulars, by which we are reminded of

the ideas, stand in much the same relation to the ideas as the painted Simmias to the real Simmias: hence by this arrangement of his examples Plato emphasises exactly the right form of the analogy. This is one of ten thousand proofs of the astonishing carefulness of Plato's writing. Also it is worth noticing that although the relation between ideas and particulars is in the *Phaedo*, as in the *Republic*, still undefined (see 100 D), this passage distinctly foreshadows the doctrine of *μίμησις*, which is evolved in the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*.

16. εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὁμοίων] as in the last example of the previous chapter. Reminiscence of the ideas by means of the particulars is ἀνάμνησις ἀφ' ὁμοίων.

Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε. Ἡ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἅττα ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἕτερον ὃν τούτων; ἢ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῆδε. 5 ἄρ' οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίστε ταῦτα ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ' οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν

2. λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην] This does not mean that the knowledge of the idea is derived from the particulars, which is in itself impossible and is contradictory to 75 B: but the knowledge that we possess of the idea is awakened by the perception of the particulars. *ἔννοια* is the more accurate word used later on. Cf. 74 C τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννεόηκός τε καὶ εἰληφας. The simile of the aviary in *Theaetetus* 197 D would not be unapt here: knowledge of the idea is our possession, but it is not actually in our grasp until awakened by *ἀνάμνησις*.

5. σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῆδε] The following sentences furnish proof of the independent existence of the idea; in 74 D begins the proof that our knowledge of it must have been prior to our observation of the particulars.

6. τῷ μὲν] So Schanz with B. The ordinary reading is *τοτὲ μὲν . . . τοτὲ δέ*, which Schleiermacher approves on the ground that the defective equality of the particulars appears in their seeming to the same observer now equal now unequal. Prof. Geddes takes the same view: 'Plato is not reasoning from the variety of judgments among men generally: his argumentation proceeds as if there was but one soul in the universe to hold converse with the outer world.' Surely this is quite unnecessary. The existence of a conflict of opinion is sufficient to establish the difference between

the particulars and the idea: in the case of the latter no such conflict does or can exist. *τοτὲ* has inferior ms. support and is clumsy after *ἐνίστε*.

7. αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα] This very strange phrase has a parallel in *Parmenides* 129 B *εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά τις ἀπέφαιεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοια, τέρας ἂν, οἶμαι, ἦν*. In the present passage various explanations have been given: (1) that of Olympiodoros, that the plural represents the idea as thought by several minds; this is adopted by most commentators: (2) that it represents the idea as exemplified in several sets of equal particulars; to this approximates the view of Schneider, that *αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα* means the separate ideas of equal logs, equal stones etc. But who ever heard of the idea of an equal log? (3) Doederlein supposes that *αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα* means perfectly equal objects, such as can be conceived but do not exist in nature. But this makes Sokrates ask 'do things, which *ex hypothesi* seem to you equal, seem to you unequal?' besides there is no point in the introduction of these imaginary equals. (4) Heindorf seems to me to come much nearer the truth. After quoting the *Parmenides* he adds 'multitudinis numerus adhiberi in his potuit, quoniam aequalitatis vel similitudinis notio non unum continet, sed ad duo certe refertur.' When Plato asks 'does the idea of equality seem equal or

ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης; Οὐδεπώποτε γε, ὦ C  
 Cώκρατες. Οὐ ταῦτ' ἄρα ἐστίν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ  
 αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον. Οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Cώκρατες. Ἀλλὰ μὴν  
 ἐκ τούτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἐτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου,  
 5 ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννενόηκας τε καὶ εἴληφας; Ἀλη-  
 θεέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. [Οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἢ ἀνο-  
 μοίου; Πάνυ γε. Διαφέρει δέ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐδέν· ἕως ἄν  
 ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὁψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσῃς, εἴτε ὅμοιον  
 εἴτε ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι. Πάνυ D  
 10 μὲν οὖν.] Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς· ἢ πάσχομέν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰ

unequal?' the implied comparison compels him perforce to use the plural; not that he thinks there are more ideas of equality than one, but because to ask whether one thing is equal or unequal is sheer nonsense. He immediately explains the unusual phrase in the following words, 'I mean, does equality ever appear to you inequality?' By the time Plato wrote the *Parmenides* he had got rid of these unfortunate ideas of relations: for in the passage quoted Sokrates is stating the earlier form of the ideal theory; and probably he there used the plural not without the intention of pointing to the contradiction which such ideas involve. Schleiermacher takes *αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα* to be the particulars; but his explanation is in itself very unsatisfactory and requires an alteration of the text.

2. *ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα*] i.e. the equal particulars.

5. *ἐννενόηκας τε καὶ εἴληφας*] 'you have recalled and gained'; see on 73 c.

6. [*οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος*] From the passage enclosed in brackets I have utterly failed to extract any meaning. Plato has just completed his proof that equal particulars carry back our minds to an idea of equality which is distinct from the particulars: next he is about to show that our knowledge

of the idea must have been prior to our observation of the particulars. But between these two necessary links in his argument we find interposed an irrelevant remark to the effect that the process is called *ἀνάμνησις* whether the object of perception is like or unlike the object of reminiscence. In the present context the repeated definition of *ἀνάμνησις* is surely pointless; and worse than pointless is the re-introduction of the *ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον*: for the reminiscence of the idea by means of the particulars is necessarily *ἀφ' ὁμοίου*. I am therefore compelled to treat the words down to *πάνυ μὲν οὖν* as an interpolation: a conclusion at which I find Susemihl and Schmidt have also arrived. Stallbaum has an elaborate defence of the words, which might possibly have been more successful had he understood the difficulty. Prof. Geddes (not however on this passage) suggests that particulars may remind us of other ideas besides that to which they belong. But the whole force of the argument comes from the fact that this kind of reminiscence is *ἀφ' ὁμοίου*, for in this case alone are we conscious of a defect in the resemblance (74 Δ); and our consciousness of this defect is our sole warrant for inferring that we must have known the ideas before we perceived the particulars (74 Ε).



ἐν τοῖς πύλοισι καὶ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἴσοις· ἄρα φαίνεται  
 ἡμῖν οὕτως ἵσα εἶναι ὥσπερ αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου  
 τοῦ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ οὐδέν; Καὶ πολὺ γε, ἔφη,  
 ἐνδεῖ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ, ὅτι  
 βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο, ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ ὀρώ, εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν  
 5 ὄντων, ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο,  
 ἀλλ' ἔστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα  
 τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ᾧ φησιν αὐτὸ προσοικέναι μὲν, ἐνδε-  
 εστέρωσ δὲ ἔχειν; Ἀνάγκη. Τί οὖν; τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ  
 ἡμεῖς, ἢ οὔ, περὶ τε τὰ ἵσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον; Παντάπασί γε. 10  
 Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου,  
 75 ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἵσα ἐνενόησαμεν, ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν  
 πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρωσ. Ἔστι  
 ταῦτα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τότε ὁμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ  
 ἐννενοηκέναι μὴδὲ δυνατόν εἶναι ἐννοῆσαι ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν 15  
 ἢ ἄψασθαι ἢ ἐκ τινος ἄλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων· ταῦτόν δὲ πάντα  
 ταῦτα λέγω. Ταῦτόν γάρ ἔστιν, ὧς Σώκρατες, πρὸς γε ὃ βού-  
 λεται δηλῶσαι ὁ λόγος. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἐκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ  
 B ἐννοῆσαι ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὀρέγεται τοῦ  
 ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεεστερά ἔστιν· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν; 20  
 Οὕτως. Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὀρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ  
 τᾶλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει που εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ  
 τοῦ ἴσου ὃ τι ἔστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἵσα

2. ὥσπερ αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν] St. adds ἴσον, which Z. has within brackets: but the word is absent in the best mss.

ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου] 'or does it fall short of the idea, that is of being similar to it.' This is the reading of Schanz, which seems quite satisfactory and is very close to the mss. The common reading is τῷ μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, which is excellent sense, but μὴ is almost destitute of authority. Madvig would read ἐκείνῳ τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, 'does there lack anything to that quality of being like': a specimen of Greek composition which one would not rashly impute to Plato.

6. τοιοῦτον εἶναι] The mss. add

ἴσον, which is clearly a gloss. Schanz retains it within brackets.

16. ταῦτόν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω] 'I count all these sensations as the same thing'; as is shown by the following sentence; not, as Wagner says, 'I say the same of all these.'

19. πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν] Since all sensuous perceptions do not remind us of equality, Madvig would insert ἴσα after αἰσθήσεσιν, Schanz brackets ἴσον. Against bracketing ἴσον I would urge that it is premature to apply the present argument to all ideas: that is first done in 75 c: while the notion of equals so exclusively engrosses our attention throughout the present chapter that Madvig's insertion seems needless.

ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν [ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτ' εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἔστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα]. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἐωρώμεν τε καὶ ἠκούομεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις εἴχομεν; Πάνυ γε. Ἔδει C  
5 δέ γε, φασί, πρὸ τούτων τὴν τοῦ ἵσου ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι; Naί. Πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι. Ἔοικεν.

XX. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἔχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, ἠπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθὺς γενό-  
10 μενοι οὐ μόνον τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἕλαττον ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἵσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὀσίου καί, ὅπερ λέγω, περὶ πάντων οἷς D  
ἐπισφραγίζόμεθα τὸ ὅ ἔστι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες  
15 καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν τούτων πάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι.

1. [ὅτι προθυμεῖται . . . φαυλότερα] Schanz following Hirschig brackets these words: Dr. Jackson independently takes the same view. The objections to them are (1) that they are irrelevant and inapposite, (2) that the use of *προθυμεῖται* is most strange. I fully acquiesce in the judgment of these scholars that the clause is an unintelligent gloss upon *ἐκεῖσε*.

5. *πρὸ τούτων*] *i.e.* before our perceptions of sight, hearing, etc.

8. *οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες*] 'if then, having received this knowledge before birth, we were born in possession of it.' As yet Plato is merely putting the case, without expressing an opinion about it: presently we shall find that we were not born possessing it, except in a dormant state. We now go on to apply the results gained for *ἴσον* to all the other ideas.

13. *ὅπερ λέγω*] just above, *εὐμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα*.

*οἷς ἐπισφραγίζόμεθα*] 'on which we stamp the character of essence.'

*ὁ ἔστι* is Plato's technical term to denote the essentiality of the ideas. Plato never descends to forms like *αὐτοάνθρωπος*, which are common in Aristotle: he would say *αὐτὸ ὁ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος*.

14. *ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν . . . ἀποκρινόμενοι*] *i.e.* in our dialectical discussions. The conversational method was as distinctive a peculiarity of the form as the ideal theory was of the substance of Plato's philosophy; and so intimately are the two connected that *διαλεκτική*, properly 'the science of dialogue,' means nothing less than 'the science of ideas.' The Sokratic method of examination was distinctly aimed at obtaining a definition or *λόγος* of the object in question; and this definition was peculiarly the outcome of the method. Plato, in developing the logical concept into a metaphysical essence, scrupulously preserved the method by which the former was attained.

15. *ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν*] Z. adds *εἶναι* with some mss.

Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε λαβόντες ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιτελέμεθα, εἰδότες αἰεὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ διὰ βίου εἰδέναι· τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ' ἐστίν, λαβόντα του ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέκεναι· ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν, ὦ Σιμμία, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν;

Ε Πάντως δήπου, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἰ δέ γε οἶμαι λαβόντες 5 πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνώμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἅς ποτε καὶ πρὶν εἴχομεν, ἄρ' οὐχ ὁ καλούμεν μαθηάνειν οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἂν εἴη; τοῦτο δὲ που ἀναμνησκέσθαι λέγοντες ὁρῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν; Πάνυ γε. Δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ 10 76 τοῦτό γε ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενόν τι ἢ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα ἢ τίνα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβόντα ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐννοῆσαι ὁ ἐπελέληστο, ᾧ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν ἀνόμοιον ὃν ἢ ᾧ ὅμοιον· ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα, ἥτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον, οὓς φάμεν μαθηάνειν, 15 οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἀναμνησκονται οὗτοι, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἂν εἴη. Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

1. ἐκάστοτε] *i.e.* 'and if after receiving it we have not, in every instance of our doing so, forgotten it, we are always born in possession of this knowledge and retain it through life.' I do not think it necessary to insert *γιγνώμενοι* after *ἐκάστοτε* with Heindorf, although I fully agree with his interpretation. Prof. Geddes' rendering can hardly stand, and he, rather than Heindorf, seems to have mistaken the argument. 'If we have,' he says, 'in all the crises of our history, retained this knowledge.' But Plato does not say 'if we have retained,' but 'if we have not forgotten': and though it is sense to say 'if we have retained it in all the crises,' it is not sense to say 'if we have not forgotten it in all the crises'; since we have forgotten it once for all, and that, as Heindorf says, at our birth. I think in fact that *ἐκάστοτε* is to be taken in close connexion with *λαβόντες*: 'in every instance of our receiving it, we have not forgotten.' (Prof. Geddes is also scarcely

accurate in saying that *ἐπιστήμη* is *ἀνάμνησις*: Plato says *μάθησις* is *ἀνάμνησις*, which is another thing.) The perfect *ἐπιτελέσμεθα*, as Wohlrab rightly observes, shows that Plato still expresses no opinion.

7. περὶ ταῦτα] This reading seems necessary, although *αὐτὰ* has stronger ms. authority. *ταῦτα* means the objects of sense, in antithesis to *ἐκείνας*. Wohlrab retains *αὐτὰ* but does not inform us how he proposes to make sense of it.

8. οἰκείαν] 'a knowledge that is already ours.'

11. ἐφάνη] in 73 c.

12. ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου] 'to derive from this a conception of something different that he had forgotten, with which this was associated, whether unlike or like.'—COPE. *ᾧ* refers to *ἕτερόν τι ὁ ἐπελέληστο*, *τοῦτο* to *τούτου*. I see no sufficient reason for bracketing the second *ᾧ* with Schanz. Here there is nothing amiss in the introduction of the *ὅμοιον* and *ἀνόμοιον*, for Plato is expressly repeating the statement in 73 c.

XXI. Πότερον οὖν αἰρεῖ, ὦ Σιμμία; ἐπισταμένους ἡμᾶς  
γεγονέναι, ἢ ἀναμνησκέσθαι ὕστερον ὢν πρότερον ἐπιστήμην B  
εἰληφότες ἡμεν; Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐλέσθαι.  
Τί δέ; τόδε ἔχεις ἐλέσθαι, καὶ πῇ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ· ἀνὴρ  
5 ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται ἔχει ἂν δοῦναι λόγον ἢ οὐ;  
Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἦ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες  
ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; Βου-  
λοίμην μὲν τᾶν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβούμαι,  
μὴ αὐρίον τηνικάδε οὐκέτι ἢ ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς ἀξίως οἶός τε  
10 τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. Οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαι γε, ἔφη, ὦ C  
Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτά; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀναμνησκονται ἄρα ἅ ποτε  
ἔμαθον; Ἀνάγκη. Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστή-  
μην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀφ' οὗ γε ἀνθρώποι γεγονάμεν. Οὐ  
δῆτα. Πρότερον ἄρα. Ναί. Ἦσαν ἄρα, ὦ Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ  
15 καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἶδει, χωρὶς σωματῶν,  
καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον. Εἰ μὴ ἄρα γιγνώμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὦ  
Σώκρατες, ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας· οὗτος γὰρ λείπεται ἔτι ὁ  
χρόνος. Εἶεν, ὦ ἐταῖρε· ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ D

5. δοῦναι λόγον] 'to give an account'; that is an accurate description of the thing defined, marking its logical differentia. A passage quoted by Wohlrab, *Republic* 534 B, explains the phrase very well: ἡ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχη λόγον αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν; where we may translate λόγον τῆς οὐσίας 'the principle of its being.' Compare also 531 E. Below, 99 E, there will be more to say about λόγος.

7. περὶ τούτων] i.e. the ideas.

15. χωρὶς σωματῶν] This does not necessarily follow: Plato however simply means apart from the human bodies in which they now dwell: cf. 114 C, where the purified souls are said to live ἀνευ σωματῶν τὸ παράπαν, although the conditions of their existence are obviously conceived as material. The body

from which they are freed by death is the γήινον σῶμα of *Phaedrus* 246 c. In the following words καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον Plato marks the additional result he has gained by the appeal to ἀνάμνησις.

18. ἀπόλλυμεν δέ] Simmias suggests that the knowledge may be acquired just at the moment of birth; Sokrates replies, it is impossible, for that is the very moment at which we lose it: we cannot gain and lose it simultaneously. Compare *Republic* 621 A, where the souls that are on the point of returning to earth must drink of the river Ameles. In comparing this passage, as Prof. Geddes does, with Wordsworth's famous ode, it ought not to be left out of sight that there is a fundamental opposition between them. According to Wordsworth we are born with the ante-natal radiance clinging about us and spend our lives in gradually losing it; according to Plato we lose the vision at birth and spend our lives in

χρόνῳ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντές γε αὐτὰς γιγνώμεθα, ὥς ἄρτι ὁμολογήσαμεν· ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν, ἐν ᾧ περ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἢ ἔχεις ἄλλον τινὰ εἰπεῖν χρόνον; Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ ἔλαθον ἑμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών.

XXII. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη, ἡμῖν, ὦ Σιμμία; εἰ μὲν 5  
ἔστιν ἃ ἐρυλοῦμεν ἀεὶ, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέρονται,  
E [ὑπάρχουσιν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὐσίαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνῃ ἀπεικάζομεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως] ὥς περ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγενῆσθαι ἡμᾶς· 10  
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος οὕτως εἰρημένος εἴη; ἄρ' οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἴση ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγενῆσθαι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε; Ὑπερφυῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλὸν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως 15

gradually recovering it. This was pointed out by Mill: *Dissertations and Discussions* III 351.

76 D—77 B, c. xxii. The outcome of the preceding argument is this: the pre-existence of our souls is inseparably bound up with the existence of ideas and the former stands or falls with the latter. Simmias heartily assents to this and affirms his unshaken conviction that the ideas do exist and consequently that our souls existed before our birth.

8. [ὑπάρχουσιν πρότερον] Dr. Jackson, in the paper before mentioned, maintains that the words from ὑπάρχουσιν to ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως are spurious. In this opinion I concur for the following reasons: (1) the clause ὑπάρχουσιν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὐσίαν would seem just the same kind of clumsy misapplication of Plato's phraseology of which we have already seen too much: Plato says (75 E) that the knowledge of the ideas is our own; but where does he say that the ideas themselves are our own, and what is the sense of saying so? (2) ταῦτα

ἐκείνῃ ἀπεικάζομεν is a pointless repetition of ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀναφέρονται: (3) ταῦτα there means sensibles; presently ταῦτα three times refers to the ideas. Wyttenbach, on this very ground, proposes to read αὕτη ἔστιν: (4) though the repetition of οὕτως may be defended, it certainly sounds very awkward here. Accordingly I have bracketed the words. With this omission the sentence will stand: 'if these ideas exist which are for ever on our lips, absolute beauty and goodness and all other absolute essence, and if it is to this essence that we refer all our sense-perceptions, as this surely exists, so surely did our soul exist before our birth.' εἶναι will then depend upon οὕτως ἔχει.

11. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα] 'if these ideas do not exist'; not as some take it, 'if this is not so.' Cf. below ἴση ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε εἶναι.

13. εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε] i.e. if the ideas do not exist, neither did our souls exist before birth.

15. εἰς καλὸν γε] 'and our argument has found an excellent refuge in the position that the pre-existence of our soul rests on the same assur-

εἶναι τήν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν 77  
 ἦν αὐτὸς νῦν λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε οὐδὲν οὕτω μοι ἐναργὲς  
 ὢν ὡς τοῦτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτ' εἶναι ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα,  
 καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ἢ αὐτὸς νῦν δὴ ἔλεγε·  
 5 καί, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται. τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἔφη ὁ  
 Σωκράτης· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθειν. Ἰκανῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας,  
 ὡς ἔγωγε οἶμαι· καίτοι καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν πρὸς τὸ  
 ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις· ἀλλ' οἶμαι οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τοῦτο πεπεῖσθαι  
 αὐτόν, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ. B  
 10 XXIII. Εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι ἔσται, οὐδὲ  
 αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σωκράτες, ἀποδεδεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐνέ-  
 στηκεν ὁ νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἀπο-  
 θνήσκοντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδαννῆται ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτὴ τοῦ  
 εἶναι τοῦτο τέλος ᾗ. τί γὰρ κωλύει γίνεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ  
 15 εὐνίστασθαι ἀμόθεν ποῦν καὶ εἶναι, πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον  
 σώμα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἀφίκηται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τοῦτου,  
 τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευτᾶν καὶ διαφείρεσθαι; Εὐ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ C  
 Σιμμία, ὁ Κέβης. φαίνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἡμῖν ἀποδεδεῖσθαι οὐ  
 δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ· δεῖ δὲ πρὸς-

ance as the existence of the ideas.' Wagner should not have supplied *καιρὸν* with *καλόν*, which is explained by the sentence in apposition, *εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι*.

2. *ἦν αὐτὸς νῦν λέγεις*] *νῦν* is omitted in some mss. and Schanz brackets it.

5. καί, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται] This reading has the best authority, and Schanz defends the parenthetical use of *ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ* by citing 108 B, *Protagoras* 314 c, *Menexenus* 236 B. Z. and St. give *ἐμοιγε ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται*.

77 B—D, c. xxiii. But, continues Simmias, reminiscence only proves that our soul existed before entering into a human body: it does not prove that the soul on leaving the body may not be dissipated and perish. Kebes agrees that immortality is only half proved. Sokrates replies that the other half is supplied by the argument from alternation of

opposites, which proved that the soul must exist after death.

13. *διασκεδαννῆται*] The indicative can hardly be right here because we have *ᾗ* in the next clause, and the change of mood would be meaningless. A parallel form is the optative *πηγνῦτο* in 118 A. I do not see on what ground the accentuation *διασκεδάννυται* (as subjunctive) and *πήγνυτο* can be defended, since the forms are clearly contractions. Z. and St. have *διασκεδάννυται*.

14. τί γὰρ κωλύει] 'What reason is there why she should not come into being and union from somewhere or other and exist before she enters a human frame, but when she has entered one and is in act of leaving it, she should not at that moment herself come to an end and perish?'

15. ἀμόθεν ποῦν] This is Bekker's correction of *ἄλλοθεν*, which is retained by Z. and St.

αποδείξει· ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἦττον ἔσται ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἔχειν. Ἀποδέδεικται μὲν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ θέλετε συνθεῖναι τοῦτόν τε τὸν λόγον εἰς ταῦτόν καὶ ὃν πρὸ τούτου ὡμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίνεσθαι πᾶν τὸ ζῶν ἐκ τοῦ 5 τεθνεώτος. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἰούσῃ τε καὶ γιγνομένῃ μηδαμῶς ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθνάναι γίνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνῃ εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ γε δεῖ αὐτοῖς αὐτὴν γίνεσθαι; ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε καὶ νῦν. 10

XXIV. Ὅμως δέ μοι δοκεῖς σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἡδέως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύεσθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παίδων, μὴ ὥς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαίνουσιν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυγῇ καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν, ἄλλως 15 ἢ τε καὶ ὅταν τύχῃ τις μὴ ἐν νηνεμίᾳ ἀλλ' ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθνήσκων. καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάσας Ὡς δεδιότων, ἔφη,

3. εἰ θέλετε συνθεῖναι] I do not understand how, in the face of this express statement of Plato's, some have regarded ἀνταπόδοσις and ἀνάμνησις as two distinct demonstrations of immortality. As he says, they are two halves of a demonstration; one showing the pre-existence, the other the after-existence of the soul.

77 D—78 B, c. xxiv. Yet, says Sokrates, you and Simmias seem still to have a lurking fear lest the soul on leaving the body be scattered to the winds. Perhaps, replies Kebes, there is a child within us that still needs to be soothed; and soon there will be no man living who can soothe it. Do not despair, says Sokrates; wide is Hellas and wider is the world; you must spare neither pains nor riches to find such a man, not omitting to search among yourselves.

12. διαπραγματεύεσθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον] I think the misgivings of Simmias and Kebes arise thus. We have indeed seen that the recurrence of soul is a law

of nature; but we are not sufficiently acquainted with the laws of nature and the conditions of their interaction to be perfectly sure how they will work in every particular case. So we are still haunted by the doubt that a soul may, under certain circumstances, be dissipated and destroyed: this doubt can only be satisfied by proving that the eternity of soul can be deduced not only from a universal law but from her own inherent nature. Next ἀνάμνησις has placed the eternity of soul on the same footing of assurance as the existence of the ideas: but this is done indirectly; we desire to be convinced that soul not only has had cognition of the ideas, but that she possesses such an affinity with their nature as will justify us in believing that she shares their attribute of eternity; see introduction § 2.

14. διασκεδάννυσιν] Hirschig would read διασκεδαννύη. But here the indicative is clearly right. What we fear is, not lest the wind should blow the soul away, but lest it is a fact that it does so.

ὦ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν· μάλλον δὲ μὴ ὥς ἡμῶν δεδιό-  
 των, ἀλλ' ἵσως ἔτι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς, ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα  
 φοβεῖται· τοῦτον οὖν πειρώμεθα πείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν  
 θάνατον ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια. Ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης,  
 5 ἐπάδειν αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας, ἕως ἂν ἐξεπάσχητε. Πόθεν οὖν,  
 ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθὸν ἐπαρδὸν ληψόμεθα, 78  
 ἐπειδὴ σύ, ἔφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις; Πολλὴ μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς, ἔφη, ὦ  
 Κέβης, ἐν ἣ ἔναισι πού ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν  
 βαρβάρων γένη, οὓς πάντας χρή διερευνᾶσθαι ζητοῦντας τοιού-  
 10 τον ἐπαρδόν, μήτε χρημάτων φειδομένους μήτε πόνων, ὥς οὐκ  
 ἔστιν εἰς ὃ τι < ἂν > ἀναγκαιότερον ἀναλίσκοιτε χρήματα. ζητεῖν

2. ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς] 'there is a child within us'; not of course 'among us.'

5. ἐξεπάσχητε] 'until you have charmed him out of you.' This reading is due to Heindorf; the old editions and the best mss. have ἐξιάσχηται. Heindorf's admirable emendation is confirmed by one ms.

7. ἐπειδὴ σύ, ἔφη] For the repetition of ἔφη Wohlrab compares 89 c, 103 c, 118 a.

8. τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη] Plato's travels had caused him to form a more liberal estimate of barbarian possibilities than was usual in his time. Compare *Republic* 499 c εἰ τοίνυν ἄκροισ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν πόλεως τις ἀνάγκη ἐπιμελεσθῆναι ἢ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῷ παρελθούσῳ χρόνῳ ἢ καὶ νῦν ἔστιν ἐν τινὶ βαρβαρικῷ τόπῳ, πόρρω που ἐκτὸς ὄντι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπόψεως, ἢ καὶ ἔπειτα γενήσεται, περὶ τούτου ἔτοιμοι τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχασθαι, ὥς γέγονεν ἢ εἰρημένη πολιτεία καὶ ἔστι καὶ γενήσεται γε, ὅταν αὕτη ἡ Μοῦσα πόλεως ἐγκρατὴς γένηται. Cf. *Symposium* 209 E.

11. ἂν ἀναγκαιότερον] So Schanz with c: BD omit ἂν. Z. and St. give ἂν εὐκαιρότερον with E.

78 B—80 E, cc. xxv—xxix. The question is then, what kind of things are liable to dissolution and what are

not? and to which class does soul belong? That which is composite and consists of parts may doubtless be resolved again into parts; but if we can discover something which is incomposite and without parts we may safely affirm that this, if anything, is indissoluble. To the class of in-composites we should assign whatever is constant and changeless; to that of composites all that is ever-changing. Now this is precisely what constitutes the difference between the contents of the ideal and of the phenomenal world respectively: the ideas are changeless, simple, apprehensible by pure intelligence; phenomena are ever-changing, manifold, apprehensible by mere sensation. Let us term the former the invisible, the latter the visible world: to which sphere shall we assign soul and body respectively? (1) the body is visible, the soul is invisible: (2) when the soul apprehends by means of the bodily senses, she deals with the ever-changing and is herself filled with confusion and uncertainty; when she apprehends by herself, she deals with the changeless, and her own reflections are constant and sure: (3) when soul and body are together, the soul is mistress, the body is servant; and to command is the function of the divine, to obey is



δὲ χρὴ καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ῥαδίως εὔροιτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν. Ἄλλα ταῦτα  
 B μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, ὑπάρξει, ὁ Κέβης· ὅθεν δὲ ἀπελίπομεν ἐπανέλ-  
 θωμεν, εἴ σοι ἡδομένῳ ἐστίν. Ἄλλα μὴν ἡδομένῳ γε· πῶς γὰρ  
 οὐ μέλλει; Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

XXV. Οὐκοῦν τοιόνδε τι, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, δεῖ ἡμᾶς  
 ἐρέσθαι ἑαυτούς, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος  
 πάσχειν τοῦ διασκεδάννυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδιέναι  
 μὴ πάθῃ αὐτό, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ <οὔ>· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐπι-  
 σκέψασθαι, πότερον ἢ ψυχὴ ἐστίν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων εἰρρεῖν ἢ 10  
 δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς; Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ἄρ'  
 C οὐν τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθετῷ ὄντι φύσει προσήκει  
 τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαίρεσθαι ταύτῃ ἢ περ συντεθέν· εἰ δέ τι τυγ-  
 χάνει ὃν ἀζύνητον, τούτῳ μόνῳ προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα,  
 εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὁ Κέβης. 15  
 Οὐκοῦν ἄπερ αἰ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταῦτα μάλιστα  
 εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀζύνητα, ἃ δὲ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ μὴδέποτε κατὰ

that of the mortal. For these three reasons we decide that the affinity of soul is to the divine and changeless and indissoluble, the world of ideas; that of body to the mortal and changeful and dissoluble, the world of phenomena. Hence we should infer that while the body quickly decays the soul is nearly if not quite indissoluble. And as even a body that is embalmed lasts for an indefinite time, how much more enduring then should we expect the soul to be?

9. τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ οὔ] οὔ is not in the mss. but was supplied by Heindorf. It is certainly necessary.

12. καὶ συνθετῷ] As Prof. Geddes remarks, συνθετῷ denotes the state which is the result of the process expressed by συντεθέντι. Wagner wrongly takes φύσει with συνθετῷ: it belongs to προσήκει.

15. εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ] It is to be noticed that the present line of argument aims at nothing more than establishing a probability that soul is immortal; and as Kebes after-

wards points out, it merely shows that soul should be much more durable than body, not that she is inherently eternal. I consider the chief importance of this part of the dialogue to consist in the opening it gives for the objections of Simmias and Kebes. The former brings in a theory of soul which would be fatal to Plato's view, were it not refuted; the latter necessitates the final investigation, to which I conceive the present argument is merely preliminary. At the same time we are here first endeavouring to establish a direct connexion between the soul's nature and that of the ideas.

16. οὐκοῦν ἄπερ αἰ κατὰ ταῦτά] Change in any object is the result of transposition, compression, or separation of its parts, or of increase or decrease in their number. Consequently that which has no parts cannot suffer change. All material things have parts, therefore the immaterial objects of reason are alone changeless.

ταῦτά, ταῦτα δὲ κύνοετα; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. Ἰωμεν δὴ,  
 ἔφη, ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἐφ' ἅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία  
 ἥς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, D  
 πότερον ὡσαύτως αἰεὶ ἔχει κατὰ ταῦτα ἢ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως; αὐτὸ  
 5 τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν, [τὸ ὄν,] μὴ  
 ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἡντινοῦν ἐνδέχεται; ἢ αἰεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον  
 ὃ ἔστι, μονοειδὲς ὅν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχει  
 καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται;  
 Ὡσαύτως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.  
 10 Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν [καλῶν], οἷον ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων ἢ  
 ἱματίων ἢ ἄλλων ὠντινωτοῦν τοιούτων, ἢ ἴσων ἢ καλῶν ἢ E  
 πάντων τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων; ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχει, ἢ πᾶν  
 τοῦναντίον ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὐδέποτε,  
 ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταῦτα; Οὕτως, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.  
 15 οὐδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει. Οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν κἂν ἄψαιο κἂν 79  
 ἴδοις κἂν ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν αἴσθοιο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταῦτα  
 ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ ποτ' ἂν ἄλλῳ ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας  
 λογισμῷ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αἰεὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐκ ὁρατά; Παντά-  
 πας, ἔφη, ἀληθεὶ λέγεις.

20 XXVI. Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει, ἔφη, δύο εἶδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ

2. ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν λόγῳ] 75 D.

3. ἥς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι]

'as whose principle we assign being.'  
 λόγον = its definition, notion. τοῦ  
 εἶναι is descriptive genitive after  
 λόγον. Madvig proposes τὸ εἶναι,  
 which Schanz adopts: but ms.  
 authority is entirely against him,  
 and there is no real difficulty in the  
 genitive. Here again we have a  
 marked association of the ideal  
 theory with the conversational  
 method.

10. τῶν πολλῶν [καλῶν] κα-  
 λῶν is an obvious interpolation:  
 we are not concerned merely with  
 beautiful particulars; and presently  
 we have ἢ ἴσων ἢ καλῶν ἢ πάντων  
 τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων, 'all the  
 particulars which share the name  
 of the ideas.' The particulars are  
 ὁμώνυμα as being copies of the ideas:  
 see *Sophist* 234 B μιμήματα καὶ  
 ὁμώνυμα τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργαζόμενος

τῇ γραφικῇ τέχνῃ. Cf. *Timaeus*  
 41 c.

13. οὔτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς] 'they  
 hardly ever preserve any constant  
 relation either to themselves or to  
 each other.' This is one of many  
 passages which show that Plato  
 thoroughly accepted the doctrines of  
 Herakleitos and Protagoras so far as  
 regards the material world.

14. οὕτως, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης] Z.  
 and St. have οὕτως αἶ, ἔφη, ταῦτα,  
 ὁ Κέβης.

17. τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ]  
 Cf. *Phaedrus* 247 c ἀχρώματος τε καὶ  
 ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφῆς οὐσία,  
 ὄντως οὐσα, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτη μόνῳ  
 θεατῇ νῷ. See also *Timaeus* 28 A.

20. θῶμεν οὖν βούλει] Z. and  
 St. have εἰ βούλει.

τὸ μὲν ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ ἀειδές]  
 Compare the division of the universe  
 into ὁρατὸν and νοητὸν in *Republic*  
 509 D.

μὲν ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ αἰδέες; Θῶμεν, ἔφη. Καὶ τὸ μὲν αἰδέες αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν μὴδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτά; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, θῶμεν. Φέρε δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν  
 B τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχὴ; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ὁμοιότερον τῷ εἶδει φαίμεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ συγγενέστερον τὸ 5 σῶμα; Παντί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε δῆλον, ὅτι τῷ ὁρατῷ. Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ; ὁρατὸν ἢ αἰδέες; Οὐκ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει λέγομεν· ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ οἶε; Τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀόρατον εἶναι; Οὐκ ὁρατόν. 10 Ἀιδέες ἄρα; Ναί. Ὁμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχὴ σῶματός ἐστιν τῷ C αἰδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ. Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XXVII. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σῶματι προσκρήται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι' ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως—τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν 15 τὸ διὰ τοῦ σῶματος, τὸ δι' αἰσθήσεων σκοπεῖν τι—, τότε μὲν ἔλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σῶματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταραττεται καὶ ἰλιγιστὶ ὥσπερ μεθύουσα, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη; Πάνυ γε. Ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκείσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ αἰεὶ ὄν καὶ 20 ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα αὐτοῦ αἰεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅτανπερ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γένηται καὶ

3. ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν] 'of ourselves is not one part body, the other soul?' I agree with Heindorf and Stallbaum in taking ἡμῶν αὐτῶν with τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δέ. Ast would join it with ἄλλο τι, on account of the reply, οὐδὲν ἄλλο. But why should special emphasis be laid on the exhaustiveness of the division?

10. οὐκ ὁρατόν] No distinction is intended between οὐκ ὁρατόν and αἰδέες. Plato has made his division into ὁρατόν and αἰδέες, and since soul is not ὁρατόν, it is αἰδέες. No doubt the motive which led Plato to choose αἰδέες instead of the direct verbal opposite ἀόρατον was the etymological connexion of the former with Ἀιδῆς: as if he would say that Ἀιδῆς, far from being the abode

of death and nothingness, is the region of true existence alone. That he did connect the words is clear from 80 D, 81 C, in spite of *Cratylus* 404 B.

13. πάλαι ἐλέγομεν] 65 B foll.

16. τότε μὲν ἔλκεται] 'then she is dragged by the body among things that are never constant, and she herself loses her way and is filled with confusion and dizziness, like one that is drunk; for of such nature are the things that she grasps.' τοιούτων = πλανωμένων etc., cf. 58 D. Plato means that when the soul makes her investigations by the aid of the body, she necessarily is concerned with sensible phenomena; and since these have nothing stable or sure in them, there is a like want of stability and certainty in her perceptions.

ἐξῆ αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπαυταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη· καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται; Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθεῖ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ποτέρῳ οὖν αὖ σοι δοκεῖ τῷ  
 5 εἶδει καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ψυχῇ Ε ὁμοιότερον εἶναι καὶ συγγενέστερον; Πᾶς ἂν μοι δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὅς, συγχωρῆσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμα-  
 θεστάτος, ὅτι ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι ψυχῇ τῷ αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μή. Τί δὲ τὸ σῶμα; Τῷ ἐτέρῳ.  
 10 ΧΧVIII. Ὅρα δὲ καὶ τῇδε, ὅτι, ἐπειδὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὧσι ψυχῇ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἢ φύσις προσ- 80  
 τάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αὖ πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ ὁμοιον τῷ θεῖῳ εἶναι, καὶ πότερον τῷ ἐνντῷ; ἢ οὐ

1. καὶ πέπαυταί τε τοῦ πλάνου] 'she has rest from her wandering, and in dwelling with them is ever constant, since the things that she grasps are constant.' So in *Republic* 500 c it is said of philosophers, εἰς τεταγμένα ἅττα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αἰεὶ ἔχοντα ὁρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους οὐτ' ἀδικοῦντα οὐτ' ἀδικούμενα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μιμῆσθαι τε καὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι. For πλάνου compare *Parmenides* 135 Ε οὐκ εἷας ἐν τοῖς ὁρῶμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν.

2. τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα] 'this condition of hers is called wisdom.' Olympiodoros is much exercised as to how φρόνησις can be a πάθημα, how an activity of the soul can be denoted by a passive term. But Aristotle, for whom cognition was emphatically an ἐνέργεια, says, *de anima* III iv 429<sup>a</sup> 13, εἰ δὴ ἐστὶ τὸ νοεῖν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. Also II v 417<sup>a</sup> 14. I think however that πάθημα here means nothing more than condition: compare *Republic* 511 D, where the term παθήματα is applied to the four mental states corresponding to the four segments of the line.

7. ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου] 'from this way of approaching the question.' μέθοδος is frequently used by Plato for 'scientific method,' especially dialectic: cf. *Republic* 510 B, *Politicus* 286 D.

8. ὅλῳ καὶ παντί] Prof. Geddes explains 'both in the general and in the particular'; which I think is a needless refinement. It is only a strong expression for 'altogether' and is not uncommon: see *Republic* 469 c, 527 c (with the article), *Laws* 779 B, *Cratylus* 434 A. In *Laws* 734 E we have the reverse order τῷ παντὶ καὶ ὅλῳ, and in 944 c we find ὅλον καὶ τὸ πᾶν in precisely the same sense. In *Lysis* 215 c is the remarkable phrase ἀρά γε ὅλῳ τινὲ ἐξαπατώμεθα;

10. ὅρα δὲ καὶ τῇδε] After showing that the soul resembles the ideas (1) in her invisibility (2) in her affinity to the changeless, we now come to the last piece of evidence: that she is mistress over the body and uses it as a slave. Cf. *Timaeus* 34 c γενέσει δὲ καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος ὡς δεσπότην καὶ ἄρξουσιν ἀρξομένον ξυνεστήσατο.

13. θεῖῳ . . . ἐνντῷ] Below, 80 B, we have the contrast θεῖῳ—

δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἶον ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἡγεμονεύειν πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ θνητὸν ἄρχεσθαι τε καὶ δουλεύειν; Ἔμοιγε. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ὅμοιον; Δῖλα δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ τῷ θεῷ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θνητῷ. Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τάδε ἡμῖν συμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θεῷ καὶ 5  
B ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχὴν, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θνητῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ ἀνοήτῳ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον αὐτὸ εἶναι σῶμα. ἔχομέν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο λέγειν, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, ἢ 10  
οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; Οὐκ ἔχομεν.

XXIX. Τί οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἄρ' οὐχὶ σῶματι μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχῇ δὲ αὐτὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ  
C εἶναι ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ἐννοεῖς οὖν, ἔφη, ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἀνθρώπος, τὸ μὲν ὁρατὸν αὐτοῦ, [τὸ σῶμα,] 15  
καὶ ἐν ὁρατῷ κείμενον, ὃ δὲ νεκρὸν καλούμεν, ὃ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν, οὐκ εὐθὺς τούτων οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ἀλλ' ἐπεικῶς συκνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον, ἔαν μὲν τις καὶ χαριέν-

ἀνθρωπίνῳ: but the antithesis θεῖον — θνητὸν occurs *Timaeus* 69 c and d.

7. ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχὴν] I have adopted this reading notwithstanding that there is much stronger ms. authority for ψυχῇ, which Schanz Z. and St. retain. ψυχῇ can only be construed by supplying *συμβαίνει* again, which is intolerably harsh. Such instances as *Philebus* 55 A πολλή τις ἀλογία *συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι* are nothing to the point: such a construction is common enough, but here we have τάδε as the subject of *συμβαίνει*. Campbell more pertinently defends ψυχῇ by citing *Republic* 517 c τὰ δ' οὖν ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα οὕτω φαίνεται, ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόγος ὁρᾶσθαι, ὁφθείσα δὲ συλλογιστέα εἶναι, ὡς ἄρα πᾶσι πάντων αὕτη ὁρθὴν τε καὶ καλὴν αἰτία. But even here the construction is less harsh.

8. ἀνοήτῳ] i.e. 'not the object of intelligence': a sense which, I

believe, ἀνόητος bears nowhere else; it is however placed beyond doubt by νοητῷ in the opposite catalogue, by which Olympiodoros absurdly understands 'intelligent.' Another rare usage is that of ἀπίθανος in *Parmenides* 133 c, = 'incredulous.' Considering the exact correspondence of every word in one list with the antithetical word in the other, Hermann ought not to have wished that the mss. gave αἰσθητῷ.

14. ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου] Here is a distinct confession that the foregoing is only an approximate demonstration: we have made out a case of probability, and that is all.

16. ἐν ὁρατῷ κείμενον] 'situate in the region of the visible.'

17. καὶ διαπίπτειν] Z. and St. add καὶ διαπνεῖσθαι which is found in the citations of Stobaeus and Eusebius, but not in the best mss. Hermann justly says 'imperite ab anima ad corpus translata esse apparet.'

✓ 18. ἔαν μὲν τις] It seems to

τως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ, καὶ πάνυ  
 μάλα. συμπεσὼν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν  
 Αἰγύπτῳ ταριχευθέντες, ὀλίγου ὅλον μένει ἀμήχανον ὅσον  
 χρόνον. ἔνια δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἂν σαπῇ, ὅστ' αὖτε καὶ D  
 5 νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὅμως ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατά  
 ἐστίν· ἢ οὐ; Ναί. Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ αἰδέεσθαι, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον  
 τόπον ἕτερον οἰκόμενον γενναῖον καὶ καθαρόν καὶ αἰδῆ, εἰς  
 "Αἶδου ὥς ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οἶ,  
 ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, αὐτίκα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἰτέον, αὕτη δὲ δὴ  
 10 ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκυῖα ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώ-  
 ματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσεται καὶ ἀπόλῳεν, ὥς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ  
 ἄνθρωποι; πολλοὺ γὰρ θεῖ, ὧ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμμία, ἀλλὰ E  
 πολλῷ μᾶλλον ᾧδ' ἔχει· ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μὴδὲν  
 τοῦ σώματος εὐνεφέλκουσα, ἅτε οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ  
 15 βίῳ ἐκοῦσα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτὸ καὶ συνηροισμένη [αὕτη

me that needless difficulty has been raised over this sentence. *χαριέντως* ἔχων simply means 'having his body in a good state,' and to this *τοιαύτη* refers. If the body were in a healthy condition at death and at a healthy age, it would hold out longer, says Plato, against decomposition. Mr. Cope, I think, is quite correct in translating: 'if a man die with his body in a vigorous state and at a vigorous period of his life, a very considerable time indeed.' The following sentence *συμπεσὼν . . . χρόνον* is bracketed by Schanz after Ast. I see no sufficient reason for doing so; the *γὰρ* is certainly not very obvious, but may be explained thus, '(nor is this the strongest case,) for if a body is embalmed, it remains nearly whole for an incredible time.' Hirschig brackets *ὥσπερ . . . ταριχευθέντες*: very superfluously. Plato says (1) the body of a healthy man who dies in the prime of life lasts a good while, (2) an Egyptian mummy lasts an indefinite time, (3) even without this some parts of the human frame are almost indestructible.

4. καὶ ἂν σαπῇ] i.e. τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα.

7. εἰς "Αἶδου ὥς ἀληθῶς] To Hades rightly named, the abode of the unseen. Cf. *Gorgias* 493 B.

80 E—81 E, cc. xxix, xxx. We cannot then believe that the soul when she leaves the body is scattered and dispersed; nay, if she departs pure and untainted of the body, because she has never willingly held communion with it during life, she is freed from its follies and passions and reaches the abode of the invisible, where she dwells with the gods for ever. But if she has been the companion of the body, sharing its pleasures and desires and thinking that alone to be real which she can apprehend by it, then she departs tainted and clogged with the material; and in fear of the viewless region, weighed down by her earthy load, she flits about the visible world. Hence it is that ghosts are seen about places of burial; they are such gross spirits as cannot rise from earth, but wander about it, until for their love of the material they once more enter a bodily form.

15. καὶ συνηροισμένη] Schanz brackets these words, but they are in

εἰς αὐτήν], ἅτε μελετῶσα αἰεὶ τοῦτο — τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο  
 ἐστὶν ἢ ὁρθῶς φιλοσοφούσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετῶσα  
 81 [ῥαδίως]. ἢ οὐ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μελέτη θανάτου; Παντάπασί γε.  
 Οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ αἰδέεσθαι ἀπέρ-  
 χεται, τὸ εἰδόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἳ ἀφικομένη 5  
 ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ  
 ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλ-  
 λαγμένη, ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμυημένων, ὥς ἀληθῶς  
 τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διαγούσῃ; οὕτω φῶμεν, ὦ  
 Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως;

B XXX. Οὕτω νῦν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Ἐὰν δέ γε οἶμαι μεμι-  
 ασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἅτε τῷ  
 σώματι αἰεὶ ξυνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἐρώσα καὶ  
 γεγοντευμένη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν,  
 ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἄλλ' ἢ τὸ σωματοειδές, 15  
 οὗ τις ἂν ἄψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι καὶ πίοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ  
 ἀφροδίσια χρῆσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὅμμασι σκοτώδες καὶ αἰδέεσθαι,  
 νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ αἰρετόν, τοῦτο δὲ εἰσικμένη μισεῖν τε  
 C καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὕτω δὲ ἔχουσαν οἷοι ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθε-  
 αὐτὴν εἰλικρινῇ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι; Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ καὶ 20  
 διειλημμένην γε οἶμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ὃ αὐτῇ ἡ ὁμιλία

the best mss., and I see nothing against them. He omits αὐτῇ εἰς αὐτήν, which words have much slighter ms. support. I have thought it sufficient to bracket them.

3. ῥαδίως savours of the margin, and I have followed Schanz and Hirschig in bracketing it.

7. ἀγρίων ἐρώτων] Cf. *Republic* 572 B δεινόν τι καὶ ἄγριον καὶ ἀνομον ἐπιθυμιῶν εἶδος ἐκάστω ἔνεστι.

9. διαγούσῃ] I have ventured to follow Heindorf and Hirschig in reading thus. The mss. all have διάγονσα, which most editors retain, but which I cannot believe that Plato wrote. It is idle to quote Thucydides VII 42 § 2: for in the first place it is rash to argue that a construction found in Thucydides is therefore possible in Plato; secondly, it is not a parallel case. When Thucydides says Συρακοσίοις κατὰ-

πληξίς ἐγένετο, and after a subordinate clause resumes with ὁρῶντες, the shock is not very great; but that after the regular datives εὐδαίμονι, ἀπηλλαγμένη Plato should end with this ungrammatical διάγονσα is quite a different thing. More to the purpose is Prof. Geddes' citation of *Phaedrus* 241 D, where however Schanz reads λέγονθ' for λέγων. Not one of the constructions given in Riddell, *Digest of Idioms* § 271 foll., at all justifies this, which is not an anacoluthon but a solecism. It has been suggested to connect διάγονσα with ἀπέρχεται, but I think this is hardly possible.

16. οὗ τις ἂν ἄψαιτο] Cf. *Theaetetus* 155 E οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἢ οὐδ' ἂν δύνωνται ἀπρὶς τοῖν χεροῖν λαβεῖσθαι, and *Sophist* 246 A.

21. διειλημμένην] 'interpene-

- τε καὶ συνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ συνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε σύμφυτον; Πάνυ γε. Ἐμβριθεὶς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, τοῦτο οἶεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὁρατόν· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ 5 ἔλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, φόβῳ τοῦ αἰδοῦς τε καὶ Ἄιδου, ὥσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματά τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους D κυλινδουμένην, περὶ ἃ δὲ καὶ ὥφθη ἅττα ψυχῶν σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα, οἷα παρέχονται αἱ τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἶδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρώς ἀπολυθεῖσαι ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ μετέχουσai, διὸ καὶ ὀρώνται.
- 10 Εἰκός γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ὦ Κέβης· καὶ οὐ τίς γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταύτας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἱ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσαι τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὕσης· καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου πλανῶνται, ἕως ἄν 15 τῇ τοῦ συνεπακολουθοῦντος τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς ἐπιθυμίᾳ πάλιν E ἐνδεσώσιν εἰς σῶμα.

trated.' The notion of this word is the mixture of two substances so that the particles of one are held apart by those of the other. The soul's substance is as it were adulterated by a material alloy. Z. and St. omit *καί*, which is however in the best mss.

2. **σύμφυτον**] 'ingrained.' The soul's perpetual communion with the body has so inseparably blended the material and the spiritual that they become virtually one nature; hence even when separated from the body she is not yet freed from matter.

4. **βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἔλκεται**] Cf. *Phaedrus* 248 c.

7. **περὶ ἃ δὲ καὶ ὥφθη**] This is an interesting illustration of the manner in which Plato will take some popular belief, as he often takes some popular expression, and fill it with a deeper meaning of his own. In *Laws* 865 d we find another current opinion about ghosts, here however without any special Platonic turn: that if one man killed another the spirit of the slain wandered about his accustomed haunts, terrifying and tormenting the homicide so long as he remained there.

13. **τροφῆς**] 'mode of life.'

**ἕως ἄν**] 'until by craving after that bodily nature which is their companion they are again confined in a body.' The presence of this material alloy is sufficient to inspire the soul with bodily desires but cannot afford means to gratify them: so that the longing grows more and more intense until the soul is once more confined in her earthly prison.

81 E—82 B, c. xxxi. These souls pass into the bodies of animals whose habits are likeliest to their former way of life; the sensual into asses, the cruel into wolves and hawks; while they that have lacked philosophy but led humane and harmless lives pass into bees and wasps and ants, or even into the human form again.

With this chapter should be compared the remarkable passage *Timaeus* 91 d foll. The other principal statements of Plato on metempsychosis are in *Timaeus* 41 E—42 D, *Republic* 618 A—620 C, *Phaedrus* 249 B. Wyttenbach has a long and learned note on the subject, dealing chiefly with neoplatonist views.



XXXI. Ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἦεν ὁποῖ' ἄττ' ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχῳσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. Τὰ ποῖα δὲ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; Οἷον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διευλαβημένους εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκός ἐνδύεσθαι· 5  
82 ἢ οὐκ οἷε; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν εἰκός λέγεις. Τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἀρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτίων γένη· ἢ ποῖ ἂν ἄλλος ἐφαίμεν τὰς τοιαύτας ἰέναι; Ἀμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, θάλα δὲ καὶ τᾶλλα, οἱ ἂν ἕκαστα ἴοι, κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν 10  
ὁμοιότητος τῆς μελέτης; Δῆλον δὲ, ἔφη· πῶς δ' οὐ; Οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι, ἔφη, καὶ τούτων εἰς καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον  
B ἰόντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἦν δὲ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἑθους τε καὶ 15  
μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ; Πῆ δὲ οὗτοι 15  
εὐδαιμονέστατοι; Τί; οὐ τούτους εἰκός ἐστίν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικόν τε καὶ ἡμέρον γένος, ἢ που μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμηκῶν, ἢ καὶ εἰς ταῦτόν γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας μετρίου. Εἰκός.

4. μὴ διευλαβημένους] 'who have not taken heed to their ways.'

8. φαμέν] So Schanz with the best mss., joining ἂν with ἰέναι. Z. and St. φαῖμεν.

10. κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητος] 'according to the peculiar affinities of their pursuits.' Cf. *Timaeus* 42 c κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς τοῦ τρόπου γενέσεως.

13. δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν] As to this popular and social virtue see on 69 B and Appendix I. In *Republic* 619 c we find that this class of people are in great danger of making a bad choice at the αἵρεσις βίῳ. One who chose a tyrant's life was τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκόντων, ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιωκότα, ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετεληφότα. ὥς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἐλάττους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀλίσκομένους τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκόντας, ἅτε πόνων ἀγυμνάστους.

16. τί; οὐ τούτους] So Schanz :

B has ὅτι οὐ. St. and Z. give ὅτι τούτους.

εἰς τοιοῦτον] 'to another social and gentle race like themselves.' In *Timaeus* 91 D we have another class of harmless but unphilosophic men with a different destination: τὸ δὲ τῶν ὀρνέων φύλον μετερρρυθμίζετο, ἀντὶ τριχῶν πτερὰ φύον, ἐκ τῶν ἀκάκων ἀνδρῶν κούφον δέ, καὶ μετεωρολογικῶν μὲν, ἡγουμένων δὲ δι' ὅψεως τὰς περὶ τούτων ἀποδείξεις βεβαιοτάτας εἶναι δι' εὐθύθειαν. Who these are we learn in *Republic* 529 A —530 C: viz. astronomers who fancy that observation of the heavenly bodies is in itself important, apart from its bearing on philosophy.

19. ἀνδρας μετρίους] 'worthy citizens'; men who practise δημοτικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ and discharge their social and domestic duties creditably. They belong to a decidedly higher grade than the character described in *Republic* 554.

XXXII. Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφῆσαντι καὶ παντε-  
 λῶς καθαροῦ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ. C  
 ἀλλὰ τούτων ἕνεκα, ὧ ἐταῖρε Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ ὁρεῶς  
 φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀπασῶν  
 5 καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ παραδιδόασιν αὐταῖς ἑαυτούς, οὐ τι  
 οἰκοφροῖαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβούμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ  
 φιλοκρήματοι· οὐδὲ αὖ ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἄδοξίαν μοχθηρίας  
 δεδιότες, ὥσπερ οἱ φίλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἔπειτα ἀπέχονται  
 αὐτῶν. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρόποι, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, ὁ Κέβης. Οὐ  
 10 μέντοι μὰ Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς. τοιγάρτοι τούτοις μὲν ἅπασιν, ὧ Κέβης, D  
 ἐκεῖνοι, οἷς τι μέλει τῆς ἑαυτῶν ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ μὴ σῶμά τι

82 c, D, c. xxxii. But to the company of the gods only the true philosopher can come. For this cause he keeps himself pure from vice, not from the worldly motives that govern the vulgar, but because he will not resist philosophy when she offers freedom and purification to his soul.

1. εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος] 'but to the company of the gods none may approach who has not sought wisdom and departed in perfect purity; none but the lover of learning.' The words ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ are appended as though μὴ φιλοσοφῆσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαροῦ ἀπιόντι had not preceded: they are certainly pleonastic, but perfectly natural and intelligible. I see no cause to insert ἄλλω, far less to adopt such a violent transposition as Wyttenbach suggests. φιλομαθῆς and φιλόσοφος are frequently identified by Plato, especially in the passage quoted by Heindorf, *Republic* 376 B τό γε φιλομαθὲς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταῦτόν. St. gives ἄλλω ἦ.

11. σῶμά τι πλάττοντες] Literally 'moulding a body,' i.e. spending all their care on tending the body. Cf. *Timæus* 88 c τὸν τε αὖ σῶμα ἐπιμελῶς πλάττοντα τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνταποδοτέον κινήσεις. Also *Republic* 377 c καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς

τοῖς μύθοις πολὺν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν. The usage of the word in the present context easily arises from that in the two passages quoted, where it signifies the development of the body by nourishment and training and in each case is opposed to the culture of the soul. The reading of BCD is σώματι, whence Fischer suggested σώμα τι, which with the Zürich editors I have adopted: the τι seems to add a touch of contempt. E has σώματα, retained by Stallbaum. Ast's σώματι πράττοντες, 'working for the body,' is a very strange expression, by no means justified by the use of πρόσσειν in Thucydides. Schanz adopts Heindorf's bold alteration λατρεύοντες, which I cannot approve; far less Madvig's coinage πελατεύοντες.

82 D—84 B, cc. xxxiii, xxxiv. Philosophy, finding the soul a prisoner in her bodily abode, strives by persuasive admonition to set her free; telling her that she is deluded by the body and its sensations: from such she should withdraw herself and trust to herself alone; for she alone can behold the invisible and apprehend the true. And the soul that is discreet listens to the voice of philosophy, for she sees that indulgence of bodily passions has this fatal result. Whatsoever awakes in

πλάττοντες ζωῇ, χαίρειν εἰπόντες οὐ κατὰ ταῦτα πορεύονται αὐτοῖς, ὥς οὐκ εἰδόσιν ὅπῃ ἔρχονται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡγούμενοι οὐ δεῖν ἐναντία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ πράττειν καὶ τῇ ἐκείνης λύσει τε καὶ καθαρῶς ταύτῃ τρέπονται ἐκείνῃ ἐπόμενοι, ἣ ἐκείνη ὑφηγεῖται.

XXXIII. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; Ἐγὼ ἔρω, ἔφη. γιγνώσκουσι 5 γάρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι παραλαβούσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν  
 Ε ἢ φιλοσοφία ἀτεχνῶς διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκε-  
 κολλημένην, ἀναγκαζομένην δὲ ὥσπερ διὰ εἰργμοῦ διὰ τούτου  
 σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὴν δι' αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ  
 ἀμαθείᾳ κυλινδουμένην, καὶ τοῦ εἰργμοῦ τὴν δεινότητα κατ- 10  
 ἰδοῦσα ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν, ὥς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος

us the strongest pleasure or pain, fear or desire, this we think to be most surely true. So if she share the body's pleasures and pains, she will also share its beliefs concerning truth; and being the body's close companion through life will leave it at death contaminated by its nature: therefore she will never reach her home in the invisible but must enter again into another body. For this reason the philosopher is virtuous; not from any common motive; but because, when philosophy is delivering his soul, he will not undo her work by indulging the body's appetites. So his soul has peace from its troubling and lives apart from it; and at death she returns to her divine abode, fearing not at all lest as she departs she be scattered by the winds and exist no more.

8. διὰ εἰργμοῦ] 'through the bars of her prison.' She can indeed see τὰ ὄντα, but only in the material symbols by which alone they reveal themselves to the senses.

10. κυλινδουμένην] 'wallowing in utter ignorance.' Stallbaum compares *Politicus* 309 A, *Theaetetus* 172 c.

11. ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν] I take the literal translation of this sentence to be as follows: 'that it (the prison) exists by means of lust; just the

way in which the captive is most apt to aid and abet his own incarceration'; in other words, the prison is the dungeon of lust, wherein the prisoners are accomplices in their own imprisonment: ὥς I understand as a simple relative, 'in which way.' The phrase δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν is understood by Stallbaum as a periphrasis for ἐπιθυμεί, by Heindorf for ἐπιθυμείται. The former makes the clause ὥς ἂν μάλιστα express the object of the ἐπιθυμία, which comes to this: the prison (i.e. the body) desires to find out how the soul may most aid her own imprisonment. But this is downright nonsense. Heindorf rightly interprets the ὥς ἂν μάλιστα clause, except that he makes ὥς = ὥστε. But δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν = ἐπιθυμείται is surely very questionable; moreover it is not the body but bodily pleasures which the embodied soul desires. The interpretation I have suggested precisely agrees with 83 D: the prison of lust is just that very one of which the soul shuts the doors upon herself: for each act of indulgence is the shooting of a fresh bolt. The translator in the Engemann series alone takes the same view: 'weil er auf der Sinnenlust beruht, auf welche Weise der Gefangene selbst haupt-

συλλήπτωρ εἶη τῷ δεδέσθαι,—ὅπερ οὖν λέγω, γιγνώσκουσιν οἱ 83  
 φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὕτω παραλαβοῦσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσαν αὐτῶν  
 τὴν ψυχὴν ἡρέμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἐνδεικνυ-  
 μένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστὴ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὁμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης  
 5 δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὥτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ  
 τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, αὐτὴν  
 δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν συλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀφορίζεσθαι παρακελευομένη, πει-  
 τεύειν δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἢ αὐτὴν αὐτῇ, ὅ τι ἂν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ B  
 καὶ αὐτὴν αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ὄντων· ὅ τι δ' ἂν δι' ἄλλων  
 10 σκοπῇ ἐν ἄλλοις ὢν ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ἀληθές· εἶναι δὲ τὸ  
 μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ὁρατόν, ὃ δὲ αὐτὴ ὁρᾷ νοητόν τε  
 καὶ αἰδέεσθαι. ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰομένη δεῖν ἐναντιοῦσθαι  
 ἡ τοῦ ὥς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν  
 τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ ὅσον δύναται,  
 15 λογισομένη ὅτι, ἐπειδάν τις σφόδρα ἡσθῇ ἢ φοβηθῇ ἢ ἐπιθυ-  
 μήσῃ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὥν ἂν τις  
 οἰηθεῖν, οἷον ἢ νοσήσας ἢ τι ἀναλώσας διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ' C  
 ὃ πάντων μέγιστόν τε κακὸν καὶ ἔσχατόν ἐστι, τοῦτο πάσχει καὶ  
 οὐ λογίζεται αὐτό. Τί τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. "Οἱ

sächlich Helfer seiner Gefangenschaft sein muss.'

1. τῷ δεδέσθαι] So all the mss. Schanz and Z. after Heindorf's conjecture read τοῦ. But since συλλαμβάνειν continually takes a dative there is no reason why the verbal συλλήπτωρ should not be followed by the same case: the alteration seems gratuitous.

2. οὕτω goes with ἔχουσιν.

9. δι' ἄλλων] i.e. τῶν διὰ σώματος αἰσθήσεων. ἐν ἄλλοις ὢν ἄλλο, 'varying with varying conditions.'

15. λογισομένη] The soul reflects that vehement passions of pleasure, pain, fear, or desire so absorb the attention that nothing seems so real as the object inspiring them. Therefore if she is strongly excited by bodily affections of this kind she will be forced to think nothing so real as these material things: so that instead of seeking truth in the

changeless verities of the intelligible she will look for it in the ever-changing flux of phenomena.

ἡσθῇ ἢ φοβηθῇ] Z. and St. add ἡ λυπηθῇ, but these words are not in BCD, and the other mss. are not agreed as to their position.

16. οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον] 'not on the scale that one might suppose.' For τοσοῦτον virtually = 'so little,' compare *Republic* 608 B μέγας γάρ, ἔφην, ὁ ἀγών, ὃ φίλε Γλαύκων, μέγας, οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ: also *Sophist*. 217 E and Plato Epigram 12 (Bergk) τόσσον ἄγος τόσσον κέρδος ἀράμενος. Schanz, against the mss., writes ὑπ' αὐτῶν: but ἀπὸ may equally well be said; 'arising from them.'

17. οἷον ἢ νοσήσας] the considerations on which the 'δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ' is based.

19. ὅτι ψυχῇ] 'that the soul of every man in the act of feeling some vehement pleasure or pain is at the same time constrained to believe

ψυχὴν παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἅμα τε ἡσθῆναι ἢ λυπη-  
θῆναι σφόδρα ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι, περὶ δ' ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτο  
πάσχει, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως  
ἔχον· ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα <τὰ> ὁρατά· ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν  
ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδεῖται ψυχὴ ὑπὸ σώματος; 5  
D Πῶς δὴ; Ὅτι ἐκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥσπερ ἥλον ἔχουσα  
προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερονᾷ καὶ ποιεῖ σωμα-  
τοειδῆ, δοξάζουσιν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἥπερ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῇ.  
ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀνα-  
γκάζεται οἶμαι ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος γίνεσθαι καὶ οἷα 10  
μηδέποτε εἰς Ἄιδου καθαρώς ἀφικέσθαι, ἀλλὰ αἰετὸς τοῦ σώματος  
ἀναπλῆα ἐσιέναι, ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν εἰς ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ  
E ὥσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄμοιρος εἶναι τῆς  
τοῦ εἰοῦ τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας. Ἀληθέ-  
στατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες. 15

XXXIV. Τούτων τοίνυν ἔνεκα, ὦ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλο-  
μαθεῖς κόσμιοί εἰσι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἔνεκά φασιν·  
84 ἢ σὺ οἶει; Οὐ δῆτα ἔγωγε. Οὐ γάρ· ἀλλ' οὕτω λογίσαιτ' ἂν  
ψυχὴν ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἴησθαι τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν  
χρῆναι ἑαυτὴν λύειν, λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι 20  
ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις ἑαυτὴν πάλιν αὖ ἐγκαταδεῖν καὶ ἀνή-  
νυτον ἔργον πράττειν, Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναντίως ἱστὸν μετα-

that whatsoever most strongly ex-  
cites such feelings, this is most vivid  
and true; whereas it is not so.'

4. τὰ ὁρατά] Heindorf supplied  
τά, which is missing in the mss. But  
I believe ταῦτα δὲ . . . ὁρατά to be  
an interpolation.

8. ταῦτα ἀληθῆ] So Schanz for  
ταῦτα: rightly, I think.

10. ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότρο-  
φος] 'like it in her ways and nur-  
ture.'

17. οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἔνεκά φασιν]  
'not for the reasons which the many  
assign for being so.' Schanz brackets  
φασίν, and Heindorf proposes φαί-  
νονται, both, as I think, needlessly.  
Stallbaum rightly supplies κόσμιοι  
εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι.

18. οὐ γάρ· ἀλλ' οὕτω] This  
punctuation is clearly right here as

in *Phaedrus* 276 D. οὐ γὰρ ἀλλὰ  
gives just the wrong sense.

20. λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης] 'and while  
philosophy is loosing her to give her-  
self up to pleasures and pains that  
they may bind her fast.' The ap-  
pended infinitive ἐγκαταδεῖν is a very  
common idiom, and why Madvig  
should wish to expunge παραδιδόναι  
I cannot see. Schanz however  
brackets it.

22. μεταχειριζομένην] This is  
doubtless the right reading, although  
the mss. are stronger in favour of  
μεταχειριζομένης: the genitive is  
however, as Prof. Geddes says, easily  
accounted for by the proximity of  
Πηνελόπης. The soul works at a  
kind of Penelope's web, only in the  
opposite way. Penelope, to preserve  
her virtue, undid at night the work

χειριζομένην· ἀλλὰ γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἐπομένη  
 τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ αἰ ἐν τούτῳ οὔσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ  
 τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη, ζῆν τε οἶται B  
 οὔτῳ δεῖν, ἕως ἄν ζῇ, καὶ ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ συγγενὲς  
 5 καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων  
 κακῶν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ,  
 ταῦτά γ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα, ὧς Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ δια-  
 σπασθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων  
 διαφυσθεῖσα καὶ διαπτομένη οἴχηται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾗ.

she wove by day; the soul weaves again the web of lusts which philosophy has been unravelling to set her free. Prof. Geddes would govern Πηνελόπης by ἐναντίως: but I believe Plato never uses the genitive with this adverb; for in 112 E, to which Prof. Geddes refers, τοῦτου is governed by καταντικρύ. St. has μεταχειριζομένης.

1. **ΤΟΥΤΩΝ**] Sc. ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν.

2. **ἘΝ ΤΟΥΤῳ**] See on 59 A.

3. **ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη**] Compare *Phaedrus* 248 B οὐδ' ἔνεχ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ τὸ ἀληθείας ἰδεῖν πεδίον οὐδ' ἐστίν, ἡ τε δὴ προσήκουσα ψυχῆς τῷ ἀρίστῳ νομῇ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεί λειμῶνος τυγχάνει οὔσα, ἡ τε τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις, ᾧ ψυχὴ κουφίζεται, τούτῳ τρέφεται. The souls which cannot reach the plain of truth τροφῇ δοξαστῇ χρῶνται. Compare the still more striking metaphor in *Timaeus* 90 A ἐκεῖθεν γάρ, ὅθεν ἡ πρώτη τῆς ψυχῆς γένεσις ἔφυ, τὸ θεῖον τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ῥίζαν ἡμῶν ἀνακρεμαννὺν ὀρθοὶ πάν τὸ σῶμα.

5. **ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ**] Sc. ἀληθὲς καὶ θεῖον καὶ ἀδόξαστον.

6. **οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ**] For this unusual phrase compare *Republic* 465 B, *Apology* 28 B, *Gorgias* 520 D, *Epistle* VII 345 E. Also Aristophanes *Ecclesiazusae* 650 οὐχὶ δέος μὴ σὲ φιλήσῃ.

7. **ΤΑΥΤΑ Γ' ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΥΣΑΣΑ**] mss. ταῦτα δ'. Many editors, beginning

with Forster, have regarded these words as a gloss upon ἐκ τοιαύτης τροφῆς, and Schanz brackets them. This view may be right; but I think there is hardly sufficient evidence for bracketing. If the words are genuine, δὲ needs correction. Wytttenbach has ταῦτά τ'.

At first sight the concluding words of the chapter seem to imply that a soul that is pure is less likely to perish than the impure. But since this is not the case, we must understand Plato to mean that the pure soul alone is exempt from fear. The impure soul, having cast in her lot with the body, and having no conception of existence apart from it, may well suppose that corporeal life is a condition of her being: but the pure soul, who has lived apart from the body so far as she may and feels her own independent power, has no misgivings lest the company of her slave be necessary to her existence: the body may dread dissolution, but she is secure.

84 C—85 D, c. xxxv. Silence ensues as Sokrates ceases: but presently Simmias and Kebes are heard conversing apart. Are you discussing any doubtful matters in the argument? asks Sokrates, for there must be many remaining. *Simmias*: There are points on which we should like further satisfaction; but we shrink from troubling you at

- C XXXV. Σιγὴ οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ αὐτός τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πλείστοι. Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σιμμίας μικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ διελεγέσθην· καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἰδὼν αὐτῶ ἤρετο· Τί; ἔφη, ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα μὴ δοκεῖ 5 ἐνδεῶς λέγεσθαι; πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβὰς, εἴ γε δὴ τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἱκανῶς διεξιέναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἄλλο σκοπεῖσθον, οὐδὲν λέγω· εἰ δέ τι περὶ τούτων ἀπορεῖτον, μὴδὲν D ἀποκνήσχετε καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰπεῖν καὶ διελθεῖν, εἴ πῃ ὑμῖν φαίνεται βέλτιον <ἄν> λεχθῆναι, καὶ αὖ καὶ ἐμὲ συμπαραλαβεῖν, εἴ τι 10 μᾶλλον οἴεσθε μετ' ἐμοῦ εὐπορήσειν. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας ἔφη· Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τάλῃ καὶ σοὶ ἔρω. πάλα γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἀπορῶν τὸν ἕτερον προώθει καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν ἀκοῦσαι, ὁκνεῖν δὲ ὄχλον παρέχειν, μή σοι ἀνδρὲς ἢ διὰ τὴν παρούσαν συμφορὰν. καὶ ὅς ἀκούσας ἐγέλασεν τε ἡρέμα καὶ 15 φησιν, Βαβαί, ὦ Σιμμία· ἢ που χαλεπῶς ἄν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀν- E ὁρώπους πείσαιμι ὥς οὐ συμφορὰν ἡγοῦμαι τὴν παρούσαν τύχην, ὅτε γε μὴδ' ὑμᾶς δύναμαι πείθειν, ἀλλὰ φοβεῖσθε, μὴ δυσκολώτερόν τι νῦν διάκειμαι ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίῳ· καί, ὥς

so sad a time. *Socrates*: If I cannot convince you that I do not consider my present situation sad, I shall find it hard indeed to persuade the rest of mankind. You think I am more foolish than the swans: for they sing sweetest just before they die; not, as men say, that they are lamenting their approaching death, but because they are Apollo's birds and know the good things that are in Hades; wherefore they sing in gladness of heart. I too am the servant of Apollo, and I depart this life no less cheerfully than they; speak then, if you have anything to ask. *Simmias*: I will speak: the truth of the matters we have been discussing is hard to discover, nevertheless it were faint-hearted to abandon the search. So in default of some divine word we must strive by all means to find the surest theory that human reason can furnish, as it were a raft to bear us over the sea

of life. Therefore, I tell you, *Socrates*, that the foregoing proof does not seem to me complete.

2. πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ] 'was absorbed in the foregoing discourse.'

10. βέλτιον ἂν λεχθῆναι] The insertion of *ἂν*, which could easily drop out after *βέλτιον*, seems to me necessary. Prof. Geddes observes that verbs of thinking often take a bare infinitive, to express duty. This is true: but *φαίνεται* is not a verb of thinking.

19. διάκειμαι] Heindorf takes this for a subjunctive, and Hirschig reads *διακέωμαι*: but, even if *διάκειμαι* could be a subjunctive, that mood would be positively wrong here. *Socrates* says 'you are afraid (not lest I should be, but) lest I am more peevish than heretofore.' Contrast this with the words of *Simmias*, *μή σοι ἀηδὲς ἦ*, where the subjunctive has its proper reference to the future.

ἔοικε, τῶν κύκνων δοκῶ φαυλότερος ὑμῖν εἶναι τὴν μαντικήν,  
 οἷ ἐπειδὴν αἵσωνται ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ἔδοντες· καὶ ἐν  
 τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, τότε δὴ πλεῖστα καὶ μάλιστα ἔδουσι, γενη- 85  
 ὅτες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀπιέναι, οὐπὲρ εἰς ἑεράποντες.  
 5 οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὸ αὐτῶν θέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκνων  
 καταψεύδονται, καὶ φασιν αὐτοὺς ὀρνεοῦντας τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ  
 λύπῃς ἐξείδειν, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται ὅτι οὐδὲν ὀρνεον ἔδει, ὅταν  
 πεινῇ ἢ ῥιγῇ ἢ τινὰ ἄλλην λύπην λυπῇται, οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἢ τε  
 ἀνδῶν καὶ χελιδῶν καὶ ὁ ἔποψ, ἃ δὴ φασὶ διὰ λύπην ὀρνεοῦντα  
 10 ἔδειν· ἀλλ' οὔτε ταῦτά μοι φαίνεται λυπούμενα ἔδειν οὔτε οἱ  
 κύκνοι, ἀλλ' ἅτε οἶμαι τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄντες μαντικοὶ τέ εἰσι B  
 καὶ προειδότες τὰ ἐν Ἄϊδου ἀγαθὰ ἔδουσι καὶ τέρπονται ἐκείνῃ  
 τὴν ἡμέραν διαφερόντως ἢ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ  
 καὶ αὐτός που οἶμαι ὁμόδουλός τε εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς  
 15 τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χεῖρον ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν  
 παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐδὲ δυσευμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλ-  
 λάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τούτου γ' ἕνεκα λέγειν τε χρὴ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὅ  
 τι ἂν βούλησθε ἕως Ἀθηναίων ἑώσιν ἄνδρες ἑνδεκα. Καλῶς,  
 ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σιμμίας· καὶ ἐγὼ τέ σοι ἐρῶ ὃ ἀπορῶ, καὶ αὖ C  
 20 ὅδε, ἢ οὐκ ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρημένα. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώ-  
 κρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἕως ὥσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφές  
 εἶδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγκάλεπόν τι, τὸ  
 μέντοι αὖ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐκὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ  
 ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι, πρὶν ἂν πανταχὲ σκοπῶν  
 25 ἀπέιπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός· δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ

3. καὶ μάλιστα] Schanz reads  
*κάλλιστα*, after Blomfield's con-  
 jecture. I have reverted to the  
 reading of the mss.

17. τούτου γ' ἕνεκα] 'so far as  
 this is concerned.'

18. ἕως Ἀθηναίων] Cobet pro-  
 poses *ἕως ἂν οἱ ἑνδεκα ἑώσιν*. I do  
 not conceive that any person who  
 has ears to hear will prefer Cobet's  
 sentence to Plato's: nor, apart from  
 this, would one willingly sacrifice  
 the grave courtesy of Sokrates' lan-  
 guage. I regret that Schanz deter-  
 mines to bracket the clause; still  
 omission is preferable to mutilation.  
 Prof. Geddes justly says *ἄνδρες ἑνδεκα*  
 is to be regarded as one expression,

and compares 69 E *τοῖς Ἀθηναίων*  
*δικασταῖς*. The common reading is  
*ἕως ἂν οἱ*, but *ἂν οἱ* are wanting in  
 the best mss.

24. καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι] Hir-  
 schig wrongly brackets *μή*. The  
 words *παντὶ . . . προαφίστασθαι*  
 are all qualified by *μή οὐκί*: or as  
 Heindorf puts it, we may regard *καὶ*  
*μή προαφίστασθαι* as equivalent to  
*μή προαφισταμένους*. We have here  
 a very strong case of *μή οὐ* after a  
 word which only implies negation:  
 cf. *Symposium* 210 B *πολλὴ ἄνοια*  
*μή οὐκ ἔν τε καὶ ταῦτ' ἡγήσθαι*,  
*Theaetetus* 151 D *αἰσχρὸν μή οὐ*  
*παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμείσθαι ὃ τί τις*  
*ἔχει λέγειν*.



ἐν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὐρεῖν ἢ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων  
 D λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχοούμενον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιότερου ὀχήματος, 5  
 λόγου θεοῦ τινός, διαπορευθῆναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπαισχυνθήσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδ' ἐμαυτὸν αἰτιάσομαι ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἶπον ἃ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται ἱκανῶς 10  
 εἰρήσθαι.

E XXXVI. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ἀληθεῖς σοὶ φαίνεται· ἀλλὰ λέγε, ὅπῃ δὴ οὐκ ἱκανῶς. Ταύτη ἔμοιγε, ἢ  
 θ' ὅς, ἢ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἄν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, ὥς ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία ἀόρατόν τι 15

1. ἢ μαθεῖν] *i.e.* either to learn from another or to discover by our own researches: cf. 99 c. Hesiod says, *Works and Days* 291, οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος, ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ, | ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κακείνος, ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται.

6. λόγου θεοῦ] 'a divine doctrine'; such as the Orphic traditions. The Pythagorean Simmias, whose mystical tendencies are well contrasted with the clear and acute intellect of Kebes, naturally gives a θεῖος λόγος the preference over dialectical demonstration. Cf. 107 A. Olympiodoros explains it, αὐτοπτικὸς νοῦς ὁ θεῶ τῶ ὄντι συνών. But the other interpretation is more natural and more dramatically appropriate. The mss. have ἡ λόγου, Schanz brackets ἡ; I have followed Heindorf in omitting it. That ἡ is ever explanatory I do not believe: it certainly is not so in the passages cited by Prof. Geddes. Plato would have used καί. St. retains ἡ.

85 E—86 D, c. xxxvi. Simmias states his objection. All the terms that have been applied to soul and body may be transferred to harmony

and the lyre. The harmony is invisible, immaterial, beautiful, divine; the lyre is material, composite, earthly, perishable. Might we not then on the same principle maintain that the harmony must survive the destruction of the lyre? yet we know it does not. Now suppose the doctrine to be true, that the soul is a harmony of the body, arising from the due proportion and temperament of its parts; will she not, let her be ever so divine, vanish away if these bodily conditions cease? will she not, like other harmonies, cease to be, long before the body itself suffers dissolution?

As I have pointed out in the introduction, the refutation of this theory does not constitute an argument for immortality. To refute a doctrine which would be fatal to immortality is not the same as to prove immortality. Plato justly considered that a view so widely entertained and so hostile to his own, must be disposed of; but its overthrow leaves the argument precisely where it was at 81 A.

14. ἢ δὴ] So Forster for ἡδη.

καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλόν τι καὶ θεῖόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμωμένη  
 λύρᾳ, αὐτὴ δ' ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ 86  
 καὶ ζύνετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ συγγενῆ. ἐπειδὴν  
 οὖν ἢ κατὰ τις τὴν λύραν ἢ διατέμῃ καὶ διαρρήξῃ τὰς χορδὰς,  
 5 εἴ τις δισχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ σύ, ὥς ἀνάγκη ἐτι  
 εἶναι τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι· οὐδεμία γὰρ  
 μηχανὴ ἂν εἴη τὴν μὲν λύραν ἐτι εἶναι διερωγυῖων τῶν  
 χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θνητοειδεῖς οὔσας, τὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν  
 ἀπολωλέναι τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὁμοφυῇ τε καὶ συγ- B  
 10 γενῇ, προτέραν τοῦ θνητοῦ ἀπολωμένην· ἀλλὰ φαίη ἀνάγκη ἐτι  
 που εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἁρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ζύλα καὶ τὰς  
 χορδὰς κατασαπῆσθαι, πρὶν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν,—καὶ γὰρ οὖν,  
 ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτόν σε τοῦτο ἐντεθυμῆσαι, ὅτι  
 τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὥσπερ  
 15 ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ

4. διατέμῃ] Schanz brackets this word: needlessly, I think.

5. εἴ τις δισχυρίζοιτο] The apodosis never comes. Prof. Geddes finds it in *ὅρα οὖν*, 86 D. This is not strictly accurate; for the subject of *δισχυρίζοιτο* is supposed to maintain that the harmony survives the lyre, while the subject of *ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ* maintains that the soul is the first to perish. In fact the protasis *ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ* is substituted for the original protasis.

7. διερωγυῖων τῶν χορδῶν] is bracketed by Hirschig, whom Schanz follows: again I see no reason.

14. ὑπολαμβάνομεν] The use of the first person by Simmias would seem to imply that this doctrine was Pythagorean. But there is little or no evidence to that effect, and it is irreconcilable with the Pythagorean dogma of transmigration. Aristotle *de anima* I iv 407<sup>b</sup>27 mentions the theory as *πιθανὴ πολλοῖς*, but without assigning it to any particular school or thinker. Macrobius ascribes it to Pythagoras and Philolaos; but the testimony of so late

a writer is worthless. Prof. Geddes remarks that it seems more Eleatic than Pythagorean: and there certainly is some resemblance between this *ἁρμονία* and the conception of *ψυχὴ* as a *κράμα* attributed to Zeno by Diogenes Laertius ix 29. The view of Parmenides is expounded by Theophrastus *de sensu* §§ 3, 4: it is however merely a theory of perception. The opinion that soul is a harmony was certainly held by Aristoxenos the musician, as we learn from Cicero *Tusc.* I 10: and Lucretius in controverting the theory (III 94 foll.) evidently had him chiefly in his mind; cf. III 131 *redde harmoniai Nomen ad organicos alto delatum Heliconi*. But Aristoxenos was a pupil of Aristotle, not a Pythagorean. On the whole then it seems probable that Simmias is not speaking as a Pythagorean, but making himself the exponent of a widely received opinion. Kebes, who is equally a Pythagorean, professes his disbelief in the doctrine, 87 A: but on the other hand it is a favourite theory with Echekrates, 88 D.

καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν, κρᾶσιν  
 C εἶναι καὶ ἁρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὴν  
 ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρίως κραθεῖ πρὸς ἄλλα. εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει  
 ἡ ψυχὴ οὕσα ἁρμονία τις, ὁμολον ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθεῖ τὸ σῶμα  
 ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπιταθεῖ ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, τὴν 5  
 μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὐθεὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολωλέναι, καίπερ οὕσαν  
 θειοτάτην, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἁρμονίαι αἵ τ' ἐν τοῖς φεόγγοις  
 καὶ αἱ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πάσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ  
 σώματος ἐκάστου πολλὸν χρόνον παραμένειν, ἕως ἄν ἡ κατα-  
 D καυθεῖ ἢ κατασαπῇ. ὅρα οὖν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τί φή- 10  
 σομεν, ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ κρᾶσιν οὕσαν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ  
 σώματι ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ πρώτῃ ἀπόλλυσθαι.

1. κρᾶσιν] 'a temperament.' Compare the lines of Parmenides quoted by Theophrastos *l. l.* (Karsten 145 foll.):

ὥς γὰρ ἐκάστῳ ἔχει κρᾶσις μελέων πολυ-  
 πλάγκτων,  
 τὼς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρέστηκεν· τὸ γὰρ  
 αὐτὸ  
 ἐστὶν ὅπερ φρονέει μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώ-  
 ποισι  
 καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί· τὸ γὰρ πλεον ἐστὶ  
 νόημα.

That is to say, the character of the perception is dominated by the preponderating elements of the percipient. As Theophrastos remarks, Parmenides does not distinguish between *φρονεῖν* and *αἰσθάνεσθαι*.

The word *ἁρμονία* is generally used to denote a succession of musical tones, not their simultaneous accord, for which *συμφωνία* is the ordinary term. The former meaning is however here clearly unsuitable; and in fact *ἁρμονία* is a general term expressing the relation between musical sounds, in itself signifying neither succession nor accord. That *ἁρμονία* includes *συμφωνία* is proved by *Republic* 617 B: the eight sirens standing on the whorl of the spindle sing each a single tone: ἐκ πασῶν δὲ ὁκτὼ οὐσῶν μίαν ἁρμονίαν ξυμφωνεῖν.

3. μετρίως κραθεῖ] Cf. Diog.

Laert. ix 29 ψυχὴν κρᾶμα ὑπάρχειν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, κατὰ μηδενὸς τούτων ἐπικράτησιν.

9. παραμένειν] 'remain with us.' Cf. 62 E. The word occurs again and again in this sense; yet Hirschig must needs alter it to *ἐπιμένειν*.

86 D—88 B, c. xxxvii. Sokrates defers his reply to Simmias until he has heard the objection of Kebes, which the latter states as follows. I think our argument is no further on than it was: I admit that the antenatal existence of the soul has been fairly proved, but the evidence of her existence after death seems still insufficient. Not that I agree with the objection of Simmias; but all that has yet been proved is that the soul is more lasting than the body. Suppose a weaver were in the habit of making his own coats; in the course of his life he would wear out many coats; but when his time came to die, the last coat would exist after him; yet we do not deny that the weaver is more durable than the coat. Similarly the soul in the course of a man's life may wear out many bodies: that is, so fast as the body wastes, she may renew it like a garment that needs mending; but when the time of her dissolution comes, she perishes and the body as

XXXVII. Διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει, καὶ μειδιάσας, Δίκαια μέντοι, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμμία· εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλως ἔοικεν ἀπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου. δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι  
 5 χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἔτι πρότερον Κέβητος ἀκοῦσαι, τί αὐτὸς ὅδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ἵνα χρόνου ἐγτενομένου βουλευσώ-  
 μεθα τί ἐροῦμεν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἀκούσαντας ἢ συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς, ἔάν τι δοκῶσι προσάδειν, ἔάν δὲ μή, οὕτως ἦδη ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ  
 λόγου. ἀλλ' ἄγε, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ Κέβης, λέγε, τί ἦν τὸ σὲ αὐτὸν  
 10 τὸν [ἀπιστίαν παρέχει]. λέγω δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Κέβης. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καί, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς

last renewed by her exists after her. Or to grant you even more: let us suppose that she wears out many bodies, not only in the span of one life, but in many lives; and that at the separation she continues to exist in Hades; yet we have no assurance that this goes on for ever; after repeated incarnations she may gradually be wearied out, and some one of them will be her last. Therefore it is not enough to show that the soul is ever so much stronger and more lasting than the body: you must show that in her own nature she is altogether indissoluble and eternal; else our hope of immortality is but foolishness.

1. διαβλέψας] 'with a piercing glance.' This rare word well describes the penetrating gaze of Sokrates' prominent eyes (*Theaetetus* 143 E) from under the gathered eyebrows: much the same is expressed by ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας in 117 B. The preposition seems to have the same force as in one usage of διαβαίνω—i.e. with eyelids far apart: cf. Aristotle *de insomniis* 462<sup>a</sup>13 ἐνίοις γὰρ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ πάνπαν διαβλέπουσιν (with eyes wide open), ἐὰν ᾗ σκότος, φαίνονται εἰδωλα πολλὰ κινούμενα, ὥστ' ἐγκαλύπτεσθαι πολλάκις φοβούμενους. Compare Xenophon *Symposium* v v

5, where Sokrates says οὕτω μὲν ἦδη τοίνυν οἱ ἐμοὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καλλίονες ἂν τῶν σῶν εἴησαν. πῶς δὴ; ὅτι οἱ μὲν σοὶ τὸ κατ' ἐνθὺ μόνον ὁρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκ πλαγίου διὰ τὸ ἐπιτόλαιοι εἶναι.

4. ἀπτομένῳ] 'he is one, it seems, who takes the question in hand after a thorough-going fashion.' I think this rendering is more agreeable to Plato's use of the phrase ἀπτεσθαι λόγον than that of Mr. Cope and Prof. Geddes, who take it to mean 'attack.' Cf. *Euthydemus* 283 A, *Republic* 538 C, *Phaedrus* 279 A.

8. προσάδειν] = speak to the purpose. This use seems to be directly derived from that in *Laws* 670 B γελοῖος γὰρ ὁ γε πολλὸς ὄχλος ἡγούμενος ἱκανῶς γινώσκειν τὸ τ' εὐάρμοστον καὶ εὐρυθμον καὶ μή, ὅσοι προσάδειν αὐτῶν καὶ βαίνειν ἐν ῥυθμῷ γεγονάσι διηναγκασμένοι.

9. τὸ σὲ αὐτὸν ὁρᾶν] In order to retain the words ἀπιστίαν παρέχει, some editors have altered τὸ into ὁ. I have judged it better to follow Hermann and Schanz in bracketing them as a gloss. This abbreviated form of τὰρτεν is more than once used to express a misgiving as to the validity of an argument: cf. *Theaetetus* 187 C, *Parmenides* 130 D.

11. ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ] i.e. just where

87 πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ταύτῃ ἐγκλημα ἔχειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡμῶν  
 ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς τόδε τὸ εἶδος ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ  
 οὐκὶ πάνυ χαριέντως καί, εἰ μὴ ἐπαχέες ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν, πάνυ  
 ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδείχθαι· ὥς δὲ καὶ ἀποθανόντων ἡμῶν ἔτι που  
 ἔσται, οὗ μοι δοκεῖ τῆδε. ὥς μὲν οὐκ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ πολυ- 5  
 χρονιώτερον ψυχὴ σώματος, οὐ ζυγχωρῶ τῇ Σιμμίου ἀντιλήψει·  
 δοκεῖ γάρ μοι πᾶσι τούτοις πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν. τί οὖν ἂν  
 φαῖν ὁ λόγος ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς, ἐπειδὴ ὁρᾷς ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώ-  
 B που τό γε ἀσθενέστερον ἔτι ὄν; τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιώτερον οὐ  
 δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἔτι σῶζεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ; 10  
 πρὸς δὲ τοῦτο τόδε ἐπίσκεισαι, εἴ τι λέγω· εἰκόνομος γάρ τις,  
 ὥς ἔοικεν, καὶ ὡς περ Σιμμίας θέομαι. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως  
 λέγεσθαι ταῦτα, ὡς περ ἂν τις περὶ ἀνθρώπου ὑφάντου πρεσβύτου  
 ἀποθανόντος λέγοι τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν ὁ ἄν-  
 Cθρωπος ἀλλ' ἔστι που σῶς, τεκμήριον δὲ παρέχοιτο θοιμάτιον ὃ 15  
 ἡμπεύχετο αὐτὸς ὑφηνάμενος, ὅτι ἐστὶ σῶς καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν,  
 καὶ εἴ τις ἀπιστοῖν αὐτῷ, ἀνερωτῶν πότερον πολυχρονιώτερόν  
 ἐστὶ τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἱματίου ἐν χρειᾷ τε ὄντος καὶ φορου-  
 μένου, ἀποκρίναμένου δὲ τινος ὅτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου,  
 οἷοιτο ἀποδεδείχθαι ὅτι παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὃ γε ἄνθρωπος σῶς 20

it was at the end of the discussion of *ἀνάμνησις*. Kebes is perfectly right: the reasoning contained in chapters 25—29 at best affords a mere presumption in favour of immortality: see note on 78 c.

3. ἐπαχέες] 'arrogant.'

6. οὐ ζυγχωρῶ] Again we may observe the superior acuteness of Kebes. The objection of Simmias is ingenious and plausible, but somewhat flimsy: it crumbles away at the first touch of the elenchus: moreover its refutation adds nothing to the argument. That of Kebes goes straight to the root of the matter, and obliges Sokrates to put forth his whole argumentative strength; while its disproof constitutes the crowning argument of the dialogue.

7. δοκεῖ γάρ] 'for I think soul is far superior in all these respects.'

12. ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι] 'for I think

your argument is exactly parallel to the assertion one might make about a weaver who died at an advanced age.' Heindorf would insert εἰ, but this is not necessary.

15. ἔστι που σῶς] I adopt without hesitation Forster's admirable emendation, which by a very slight change materially improves the sense. ὥς seems to me quite inappropriate, notwithstanding Heindorf's defence of it and its retention by Z. and St.

16. αὐτὸς ὑφηνάμενος] The weaver is chosen as the closest parallel to the soul, who is perpetually renewing the body that is her vesture.

17. ἀπιστοῖν] mss. ἀπιστῶν which cannot stand, since the question would be pointless in the mouth of an opponent. The ἂν which belongs to λέγοι also does duty for παρέχοιτο, ἀνερωτῶν, and οἷοιτο.

ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τό γε ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν. τὸ δ' οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐκ οὕτως ἔχει· σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ ἃ λέγω. πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ὑπολάβοι ὅτι εὖθεος λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων· ὁ γὰρ ὑφάντης οὗτος πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἱμάτια καὶ ὑφηνάμενος  
 5 ἐκείνων μὲν ὕστερος ἀπόλωλεν πολλῶν ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ τελευ- D  
 ταίου οἶμαι πρότερος, καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἕνεκα ἀν-  
 θρωπός ἐστιν ἱματίου φαυλότερον οὐδ' ἀσθενέστερον. τὴν αὐτὴν  
 δὲ οἶμαι εἰκόνα θέσαι· ἂν ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα, καὶ τις λέγων  
 αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν μέτρι' ἂν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὥς ἡ  
 10 μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρόνιον ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ  
 ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ἐκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν  
 πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ πολλὰ ἔτη βίῃ·  
 εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο ἔτι ζώντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου,  
 ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχὴ ἀεὶ τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφαίνει, ἀναγκαῖον E  
 15 μεντὰν εἶναι, ὁπότε ἀπολλύοιτο ἡ ψυχὴ, τὸ τελευταῖον ὕφασμα  
 τυχεῖν αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν καὶ τούτου μόνου προτέραν ἀπόλλυσθαι,  
 ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότε ἥδη τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας  
 ἐπιδεικνύοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταχὺ σαπὲν διοίχοιτο. ὥστε τούτῳ τῷ  
 λόγῳ οὕτω ἄξιον πιστεύσαντα θαρρεῖν, ὥς, ἐπειδὴ ἀποθανώμεν,  
 20 ἔτι που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ πλεον ἔτι τῷ 88

1. τὸ δέ] 'but in fact this is not the case.' Cf. *Theaetetus* 157 B, *Sophist* 244 A, *Laws* 642 A.

12. πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν] i.e. within the limits of a single human life. Kebes puts his case in two forms: the superior durability of the soul is consistent with the supposition (1) that during the ordinary span of human life she wears out many bodies, perpetually restoring them as they suffer waste; (2) that after separation from one body she may survive and enter into another and another. Yet in the first case she may become extinct on separating from the body; in the second she may after several incarnations be worn out by her labours and at some one separation perish utterly. Therefore we cannot argue that because the soul outlasts the body she is necessarily immortal.

13. εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι] Compare *Timaeus*

43 A τὰς τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς περιόδους ἐνέδουν εἰς ἐπίρρυτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπόρρυτον.

18. ἐπιδεικνύοι] Prof. Geddes is not, I think, right in referring this optative to indirect speech, though *Soph. Phil.* 617 would justify it (not the other passage he cites). As Stallbaum points out ἂν is easily carried on from above, ἀναγκαῖον μεντὰν.

20. ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστίν] Schanz adopts ἔσται from Hirschig, for which I see no sufficient reason, since ἔστιν is general. Note that Kebes treats the whole of chapters 25—29 as intended to supplement ἀνάμνησις by showing the after-existence of the soul: he recurs to the objection he made at 77 c, against which Sokrates appeals to ἀνταπόδοσις, but nevertheless proceeds to bring fresh evidence.

τῷ λέγοντι [ἦ] Madvig proposed to strike out ἦ, and Schanz seems

λέγοντι [ἤ] ἂν αὐτὸ λέγεις συγχωρήσειεν, τοὺς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ εἶναι ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχὰς, ἀλλὰ μὴδὲν κωλύειν καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐνίων ἔτι εἶναι καὶ ἕσεσθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενήσεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι αὖθις· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι, ὥστε πολλάκις γιγνομένην ψυχὴν 5 ἀντέχειν· τοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο μὴκέτι συγχωροί, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσιν καὶ τελευτῶσάν γε ἔν τινι τῶν θανάτων παντάπασιν ἀπόλλυσθαι· τοῦτον δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ B ταύτην τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος, ἢ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρει ὄλεθρον, μὴδένα φαίει εἶδέναι· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὁπωροῦν αἰσθάνεσθαι 10 ἡμῶν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρεῖν, ὅς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδείξει ὅτι ἔστι ψυχὴ παντάπασιν ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον· εἰ δὲ μή,

right in bracketing it. For (1) τῷ λέγοντι wants an object, (2) Kebes offers to grant not more than what Sokrates says, but more than he has himself just said. He will grant not only that the soul may have existed before birth and may wear out many bodies in this life before perishing, but also that she may survive the severance once or many times before she herself succumbs.

4. οὕτω γὰρ αὐτό] αὐτό, referring to ψυχὴν, seems to be attracted into the gender of ἰσχυρόν. Prof. Geddes compares 109 A πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό, sc. τὴν γῆν.

8. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν θάνατον] Since no one knows how often his soul has already been incarnate, he cannot tell whether or not she may survive the termination of his present life.

11. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει] 'if the hypothesis I suggest be true.' Few who have read through this forcibly stated argument will agree with Wagner that 'it gives the reader the impression that Kebes is represented as an awkward speaker, because he is not a clear thinker.'

88 c—89 c, c. xxxviii. Phaedo pauses to describe the effect of these objections upon the audience: how

their confidence is shattered in the argument and in their own judgment. Echekrates sympathises, adding that the conception of soul as a harmony has always had a strong attraction for him. He desires to know how Sokrates behaved. Never, replies Phaedo, did Sokrates appear to greater advantage: he showed neither irritation nor dismay; he cheered and encouraged us, as a general rallies his broken forces. In illustration thereof Phaedo narrates a little by-play which passed between Sokrates and himself.

By interposing this interlude Plato desires to mark in the most emphatic manner that an acute crisis has arrived in the discussion. The whole position has to be reconsidered, and the argument, as Echekrates says, started again almost from the beginning. The exact situation of the argument at this point is dealt with in the Introduction § 2, where I have tried to show as clearly as possible the relation between the earlier and the later part of the demonstration. A short dialogue between Phaedo and Echekrates is similarly introduced at 102 A to mark the completion of an important step.

ἀνάγκην εἶναι αἰεὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς, μὴ ἐν τῇ νῦν τοῦ σώματος διαζεύξει παντάπασιν ἀπόληται.

- XXXVIII. Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν ἀνδρῶς C  
 5 διετέθημεν, ὥς ὕστερον ἐλέγομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ  
 ἔμπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρα πεπεισμένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἐδόκουν  
 ἀναταράσσει καὶ εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρη-  
 μένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι, μὴ  
 οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταὶ ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἄπιστα ἦ.  
 10 ΕΧ. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὦ Φαίδων, συγγνώμην γε ἔχω ὑμῖν.  
 καὶ γὰρ αὐτόν με νῦν ἀκούσαντά σου τοιοῦτόν τι λέγειν πρὸς  
 ἑαυτὸν ἐπέρχεται· τίνι οὖν ἔτι πιστεύσομεν λόγῳ; ὥς γὰρ D  
 σφόδρα πιθανὸς ὢν, ὃν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἀπι-  
 στίαν καταπέπτωκεν. θαυμαστῶς γάρ μου ὁ λόγος οὕτως ἀντι-  
 15 λαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ αἰεὶ, τὸ ἁρμονίαν τινὰ ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν  
 ψυχὴν, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπέμνησέν με ῥηθεῖς ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα  
 προυδέδοκτο· καὶ πάνυ δέομαι πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλλου  
 τινὸς λόγου, ὅς με πείσει ὥς τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συναποθνήσκει  
 ἡ ψυχὴ. λέγε οὖν πρὸς Διός, πῇ ὁ Σωκράτης μετῴλεε τὸν  
 20 λόγον; καὶ πότερον κάκεῖνος, ὥσπερ ὑμᾶς φῆς, ἐνδηλός τι E  
 ἐγένετο ἀχρόμενος ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πρῶτος ἐβόησεν τῷ λόγῳ; καὶ  
 ἱκανῶς ἐβόησεν ἢ ἐνδεῶς; πάντα ἡμῖν δῖελεε ὥς θύνασαι  
 ἀκριβέστατα.

- ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη  
 25 οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἠγάσθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος. τὸ μὲν 89  
 οὖν ἔχειν ὅ τι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· ἀλλὰ ἔγωγε  
 μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὥς ἡδέως καὶ  
 εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο,

7. τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις] governed by *ἀπιστίαν*.

9. ἄπιστα ἦ] Schanz, following Heindorf, reads *εἴη* against the mss. But the change of mood is nothing remarkable, as the instances cited by Stallbaum will show. The subjunctive represents a more vivid conception of the contingency: see Prof. Goodwin's excellent article in the *Journal of Philology*, vol. VIII p. 18. For *εἶμεν* BCD corruptly give *ἡμεν*.

12. ὥς γὰρ σφόδρα] 'for how

strongly persuasive was that theory which Sokrates maintained, and yet it has now fallen into discredit.'

14. ἀντιλαμβάνεται] 'has a wonderfully firm grasp of me.' It never seems to have occurred to Echekrates that his favourite theory was fatal to the soul's immortality and to metempsychosis.

20. ἐνδηλός τι] Heindorf rightly says that *τι* belongs to *ἀχρόμενος*.

26. ὅ τι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος] The subject is placed in the relative instead of the main clause.



ἔπειτα ἡμῶν ὥς ὀξέως ἤσθετο ὃ πεπόνθειμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων,  
ἔπειτα ὥς εὖ ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο καὶ ὥσπερ πεφευγότας καὶ ἡττημένους  
ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προύτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαι τε καὶ συσκο-  
πεῖν τὸν λόγον.

ΕΧ. Πῶς δὴ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος  
Β παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός, ὃ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑψηλο-  
τέρου ἢ ἐγώ. καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπίεσας  
τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας—εἰώθει γάρ, ὅποτε τύχοι, παίζειν μου  
εἰς τὰς τρίχας—Αὔριον δὴ, ἔφη, ἴσως, ὦ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς 10  
κόμας ἀποκερεῖ. Ἔοικεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐκ ἄν γε  
ἐμοὶ πείθῃ. Ἀλλὰ τί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Τήμερον, ἔφη, κἀγὼ τὰς  
ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, ἐάνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ  
C δυνηώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. καὶ ἔγωγ' ἄν, εἰ σὺ εἶην καὶ  
με διαφεύγοι ὁ λόγος, ἔνορκον ἂν ποιησαίμην ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖοι, 15  
μὴ πρότερον κομήσειν, πρὶν ἂν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν  
Σιμμίου τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον. Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς δύο  
λέγεται οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οἶός τε εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν  
Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἐστίν. Παρακαλῶ τοίνυν, ἔφη, 20  
οὐκ ὥς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ' ὥς Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆ. Οὐδὲν διοίσει, 20  
ἔφη.

1. ὥς ὀξέως ἤσθετο] as is shown by his admonition against 'misology' in the next chapter.

10. τὰς καλὰς κόμας] Z. and St. with some mss. have τὰς καλὰς ταύτας κόμας.

14. ἀναβιώσασθαι] This transitive use of the word occurs again *Crito* 48 c.

15. ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖοι] referring to the story told by Herodotus I 82. The Argives, foiled in their attempt to recover Thyreai from the Spartans, vowed not to let their hair grow till they reconquered it. Prof. Geddes remarks that the Romans on the contrary showed grief by letting their hair grow long.

16. ἀναμαχόμενος] 'renewing the battle.'

18. οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς] We find the legend in *Euthydemus* 297 c. Herakles, while fighting the hydra,

was assailed by a big crab, against which he called in the aid of Iolaos. Cf. *Laus* 919 B. Presently Schanz after Cobet brackets τὸν Ἡρακλῆ.

19. ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἐστίν] because at sunset he must drink the poison.

89 D—90 D, c. xxxix. Sokrates continues: we must beware lest we become haters of arguments as some become haters of mankind. For when one has been repeatedly deceived in others, whom he believed to be good and true men, he falls sometimes into distrust and dislike of the whole human race. But this is owing to his ignorance of human nature: he does not reflect that extremes are rare, and that the very good and very bad are equally few in number. It is the same with arguments: if we have come rightly or wrongly to distrust one argument after another, we must not hastily

XXXIX. Ἄλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβησώμεν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν. Τὸ ποῖον; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Μὴ γενώμεθα, ἢ δ' ὅς, μισόλογοι, ὥσπερ D οἱ μισάνθρωποι γιγνώμενοι· ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη, ὅ τι ἂν τις μείζον τουτου κακὸν πάθοι ἢ λόγους μισήσας. γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ 5 αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισάνθρωπία. ἢ τε γὰρ μισάνθρωπία ἐνδύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἡγήσασθαι παντάπασί γε ἀληθὴ εἶναι καὶ ὑγιᾶ καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον εὐρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον· καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθῃ τις, 10 καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα οὕς ἂν ἡγήσαιο οἰκειοτάτους τε καὶ ἐταιροτάτους, τελευτῶν δὲ θαμὰ προσκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντας E καὶ ἡγεῖται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἢ οὐκ ἤσθηναι cὺ τοῦτο γιγνώμενον; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, αἰσchrὸν, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τᾶνθρώ- 15 πεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; εἰ γάρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἐχρήτο, ὥσπερ ἔχει, οὕτως ἂν ἡγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἐκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ 90 μεταξὺ πλείστους. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη ἐγώ. Ὡσπερ, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων· οἷε τι σπανιώτερον 20 εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα μικρὸν ἐξευρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἢ κύνα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν; ἢ αὖ ταχὺν ἢ βραδύν, ἢ αἰσchrὸν ἢ καλόν, ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλανα; ἢ οὐκ ἤσθηναι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ

conclude that no valid argument is to be found; it is our own want of skill that we should rather blame. We ought to take warning by those contentious disputants, who assert that there is no stable truth in anything, and fancy themselves prodigiously clever to have found this out. Yet it were sad indeed, supposing there is such a thing as truth, and that we might discover it, if, instead of laying the fault where it is really due, we quarrelled with philosophy and thus deprived ourselves of all chance of attaining truth.

4. ἢ λόγους μισήσας] 'than by conceiving a hatred for arguments'; explanatory of τοῦτου.

10. οὕς ἂν ἡγήσαιο] 'whom he

would naturally think.' ἂν of course belongs to ἡγήσαιο.

13. ἤσθηναι cὺ τοῦτο] Z. has οὕτω τοῦτο. St. οὕτω πως τοῦτο.

14. αἰσchrὸν is bracketed by Schanz.

ἄνευ τέχνης] i.e. without a knowledge of mankind.

16. τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα] Although the order of the words inclines us to take σφόδρα with ὀλίγους, I think the sense requires that it should be joined with χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς. Heindorf would double σφόδρα; but it is not really wanted with ὀλίγους.

23. τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων] 'the extremes in both directions.' The ἔσχατα are the two opposite qualities, ἄκρα the extremes of these.

μεταξὺ ἄφρονα καὶ πολλά; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν οἶει,  
 B ἔφη, εἰ πονηρίας ἀγὼν προτεθείη, πάνυ ἂν ὀλίγους καὶ ἐνταῦθα  
 τοὺς πρώτους φανῆναι; Εἰκός γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Εἰκός γάρ, ἔφη·  
 ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ  
 Nῦν δὲν προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφespόμην, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῃ, ἦ, ἐπειδάν τις 5  
 πιστεύῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους  
 τέχνης, κάπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδὴς εἶναι, ἐνίστε  
 μὲν ὧν, ἐνίστε δ' οὐκ ὧν, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος· καὶ  
 C μάλιστα δὲ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἶσθ' 10  
 ὅτι τελευτώντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι τε καὶ κατανενοη-  
 κέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ  
 βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ  
 ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν

Thus if we conceive λευκὸν and μέλαν to be represented by a straight line, the central portion is occupied by shades of grey; the ἔσχατα, or parts remote from the centre, by white and black; and the ἄκρα, or ends of the line, by the highest degree of each.

4. ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν] Sokrates has been led by the question of Phaedo into a digression upon the nature of the ἀτεχνία shown by misanthropes, which consists in their forgetting that extremes are seldom met with. But this does not constitute the analogy between μισανθρωπία and μισολογία. The real analogy is that when we have been several times disappointed in a λόγος we jump to the conclusion that all λόγοι are worthless, without stopping to consider whether the fault may not lie in our unscientific treatment.

5. ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύῃ] The apodosis never comes: Plato finishes the sentence as if he had not written ἦ, which Schanz, at Madvig's suggestion, omits.

9. οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους] Plato may refer to the Ephesian school, οἱ ῥέοντες of the

*Theaetetus*: perhaps also to sophists of the type of Dionysodoros and Euthydemus, such as he seems to have in view at 101 E; and to the Cynics.

10. σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι] Cf. *Sophist* 251 C ἐντυγχάνεις γὰρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακόσιν, ἐνίστε πρεσβυτέροις ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθναυμάκοσι, καὶ δὴ τι καὶ πάσσοφον οἰομένοισι τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀνευρηκέναι. Clearly a hit at Antisthenes.

13. ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται] Compare the invective of Theodoros against the Ephesians, *Theaetetus* 179 E foll. Besides these Herakleiteans (with whom Plato had really little or no quarrel, so far as regards the phenomenal world), the principal ἀντιλογικοὶ were Antisthenes with his school, and some later Sophists, who had caught up the trick of the Sokratic method of question and answer and used it to force on the unwary the acceptance of the most preposterous paradoxes. Their habits are admirably described in the *Euthydemus*. These men, whose only object was to make a sensation, must

οὐδενὶ μένει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν,  
 ὦ Φαίδων, ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δὴ τινος  
 ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι, ἔπειτα διὰ  
 τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιούτοις τις λόγοις τοῖς αὐτοῖς τότε μὲν D  
 5 δοκοῦσιν ἀληθῆς εἶναι, τότε δὲ μή, μὴ ἑαυτὸν τις αἰτιῶτο  
 μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν  
 ἄσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιο καὶ  
 ἦδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε καὶ λοιδορῶν διατελοῖ, τῶν δὲ  
 ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθεῖν. Νῦν τὸν Δία,  
 10 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἰκτρὸν δῆτα.

XL. Πρῶτον μὲν τοῖνυν, ἔφη, τοῦτο εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ  
 παρίωμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν, ὥς τῶν λόγων κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς E  
 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὕτω ὑγιῶς ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ  
 ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ὑγιῶς ἔχειν, κοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς  
 15 ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς ἕνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα  
 τοῦ θανάτου· ὥς κινδυνεύω ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ 91  
 τούτου οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι  
 φιλονείκως. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅπῃ  
 μὲν ἔχει περὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾗ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἂ  
 20 αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παρούσιν, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται.  
 καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων  
 διοίσειν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παρούσιν ἂ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ  
 εἶναι προθυμηθῆσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ὅπως αὐτῷ

be classed apart from disputants of the Cynic and Megarian schools, whose paradoxes rested upon logical and metaphysical errors which were genuine difficulties at the time; which in fact required all Plato's genius to clear away.

90 D—91 c, c. xl. Let us beware then, says Sokrates, lest we rashly charge our argument with being faulty, when the fault is our own. The question is of deep interest to us all, and to me especially: indeed I feel less like a philosopher than like those who argue not for truth's sake but merely that their opinion may prevail; only I am more anxious to persuade myself than you. However, if my belief is true, it is well; if not, it will at least make me better

company for you while I am with you. For your part, you must think more of the truth than of Sokrates; and you must not accept my reasoning until you have fully tested it; lest I depart like a bee leaving my sting behind.

17. οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι] The language suggests the Cynics; cf. *Theaetetus* 155 E εἰς γὰρ, ὦ παῖ, μάλ' ἐὶ ἄμουςοι; cf. *Sophist* 246 D, and Arist. *Metaph.* H iii 1043<sup>b</sup> 24 οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι. Sophists of the eristic type are no doubt included.

23. εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον] 'unless it were merely by the way.' It is surprising that Prof. Geddes has adopted against all the mss. Hermann's most infelicitous conjecture

B ἐμοὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως ἔχειν. λογίζομαι γάρ, ὦ φίλε  
 ἐταῖρε, θέσσαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς· εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθὴ ὄντα ἃ  
 λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μὴδὲν ἐστὶ τελευτή-  
 σαντι, ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦτόν γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ  
 θανάτου ἦττον τοῖς παρούσιν ἀνδρὲς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος. ἡ δὲ 5  
 δὴ ἄγνοιά μοι αὕτη οὐ ξυνδιατελεῖ, κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν, ἀλλ'  
 ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀπολείται. παρσκευασμένος δὴ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία  
 τε καὶ Κέβης, οὕτως ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον· ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἂν  
 C ἐμοὶ πείθῃσθε, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας  
 πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἔαν μὲν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογή- 10  
 σατε, εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προ-  
 ουμίας ἅμα ἑμαυτὸν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ  
 κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχίσσομαι.

εἰ μὴ εἰ πάρεργον. Had εἰ been found in the texts, one would have felt strongly inclined to alter it to εἴη.

1. λογίζομαι γάρ] 'for I am reasoning, my dear companion—see how selfishly.' All this is Socratic εἰρωνεία: Sokrates and Plato were the last men to persuade themselves that a belief was true, because it was pleasant.

5. ἦττον τοῖς παρούσιν] 'I shall be less likely to annoy the company with lamentation.' ἦττον of course qualifies all the words that follow: it will less be the case that I shall annoy them by lamenting. The passage would not have required a note but for the strange misconception of Wagner, who seems to think that μὴ is wanted before ὀδυρόμενος.

ἡ δὲ δὴ ἄγνοια] Sokrates means that one way or another his doubts will be cleared away; he will not go on existing in doubt whether his existence will continue. For at death he will either find assurance of immortality or he will cease to be, and in neither case is he subject to ἄγνοια. ὀλίγον ὕστερον means shortly after the present moment, not after death. δὴ ἄγνοια is Fischer's suggestion for διανόια,

which is the reading of the best mss.; the rest have ἄνοια.

9. σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους] Cf. *Republic* 595 c ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρὸ τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνὴρ: and *Arist. Nic. Eth.* i iv 1096<sup>a</sup> 16 ἄμφοιν γὰρ ὄντων φίλοιον ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

11. ὅπως μή] The editions generally have ἐλαβούμενοι ὅπως: but the participle is absent in BCD and omitted by Schanz.

12. ἑμαυτὸν] This reading has the best authority: Z. and St. give ἐαυτόν.

ὥσπερ μέλιττα] The commentators think this is borrowed from the line of Eupolis concerning Perikles, τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκρωμένοις. The expression seems likely to have been proverbial.

91 c—92 d, c. xli. Sokrates briefly restates the objections of Simmias and Kebes: he then points out to the former that he must make his choice between the doctrine that soul is a harmony and the doctrine that learning is reminiscence. The theory of reminiscence presupposes that the soul existed before the body; but a harmony comes into existence after that which produces it: either

XLI. Ἄλλ' ἰτέον, ἔφη. πρῶτόν με ὑπομνήσατε ἃ ἐλέγετε, ἔαν μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος. Σιμμίας μὲν γάρ, ὥς ἐγώ μαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται, μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅμως καὶ βειότερον καὶ κάλλιον ὢν τοῦ σώματος προαπολλύηται ἐν ἁρμονίας εἶδει οὐσα· D  
 5 Κέβης δέ μοι ἔδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοὶ συγχωρεῖν, πολυχρονιώ-  
 τερὸν γε εἶναι ψυχὴν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί, μὴ  
 πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευ-  
 ταῖον σῶμα καταλιποῦσα νῦν αὐτὴ ἀπολλύηται, καὶ ἥ αὐτὸ  
 τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμά γε αἰεὶ ἀπολλύμενον  
 10 οὐδὲν παύεται. ἄρα ἄλλ' ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης,  
 ἃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι; Συνωμολογείτην δὴ ταῦτ' εἶναι ἄμφω. E  
 Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἔμπροσθε λόγους οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε,  
 ἢ τοὺς μὲν, τοὺς δ' οὐ; Τοὺς μὲν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ' οὐ. Τί  
 οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε, ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τὴν  
 15 μάθῃσιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀναγκάως  
 ἔχειν ἄλλοι πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ  
 σώματι ἐνδεσθῆναι; Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς 92  
 ὥς ἐπέισθην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὥς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ. Καὶ  
 μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πάνυ ἂν θαυμά-  
 20 ζοιμι, εἴ μοι περὶ γε τούτου ἄλλα ποτὲ δόξειεν. καὶ ὁ Σωκρά-  
 τής, Ἄλλα ἀνάγκη σοι, ἔφη, ὦ ἔνε Θηβαῖε, ἄλλα δόξαι, ἐάν περ  
 μείνη ἥδε ἡ οἴησις, τὸ ἁρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον πρᾶγμα,  
 ψυχὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων  
 συγκεῖσθαι. οὐ γάρ που ἀποδέξει γε αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, ὥς πρότερον B  
 25 ἦν ἁρμονία συγκεῖμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἔδει αὐτὴν  
 συντεθῆναι· ἢ ἀποδέξει; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Αἰσθάνει

therefore soul is not a harmony or she has had no precognition of the ideas. Simmias admits this and declares without hesitation in favour of reminiscence, which he affirms to be a rational hypothesis, while the other is merely a plausible analogy.

The first refutation is addressed to believers in ἀνάμνησις and pre-existence of the soul; it appeals therefore only to Platonists or possibly Pythagoreans.

4. ἐν ἁρμονίας εἶδει] Cf. *Timaeus* 30 c τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν μέρους εἶδει μηδενὶ καταξιώσωμεν. Also *Republic* 389 B; *Cratylus* 394 D.

7. πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις] We might take πολλὰ to refer to the exhaustion of many bodies during our human life, and πολλάκις to the repeated incarnations of the soul; the two cases put by Kebes. But the following words καὶ ἥ . . . παύεται seem to show that Sokrates had the first case only in view; and for the purposes of his argument there is no difference between them.

21. ἄλλα δόξαι] So Stallbaum and Schanz; Z. has δοξάσαι with the mss.

οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ταυτά] σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν, ὅταν φῆς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἶδος τε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δὲ αὐτὴν συγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἁρμονία γέ σοι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὃ ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ οἱ φεόγγοι ἔτι ἀνάρμοσ- 5  
C τοι ὄντες γίγνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ πάντων ξυνίσταται ἡ ἁρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται. οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς ξυνάσεται ; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Καὶ μήν, ἢ δ' ὅς, πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ξυνωδῶ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἁρμονίας. Πρέπει γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὗτος τοίνυν, ἔφη, 10  
σοὶ οὐ ξυνωδός, ἀλλ' ὅρα· πότερον αἰρεῖ τῶν λόγων, τὴν μάθῃσιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν ; Πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἐκείνον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ὅδε μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ  
D ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινός καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς 15  
ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένοις λόγοις ξύνοῖδα οὖσιν ἀλαζόσιν, καὶ ἂν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ φυλάττηται, εὖ μάλα ἐξαπατῶσι, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίας καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν. ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι' ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέεσθαι εἴρηται. ἐρρήθη

1. ταυτά σοι συμβαίνει] 'this is what your statement amounts to.' Schmidt proposes οὐ ταυτά, *i.e.* you make contradictory statements. This would do well enough, had it ms. authority ; but the ms. reading is equally good sense. ταῦτα = πρότερον . . . συντεθῆναι.

4. ὃ ἀπεικάζεις] 'harmony is not what you represent it; *i.e.* it is not such a thing as soul. This is the reading of the best mss. and gives a simpler construction than the ordinary φ.

5. οἱ φεόγγοι] *i.e.* the tones of the several strings before they are combined into harmony.

14. μετὰ εἰκότος τινός] 'through a certain analogy and plausibility.'

τοῖς πολλοῖς] Another indication that this was a widely spread popular opinion, not distinctively Pythagorean.

19. ἐρρήθη γάρ που] 'for we said, I think, that the existence of

our soul before she entered the body rested on the same assurance as that of the very substance that has the title of absolute essence.' I have followed Schanz in adopting the emendation of Mudge, αὐτῇ for αὐτῆς. Retaining αὐτῆς we make Plato affirm that the pre-existence of the soul is assured inasmuch as her substance is absolute existence. But Plato never said anything of the sort : he merely said, as surely as the ideas exist, so surely did the soul, 76 E. Heindorf in an acute note defends the vulgate, taking αὐτῆς as possessive ; 'as surely as absolute existence belongs to her,' *i.e.* was cognised by her ; referring to the words in 76 E ὑπάρχονσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὖσαν. But (1) this interpretation supposes a very awkward ellipse of ἐστὶν in a relative clause, (2) the sense of αὐτῆς is severely strained : could Plato say 'absolute existence is hers,' meaning

γάρ που οὕτως ἡμῶν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὥσπερ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὁ ἐστίν. ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὥς ἑαυτὸν πείθω, ἱκανῶς τε καὶ Ε  
ὁρεῶς ἀποδέδεγμαι. ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὥς ἔοικε, διὰ ταῦτα μήτε  
5 ἑαυτοῦ μήτε ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος, ὥς ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἁρμονία.

XLII. Τί δέ, ἡ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σιμμία, τῆδε; δοκεῖ σοι ἁρμονία  
ἡ ἄλλῃ τινὶ συνθέσει προσήκειν ἄλλως πως ἔχειν ἢ ὥς ἂν 93  
ἐκεῖνα ἔχῃ ἐξ ὧν ἂν συγκένται; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν  
10 τι, ὥς ἐγὼμαι, οὐδέ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ' ἃ ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἡ ποιῇ  
ἡ πάσχη; Συνέφη. Οὐκ ἄρα ἡγεῖσθαι γε προσήκει ἁρμονίαν  
τούτων ἐξ ὧν ἂν συντεθῇ, ἀλλ' ἔπεσθαι. Συνεδόκει. Πολλοῦ

'absolute existence is cognised by her'? (3) we have already seen reason to doubt the genuineness of the words in 76 E. Hirschig also adopts *αὐτή*.

3. ἱκανῶς] 'on adequate proof.'

92 E—94 B, c. xlii. Again a harmony must conform to the conditions of the materials which produce it; consequently the completeness of the harmony is in exact proportion to the completeness with which these are brought into tune. It follows then that there are degrees in harmony, corresponding with the conditions of the materials. But in soul there are no degrees; each soul is just as completely soul as every other. Furthermore we say some souls are virtuous, others vicious; and we define virtue to be a harmony, vice a discord of the soul. Now supposing that souls are harmonies, they are harmonies which admit of no difference in degree, since we have admitted that there are no degrees of soul. But a virtuous soul, being a harmony, has in her another harmony, while a vicious soul has a discord; therefore the virtuous soul is more of a harmony, that is, more of a soul, than the vicious. But this being contrary to our premisses, we are forced to

conclude that no soul is more virtuous or vicious than another; or rather that all souls, being complete harmonies, are completely virtuous: a *reductio ad absurdum*.

The second argument will reach those who accept neither *ἀνάμνησις* nor the ideal theory, but who do accept the view that virtue is a harmonious state of the soul. It is to be observed (1) that the premiss in 93 A πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ κ.τ.λ., of which a different use is made in the next chapter, here is simply brought in to show that the perfection of the harmony depends upon the tuning of the strings etc., and consequently that as these may be more or less in tune, the harmony admits corresponding degrees of completeness: (2) the argument might seem to be complete in 93 B, where it is allowed that, while harmony admits degrees, soul does not. But we should regard all the earlier part of the chapter as collecting the materials for the refutation which proceeds consecutively from 93 D: moreover Plato had to guard against the rejoinder that, although harmony, as such, admits of degrees, there may yet be particular kinds of harmony, whereof soul is one, which do not admit of degrees.



ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἁρμονία κινήσθαι ἢ φεέσθαι ἢ τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσιν. Πολλοὺ μέντοι, ἔφη. Τί δέ; οὐχ οὕτως ἁρμονία πέφυκεν εἶναι ἐκάστη ἁρμονία, ὥς ἂν  
 B ἁρμοσεῖ; Οὐ μαθεῖναι, ἔφη. Οὐχί, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἂν μὲν μᾶλλον  
 ἁρμοσεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίνεσθαι, μᾶλλον  
 5 τε ἂν ἁρμονία εἶναι καὶ πλείων, εἰ δ' ἥττον τε καὶ ἐπ' ἑλάττω,  
 ἥττον τε καὶ ἐλάττω; Πάνυ γε. Ἡ οὖν ἔστι τοῦτο περὶ  
 ψυχῆν, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον μᾶλλον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας

1. ἐναντία γε ἁρμονία] ἐναντία is of course accusative plural. Plato means that the harmony is entirely the outcome of its constituents and is conditioned by them, having no independent existence: as you tighten the string the tone rises. On this ground it would be impossible for a soul to be in a harmonious state, *i.e.* virtue, independently of the physical conditions of which she herself is the result.

4. μᾶλλον ἁρμοσεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον] There must be distinction between μᾶλλον and ἐπὶ πλέον. I think μᾶλλον may apply to the degree of completeness in which the σύνθεσις is accomplished, and ἐπὶ πλέον to the character of the σύνθεσις itself. To take an illustration from music (1) the two notes forming an octave may be more or less in tune; (2) the octave and the fifth are more perfect concords than the fourth and third. This view, I find, is in a manner supported by Olympiodoros: ὑποτίθεται μὴ εἶναι ἁρμονίαν ἁρμονίας πλείω μηδὲ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἥττον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον περὶ τὴν ποσότητα τῶν διαστημάτων καὶ τῶν συστημάτων ἢ γὰρ διὰ τεσσάρων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο οὔτε ἐν πλείοσιν οὔτε ἐν ἐλάττωσιν· τὸ δὲ δεύτερον περὶ τὴν ἀνεσιν καὶ τὴν ἐπίτασιν· κατ' αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ εἶδος οὐδεμία ἁρμονία οὔτε ἀνίσταται οὔτε ἐπιτείνεται. That is, a particular harmony, *e.g.* the fourth, cannot be harmonised ἐπὶ

πλέον or μᾶλλον: since (1) it cannot comprehend more than a fixed number of tones, (2) it cannot (if it is to be a true fourth) admit any tampering with the pitch, κατὰ τὸν ἁρμονικὸν λόγον. The Pythagoreans, he says, συλλαβὰν μὲν καλοῦσι τὴν διὰ τεσσάρων ἁρμονίαν ὡς ἡκίστα ἁρμονίαν κατακορεστέην δὲ τὴν διὰ πασῶν ὡς μάλιστα. As to the μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον he remarks ἔχει γὰρ ἐκάστη ἁρμονία πλάτος τι κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν, οὐ μὴν κατὰ τὸν ἁρμονικὸν λόγον: that is to say, although one precise ratio alone constitutes a true octave, there is a certain margin of variation within which the ear will accept the interval as an octave.

8. μᾶλλον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας] I have retained μᾶλλον with all the mss. It is bracketed by Schanz and expunged by the Zürich editors. μᾶλλον however is not seldom used by Plato to strengthen another comparative: cf. *Timaeus* 87 c δικαιότερον γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν περὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κακῶν ἴσχειν λόγον. *Politicus* 259 c τῆς δὲ γνωστικῆς μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς χειροτεχνικῆς καὶ ὅλως πρακτικῆς βούλει τὸν βασιλέα φῶμεν οἰκειότερον εἶναι; *Gorgias* 487 B αἰσχυντοτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος. The present case is, it is true, a stronger one, since the word μᾶλλον is actually repeated; but this is softened by the interposition of ἐπὶ πλέον, and the pleonasm seems to me not unnatural. Some editors would

ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλεόν καὶ μάλλον ἢ ἐπ' ἑλαττον καὶ ἥττον αὐτὸ  
 τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχὴν; Οὐδ' ὁπωστίουν, ἔφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἔφη,  
 πρὸς Διός· λέγεται ψυχὴ ἢ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ C  
 εἶναι ἀγαθὴ, ἢ δὲ ἄνοιάν τε καὶ μοχθηρίαν καὶ εἶναι κακὴ; καὶ  
 5 ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται; Ἀληθῶς μέντοι. Τῶν οὖν θεμένων  
 ψυχὴν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσκει ταῦτα [ὄντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς  
 ψυχαῖς, τὴν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν; πότερον ἀρμονίαν αὖ  
 τινα ἄλλην καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν; καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡρμόσσει, τὴν  
 ἀγαθὴν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἀρμονίᾳ οὐκ ἄλλην ἀρμονίαν, τὴν  
 10 δὲ ἀνάρμοστον αὐτὴν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἄλλην;  
 Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, εἰπεῖν· δῆλον δ' ὅτι τοιαύτ'  
 ἄττ' ἂν λέγοι ὁ ἐκεῖνο ὑποθέμενος. Ἀλλὰ προωμολόγηται, ἔφη, D  
 μὴδὲν μάλλον μὴδ' ἥττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχὴν ψυχῆς εἶναι·  
 τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα, μὴδὲν μάλλον μὴδ' ἐπὶ πλεόν

insert *ψυχὴν* before *ψυχῆς*: but, as Schmidt observes, this is superfluous on account of the preceding words *ἢ οὐδ' ἔστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχῆν*.

#### 7. ἀρμονίαν αὖ τινα ἄλλην]

The conception of virtue as a harmonious condition of the soul is peculiarly Platonic. Compare the description of *δικαιοσύνη* in *Republic* 443 D *μὴ ἑάσαντα τὰλλότρια πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὰ οἰκεία εὖ θέμενον καὶ ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ καὶ ξυναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, ὥσπερ ὄρους τρεῖς ἀρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς, νεότης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης*. And in *Sophist* 228 B we hear that vice is a *στάσις* of the soul.

Plato's contention is this. If soul is a harmony of the body, soul is the result of a combination of certain elements arranged in a certain way and in certain ratios. And if virtue is a harmonious state of the soul, the difference between a virtuous and a non-virtuous soul must consist in some variation of the component elements, either in the number or in the disposition or in the ratios.

Virtue then is due either to the addition of some element which is wanting in the non-virtuous soul, or to some better proportion or arrangement of the same elements. Whichever alternative we adopt, the result is that the virtuous soul is a more complete harmony than the non-virtuous; thus contravening our statement that one soul cannot be more soul, *i.e.* more harmony, than another.

#### 14. τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα]

'the admission amounts to this, that (in saying one soul is not more soul than another) you affirm that one harmony is not more a harmony than another.' Schanz, following Madvig and Schmidt, brackets *ἀρμονίας*, so that we must understand *ψυχὴν ψυχῆς* in agreement with *ἐτέραν ἐτέρας*. But this prematurely anticipates the conclusion in *ε οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ . . . ἡρμύσται*. The train of reasoning is thus. We agree that one soul is as much soul as any other. Assuming soul to be a harmony, this amounts to saying that all these harmonies, which we call souls, are equally harmonies. Now equal harmonies are equally harmonised

μηδ' ἦττον μηδ' ἐπ' ἔλαττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ἁρμονίαν ἁρμονίας  
 εἶναι· ἢ γάρ; Πάνυ γε. Τὴν δέ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἦττον  
 ἁρμονίαν οὐσαν μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἦττον ἡρμόσθαι· ἔστιν  
 οὕτως; Ἔστιν. Ἡ δὲ μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἦττον ἡρμωμένη  
 ἔστιν ὅ τι πλεον ἢ ἔλαττον ἁρμονίας μετέχει, ἢ τὸ ἴσον; Τὸ 5  
 ἴσον. Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἦττον ἄλλῃ  
 ἢ ἁλλῃς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ψυχὴ ἐστίν, οὐδὲ δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἦττον  
 ἡρμωται; Οὕτω. Τοῦτο δέ γε πεπονευῖα οὐδὲν πλεον  
 ἀναρμωσίας οὐδὲ ἁρμονίας μετέχει ἄν; Οὐ γὰρ οὐν. Τοῦτο  
 δ' αὖ πεπονευῖα ἄρ' ἄν τι πλεον κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς μετέχει 10  
 ἐτέρα ἐτέρας, εἴπερ ἢ μὲν κακία ἀναρμωσία, ἢ δὲ ἀρετὴ  
 ἁρμονία εἴη; Οὐδὲν πλεον. Μᾶλλον δέ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία,  
 94 κατὰ τὸν ὁρὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχὴ μεθέξει, εἴπερ  
 ἁρμονία ἐστίν· ἁρμονία γὰρ δήπου παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐσα,  
 ἁρμονία, ἀναρμωσίας οὐποτ' ἂν μετάρχοι. Οὐ μέντοι. Οὐδέ 15  
 γε δήπου ψυχὴ, οὐσα παντελῶς ψυχὴ, κακίας. Γίως γὰρ ἐκ γε  
 τῶν προειρημένων; Ἐκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι  
 ψυχαὶ πάντων ζώων ὁμοίως ἀγαθαὶ ἔσονται, εἴπερ ὁμοίως  
 ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχαί, εἶναι. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη,  
 ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἡ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὕτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ 20  
 Β πᾶσκειν ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος, εἰ ὁρὸν ἢ ὑπόθεσις ἦν, τὸ ψυχὴν  
 ἁρμονίαν εἶναι; Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.

and have an equal portion of harmony. Therefore souls, being harmonies, are equally harmonised. In other words, if souls are harmonies, they are equal harmonies; but equal harmonies cannot be more or less harmonised one than another; neither therefore can souls. There is no difficulty about *ἁρμονίας*, if we understand 'that particular harmony which is soul.'

14. **παντελῶς**] Soul is complete and perfect soul, as such; therefore complete and perfect harmony: no discord then, and consequently no vice, can exist in her.

19. **ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν**] Schanz brackets *ψυχαί*, following Heindorf. But the clause is of general application: 'seeing that it is the nature of souls to be this precise thing, namely souls, in the same degree.'

20. **ἢ καὶ καλῶς**] 'do you think this is a worthy conclusion? or that our theory would have been in such a predicament, had our premiss been correct, that soul is a harmony?'

21. **πᾶσκειν ἂν**] The mss. omit *ἂν*, which however occurs in the citation of Stobaeus. It is certainly necessary, since *εἰ* . . . *ἦν* = 'if our premiss had been correct': which it is not.

94 B—95 A, c. xliii. Lastly we see that the soul rules the body, often thwarting its desires and controlling its affections; whereas we saw that a harmony could not act in opposition to its constituent elements. Soul therefore cannot be a harmony.

The last argument rests neither upon the ideal theory nor upon the doctrine that virtue is harmony: it

XLIII. Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς· τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἔσθ' ὅ  
 τι ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἢ ψυχὴν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον; Οὐκ  
 ἔγωγε. Πότερον συγχωροῦσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα παθήμασιν ἢ  
 καὶ ἐναντιουμένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε, ὥς καύματος ἐνότος  
 5 καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον ἔλκειν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, καὶ πείνης  
 ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθίειν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία που ὁρώμεν ἐναν-  
 τιουμένην τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα· ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν C  
 οὖν. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ὁμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μήποτ' ἂν  
 αὐτὴν, ἀρμονίαν γε οὔσαν, ἐναντία ἄδειν οἷς ἐπιτείνοιτο καὶ  
 10 χαλῶτο καὶ πάλλοιτο καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιον πάθος πάσχοι ἐκείνα ἐξ  
 ὧν τυγχάνει οὕσα, ἀλλ' ἔπεσθαι ἐκείνοισι καὶ οὔποτ' ἂν ἡγε-  
 μονεύειν; Ὁμολογήσαμεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Τί οὖν; νῦν  
 οὐ πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύουσα  
 τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησί τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιου-  
 15 μένη ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπύζουσα πάντας D  
 τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ' ἀλγηδόνων,  
 τά τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν, τὰ δὲ πραότερον,  
 καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νοουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ

is simply an appeal to common sense. Aristotle's views on the subject will be found in *de anima* I iv §§ 2—9. In the lost dialogue *Eudemos* he argued against harmony, (1) that harmony has an opposite, viz. ἀναρμοστία, but soul has no opposite—an obvious *petitio principii*; (2) that the opposite of ἀρμονία σώματος is ἀναρμοστία σώματος: the ἀναρμοστία is disease, weakness, and deformity, therefore the ἀρμονία is health, strength, and beauty; none of which is soul. See Bernays, *Dialoge des Aristoteles* p. 26.

3. **πότερον συγχωροῦσαν**] The mss. are in confusion here. Schanz gives *πότερον [συγχωροῦσαν] τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἐναντιουμένην [παθήμασι]*; which, omitting the brackets, is the reading of BCD. Schanz considers that the confusion arose because the copyist was puzzled by the use of *πότερον* with a single interrogative. The sentence, as he reads it, seems to me however some-

what bare; and I have reverted to the text of Z. and St. In the next sentence *ὥς εἰ* is found in B, *ὥσεἰ* in CD. *οἶον* is in Stobaeus and many inferior mss. *ὥς* is in the margin of B, and was approved by Schanz *N. C.* p. 150, though he now prints [*ὥσεἰ*]. St. and Z. give *οἶον*.

5. **ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον ἔλκειν**] Cf. *Republic* 439 B foll.

8. **ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν**] 93 A. St. and Z. give *ἐμπροσθεν*.

9. **οἷς ἐπιτείνοιτο**] i.e. ἐκείνοις ᾧ, cognate accusative, 'it can never give a sound contrary to the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and all the other conditions of the materials from which it arises.'

18. **ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις**] The construction is usually regarded as following *ἀπειλοῦσα* rather than *νουθετοῦσα*. Heindorf compares Isokrates *Areop.* 149 c (§ 48) and Lysias *against Andokides* § 33. But it is surely evident that *ἐπιθυμίαις*

ὄργαις καὶ φόβοις ὥς ἄλλη οὐσα ἄλλῳ πράγματι διαλεγομένη ;  
οἷόν που καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐα πεποίηκεν, οὐ λέγει τὸν  
Ὀδυσσεά

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἡνίπαπε μύθῳ·

Ε

τέτλαει δὴ, κραδίην· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης.

5

ἀρ' οἶει αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοούμενον ὥς ἁρμονίας αὐτῆς  
οὔσης καὶ οἷας ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ  
οἷας ἄγειν τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ οὔσης αὐτῆς πολὺ θειο-  
τέρου τινὸς πράγματος ἢ καθ' ἁρμονίαν ; Νῆ Δία, ᾧ Σώκρατες,  
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ᾧ ἄριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμῇ καλῶς ἔχει 10  
ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν τινὰ φάναι εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἄν, ὥς ἔοικεν,  
95 Ὅμηρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ ὁμολογοῖμεν οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.  
Ἔχει οὕτως, ἔφη.

XLIV. Εἶεν δὴ, ἡ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἁρμονίας

κ.τ.λ. depends on *διαλεγομένη*, as Schleiermacher takes it.

4. *στῆθος δὲ πλήξας*] *Odyssey* xx 17. The passage is quoted also in *Republic* 390 D, 441 B.

12. Ὅμηρῳ] In the same half-serious manner Plato professes to trace the doctrine *πάντα ρεῖ* back to Homer: *Theaetetus* 152 E *εἰπὼν γὰρ Ὀκεανὸν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν, πάντα εἴρηκεν ἐκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως*. Cf. 153 C.

95 A—E, c. xlv. Having thus disposed of the theory of harmony, Sokrates proceeds to deal with the objection of Kebes, which he first recapitulates. If the philosopher is to feel any reasonable confidence that his life in Hades will be the happier for his devotion to philosophy on earth, we must prove that the soul is absolutely indestructible. It is not enough that she is strong and godlike, nor that for ages before our birth she enjoyed an intelligent existence. This does not prove her immortality: the very incarnation in a human body may be the first symptom of her coming dissolution; it matters not whether she undergo one or many such incarnations; if

we cannot show that she is actually imperishable, our hope of a future life is vanity.

14. τὰ μὲν Ἁρμονίας] Sokrates playfully personifies the theory of his Theban friend as Harmonia the Theban heroine. She had threatened the argument with destruction, but the persuasive tongue of Sokrates has propitiated her. Harmonia naturally suggests Kadmos, who is made to personify the objection of Kebes. Many and marvellous are the interpretations which various commentators have forced upon this simple piece of pleasantry, which ill deserves such treatment. But even the laboured absurdity of Olympiodoros compares favourably with such trifling as Stallbaum's '*Simmia ratio facilius, Cebetis difficilior ad refellendum fuit. quamobrem facile illa uxori haec marito tribuitur.*' Supposing the 'ratio' of Simmias had been ten times more difficult than that of Kebes, to whom but Harmonia could it have been assigned? Heindorf sensibly says '*hinc ad alteram illam Cebetis itidem Thebani transituro sponte se Cadmi offerebat mentio.*' Richard Shilleto (as I am informed

ἡμῖν τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς ἴλεα πῶς, ὥς ἔοικε, μετρίως γέγονε· τί δὲ  
 δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, πῶς ἱλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ;  
 Κύ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἐξευρῆσαι· τουτονὶ γοῦν τὸν  
 λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἁρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἶπες ὥς παρὰ  
 5 δόξαν. Σιμμίου γὰρ λέγοντος ὅ τι ἠπόρει, πάνυ ἐθαύμαζον, εἴ  
 τι ἔξει τις χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ· πάνυ μὲν οὖν μοι ἀτόπως B  
 ἔδοξεν εὐθὺς τὴν πρώτην ἐφοδὸν οὐ δέεσθαι τοῦ σοῦ λόγου.  
 ταῦτα δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ  
 πάθοι. ὦ γασέ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μὴ τις ἡμῖν  
 10 βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δὴ

by Dr. Jackson) held that ἴλεα conveys the notion of 'bidding farewell,' ἱλαθι having the same sense addressed to a deity as χαῖρε addressed to a mortal: this view he supports by Cicero *de natura deorum* i § 124 *deinde si maxime talis est deus, ut nulla gratia, nulla hominum caritate teneatur, valeat; quid enim dicam 'propitius sit'?* This seems to me very probable: ἱλαθι certainly is a form of farewell in Theokr. xv 143, where the lady ends her song with ἱλαθι νῦν φίλ' Ἀδωνι, καὶ ἐς νέωτ' εὐθυμήσαις. Compare Apollonius Rhodius iv 1773 ἱλατ' ἀριστῆων μακάρων γένος: the poet is taking leave of his heroes. I am indebted to Dr. Jackson for some further illustrations from the *Anthology*: the point is well brought out in xii 140:

τὸν καλὸν ὥς ἰδόμεν Ἀρχέστρατον, οὐ μὰ  
 τὸν Ἑρμῆν  
 οὐ καλὸν αὐτὸν ἔφαν· οὐ γὰρ ἄγαν  
 ἔδοκει.  
 εἶπα, καὶ ἂ Νέμεσις με συνάρπασε, κεῖθδ' ἔκειμαν  
 ἐν πυρὶ πᾶς, ὁ δέ μ' ὥς Ζεὺς ἐκεραυνο-  
 βόλει.  
 τὸν παῖδ' ἱλασόμεσθ', ἢ τὰν θεόν; ἀλλὰ  
 θεοῦ μοι  
 ἔσταν ὁ παῖς κρέσσων· χαιρέτω ἂ Νέ-  
 μεσις.

5. ὅ τι ἠπόρει] So Schanz after Forster. I have adopted ὅ τι mainly because λέγοντος seems to want an

object. If ὅτε be retained we must translate: 'while Simmias was speaking, at the time he was stating his difficulty.' Kebes did not agree with the theory of Simmias, but apparently did not see his way to refute it.

10. βασκανία] 'lest some malign influence should put to confusion our discourse that is to come.' βασκανία expresses the prevalent superstition that over-confidence on the part of man drew down on him the resentment of superhuman powers. Cf. Verg. *Ecl.* vii 27 aut, si ultra placitum laudarit, bacchare frontem Cingite, ne vati noceat mala lingua futuro. The 'mala lingua' of Codrus vents its malice, not in abuse, but in extravagant praise exciting supernal wrath. This feeling has found its most perfect expression in *Caliban upon Setebos*, e.g. 'Meanwhile the best way to escape His ire Is, not to seem too happy. 'Sees, himself, Yonder two flies, with purple films and pink, Bask on the pompion-bell above: kills both.' Plato, however, when speaking seriously, is careful to repudiate the popular notion of θεῶν φθόνος: cf. *Timaeus* 29 E ἀγαθὸς ἦν [sc. ὁ τὸδε τὸ πᾶν ξυνιστάς], ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος. See too *Phaedrus* 247 A φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται. Aristotle also denies it, *Metaph.* i ii 983<sup>a</sup> 2.

- ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ὀμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἰόντες  
πειρώμεθα εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις. ἔστι δὲ δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ζητεῖς·  
C ἀειοῖς ἐπιδεικθῆναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνώλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀθάνα-  
τον οὖσαν, εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι, θαρρῶν τε  
καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀποθανῶν ἐκεῖ εὖ πράξειν διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν 5  
ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοὺς ἐτελεύτα, μὴ ἀνόητόν τε καὶ ἡλίθιον θάρσος  
θαρρήσει. τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν ὅτι ἰσχυρόν τί ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ  
θεοειδὲς καὶ ἥν ἔτι πρότερον, πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι,  
οὐδὲν κωλύειν φῆς πάντα ταῦτα μνηύειν ἀθανασία μὲν μή,  
ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιον τέ ἐστὶν ψυχὴ καὶ ἥν που πρότερον ἀμή- 10  
D χανον ὅσον χρόνον καὶ ἤδει τε καὶ ἔπραττεν πολλὰ ἄττα· ἀλλὰ  
γὰρ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἥν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀν-  
θρώπου σῶμα ἐλεῖν ἀρχὴν ἥν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου, ὥσπερ νόσος· καὶ  
ταλαιπωρουμένη τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν βίον ζῶν καὶ τελευτῶσά γε  
ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ ἀπολλύοιτο. διαφέρει δὲ δὴ, φῆς, 15  
οὐδὲν εἴτε ἅπαρ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἴτε πολλάκις, πρὸς γε τὸ  
ἕκαστον ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι· προσήκει γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος  
εἴη, τῷ μὴ εἶδῶτι μὴδὲ ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι, ὥς ἀθάνατόν ἐστι.  
E τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐστὶν οἶμαι, ὧ Κέβης, ἃ λέγεις· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες

ἡμῶν is Heindorf's correction for ἡμῶν, which seems too far removed from τὸν λόγον.

ἐσεσθαι seems suspicious, and is bracketed by Schanz. As it has strong ms. support, however, I have retained it. λέγεσθαι has hardly any authority.

1. Ὀμηρικῶς] Prof. Geddes rightly translates, 'as Homer's heroes do': not, as Wagner, 'in Homeric phrase.'

4. εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ] Note that Plato once more carefully marks the proof of immortality as merely subordinate to this main thesis.

5. ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ] i.e. ἐν βίῳ μὴ φιλοσόφῳ.

7. τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν] 'but as for proving that the soul is a strong and godlike thing, and that she existed even before we were born as men—there is nothing, you say, to prevent all this from showing, not indeed her immortality, but that she

is long-lived, etc.' That is to say, Kebes does not object to the reasoning of Sokrates, so far as it merely shows that the soul is very durable; but it is none the nearer to showing that she is immortal.

13. ἀρχὴ ἥν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου] Kebes did not put it quite in this way; Sokrates amplifies his expression in 88 A ποιεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσι.

14. ζῶν] The change of mood is readily understood if we transfer the words from reported to direct speech. The two imperfects would naturally be used by Kebes in making his statement: 'for all your reasoning, she was none the more immortal' (ἦν=ἦν ἄρα); 'the incarnation was the beginning of her dissolution': while the two optatives would in his mouth be present indicative; ἔῃ and ἀπόλλυται. As Ast says, the construction follows ὅτι: cf. 96 B, where ὅτι is never actually expressed.

πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μή τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἴ τί τι βούλει, προσέῃς ἢ ἀφέλῃς. καὶ ὁ Κέβης, Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἔφη, οὔτε ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσεῖναι δέομαι· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ἃ λέγω.

- 5 XLV. Ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συκνὸν χρόνον ἐπισκῶν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τι σκεψάμενος, Οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ζητεῖς· ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύεσθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δειμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἔαν βούλῃ, 96  
τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη· ἔπειτα ἂν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνεται ὧν ἂν

1. πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω] This extreme care in preparing the indictment serves to remind us of the vital importance of the coming struggle. All that precedes has been, so to speak, mere skirmishing: from this point the main battle begins; the whole strength of the ideal theory must be put forth to secure the victory.

95 E—97 B, c. xlv. This demands an investigation into the causes of generation and decay, on which subject Sokrates proposes to relate his own experiences. In his youth he was strongly fascinated by the old physical philosophy; he inquired whether heat and cold were the universal generative forces; whether the blood were the source of intelligence, or fire, or air, or the brain. But finally he came to the conclusion that he had no aptitude for such speculations, and even lost his faith in the knowledge he before supposed himself to possess. Formerly he rested comfortably in the belief that eating and drinking were the cause of growth; nor did he shrink from saying that one man was taller than another by the head, and that ten are more than eight because of the addition of two. But now he cannot satisfy himself that the mere juxtaposition of separate units is a sufficient cause for their being two; all the less because the same result is

produced by the precisely opposite process of division; nor can he even tell why one is one; but he is forced to reject the physical method as affording no real explanation of anything.

7. ὅλως γάρ] The ἀπορία of Kebes necessarily raises the question propounded in *Timaeus* 27 E τί τὸ ὄν ἀεὶ γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ὄν δὲ οὐδέποτε; The immortality of the soul can only be proved by means of the theory of ideas; and in order that we may fully understand the bearing of that theory, it is put in sharp contrast with the αἰτίαι of previous philosophies.

9. τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη] It has been maintained that we have here a piece of actual history; that the mental development of the real Sokrates is here described. This is, however, highly improbable. We know from Xenophon (*Mem.* i i 11—15) that Sokrates had the utmost distaste for physical speculation; nor does Xenophon say one word which leads us to suppose this was the result of fruitless study. Such inquiries must have been always alien to the strongly practical genius of Sokrates. Plato may be merely describing in its supposed effect on an individual mind the development of philosophy to the theory of ideas; but it is not impossible that he is recounting his



λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειρῶν περὶ ὧν ἂν λέγῃς χρήσει. Ἄλλα μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαί γε. Ἄκουε τοίνυν ὥς ἐροῦντος. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὧν θαυμαστῶς ὥς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας, ἦν δὲ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν. ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται 5 ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι· καὶ πολλάκις B ἑμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν τὰ τοιάδε, ἄρ' ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σιηπέδονα τινὰ λάβῃ, ὥς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῶα συντρέφεται· καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμα ἐστὶν ὃ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ τὸ πῦρ, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δ' 10

own experience. Nothing can be more probable than that a mind so insatiably thirsting for knowledge should have already sought it from every existing source, and that when he met Sokrates his disappointment in all should fast be leading him to philosophic scepticism. But in the lack of direct evidence it would be rash to speak positively.

1. ὧν ἂν λέγῃς] *i.e.* whatever you may have to say after hearing my reply. ὧν λέγεις would refer to the statement already made by Kebes; but this has less ms. authority.

8. τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν] This was held by several philosophers, first perhaps by Anaximandros, of whose ἄπειρον, according to Plutarch and Stobaeus, the first determinations were these. Simplicius assigns to him other ἐναντιότητες among the first determinations, such as ξηρὸν and ὑγρὸν. To Anaxagoras this classification is attributed by Theophrastos *de sensu* 59; and to Archelaos by Diogenes Laertius II 16. Compare Aristotle *de gen. et corr.* II ii 329<sup>b</sup> 24 θερμὸν δὲ καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν τὰ μὲν τῷ ποιητικῷ εἶναι τὰ δὲ τῷ παθητικῷ λέγεται. Schanz gives τὸ θερμὸν [καὶ ψυχρὸν].

σιηπέδονα] 'fermentation.' The σηπέδων would take place by the action of θερμόν, cf. Aristotle *de gen.*

*anim.* v iv 784<sup>b</sup> 6 γίνεται δὲ σῆψις διὰ θερμότητος μὲν πᾶσα, οὐ τῆς συμφύτου δέ. Also *Meteorologica* IV i 379<sup>a</sup> 16 σῆψις δ' ἐστὶ φθορὰ τῆς ἐν ἐκάστῳ ὑγρῷ οἰκείας καὶ κατὰ φύσιν θερμότητος· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ περιέχοντος. Decomposition of matter in one form must precede its recomposition in another.

9. τὸ αἷμα] See Empedokles 315 (Karsten):

αἵματος ἐν πελάγεσσι τετραμμένη ἀμφι-  
θροῶντος,  
τῇ τε νόημα μάλιστα κυκλίσκεται ἀν-  
θρώποισιν.  
αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι  
νόημα.

Compare too the Hippokratean treatise *περὶ νούσων* book I (Kühn vol. I p. 209) τὸ αἷμα τὸ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πλεῖστον συμβάλλεται μέρος συνέσιος· ἐνιοὶ δὲ λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν. The same view is mentioned by Lucretius III 43, without being assigned to any particular authority: 'et se scire animae naturam sanguinis esse.' Aristotle *de anima* I ii 405<sup>b</sup> 5 gives Kritias as the upholder of this theory: ἕτεροι δ' αἷμα, ὥσπερ Κριτίας, τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ψυχῆς οἰκειότατον ὑπολαμβάνοντες, τοῦτο δ' ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὴν τοῦ αἵματος φύσιν.

10. ὁ ἄνθρωπος] This too was the view of more than one philosopher. Air was the ἀρχή of Anaximenes. Diogenes of Apollonia said the

ἐγκέφαλος ἐστὶν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν· καὶ ὁσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνεται μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἡρεμεῖν κατὰ ταῦτα γίνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην· καὶ αὐτὸ τούτων τὰς θεωρίας σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν  
5 οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθαι, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἑμαυτῷ ἔδοξα C

soul was dry hot air; as in a passage quoted by Simplicius, καὶ πάντων τῶν ζῶων δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν, ἀλλ' θερμότερος μὲν τοῦ ἔξω, ἐν ᾧ εἰμέν, τοῦ μέντοι παρὰ τοῦ ἡελίου πολλὸν ψυχρότερος: and again ἄνθρωπος γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα ἀναπνέοντα ζῶει τῷ ἀέρι, καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῖσι καὶ ψυχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ νόησις. Cf. Theophrastus *de sensu* 39—45.

τὸ πῦρ] This was held by Hera-  
kleitos, who considered the soul as a ξηρὰ ἀναθυμίασις. Cf. Arist. *de anima* I ii.

ὁ δ' ἐγκέφαλος] It is very doubtful to whom this doctrine must be assigned. Possibly it was merely a popular opinion, as Wytttenbach thinks. It has been ascribed to the Pythagoreans; but this rests only on a statement of Diogenes Laertius (VIII 30), which has a suspiciously post-platonic appearance. R. Hirzel (*Hermes*, vol. XI p. 240) endeavours to trace it to Alkmaion of Krotona; but his evidence hardly amounts to proof. Theophrastus *de sensu* 26 does indeed say of him that he affirmed ἀπάσας τὰς αἰσθήσεις συν-  
ηρτησθαι πρὸς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον, but this is not very definite. It may be observed that the brain is not ᾧ φρονούμεν, but ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων: and the view of Hippokrates is not far off this. In a passage quoted by Heindorf, *de morbo sacro* 17, he says of the brain, οὗτος γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡέρος γενομένων ἐρμηνεύς, ἣν ὑγιαίνων τυγχάνει· τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν αὐτῷ ὁ ἄλλο παρέχεται. Thus Hippokrates

may be said to have held that air is ᾧ φρονούμεν and the brain is ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων. Still as the brain is introduced as an alternative to air, not as supplementary, probably no special reference to Hippokrates is intended. Plato's own view is that the brain and spinal marrow form the medium through which the soul acts on the body: *Timaeus* 73 c, d. For the process of growth see *Timaeus* 80 d foll.

3. λαβούσης τὸ ἡρεμεῖν] Cf. *Meno* 97 E καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσι, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα, καὶ πάντα τὰγαθὰ ἐργάζονται· πολλὸν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπέτευουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἀξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἂν τις αὐτὰς δόξῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ. . . . ἐπειδὴν δὲ δεθῶσι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστήμαι γίνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστὶ, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης. Also Aristotle *Anal. Post.* II xix 100<sup>a</sup> 3 ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολ-  
λάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομένης ἐμπειρία· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνήμαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐμπειρία ἐστίν. ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἡ ἐκ παντὸς ἡρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἐνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἐν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἰ μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, εἰ δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης. See also *Metaph.* I i 980<sup>b</sup> 28. To Plato the difference between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη was fundamental, the one dealing with γιγνόμενα, the other with ὄντα.

πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυῆς εἶναι, ὥς οὐδὲν χρῆμα. τεκμήριον δέ σοι ἔρῳ ἱκανόν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἃ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπιστάμην, ὥς γε ἑμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὥστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ἃ πρὸ τοῦ ᾧ μὴ εἶδέναι, περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τί 5 ἄνθρωπος αὐξάνεται. τοῦτο γὰρ ᾧ μὴ πρὸ τοῦ παντὶ θῆλον D εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν· ἐπειδὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν σιτίων ταῖς μὲν σαρκὶ σάρκες προσγένωνται, τοῖς δὲ ὀστέοις ὀστᾶ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεῖα ἐκάστοις προσγένηται, τότε δὴ τὸν ὀλίγον ὄγκον ὄντα ὕστερον 10 πολὺν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γίνεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν· οὕτως τότε ᾧ μὴ· οὐ δοκῶ σοι μετρίως; "Εμοίγε, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἔτι. ᾧ μὴ γὰρ ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖν, ὁπότε τις φαίνοιτο ἄνθρωπος παραστὰς μέγας σμικρῷ, E μείζων εἶναι αὐτοῦ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ ἵππος ἵππου· καὶ ἔτι γε 15 τούτων ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν ὀκτὼ πλέονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσθεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δίπνηυ τοῦ πηχυαίου μείζων εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν. Νῦν δὲ δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν; Πόρρω που, ἔφη, νῆ Δία ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἵεσθαι περὶ τούτων τοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν εἶδέναι, ὅς γε 20 οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἑμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὥς, ἐπειδὴν ἐνί τις προσεῖ ἔν, ἢ τὸ ἐν ᾧ προσετέθη δύο γέγονεν, ἢ τὸ προστεθέν καὶ ᾧ προσετέθη

1. ἀφυῆς εἶναι] 'nothing in the world could be more stupid in such studies than myself.'—COPE.

2. ἃ καὶ πρότερον] There are three stages to be discriminated in the *πάθη* of Sokrates: (1) the period when he was content with the ordinary beliefs of the unreflecting many concerning *γένεσις καὶ φθορά*: (2) when he sought some more scientific theory in the speculations of the physicists: (3) when, disappointed in this and failing in his search for the ultimate *αἰτία* itself, he fell back upon his system of *λόγοι*.

8. ταῖς μὲν σαρκὶ σάρκες] This is commonly understood as alluding to the theory of Anaxagoras. But I cannot imagine that any such reference is meant. Sokrates says that his physical studies not only brought him no fresh knowledge but made

him sceptical of that which he fancied he already possessed. This belief therefore is one that he held, not only before he made acquaintance with the works of Anaxagoras, but before he entered upon any physical speculations whatsoever. It is probably the view of popular common sense, that the human frame is composed of the food consumed, without any reference to the *ὁμοιομερῆ*.

15. μείζων εἶναι αὐτοῦ] The mss. have *αὐτῇ*. I have accepted Wytttenbach's correction (1) because the following words, *καὶ ἵππος ἵππου*, seem to require that the object of comparison should be expressed here also, (2) because *αὐτῇ* seems superfluous with *τῇ κεφαλῇ*. If we retain *αὐτῇ*, we must translate 'just by the head.' Cf. 101 A.

22. ἢ τὸ προστεθέν] Wytttenbach

διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου τῷ ἑτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο· εαυ- 97  
 μάζω γὰρ εἶ, ὅτε μὲν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν, ἐν  
 ἄρα ἑκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἦσθην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπλησίασαν  
 ἀλλήλοισι, αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο δύο γενέσθαι, ἡ εὐνοδος  
 5 τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι. οὐδέ γε ὥς, ἐάν τις ἐν διασχίῃ,  
 δύναμαι ἔτι πείθεσθαι ὥς αὕτη αὐ αἰτία γέγονεν, ἡ σχίσις, τοῦ  
 δύο γεγονέναι· ἐναντία γὰρ γίγνεται ἢ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γί-  
 νεσθαι· τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι συνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσ- B  
 ετίθετο ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ, νῦν δ' ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἕτερον  
 10 ἀφ' ἑτέρου. οὐδέ γε δι' ὃ τι ἐν γίγνεται ὥς ἐπίσταμαι ἔτι πείθω  
 ἑμαυτόν, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐνὶ λόγῳ δι' ὃ τι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλ-  
 λυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθεόδου, ἀλλὰ τιν'  
 ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσείμαι.

writes these words twice over, arguing that the question should be put thus: if *B* be added to *A*, has *A* become two, or *B*, or are *A + B* two because of their juxtaposition? Schanz follows him. I cannot see that Plato is bound to express this in full, and therefore I have reverted to the ms. reading.

4. ἡ εὐνοδος] 'the juxtaposition caused by their approximation.' τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι is explanatory genitive after ξύνοδος: compare *Timaeus* 58 B ἡ δὲ τῆς πιλύσεως ξύνοδος. The right explanation, according to Plato, is not juxtaposition but participation in the idea of duality: it is irrational to speak as if the mere approximation of two objects one to the other had anything to do with the question.

7. ἐναντία γὰρ γίγνεται] The fact that two opposite processes produce the same result shows that neither of them can really be the explanation of the result; they are συναίτια, not αἴτια.

12. κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον] i.e. the method of physical speculation.

13. αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω] 'I mix up everything at random according to another method of my own.' Such is the literal translation of this diffi-

cult phrase, but the meaning is not so easily fixed. Wytttenbach, saying that the ideal theory cannot possibly be meant, takes φύρω as virtually a past tense, and explains 'alium modum ex male intellecto Anaxagora susceptum commentus sum.' Prof. Geddes translates 'it so chanced that I form to myself another method.' He says φύρω is 'I work up,' like dough, and quotes Aristoph. *Birds* 482 προπεφύραται λόγος εἰς μοι: and so Heindorf takes it. But φύρω is not the same as φυράω: Plato always uses the former word in the sense of 'confusing,' see below 101 D, *Gorgias* 465 D, etc. For 'kneading' he uses the proper word φυράω, cf. *Timaeus* 73 E, *Theaetetus* 147 C. The exact phrase occurs in Aeschylus *Prometheus* 450 ἔφυρον εἰκῇ πάντα. Wytttenbach's explanation will not do; we have the present tense running through the whole passage. Nor does Sokrates represent his view as arising from that of Anaxagoras. I believe Sokrates is speaking half ironically, half in earnest. We must remember that the Platonic Sokrates took refuge, not in the theory of ideas, which he failed to reach, but in the method of λόγοι, cf. 99 E. This method is then what

XLVI. 'ΑΛΛ' ἀκούσας μέν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη,  
 C 'Αναξαγόρου ἀναγινώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστὶν  
 ὁ διακοσμών τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἥσθη  
 τε καὶ ἔδοξε μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάν-  
 των αἴτιον, καὶ ἡγασάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τόν γε νοῦν 5  
 κοσμοῦντα πάντα [κοσμεῖν] καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέσθαι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν  
 βέλτιστα ἔχῃ· εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὐρεῖν περὶ  
 ἐκάστου, ὅπῃ γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ  
 αὐτοῦ εὐρεῖν, ὅπῃ βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν  
 D πᾶσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο 10  
 σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ περὶ  
 ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ  
 εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἶδέναι· τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ  
 εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὴ λογίζομενος ἄσμενος  
 εὐρηκέναι ᾧ μὴ διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ 15

he means by τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον. In 101 c he advises Kebes to leave divisions and additions and such subtleties to those who are cleverer than he. There the irony is obvious; and here with the same irony he says that being unable to follow any of the infallible methods of the physicists he was forced to blunder on after a fashion of his own. And although he does not seriously mean to disparage his own method in comparison with theirs, perhaps he does hint some dissatisfaction that he is still unable to work on the more perfect principle.

97 B—98 B, c. xlvi. Afterwards Sokrates hears a passage of Anaxagoras, wherein that philosopher declares that mind is the universal cause. His hopes are thereby raised to the highest pitch; a system which takes mind for its principle cannot, he thinks, be otherwise than teleological. Anaxagoras will surely point out that mind must order all things for the best, and he will seek no other cause why each thing is as it is, but that it is best so. He will first inform us of the shape and

position of the earth and then explain how that shape and position were the best; and similarly with all other natural phenomena, assigning as the cause the best for each and all. So he read the book with eager anticipation.

1. ἀλλ' ἀκούσας] 'but once when I heard a man reading from a book, as he said, of Anaxagoras.'

4. τρόπον τινά] 'in a certain way,' but not, as we presently see, in the way of Anaxagoras.

6. πάντα [κοσμεῖν]. Hermann is probably right in bracketing κοσμεῖν. Translate: 'if mind orders all things, it places each thing severally as is best,' i.e. we must not, as Anaxagoras did, assign ἀέρες and αἰθέρες as causes of various phenomena, if we assign νοῦς as the cause of the whole.

11. περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου] So the best mss. Schanz brackets αὐτοῦ, Z. and St. give αὐτοῦ, omitting ἐκείνου. I think the ms. reading will stand: it refers to the ἐκάστου above; 'he will seek this cause both for the particular object of his inquiry and for everything else.'

15. κατὰ νοῦν ἑαυτῷ] As

νοῦν ἑμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν, καὶ μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν  
 πότερον ἢ γῆ πλατεΐά ἐστιν ἢ στρογγύλη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσειεν,  
 ἐπεκδιηγέσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον E  
 καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἄμεινον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη  
 5 εἶναι αὐτήν, ἐπεκδιηγέσθαι ὥς ἄμεινον ἦν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ  
 εἶναι· καὶ εἴ μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοιτο, παρεσκευάσμην ὥς οὐκέτι 98  
 ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου οὕτω  
 παρεσκευάσμην, ὡσαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν  
 ἄλλων ἄστρον, τάχους τε περὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ  
 10 τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πᾷ ποτε ταῦτ' ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον  
 καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἃ πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸν ζῶμην,  
 φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμήσθαι, ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτοῖς

Wytttenbach points out, there is a play on νοῦν: 'κατὰ νοῦν, secundum mentem, Anaxagorae placitum significat, et vulgo usurpatur, gratum, ex animi nostri sententia.'

## 2. πλατεΐά ἐστιν ἢ [στρογγύλη]

For various views on this subject see Aristotle *de caelo* II xiii 294<sup>a</sup> 29. Thales thought the earth floated like a piece of wood; Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Demokritos said it was flat. The Pythagoreans held that it was a sphere.

4. εἰ ἐν μέσῳ] Aristotle *de caelo* 293<sup>a</sup> 15. This view was almost universal: the Pythagoreans seem to have been the only exception. They believed the earth to revolve round the central fire.

10. πᾷ ποτε ταῦτ' ἄμεινον] The final cause of the movements of the heavenly bodies is declared in the *Timaeus*, see especially 39 B foll.

12. φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ] If an intelligent cause ordered the universe, it is inconceivable that it should not design the best in all things: and this is our proper object of investigation, not the mere physical agencies which immediately produce the phenomena. Plato's own system is perfectly consistent with this principle: by making the αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν the ultimate cause he keeps his ontology

strictly teleological; and again his teleology is strictly ontological. The cause of each thing is its indwelling idea; this idea is a form of the ἀγαθόν, therefore the ἀγαθόν is the cause why each thing is as it is. The βέλτιστον is not merely the design of a creative intelligence; it is the very idea which is symbolised in the particular. In the *Timaeus* Plato teaches that the entire universe is the self-evolution of absolute intelligence, which is the same as absolute good. This is differentiated into finite intelligences, subject, through their limitation, to the conditions of space and time. Sensible perceptions are the finite intellect's apprehension, within these conditions, of the idea as existing in absolute intelligence. Thus the perception is the idea, as existing under the form of space. Therefore the idea, which is a form of the good, is the cause of the perception's existence: that is, as was said above, the ἀγαθόν is the ultimate αἰτία of each thing. But only the first-beginnings of this theory are to be found in the *Phaedo*.

98 B—99 D, c. xlvii. Bitter was his disappointment when he found that Anaxagoras did not really use mind as a cause, but accounted for phenomena by the agency of merely

αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ  
 B ἔχει· ἐκάστῳ οὖν αὐτὸν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι  
 τὸ ἐκάστῳ βέλτιστον ᾧ μιν καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσι ἐπεκδιηγέσθαι  
 ἀγαθόν· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνυ  
 σπουδῇ λαβὼν τὰς βίβλους ὥς τάχιστα οἶός τ' ἢ ἀνεγίγνωσκον, 5  
 ἵν' ὥς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον.

XLVII. Ἀπὸ δὲ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος, ᾧ ἐταῖρε, ᾧκόμην  
 φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προῖων καὶ ἀναγινώσκων ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ  
 μὲν νῶ οὐδὲν χρώμενον [οὐδέ τινος αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον] εἰς

physical forces. Exactly similar would be the conduct of one who, after saying that Sokrates acted by intelligence, should maintain that he sat there in prison because he had muscles and sinews and joints which enabled him to do so; instead of assigning the real cause, that he thought it right to submit to the judgment of the Athenian people. So far as his bones and muscles are concerned, he might have been at Megara by this time; only he thought it his duty to remain. To call such things causes is folly; although they may be termed instruments without which the cause would not produce its effect. But just this confusion of cause and instrument is made by those who suppose a vortex or some other physical force is what keeps the earth in the centre, instead of the true cause, that it is best for it to be there. About this supreme cause, the good, Sokrates would gladly have learnt, could he have found a teacher: as it is he was obliged to content himself with the second best method.

7. ἀπὸ δὲ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος] 'from what a height of hope was I hurled down, when I went on with my reading and saw a man that made no use of mind.' Heindorf takes ἄνδρα = τὸν ἄνδρα: but the above rendering seems preferable. The metaphor in ᾧκόμην φερόμενος is

surely falling from a height; not, as Wagner has it, 'starting from great hope, I was sailing along': a most feeble saying. The same charge is brought against Anaxagoras by Aristotle, *Metaph.* I iv 985<sup>a</sup> 18. Ἀναξαγόρας τε γὰρ μηχανῇ χρῆται τῷ νῶ πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιίαν, καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστί, τότε παρέλκει αὐτόν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιᾶται τῶν γιγνομένων ἢ νοῦν: compare *Laus* 967 B, c. Schanz brackets καὶ before ἀναγινώσκων, but this causes a harsh collision between the two participles.

9. οὐδέ τινος αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον] I concur with Dr. Jackson in regarding these words as an unmeaning interpolation. The sole complaint Plato has against Anaxagoras is that he made no use of νοῦς: what then are these αἰτίαι that he ought to have introduced? We cannot understand it as explanatory of τῷ μὲν νῶ οὐδὲν χρώμενον, 'making no use of mind, that is alleging no real (primary) causes,' (1) because the distinction between primary and secondary causes has not yet been made, so that a reference to it would be unintelligible, (2) the plural is fatal to such a rendering; there is but one real cause, that is νοῦς. Dr. Jackson now proposes to bracket also the words εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, which are twice omitted by

τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα C  
 αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα. καὶ μοι ἔδοξεν ὁμοιό-  
 τaton πεπονηθέναι ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα  
 ὅσα πράττει νῶν πράττει, κ᾽πειτα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας  
 5 ἐκάστων ὧν πράττω, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν  
 ἐνεάδε κάθηναι, ὅτι σύγκειται μου τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὀστέων καὶ  
 νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀστᾶ ἐστὶν στερεὰ καὶ διαφυὰς ἔχει χωρὶς  
 ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίεσθαι, περιам- D  
 πέχοντα τὰ ὀστᾶ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος ὃ συνέχει  
 10 αὐτά· αἰωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὀστέων ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν συμβολαῖς  
 χαλῶντα καὶ συντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαι· που ποιεῖ οἷόν  
 τ' εἶναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαμ-  
 φθεῖς ἐνεάδε κάθηναι· καὶ αὐτὸ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἐτέρας  
 τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνὰς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ ἄλλα  
 15 μυρία τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος, ἀμελήσας τὰς ὥς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας E  
 λέγειν ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψη-  
 φίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὐτὸ δέδοκται ἐνεάδε  
 καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἢν  
 ἂν κελεύωσιν· ἐπεὶ νῦν τὸν κύνα, ὥς ἐγὼμαι, πάλαι ἂν ταῦτα 99  
 20 τὰ νεῦρά τε καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἢ περὶ Μέγαρον ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἢν, ὑπὸ  
 θόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ζῶμην καὶ  
 κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν  
 τῇ πόλει δίκην ἢντιν' ἂν τάττη. ἀλλ' αἷτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα

Proklos in citing this passage—in *Timaeum* 1 c, and in *Parmenidem* p. 481 Stallb.

7. διαφυὰς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων] 'joints to separate them one from another,' and so render the limbs flexible. διαφυὴ and ἄρθρον regard the joints from opposite points of view; the former as breaking the continuity of the bones, the latter as knitting the frame together.

8. νεῦρα here, as always in Plato, mean sinews or muscles, not nerves. Of the nerves he had no knowledge. Cf. *Timaeus* 74 d.

18. ἢν ἂν κελεύωσιν] Hirschig most unnecessarily brackets these words. It is true there is now no doubt what the sentence is; but Sokrates expresses in general terms

that he deems it best to submit to whatever may be the judgment of the Athenians: compare ἦντιν' ἂν τάττη below.

19. πάλαι ἂν ταῦτα] The bones and muscles cannot be the cause; for they would have acted in a precisely opposite way had a different δόξα τοῦ βελτίστου prompted them.

20. ὑπὸ θόξης φερόμενα] Prof. Geddes justly remarks that it is δόξα not ἐπιστήμη τοῦ βελτίστου that could urge Sokrates to escape.

23. ἀλλ' αἷτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα] Cf. *Timaeus* 46 c ταῦτ' οὖν πάντ' ἔστι τῶν ξυναιτίων οἷς θεὸς ὑπηρετοῦσι χρήται τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἰδέαν ἀποτελών· δοξάζεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων οὐ ξυναιτία ἀλλ' αἷτια εἶναι τῶν πάντων,



καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον· εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν, καὶ ὅσα καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω, οὐκ ἂν οἶός τ' ἦν ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι, ἀληθεῖ ἂν λέγοι· ὥς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα B ποιῶ ἃ ποιῶ, καὶ ταῦτα νῶν πράττων, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἰρέσει, πολλὴν καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία ἂν εἴη τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γὰρ 5 μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν τί ἐστὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη αἴτιον· ὁ δὲ μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφῶντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὥσπερ ἐν σκότει, ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι προσκρώμενοι, ὥς αἴτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μὲν τις δίνην περιτιθεῖς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ 10

ψύχοντα καὶ θερμαίνοντα πηγνύντα τε καὶ διαχέοντα καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα ἀπεργαζόμενα. λόγον δὲ οὐδένα οὐδὲ νοῦν εἰς οὐδὲν δυνατὰ ἔχειν ἐστὶ. Presently he distinguishes these two classes as *πρῶται* and *δεύτεραι αἰτίαι*. In 46 E he says τὰ μὲν οὖν ὁμμάτων ξυμμεταίτια πρὸς τὸ ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν, ἣν νῦν εἴληχεν, εἰρήσθω· τὸ δὲ μέγιστον αὐτῶν εἰς ὠφέλειαν ἔργον, δι' ὃ θεὸς αὐθ' ἡμῖν δεδώρηται, μετὰ τοῦτο λεκτέον.

4. καὶ ταῦτα νῶν πράττων] So Schanz after Heindorf. The mss. have *πράττω*, which may be thus rendered: 'to say that it is because of these that I do what I do, and at the same time that I do it by intelligence, is an extremely slovenly mode of speaking': i.e. to assert simultaneously that Sokrates acts thus because of these subsidiary causes and also through intelligence, is a very confused statement. But though the ms. reading can be defended, I think it probable that Heindorf's neat and simple emendation restores what Plato wrote. Z. and St. have *ταύτη νῶν πράττω*.

5. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι] The construction is either an anacoluthon or an indignant aposiopesis. Cf. *Symposium* 177 c τὸ οὖν τοιούτων μὲν πέρι πολλὴν σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι, Ἐρωτα δὲ μηδένα πω ἀνθρώ-

πων τετολημκέναι εἰς ταυτηνὴ τὴν ἡμέραν ἀξίως ὑμνήσαι, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἡμέληται τοσούτος θεός; Similarly Xen. *Mem.* i iv 12, iv iii 5. Wyttenebach suggests τὸ δ' ἄρ' ἦν μὴ διελέσθαι, which is neat; but no change is needed.

8. ὁ δὲ μοι φαίνονται] 'this is what they seem to me to be handling blindly, as if in the dark.' ὁ = τὸ ξυναίτιον. ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι, they call it by a name which does not belong to it, i.e. αἴτιον. The reading *ὁματι* is quite out of place.

10. ὁ μὲν τις δίνην] Empedokles conceived the earth to be kept in its place by the rapid rotation of the universe, as, when a cup of water is whirled swiftly round, the water is retained in the cup; so Aristotle explains, *de caelo* ii xiii 295<sup>a</sup> 16, οἱ δ' ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φορὰν κύκλῳ περιθέουσιν καὶ θάπτον φερομένην τὴν τῆς γῆς φορὰν κωλύειν, καθάπερ τὸ ἐν τοῖς κνάθοις ὕδωρ· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο κύκλῳ τοῦ κνάθου φερομένου πολλάκις κάτω τοῦ χαλκοῦ γινόμενον ὁμῶς οὐ φέρεται κάτω πεφυκὸς φέρεσθαι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. Anaxagoras too supposed a *περιχώρησις*, in order to effect the separation of the *ὁμοιομερῆς*; but he did not utilise it to steady the earth.

ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ should be connected with *μένειν*.

μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόφω πλατεία βάθρον  
 τὸν ἀέρα ὑπερείδει· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὥς οἶόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ C  
 τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κείσθαι, ταύτην οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὔτε  
 τινὰ οἶονται δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου Ἄτ-  
 5 λαντα ἄν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μάλλον  
 ἅπαντα συνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν καὶ ὥς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον  
 εὐνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἶονται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύ-  
 τῆς αἰτίας, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει, μαθητῆς ὁτουοῦν ἥδιστ' ἂν γενόμην·  
 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὗτ' αὐτὸς εὐρεῖν οὔτε παρ'  
 10 ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἶός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν D

1. ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόφω] 'another sets the air as a basis of support beneath the earth, which is like a flat kneading-trough.' This view is attributed by Aristotle to Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Demokritos; cf. *de caelo* II xiii 294<sup>b</sup> 13. Ἀναξίμενης δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Δημόκριτος τὸ πλάτος αἴτιον εἶναι φασὶ τοῦ μένειν αὐτήν. οὐ γὰρ τέμνειν ἀλλ' ἐπιπωματίζει τὸν ἀέρα τὸν κάτωθεν, ὅπερ φαίνεται τὰ πλάτος ἔχοντα τῶν σωμάτων ποιεῖν. That is to say, the earth does not sink in the ocean of air, but rests upon the surface like a lid.

2. τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὥς οἶόν τε βέλ-  
 τιστα] As Heindorf says, the words must be construed τὴν δὲ δύναμιν τοῦ οὕτως νῦν αὐτὰ κείσθαι ὥς οἶόν τε βέλτιστα τεθῆναι. The distinction between τεθῆναι and νῦν κείσθαι should be noticed: 'as it was best for them to be placed by mind, so they are now situate.'

4. τούτου] i.e. τοῦ ὥς οἶόν τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. They think that in their purely physical theories they can find an Atlas, i.e. a system to explain the universe, more potent than the final cause which Sokrates postulates.

6. τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον] 'the good and the binding.' There is a play on the double sense of δέον: cf. *Cratylus* 418 E ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ ἰδέα οὖσα

τὸ δέον φαίνεται δεσμὸς εἶναι καὶ κώλυμα φορᾶς. All this critique of Anaxagoras is a propaedeutic to the ideal theory. The main fault of Anaxagoras is that 'the good' is not the ultimate cause in his system. Plato supplies his defects (in the *Republic* first and still more in the later dialogues) (1) by making τὸ ἀγαθὸν the principle of all existence, so that each thing really exists in proportion as it is perfect; (2) in that νοῦς, instead of being a merely external motive power, is actually the universe: causation is ultimately identity.

9. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην] Sokrates here expressly confesses that he has not succeeded in tracing the genesis of the universe to the idea of the good: and it is most important to bear in mind that what follows is only a description of the δεύτερος πλοῦς. In the *Republic* Plato is bolder and sets forth under a similitude the relation between the ἀγαθὸν and the ideal and material worlds; but not until the *Philebus* and especially his crowning achievement, the *Timaeus*, does he attempt fully to expound the supremacy of the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν.

10. τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν] i.e. the next best course. The origin of this proverb is shown by a passage of Menander which Wagner quotes: ὁ

τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ἢ πεπραγμάτευμαι, βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὦ Κέβης; Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὡς βούλομαι.

XLVIII. Ἔδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἡ δ' ὅς, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι, μὴ πάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι· δια- 5 φεῖρονται γάρ που ἔνιοι τὰ ὄμματα, ἂν μὴ ἐν ὕδατι ἢ τινι τοιούτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ διανοήθημ, καὶ ἔδειξα, μὴ παντάπασιν τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθεῖν βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθή- 10 σεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. ἔδοξε δὲ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλή-

δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐστὶ δῆπου λεγόμενος, ἂν ἀποτύχη τις πρῶτον ἐν κώπαισι πλεῖν. Heindorf quotes Eustathius: δεύτερος πλοῦς λέγεται, ὅτε ἀποτυχὼν τις οὐρίου κώπαις πλέῃ κατὰ Πανσανίαν. Plato uses it again, *Politicus* 300 c, *Philebus* 19 c. Compare Aristotle *Nic. Eth.* II ix 4 ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπὸν, κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον, φασί, πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν. Also *Politics* III viii 6 (Susemihl) 1284<sup>b</sup> 19.

99 D—100 A, c. xlviii. Since then, continues Sokrates, I have been forced to abandon the search for the true cause, and fearing lest, as those who rashly take observations by gazing on the sun himself, instead of his reflection in the water, are bereft of their bodily vision, my soul should be blinded in the endeavour to behold truth herself, I bethought me of contemplating her image, by which I mean definitions or notions. And yet this comparison is scarcely fair: for he that investigates truth in notions certainly does not see her in a similitude more than he who observes sensible objects. Anyhow this was the course I took: assuming the best definition I could form, I regard whatever agrees with that as true, and whatever does not I reject as false. I will presently explain my method more clearly.

From the foregoing analysis it will be seen that the interpretation here given of this extremely difficult passage differs widely from that of other editors. A full discussion of the problems presented in this chapter would occupy too much space for a note: they are accordingly dealt with in Appendix II.

4. τὰ ὄντα] 'realities'; i.e. from Plato's point of view the true causes, τὰ γὰρ ἀληθινὰ καὶ δέον.

7. τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ] Cf. *Republic* 516 A.

8. τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθεῖν] Compare the metaphor in *Republic* 527 D τὸ δ' ἐστὶν οὐ πᾶν φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πιστεῦσαι, ὅτι ἐν τοῦτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐκάστον ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεται τε καὶ ἀνασφύγγεται ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυφλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδεύματων, κρείττον ὃν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὀμμάτων· μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλήθεια ὁράται.

9. πρὸς τὰ πράγματα] I formerly understood this to mean the ideas themselves. Cf. 66 D αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα. But I am now convinced that it is possible to make *πράγματα* signify particulars, and thus to avoid the harshness of taking *ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων* as a metaphorical expression for 'all the powers of the soul': see the discussion of this clause in Appendix II.

10. εἰς τοὺς λόγους] The mean-

ΘΕΙΑΝ. Ἰώως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν· οὐ 100  
 γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα  
 ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις. ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ  
 ταύτῃ γε ὥρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω

ing of this can be fully understood only after a very careful study of *Republic* 506-518. Briefly, however, it is this. The Sokratic method of definition was, by comparison of a number of particulars which we designate by the same name, to ascertain what attributes were merely accidental in various particulars, and what were essential to the class: thus in defining a horse we must distinguish between those qualities which some horses possess and others do not, and those without which the animal would not be a horse. The definition thus formed is the λόγος, the concept or general notion. Now in the earlier stage of the ideal theory, wherever there is such a λόγος, there is also an idea, corresponding to every group of particulars called by the same name (*Republic* 596 A). The principal difference between the λόγος and the ἰδέα is (1) the λόγος is a mental concept, having no existence but in our thought; the ἰδέα is a self-existing essence, independent of our thought: (2) the λόγος includes all that we can discover about the class by observation; the ἰδέα includes all that there is to be known about it. Therefore from the Platonic point of view the λόγος is our conception of the ἰδέα, the reflection of it in our mind; which reflection only imperfectly represents it, inasmuch as it is derived from an imperfect apprehension of particulars, which themselves are only imperfect likenesses of the idea. In this sense it is that Plato regards the λόγος as εἰκὼν τοῦ ὄντος. This matter has been admirably cleared up by Dr. Jackson, *Journal of Philology* vol. x

p. 132 foll. See Introduction § 5. There is an interesting use of λόγος in *Laws* 895 D, where the Athenian says ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις περὶ ἑκάστον τρία νοεῖν; . . . ἐν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἐν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον, ἐν δὲ τὸ ὄνομα. The approximation of οὐσία to the Aristotelian sense is also notable.

1. Ἰώως μὲν οὖν] Sokrates stops to guard himself against conceding too much. The λόγοι are indeed only εἰκόνες, but so also are the sensible particulars; and the latter are the less trustworthy. He then who seeks truth ἐν τοῖς λόγοις does not deal with images any more than the physicist who investigates natural phenomena. For ξ BCDE give ὥς, which perhaps should be retained.

3. τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις] ἔργα here = the particulars. The word is used because of the familiar antithesis with λόγοις: not, I think, with a view of denoting the particulars as works or products of the ideas whence they derive their existence.

ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ] 'however that may be.' Sokrates does not propose here to debate the issue raised in the preceding sentence.

4. ὑποθέμενος] The method is more fully explained in the next chapter. For example, Sokrates by examining a number of instances of δίκαιον forms his ὑπόθεσις as to the nature of δικαιοσύνη. This ὑπόθεσις is his conception of the αὐτὸ δίκαιον. Then he compares with this ὑπόθεσις particular δίκαια, or whatever professes to be such, and admits or rejects each in so far as it agrees or disagrees with the ὑπόθεσις.

ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἄν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν, τίημι ὥς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων τῶν ὄντων, ἃ δ' ἄν μή, ὥς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. βούλομαι δέ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἢ λέγω· οἶμαι γάρ σε νῦν οὐ μαθησάμεν. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα.

5

B XLIX. 'Αλλ' ἢ δ' ὅς ὥδε λέγω, οὐδὲν καινόν, ἀλλ' ἅπερ αἰεὶ καὶ ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυερούλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναί τι καλὸν αὐτὸ 10 καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα· ἃ εἴ μοι δίδως τε καὶ συγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν, ὥς ἀθάνατον ἢ ψυχὴν. 'Αλλὰ C μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὥς διδόντος σοι οὐκ ἄν φεάνοις περαίνων.

100 B—102 A, c. xlix. My method is nothing new, he proceeds: it starts from the ideal theory which is familiar to us; and by means of this theory I hope to prove the soul's immortality. Starting from the assumption that there are ideas of beautiful and just and great etc., I simply affirm that all particulars possessing these qualities possess them through the idea, whether by participation, presence, or communion, or however you may define the connexion. All other causes are beyond my comprehension; I cling simply to my safe reply, that the idea of the beautiful is the cause of beauty. If you accept this, you will never consent to say that one man is greater or less than another by a head, but by greatness or smallness; nor that ten are more than eight by two, but by multitude. Similarly when one is added to one, or divided, the cause why the two are two is not addition or division, but the idea of duality: all other causes you would leave to wiser heads than yours. Again if you were forced to give an account of your hypothesis, you would proceed to a higher generalisation, and

again to another; ascending till you reached one that was adequate: and you would beware of falling into the confusions of thought, of which sham philosophers are guilty. Here Echekrates interrupts to express his admiration of Sokrates' clear exposition.

The upshot of this chapter is that universals alone can be known. For the present, however, these universals are in the form of λόγοι or ὑποθέσεις, which are not objects of νοῦς proper. When dialectic is made perfect λόγοι will be exchanged for ἰδέαι, ὑποθέσεις for ἀρχαί.

8. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν] As Heindorf observes ἐπιχειρῶν ἐπιδείξασθαι has virtually a future force, whence it takes the place of ἐπιδειξόμενος, which would be the ordinary construction. Cf. *Theaetetus* 180 c ὅπερ ἦα ἐρῶν: a phrase which occurs in *Republic* 449 A, 562 c.

14. οὐκ ἄν φεάνοις] 'you cannot be too quick in proceeding to the end.' This is not an uncommon formula. Cf. *Symposium* 185 E, Eurip. *Iph. Taur.* 245, Xen. *Mem.* II iii 11.

Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη, τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνοις, ἐάν σοι εὐνδοκῇ ὥσπερ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλόν, οὐδὲ δι' ἐν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. τῇ τοιᾷδε αἰτία συγχωρεῖς; Συγχωρῶ, ἔφη. Οὐ  
 5 τοῖνυν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἔτι μαθεῖναι οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας γινώσκειν· ἀλλ' ἐάν τις μοι λέγῃ δι' ὃ τι καλόν ἐστιν ὅτιοῦν, ἢ χρῶμα εὐαθεὲς ἔχον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο D ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐὼ, ταράττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι, τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως  
 10 εὐθέως ἔχω παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἢ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διιχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ'

6. τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας] *i.e.* the causes of the physicists.

10. ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ] This is the passage referred to by Aristotle *de gen. et corr.* II ix 335<sup>b</sup> 9 ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἱκανὴν ψήθησαν αἰτίαν εἶναι πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν φύσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, ἐπιτιμήσας τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς οὐδὲν εἰρηκόσιν, ὑποτίθεται ὡς ἔστι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν εἶδη τὰ δὲ μεθεκτικὰ τῶν εἰδῶν, καὶ ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἕκαστον λέγεται κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, γίνεσθαι δὲ κατὰ τὴν μετάληψιν καὶ φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀποβολήν· ὥστ' εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, τὰ εἶδη οὔτετα ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἰτία εἶναι καὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. Another reference is in *Metaph.* I ix 991<sup>b</sup> 3.

11. εἴτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένου] The ms. reading *προσγενομένη* has given much trouble to the editors. Wytttenbach proposes *προσαγορευομένη*, which, though accepted by the Zürich editors, is hardly satisfactory. Schanz and other recent editors bracket *εἴτε*, which is precisely the word I should most wish to keep. For surely Plato is suggesting some alternative to *παρουσία* and *κοινωνία*, not merely some mode of their existence: moreover *προσγενομένη* is not properly applied to those two nouns. On the

whole Ueberweg's *προσγενομένου* seems the best remedy; though I formerly adopted Dr. Jackson's suggestion to omit the participle altogether. He remarks that *προσγίνεσθαι* is a familiar word as applied to the connexion of ideas and phenomena; cf. *Hippias maior* 289 D, 292 D, *Parmenides* 153 E, and is especially common in later writers; it might therefore be supposed to be a marginal note upon *ὅπη καὶ ὅπως*. Certainly, had Plato written *προσγενομένου*, there seems no obvious reason for its corruption into *-η*. A very similar use of *ὅπη καὶ ὅπως* is found in *Laws* 899 B *θεοὺς αὐτὰς εἶναι φήσομεν, εἴτε ἐν σώμασιν ἐνοῦσαι, ζῶα ὄντα, κοσμοῦσι πάντα οὐρανόν, εἴτε ὅπη τε καὶ ὅπως*. I should add that Olympiodoros in quoting this passage omits *προσγενομένη*.

12. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο] 'for I do not proceed to insist upon that point,' *i.e.* all he insists upon is that the idea is the cause; he does not specify the mode of its operation. This phrase is an indication that Plato at this period did not entertain a view of the relation between ideas and particulars definitely distinct from that expounded in his later writings; but that he had not as yet applied him-

ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά. τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖ  
 ἀσφαλέςτατον εἶναι καὶ ἑμαυτῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ  
 Εἰ τούτου ἐχόμενος ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἂν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλές  
 εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὁτῶοῦν ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ  
 καλὰ καλά· ἢ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ; Δοκεῖ. Καὶ μετέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα 5  
 μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζω μείζω, καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω;  
 Ναί. Οὐδὲν δὲ ἄρ' ἂν ἀποδέχοιο, εἴ τίς τινα φαίη ἕτερον ἑτέρου  
 τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ  
 101 ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροιο ἂν ὅτι ἐν μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγεις ἢ  
 ὅτι τὸ μείζον πᾶν ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ μείζον ἐστίν ἢ 10  
 μετέθει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μείζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἕλαττον  
 οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἕλαττον ἢ σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἕλαττον, διὰ  
 τὴν σμικρότητα, φοβούμενος οἶμαι, μή τίς σοι ἐναντίος λόγος  
 ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐὰν τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζονά τινα φῆς εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω,  
 πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μείζον μείζον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἕλαττον 15  
 Β ἕλαττον, ἔπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ σμικρῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸν μείζω μείζω εἶναι,  
 καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῷ τινὶ μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι· ἢ  
 οὐκ ἂν φοβοῖο ταῦτα; καὶ ὁ Κέβης γελάσας, Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Οὐκ-  
 οῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτὼ δυοῖν πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ  
 ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ 20  
 πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος; καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου ἡμίσει  
 μείζον εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐ μετέθει; ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ που φόβος. Πάνυ  
 γ' ἔφη. Τί δέ; ἐνὶ ἐνὸς προστεθέντος τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν  
 C εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχιθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο  
 ἂν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῶνς ὅτι οὐκ οἶσα ἄλλως πως 25

self to working out the question. In the later dialogues he does not so much alter his view as define it; the definition, however, necessarily leads to important modifications in the theory of ideas, and to the decisive rejection of the doctrine of *παρουσία*, towards which he had hitherto chiefly inclined: see on 73 E: compare *Parmenides* 133 D τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν εἶτε ὁμοιώματα εἶτε ὅπῃ δὴ τις αὐτὰ τίθεται.

5. μετέθει ἄρα] The words μέγεθος and σμικρότης are synonymous with μείζον and ἕλαττον in 75 c.

8. τῇ κεφαλῇ] Plato here clears up a logical confusion. The fact

that the dative is used to express both cause and manner gives the ἀντιλογικὸς his opportunity. If A is said to be taller by a head than B, he insists upon understanding 'by the head' as denoting the cause, just as in the phrase 'Sokrates acts by intelligence,' νῷ πράττει.

13. ἐναντίος λόγος] Inasmuch as (1), if A is taller by a head than B, B is shorter than A by the same head, namely A's; which is therefore the cause of both tallness and shortness; (2) the head is small compared with the rest of the body, therefore it is absurd to say A is large through a small part of himself.

ἑκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὼν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστου οὐ ἂν  
 μετάρχη, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο  
 γενέσθαι ἄλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάρχεσιν, καὶ δεῖν τούτου  
 μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος δ' ἂν μέλλῃ  
 5 ἐν ἔσεσθαι, τὰς δὲ στίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας  
 τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐφ' ἧς ἂν χαίρειν, παρὲς ἀποκρίναςθαι  
 τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις· σὺ δὲ δεδιώς ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν D  
 ἑαυτοῦ σκιδᾶν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐκόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς  
 τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἂν. [εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς  
 10 ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἐφ' ἧς ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο, ἕως ἂν

8. τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέ-  
 σεως] 'clinging to the safeguard of  
 your hypothesis.' The *ὑπόθεσις* is  
 the notion or definition, λόγος, under  
 which the object to be explained  
 falls. If we are asked, why is a  
 rose beautiful? we shall not attribute  
 its beauty to the colour, shape, dis-  
 position of the petals, and such κομ-  
 ψεῖαι, for all these are merely  
 ξυναίτια: we shall say it is because  
 the rose partakes of the beautiful.  
 Now it is of course the idea which  
 is the cause of the rose's beauty; the  
 λόγος is not the cause, but it is the  
 conception of the cause which, for  
 fault of direct apprehension of the  
 idea, we have formed by generalisa-  
 tion from particulars. Only when  
 we know the ideas shall we have a  
 true insight into causation; until  
 then λόγοι are the best substitute.  
 The term *ὑπόθεσις*, as well as the  
 method, may be traced to Sokrates:  
 cf. Xen. Mem. iv vi 13 εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ  
 περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν μὴδὲν ἔχων σαφὲς  
 λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως ἤτοι  
 σοφώτερον φάσκων εἶναι ὃν αὐτὸς  
 λέγει ἢ πολιτικώτερον ἢ ἀνδρειώτερον  
 ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπὶ τὴν  
 ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανήγεν ἅν πάντα τὸν λόγον  
 δίδε πω. In illustration we have an in-  
 quiry, what is the ἀγαθὸς πολίτης. It  
 is used in a similar sense in *Gorgias*  
 454 c ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν  
 ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν βούλῃ περαίνῃς.

9. [εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέ-  
 σεως ἔχοιτο] The difficulty of retain-  
 ing ἔχοιτο in the sense of 'attack'  
 has been perceived by most editors,  
 and Madvig proposes to read ἔφοιτο,  
 which Schanz adopts. But the  
 objections to the passage are by no  
 means thus exhausted. A discussion  
 of them will be found in the article  
 of Dr. Jackson's before mentioned,  
*Journal of Philology* vol. x p. 148.  
 I shall state them as follows: (1)  
 ἔχοιτο in a sense entirely unparalleled  
 following immediately upon the  
 ordinary use. Wagner indeed finds  
 'a certain acumen' in this; but  
 wherein it consists he fails to  
 inform us. (2) If we acquiesce in  
 ἔχοιτο or accept ἔφοιτο, the words  
 εἰ δέ τις . . . ἔχοιτο are a clumsy  
 and tautological anticipation of ἐπειδὴ  
 δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι  
 λόγον. Ast, seeing this, most in-  
 geniously suggests εἰ δέ τις ἄλλης  
 ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο. But, as Dr.  
 Jackson observes, there is grave  
 difficulty in applying the term ὑπό-  
 θεσις, which is throughout reserved  
 for the Sokratic method, to the  
 principle of an opponent, who would  
 doubtless term it αἰτία. Moreover  
 the introduction of a rival method  
 is here irrelevant. Finally Ast's  
 emendation does not meet the most  
 serious objection of all, which is (3)  
 that the words ἕως ἂν . . . διαφωνεῖ



τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὀρμηθέντα σκέψαιο, εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοισι συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ·] ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε δίδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἥτις τῶν  
 Ε ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἕως ἐπὶ τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις, ἅμα δὲ οὐκ

are inconsistent with the method indicated in ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης κ.τ.λ. and are in themselves sheer nonsense. The comparison of particulars between themselves is made *before* the formation of the ὑπόθεσις. But when the ὑπόθεσις is established by means of this comparison, we proceed to observe, not whether the particulars are consistent with one another, but whether they are consistent with the hypothesis; and this is precisely what Sokrates professes to do in 100 A α μὲν ἂν δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν, τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, where he is supposing the truth of his hypothesis established. And presently we see that the validity of a doubtful hypothesis is tested, not by examination of particulars, but by the ascent to a more general hypothesis. The word ὀρμηθέντα too strikes me as betraying a writer who had no sense of the difference between aorist and perfect participles: below we have ὀρμημένων. On these grounds I fully agree with Dr. Jackson in regarding the passage εἰ δέ τις . . . διαφωνεῖ as an interpolation; probably, as he suggests, by the same hand that inserted ταῖς μὲν γ' ἀγαθαῖς κ.τ.λ. in 72 D.

A very full and instructive discussion of the whole subject of the present chapter, and the relation of the δεύτερος πλοῦς to the dialectical method, will be found in the aforesaid article of Dr. Jackson's in *Journal of Philology* vol. x; to which my notes on this part of the dialogue are largely indebted.

3. ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης] i.e. as

when we are asked to explain a group of particulars we form by generalisation a concept or definition, ὑπόθεσις, which includes them all, so if we have to explain our ὑπόθεσις we form a wider generalisation which includes that and other ὑποθέσεις corresponding to other groups of particulars. We proceed from particulars to species, from species to genus, from genus to a more comprehensive genus, and so ascend step by step until we arrive at one that will satisfy our needs.

ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν] 'whichever of the higher generalisations seems most adequate.' τῶν ἄνωθεν means the more comprehensive ὑποθέσεις, farther removed from the particulars. So Aristotle *Anal. Post.* I xx 82<sup>a</sup> 23: λέγω δὲ ἄνω μὲν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου, κάτω δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος. Cf. *Metaph.* B iii 998<sup>b</sup> 17 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι τὰ καθόλου μᾶλλον ἀρχαί, φανερόν ὅτι τὰ ἀνωτάτω τῶν γενῶν . . . ταῦτα γὰρ λέγεται κατὰ πάντων.

4. ἕως ἐπὶ τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις] I agree with Prof. Geddes, though for very different reasons, in holding that ἱκανὸν does not mean the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. In this passage Sokrates is avowedly setting forth his δεύτερος πλοῦς: he has declared his inability (99 D) to attain to the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. Now if ἱκανὸν means the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, we have here described no δεύτερος πλοῦς, but the perfect dialectic of which Sokrates at present despairs; and we ought to exchange the term ὑπόθεσις for ἀρχή. By the superior method we use our ὑποθέσεις merely as steps to the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν: having reached this we are enabled

ἂν φύροις ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περὶ τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος  
καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὠρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων  
εὐρεῖν. ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲ εἰς περὶ τούτου λόγος οὐδὲ  
φροντίς· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκλώντες ὁμῶς  
5 δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκειν· cὺ δ' εἴπερ εἶ τῶν φιλοσόφων, 102  
οἶμαι ἂν ὥς ἐγὼ λέγω ποιοῖς. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὃ τε  
Σιμμία καὶ ὁ Κέβης.

to descend step by step, verifying every one of the *ὑποθέσεις* by which we ascended: so that the knowledge of the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν* is essential to the real knowledge of all our generalisations from the highest to the lowest. But since the inferior method only is attempted here, *ἱκανὸν* must merely mean a *ὑπόθεσις* comprehensive enough to satisfy the antagonist or our own doubts. Olympiodoros, though his phraseology is sadly confused, means rightly when he says *ἀμεινον δέ, τὸ αἰὶ ὁμολογούμενον φάναι καὶ τὰς αὐτοπίστους ὑποθέσεις τε καὶ ἀρχάς*.

ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροις] *i.e.* you would not make a confusion between arguments intended to prove your *ὑπόθεσις* and arguments applicable to deductions therefrom: *e.g.* in the case that follows, you would not confuse a demonstration of the ideal theory with a demonstration of the immortality of the soul, which is a corollary from the former. In other words the processes which are not to be confounded are (1) the establishment of the *ὑποθέσεις*, (2) the comparison of the *ὠρμημένα* with the *ὑπόθεσις*, cf. 100 A. As Grote says, 'during this debate [on the *ὠρμημένα*] Plato would require his opponent to admit the truth of the fundamental hypothesis provisionally. If the opponent chose to impugn the latter, he must open a distinct debate on that express subject. Plato insists that the discussion of the conse-

quences flowing from the hypothesis shall be kept quite apart from the discussion on the credibility of the hypothesis itself.' In the sarcastic remarks that follow Plato indicates the difference between the aim of the *φιλόσοφοι* and that of the *ἀντιλογικοί*: the former seek *τῶν ὄντων τι εὐρεῖν*, the latter *αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκειν*. This spirit of self-satisfaction is exorcised by dialectic; cf. *Theaetetus* 177 B. *φύροις* is Madvig's correction for *φύροιο*, which is retained by Z. and St. *οὐκ ἂν φύροιο* means 'you would not get muddled,' but the active gives a preciser sense.

102 A. Plato brings in this brief interlude with his usual skill. The emphatic approval expressed by Echekrates of the principles just laid down serves to impress on us that by them we must stand or fall. We have staked all upon this last effort; we have chosen our own battle-ground, on which alone we can hope for victory. Nothing could better mark the gravity of the crisis than this momentary pause in the narrative.

102 A—103 A, c. l. Assuming then that ideas exist corresponding to the hypotheses, and that by participation in them particulars possess their attributes, Sokrates proceeds thus. When we say Simmias is bigger than Sokrates and less than Phaedo, we are speaking loosely: in reality Simmias partakes of the ideas of great and small; and it is greatness

ΕΧ. Νῆ Δία, ὦ Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε· θαυμαστῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ὥς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντι εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνος ταῦτα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἔδοξεν.

5

ΕΧ. Καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀποῦσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα;

Λ. ΦΑΙΔ. Ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνεχω-  
B ρήθη, καὶ ὡμολογεῖτο εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων  
τᾶλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, 10  
τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡρώτα, Εἰ δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτα οὕτως λέγεις,  
ἄρ' οὐκ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῆς μείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος  
δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τότε εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἀμφότερα, καὶ μέγε-  
θος καὶ σμικρότητα; Ἔγωγε. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ  
τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐκ ὥς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται 15

in him which is bigger than smallness in Sokrates, and smallness in him that is less than greatness in Phaedo. For it has nothing to do with the personality of Simmias Sokrates and Phaedo, as such, that one is greater or less than another. We observe then that (1) two opposite ideas can coexist in the same subject, although (2) such opposite ideas cannot combine with each other, either (3) as they exist absolutely in nature, or (4) as they are manifested in concrete particulars. And this incapacity of one opposite idea to take upon it the nature of the other is true of all pairs of opposite ideas as well as great and small.

Setting aside the metaphysical objections to the doctrine of ideas of relation, which we have here in its most pronounced form, it conveniently serves Plato's purpose to show that in particulars contradictory ideas may coexist. In 103 D we pass on to the next stage. We are here dealing with the participation by particulars in ideas which are not essential to their nature. Greatness and smallness are not essential to a

man as heat is essential to fire and cold to snow. With this chapter it is well to contrast *Parmenides* 150 A foll.

8. ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη] Sokrates now assumes the existence of the ideas, though at present he is unable to attain cognition of them: that is, he assumes that his ὑποθέσεις more or less faithfully represent the substantial realities. Taking then the ideas as the true αἰτίαι περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, it remains to examine whether the immortality of the soul is a legitimate deduction from this theory.

10. τᾶλλα] *i.e.* concrete existence. τᾶλλα is constantly used thus in the *Parmenides*.

13. λέγεις τότε εἶναι] The ideas are the cause of comparison, as of everything else. It is through partaking of the ideas of great and small that Simmias is comparable in point of size with other men.

14. τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν] 'as to Simmias being bigger than Sokrates, you admit the truth is not as expressed in the words.' Strictly speaking Simmias is not bigger than

οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν. οὐ γάρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν  
 ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει C  
 ἔχων· οὐδ' αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν, ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης  
 ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου  
 5 μέγεθος; Ἀληθῆ. Οὐδέ γε αὖ ὑπὸ Φαίδωνος ὑπερέχεσθαι τῷ  
 ὅτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων  
 πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίου σμικρότητα; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὕτως ἄρα ὁ  
 Σιμμίας ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει σμικρὸς τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσῳ  
 ὧν ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα D  
 10 ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχον.  
 καὶ ἅμα μειδιάσας, Ἔοικα, ἔφη, καὶ συγγραφικῶς ἐρεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐν

Sokrates, for the personality of two men cannot be compared in respect of size. The only things that can be so compared are great and small: therefore it is the greatness in Simmias which we compare with the smallness that is in Sokrates. But to say that Simmias *qua* Simmias is greater or less than Sokrates *qua* Sokrates would be nonsense.

8. ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει] because he participates in the two opposite ideas. This predication of opposite attributes exhibits particulars in sharp contrast to the ideas, of which no such contrary predication is, to the Sokrates of the *Phaedo*, possible: cf. *Parmenides* 129 B εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοιά τις ἀπέφαινε ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια, τέρας ἂν, οἶμαι, ἦν· εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφοτέρα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα, οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ζήνων, ἄτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι. The whole passage 129 A—130 A should be compared, where Sokrates is stating the earlier Platonic doctrine, which in the latter part of the dialogue Plato criticises with a view to its modification.

9. τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων] This reading is due to Madvig, who thus renders the sentence: 'alterius magnitudini exiguitatem suam superandam subministrans, alteri magnitu-

dinem exiguitatem superantem praebens'; i.e. Simmias submits his smallness to be exceeded by the greatness of Phaedo and presents his greatness to exceed the smallness of Sokrates. On the whole this seems the best attempt to disentangle this troublesome sentence that has yet been made. The ordinary reading is ὑπερέχων, which is thus translated by Mr. Cope: 'exceeding the shortness of the one by excess of height, and lending to the other by comparison a size exceeding his own shortness.' The grave objection to this reading and interpretation is that in the first clause ὑπερέχων is followed by the accusative, in the second ὑπερέχον by the genitive. The verb may, it is true, take either case; but surely Plato would not use both constructions in the same breath. Wyttienbach, Heindorf, and Ast reconstruct the passage each in his own way: Madvig's remedy is, however, the simplest.

11. συγγραφικῶς ἐρεῖν] 'it seems I am going to talk in the style of an indenture.' *συγγραφὴ* is the regular term for a legal document, especially a bond or covenant. Sokrates makes fun of the clumsy sentence he has just uttered, which he compares to the cumbersome pedantry of legal phraseology.

ἔχει γέ που ὡς λέγω. **ΣΥΝΕΦΗ.** Λέγω δὲ τοῦδ' ἕνεκα, βουλό-  
μενος δόξαι σοὶ ὅπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ  
τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτε' ἐθέλειν ἅμα μέγα καὶ μικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ  
καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ μικρὸν οὐδ'  
ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυοῖν τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ φεύγειν καὶ 5  
Εἰ ὑπεκχωρεῖν, ὅταν αὐτῷ προσίῃ τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ μικρόν, ἢ  
προσελεόντος ἐκείνου ἀπολωλέναι· ὑπομένον δὲ καὶ δεξιόμενον  
τὴν μικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἕτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν. ὥσπερ  
ἐγὼ δεξιόμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν μικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὥν ὅσπερ  
εἰμὶ, οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς μικρὸς εἰμι· ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ τετόλμηκεν μέγα 10

2. οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος] According to the earlier Platonism, the idea exists (1) absolutely apart from the sensible world, *χωριστή*, (2) inherent in phenomena, to which it imparts their attributes. Not only are opposite ideas incapable of communion, as existing apart by themselves, but also as informing particulars. The importance of this point becomes manifest when the argument is applied to *ψυχή*.

5. ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν] If any object that was great becomes small, the idea of greatness either withdraws from it and goes elsewhere or is extinguished; and the idea of smallness takes its place. But under no circumstances can the idea of greatness remain in the object and accept the attribute of smallness, thus contradicting its own nature.

7. ὑπομένον] Schanz has adopted Hirschig's *ὑπομείναν*, against all authority. The change of tense is however perfectly proper. Awaiting the approach of the other idea is a prolonged process, accepting it is an act performed once for all. In the next sentence *ὑπομείνας* denotes the actual completion of the process in a specified instance.

8. οὐκ ἐθέλειν] 'it will not consent to abide and accept smallness and thus become different from what it was, in the way that I accept and abide smallness and still remaining

the man I am, without losing my identity am small; whereas it has never submitted, while remaining great, to be small.' That is to say, if Sokrates *δέχεται μικρότητα*, we have a small Sokrates, which involves no incongruity nor loss of identity; but if greatness *δέχεται μικρότητα*, we have small greatness, which is incongruous and impossible. Schmidt (*Krit. Comm.* II p. 41) discusses this passage at great length: he would read οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἔτι ὅπερ ἦν, comparing 103 Ε δεξιόμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἔτι εἶναι ὅπερ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν. There is much to be said for this; but I think the vulgate may be defended, as indicating that in the one case a change of identity is involved but not in the other: the incongruity in fact lies in the supposed retention of its identity by the idea under circumstances which render its retention impossible. *σικρόν μέγεθος* would remain *μέγεθος* but yet be *ἕτερον*. Moreover Schmidt's reading anticipates the point made in *μέγα δὲ σικρόν εἶναι*. On the whole, therefore, it is better to make no change.

10. οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σικρὸς εἰμι] 'I, this same Sokrates, am small.'

τετόλμηκε] as in 103 D *τολμήσιν*. The perfect expresses the fixed constitution of the idea: it has been ordained by nature not to endure smallness.

ὄν σμικρόν εἶναι· ὥς δ' αὐτως καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ  
ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν  
ἐναντίων ἔτι ὄν ὅπερ ἦν ἅμα τούναντίον γίνεσθαι τε καὶ  
εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἦτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι. 103

5 Παντάπασιν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτω φαίνεται μοι.

LI. Καί τις εἶπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας—ὅστις δ' ἦν, οὐ  
σαφῶς μέμνημαι—Πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λό-  
γοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυνὶ λεγομένων ὠμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ  
ἐλάττωτος τὸ μείζον γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἔλαττον,  
10 καὶ ἀτεχνῶς αὕτη εἶναι ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐναν-  
τίων; νῦν δέ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο.  
καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἀκούσας, Ἄνδρι-  
κῶς, ἔφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρειν τοῦ B  
τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ  
15 ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πρᾶγμα γίνεσθαι, νῦν δὲ ὅτι  
αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ  
ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. τότε μὲν γάρ, ὦ φίλε, περὶ τῶν

4. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι] *i.e.*  
ἐν τῷ προσιέναι αὐτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον.

103 A—C, c. li. One of the  
company suggests that this doctrine  
is inconsistent with our former  
theory of generation from opposites  
(70 c foll.) Sokrates replies that  
then we were speaking of particulars  
possessing the attributes of such  
opposites, but now we deal with the  
absolute opposites themselves. The  
former can pass from one to the  
other of two opposite conditions;  
but the opposite itself can never put  
on the nature of its opposite.

12. παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν]  
'bending his head to listen.' As  
Heindorf suggests, the objector prob-  
ably spoke in a low voice through  
diffidence.

ἀνδρικῶς] Sokrates is never  
without a word of praise for any  
mark of interest or intelligence in  
his listeners. Plato is fond of the  
word ἀνδρικῶς and its cognates to  
express staunchness in argument; cf.  
*Theaetetus* 204 E, *Phaedrus* 265 A,

*Republic* 454 B, *Laws* 752 B: in the  
last two instances ironically.

13. οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ δια-  
φέρειν] The distinction is clear  
enough. The concrete particular is  
not in itself opposed to either of the  
opposites, therefore it can admit  
either of such opposites without  
contradicting itself; but the opposites  
themselves are so mutually exclusive  
that neither can admit the other  
without self-contradiction. Hot  
water can become cold, because water  
is not itself opposite to hot or cold,  
nor is any attribute essential to it  
which is opposed to either. But hot  
cannot become cold without manifest  
contradiction of its own nature.  
Similarly, when we generated ζῶν  
from τεθνηκός, we did not mean  
that death became life, but simply  
that things that live have passed  
over from a state of death into a  
state of life. In the next chapter,  
however, we shall see that a further  
refinement must be made.

16. οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν] Simmias

ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ὧν ἐνότων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα· αὐτὰ δ' ἐκεῖνα οὐκ ἂν ποτέ  
 C φαμεν ἐεληῖσαι γένεσιν ἀλλήλων δέεσθαι. καὶ ἅμα βλέψας  
 πρὸς τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν, Ἐὰρ μή που, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη, καὶ σέ τι 5  
 τούτων ἐτάραξεν ὧν ὅδε εἶπεν; ὁ δ' <Οὐκ> αὖ, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης,  
 οὕτως ἔχω· καίτοι οὐ τι λέγω ὥς οὐ πολλά με τaráττει.  
 Cυνωμολογήκαμεν ἄρα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀπλῶς τοῦτο, μὴδέποτε ἐναν-  
 τίων ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσεσθαι. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη.

LII. Ἔτι δὴ μοι καὶ τότε σκέψαι, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα Cυνωμολογή- 10  
 σεαι. θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν; Ἐγώ γε. Ἄρ' ὅπερ χιόνα  
 D καὶ πῦρ; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. Ἄλλ' ἕτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμόν

can be small and great by participation in the ideas of small and great; but the idea of greatness in him can never have the quality of smallness, so that Simmias should be small by virtue of its immanence. For ἐν τῇ φύσει compare *Parmenides* 132 D τὰ μὲν εἶδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα εἶσθαι ἐν τῇ φύσει.

1. τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ] Here Plato propounds a theory of predication. When we say that Sokrates is small, we do not mean that Sokrates and small are the same thing, but we call Sokrates after the name of the idea whose attribute he possesses. To mark this point was necessary because of the confusion into which Antisthenes and others had fallen in the matter of predication. The difference between Plato's treatment of the subject in the *Phaedo* and in the *Sophist* has been dealt with in the Introduction § 5.

6. οὐκ αὖ] 'no, not this time.' The mss. are corrupt here: I have adopted the text of Schanz, except that he brackets ὁ Κέβης. Z. and St. have οὐκ αὖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

103 c—104 c, c. lii. The mutually exclusive opposites, hot and cold, are not identical with fire and snow; yet we see that fire will not admit cold, nor snow heat. Whence we

infer that there may be an idea which is not one of a pair of opposites, but which may exclude one of such opposites. For instance, the idea of odd is opposite to that of even, and exclusive of it. Also the idea of three, though not opposite to even, excludes it, because the idea of three necessarily carries with it the idea of odd. Similarly the idea of even and the idea of two exclude the idea of odd. Thus it appears that there are (1) opposite ideas which are mutually exclusive, (2) other ideas, not identical with any such opposite but necessarily partaking of it, which, equally with that opposite, exclude the other opposite.

After establishing in the fiftieth chapter that opposite ideas cannot enter into communion, Plato's next task is to show that this incommunicability extends to other ideas, which, though not themselves opposite to anything, are inseparably combined with one of such opposites and therefore necessarily exclude the other.

11. ὅπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ] Plato at first speaks of hot, cold, fire, snow, without distinctly specifying whether he means ideas or particulars: presently, however, he gives a precise statement: we have in 104 A (1)

καὶ ἕτερόν τι χιόνος τὸ ψυχρόν; Ναί. Ἀλλὰ τόδε γ' οἶμαι  
δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χιόνα οὖσαν δεξαμένην τὸ θερμόν, ὥσπερ  
ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἔτι ἔσσεσθαι ὅπερ ἦν, χιόνα καὶ  
θερμόν, ἀλλὰ προσιόντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ὑπεκχωρήσειν αὐτῷ ἢ  
5 ἀπολείψαι. Πάνυ γε. Καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὖ προσιόντος τοῦ ψυ-  
χροῦ αὐτῷ ἢ ὑπεζιέναι ἢ ἀπολείψαι, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ τολμήσειν  
δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἔτι εἶναι ὅπερ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν.  
Ἀληθεῖ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ἔστιν ἄρα, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιού- E  
των, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιόυσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ  
10 ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν αἰ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ  
ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν αἰ ὅτανπερ ἦ. ἔτι δὲ ἐν

περιττόν, the idea of odd, (2) *τριάς*, the idea of three, (3) *τρία*, the three particulars informed by the *τριάς*.

2. **χιόνα οὖσαν**] Schanz writes *χιόνα* twice, which is far from euphonious and surely unnecessary, the subject being readily supplied from the preceding sentence.

3. **ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν**] 102 E.

**χιόνα καὶ θερμόν**] 'at once snow and hot.' The sense is perfectly right, and I cannot understand why Schanz should bracket *καὶ θερμόν*, as he does *καὶ ψυχρόν* in E. For the phrase *χιόνα καὶ θερμόν* is explanatory of the whole clause *δεξαμένην τὸ θερμόν ἔτι ἔσσεσθαι ὅπερ ἦν*, the result of which process would be precisely what Plato says, hot snow. Schanz seems to refer it to the *ὅπερ ἦν* alone. Hirschig goes so far as to bracket all three words; also *πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν* below. I cannot see that the shadow of suspicion attaches to them.

5. **ἀπολείψαι**] That which *ἀπόλλυται* is of course not the idea, which is as imperishable existing *ἐν τῇ χιόνι* as existing *ἐν τῇ φύσει*: what perishes is the quality of snow which the particular possesses by the immanence of the idea of snow—the sensible form of snow, such as those described in *Timaeus* 50 C as *εἰσύοντα*

*καὶ ἐξίοντα*: this, however, is to explain Plato's words by means of an analysis which he had not yet made. For *αὐτῷ* the mss. have *αὐτό*.

8. **ἔστιν ἄρα, ἢ δ' ὅς**] 'it is the case then with some ideas of this kind that not only do we recognise the right of this idea itself to the same name in perpetuity, but also that of some other idea, not being identical with it, which, whenever it exists, always possesses the form of the other.' For the construction *ἔστιν ὥστε* cf. 93 B.

9. **τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος**] So Schanz: rightly, it would seem; cf. below, *τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν αἰεί που δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνειν*. In support of *ἐαυτοῦ* Prof. Geddes refers to 104 A *μετὰ τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ ὀνόματος*. But there, as well as in *τῷ τε αὐτῆς ὀνόματι* below, a comparison is involved which is absent here. Z. and St. give *ἐαυτοῦ*.

11. **τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν**] On this Wytttenbach observes 'notatur alius verborum usus: quo *εἶδος* ut universalis habetur, *μορφή* minus universalis et quasi communio *τοῦ εἶδους*: veluti *numerus impar εἶδος* dicitur, *τρία* autem illius *μορφήν* habere.' But this distinction cannot be maintained; for, as Wytttenbach himself points out, in 104 D Plato says ἡ



τοῖςδε ἴσως ἔσται σαφέστερον ὃ λέγω. τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν αἰεί που  
 δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνειν, ὅπερ νῦν λέγομεν· ἢ οὐ;  
 Πάνυ γε. Ἐὰρ μόνον τῶν ὄντων, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ, ἢ καὶ  
 104 ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ὅπερ τὸ περιττόν, ὅμως δὲ δεῖ αὐτὸ  
 μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν αἰεί, διὰ τὸ οὕτω 5  
 πεφυκέναι, ὥστε τοῦ περιττοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ  
 αὐτὸ εἶναι οἶον καὶ ἡ τριάς πέπονθε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. σκόπει  
 δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος· ἄρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὐτῆς ὀνόματι  
 αἰεί προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ τοῦ περιττοῦ, ὄντος οὐκ οὐπερ  
 τῆς τριάδος; ἀλλ' ὅμως οὕτω πως πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριάς καὶ ἡ 10  
 πεμπτὰς καὶ ὁ ἥμις τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας, ὥστε οὐκ ὦν ὅπερ τὸ  
 B περιττὸν αἰεί ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστὶ περιττός· καὶ αὖ τὰ δύο καὶ  
 τὰ τέτταρα καὶ ἅπας ὁ ἕτερος αὖ στίχος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὦν  
 ὅπερ τὸ ἄρτιον ὅμως ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἄρτιός ἐστιν αἰεί· συγχωρεῖς  
 ἢ οὐ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη. Ὁ τοίνυν, ἔφη, βούλομαι δηλῶσαι, 15  
 ἄρχει. ἔστιν δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία  
 ἄλληλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντ' ἀλλήλοισ ἐναντία  
 ἔχει αἰεί τὰναντία, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν

ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ ἢ ἂν  
 τοῦτο ἀπεργάζεται, where μορφῇ =  
 τῷ περιττῷ. In fact μορφή, εἶδος,  
 and ἰδέα are in the present passage  
 interchangeable words. 'The species  
 has the μορφή of the genus present,  
 with whatever else that μορφή may  
 be combined,' says Prof. Geddes,  
 rightly.

ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖςδε] No fresh point  
 is introduced here: Plato is merely  
 illustrating his proposition more  
 fully. From his second example he  
 again draws the inference stated in  
 103 E, which he gives in a more  
 complete form in 104 B.

3. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ] 'for this  
 is the point of my question.' These  
 words direct the attention of the  
 hearer to the proposition on which  
 most stress is laid: viz. that there  
 are ideas which are not logically  
 opposite to anything, but which  
 nevertheless contain the principle of  
 some opposite and therefore refuse  
 to combine with the rival opposite.

The vital importance of this we shall  
 presently see.

5. καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν] sc. περιττόν.

11. ὁ ἥμις τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας]  
 'the entire half of the set of numbers,'  
 COPE. For the construction cf. Thucy-  
 dides VIII 8 τὰς ἡμισείας τῶν νεῶν.  
 πολὺς is similarly used, Thuc. I 5  
 τὸν πλείστον τοῦ βίου: and other  
 like idioms are given in Wagner's  
 note.

16. οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία]  
 'not only those original opposites  
 refuse to admit each other, but also  
 those which, though not opposite  
 one to another, always contain the  
 opposites, seem no more likely to  
 admit the idea which is opposite to  
 the idea they contain, but on its  
 approach they either perish or with-  
 draw.' That is to say τριάς is not  
 opposite to δυνάς, but it contains an  
 opposite, περιττόν, to the idea, ἄρτιον,  
 contained in δυνάς. Therefore τριάς  
 equally with περιττόν excludes ἄρτιον,  
 and δυνάς excludes περιττόν.

ἰδέαν ἢ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐναντία ἢ, ἀλλ' ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς  
 ἦτοι ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἢ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ C  
 ἀπολείπειν πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιον πείσεται, πρὶν ὑπομεῖναι  
 ἔτι τρία ὄντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.  
 5 Οὐδὲ μὴν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐναντίον γέ ἐστι δυὰς τριάδι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.  
 Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐναντία οὐκ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα ἄλ-  
 ληλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ' ἅττα τὰ ἐναντία οὐκ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα.  
 Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

LIII. Βούλει οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, εἴαν οἱοί τ' ὦμεν, ὁρίσώμεθα  
 10 ὁποῖα ταῦτά ἐστιν; Πάνυ γε. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, τάδε D  
 εἴη ἂν, ἃ ὅ τι ἂν κατάσκη μὴ μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὐτοῦ  
 ἰδέαν αὐτὸ ἴσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου ἀεί τινος; Πῶς λέγεις;

2. ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχω-  
 ροῦντα] As Ast says, the construc-  
 tion is as though φαίνεται had been  
 written instead of εἶκε.

104 c—105 b, c. liii. Let us  
 define these ideas more closely.  
 Such an idea is not itself one of two  
 opposite ideas; nevertheless, into  
 whatsoever particulars it informs it  
 carries along with it one of these  
 opposites; so that the particulars  
 are called not only by the name of  
 their own idea, but by the name of  
 this opposite also; nor can they  
 admit the other opposite without  
 ceasing to be what they are. For  
 instance three particulars are three  
 by participation in the ideal triad;  
 but they are also odd, because the  
 triad always carries with it the idea  
 of oddness. Consequently they can  
 never admit the idea of even without  
 ceasing to be three. Of this a  
 number of other examples are given.

It might be thought that in the  
 last chapter we had already a suffi-  
 cient account of these ideas. But in  
 the present chapter one important  
 addition is made. Now we not only  
 say of the ἄλλ' ἅττα that they ἔχει  
 τὰ ἐναντία, but also that they ἐπι-  
 φέρει τὰ ἐναντία εἰς ὅ τι ἂν κατάσκη.  
 This is a necessary corollary to  
 the foregoing; but Plato desires to

bring it out as prominently as  
 possible, because this is the point  
 at which the whole argument is  
 aimed. Thus the gist of this chapter  
 lies in its application of the principle  
 to concretes.

11. ἃ ὅ τι ἂν κατάσκη] 'which,  
 whatever they occupy, compel that  
 to have not only its own idea, but  
 always that of some opposite as well.'  
 The word κατάσκη marks the fresh  
 point: what the idea occupies or  
 informs can be nothing else but  
 particulars.

τὴν αὐτοῦ ἰδέαν] i.e. ἐκείνου ὅ  
 τι ἂν κατάσκη. Wohlrab strangely  
 remarks 'αὐτοῦ bezüglich auf den  
 Plural ἃ.' To say nothing of the  
 grammar, this makes sheer nonsense,  
 representing the idea as the idea of  
 itself. Plato's meaning is plain  
 enough. The ideal triad, for in-  
 stance, occupying the concrete three,  
 forces the latter to receive not only  
 the special idea, τριάς, but also the  
 idea of a certain opposite, περιττόν.

12. ἐναντίου ἀεί τινος] There is  
 so much confusion in the mss. that  
 it would be rash to assert confidently  
 what is the true reading. This how-  
 ever gives precisely the sense required  
 and differs from the best mss. only  
 in the omission of αὐτῷ. Notwith-  
 standing that αὐτῷ has overwhelming

“Ὡς περ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν. οἶσα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι ἂν ἡ τῶν τριῶν  
 ἰδέα κατὰ σκῆ, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ  
 περιττοῖς. Πάνυ γε. Ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δὴ, φασκέν, ἡ ἐναντία  
 ἰδέα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ, ἡ ἂν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζεται, οὐδέποτε ἂν  
 ἔλθοι. Οὐ γάρ. Εἰργάζεται δέ γε ἡ περιττότης; Ναί. Ἐναντία 5  
 Εἰ δὲ ταύτῃ ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου; Ναί. Ἐπὶ τὰ τρία ἄρα ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου  
 ἰδέα οὐδέποτε ἔξει. Οὐ δῆτα. Ἄμοιρα δὴ τοῦ ἀρτίου τὰ τρία.  
 Ἄμοιρα. Ἀνάρτιος ἄρα ἡ τριάς. Ναί. “Ὁ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὀρί-  
 σασθαι, ποῖα οὐκ ἐναντία τινὶ ὄντα ὁμῶς οὐ δέχεται αὐτὸ τὸ  
 ἐναντίον, οἷον νῦν ἡ τριάς τῷ ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὔσα ἐναντία οὐδέν 10  
 τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἀεὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει,  
 05 καὶ ἡ δυὰς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα πάμ-  
 πολλα—ἀλλ’ ὅρα δὴ, εἰ οὕτως ὀρίζει, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ  
 ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρει τι ἐναν-

ms. authority I cannot believe it genuine. The only plan for making sense of it is to read δέ with Schmidt for ἀεί. But the phraseology ‘but it also has need of some opposite’ is so glaringly inappropriate that it is incredible that Plato wrote it. I have therefore with the Zürich editors ejected αὐτῷ, which Schanz retains within brackets. Ast’s ἀεὶ δὴ τινος is not bad, possibly accounting for the corruption δῆνος.

4. ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ] see on 103 E.

5. εἰργάζεται δὲ ἡ περιττότης] The ms. reading ἡ περιττῇ is surely indefensible. Plato never uses such a phrase as ἡ περιττῇ ἰδέα, which would indeed be something very like nonsense. Probably he wrote either ἡ τοῦ περιττοῦ or ἡ περιττότης: the latter, which was suggested to me by Dr. Jackson, I have ventured to adopt, as the mildest remedy I can find for an evident corruption. Compare 105 C οὐκ ἔρῳ ᾧ ἂν περιττότης.

6. ἐπὶ τὰ τρία] i.e. three particulars.

8. ἀνάρτιος ἄρα ἡ τριάς] The word ἀνάρτιος is used instead of

περιττῇ to denote the opposition to ἀρτίον involved in the number three: the full significance of this mode of expression will be clear when we come to take the case of ψυχῇ.

ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι] Heindorf says ‘ἔλεγον in his, ut saepe, idem fere est quod ἐκέλευον.’ Cf. Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 955 λέγω κατ’ ἄνδρα, μὴ θεόν, σέβειν ἐμέ.

9. οὐ δέχεται αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον] There seems no reason for omitting τὸ ἐναντίον. ‘The opposite itself’ is distinguished from the idea which is not, but implies, an opposite: and this is all that is meant by the word αὐτό. Cf. 103 B. This seems to be the view of H. Schmidt (*Krit. Comm.* II p. 58), who understands αὐτὸ ‘nicht in dem streng philosophischen Sinne an sich.’ Stallbaum’s plan of taking τὸ ἐναντίον in apposition to αὐτὸ is clumsy.

13. ὅρα δὴ, εἰ οὕτως ὀρίζει] resumes the sentence begun at ὃ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι, the construction of which is left imperfect.

μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον] ‘that not only does the opposite refuse to admit its opposite, but whatever imports an opposite into that to

τίον ἐκείνῳ, ἐφ' ὃ τι ἂν αὐτὸ ἴῃ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρειν τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξεσθαι. πάλιν δὲ ἀναμιμνήσκου· οὐ γὰρ χεῖρον πολλάκις ἀκούειν. τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ δέσσεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον·  
 5 τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ <οὐκ> ἐναντίον, ὅμως δὲ τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ οὐ δέσσεται. οὐδὲ τὸ ἡμιόλιον οὐδὲ τὰλλα τὰ Β τοιαῦτα, τὸ ἥμισυ, τὴν τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τριτημόριον αὖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴπερ ἔπει τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι οὕτως. Πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ἔφη, καὶ ἔπομαι.

which itself comes—that very importing idea can never admit the opposite of that which is imported.' Sokrates here speaks highly *ξυγγραφικῶς*. Not only will odd refuse to admit even, but the triad, which imports the idea of odd (*ἐκείνο δ' ἂν ἐπιφέρειν τι ἐναντίον*) into whatsoever it enters, will itself (*αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρειν*) never admit even, the opposite of oddness which is imported by it (*τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα*). *ἐκείνῳ* is to be joined with *ἐπιφέρειν*. The present definition differs from that in 104 B in the introduction of the word *ἐπιφέρειν*, which denotes that the principle is now being applied to concretes which are informed by the ideas.

5. **τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ <οὐκ> ἐναντίον**] The insertion of *οὐκ* is absolutely necessary: there is no sense in which the number ten can be said to be contrary to anything else. Cf. 104 c *ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντα ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει ἀεὶ τὰναντία*: and 104 E. Stallbaum's defence of the vulgate apparently fails to satisfy even himself.

6. **οὐδὲ τὸ ἡμιόλιον**] 'nor will  $\frac{3}{2}$  and the rest of the fractions whose denominator is 2 accept the idea of whole; nor yet will  $\frac{1}{3}$  and the fractions whose denominator is 3.' These last examples do not seem very felicitous, since we have no such

definite contrast of opposites as in the case of odd and even. We must however take it thus:  $\frac{3}{2}$  and  $\frac{1}{3}$  are not opposites to anything; they contain however the idea of fractionality, which is opposite to that of integrity, therefore they will never admit the latter.

7. **τὸ ἥμισυ**. Schanz brackets this as a gloss.

105 B—D, c. liv. We are now enabled to advance beyond our first simple and safe hypothesis. When we are asked what by its immanence makes a thing hot, we shall no longer answer heat, but fire: similarly we shall assign fever as the cause of sickness, not disease; the monad as the cause of numerical imparity, not oddness. Applying this rule, when asked what is the cause of life in the body, Kebes answers soul; for soul contains in her the principle of life which is opposite to death; whence soul can never combine with death.

We now see the significance of Plato's insistence on his point that some ideas which are not opposites yet refuse to combine with certain opposites. Soul is not opposite to anything: but she stands in the same relation to the idea of life as fire does to that of heat and the triad to that of oddness.

It is to be noted that a fourth term is added in this chapter.

LIV. Πάλιν δὴ μοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μή μοι ὁ ἄν  
 ἔρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ. λέγω δὲ παρ' ἡν τὸ  
 πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν  
 λεγομένων ἄλλην ὁρῶν ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔροιό με, ᾧ ἂν τί  
 C [ἐν τῷ] σώματι ἐγγένηται, θερμὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ 5  
 ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθεῖ, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομ-  
 ψότεραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν πῦρ· οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρῃ, ᾧ ἂν  
 σώματι τί ἐγγένηται, νοσῆσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι ᾧ ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ'  
 ᾧ ἂν πυρετός· οὐδ' ᾧ ἂν ἀριεμῶ τί ἐγγένηται, περιττός ἔσται,  
 οὐκ ἐρῶ ᾧ ἂν περιττότης, ἀλλ' ᾧ ἂν μονάς, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτως. 10  
 ἀλλ' ὅρα, εἰ ἤδη ἱκανῶς οἶσθ' ὅ τι βούλομαι. Ἄλλα πάνυ  
 ἱκανῶς, ἔφη. Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ᾧ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώ-  
 ματι, ζῶν ἔσται; Ὡς ἂν ψυχὴ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ τοῦτο οὕτως  
 D ἔχει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἢ δ' ὅς. Ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅ τι ἂν αὐτὴ

Hitherto we have had three, *e.g.* *περιττότης*, *τριάς*, *τρία*: the general idea, the special idea, and the particular informed by the latter: now in addition to these three we have *σῶμα* in which the particular resides; the fever that seizes on us is not the idea of fever, but a particular fever, which corresponds to *τρία*, while the idea of fever corresponds to *τριάς*. Similarly the soul that quickens a particular body corresponds to *τρία*. Now since this fourth term is itself in no wise material to the argument,—it matters nothing to the immortality of soul whether or not she resides in a body—I conceive the point of it is to emphasise the fact that these particulars too, *πυρετός* and *ψυχή*, carry with them the ideas of *νόσος* and *ζωή*, and consequently refuse to admit their opposites. Hitherto it has only been the special idea which ἐπιφέρει the general idea.

1. καὶ μή μοι ὁ ἄν ἐρωτῶ] 'and do not answer in the terms of the questions I put, but following the examples I shall give you,' *i.e.* to the question, what makes a thing *θερμόν*? the answer must be, not *θερμότης*, but *πῦρ*. The reading in

the text has the best ms. authority and gives the best sense.

3. τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην] Cf. 100 E ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ δῖω οὖν ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά. For the use of ἀσφαλές cf. *Timaeus* 50 A μακρῷ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀσφαλέστερον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι χρυσός.

4. εἰ γὰρ ἔροιό με] 'were you to ask me what must be inherent in a body to make it hot.' Stallbaum seems right in bracketing ἐν τῷ: we thus have the same phrase three times over, with a slight variation in the order of the words. Schanz and others include *σώματι* in the bracket; but it seems quite as much in place here as in the two passages below.

9. ᾧ ἂν πυρετός] *i.e.* he will specify the particular kind of sickness instead of using the general term: as Prof. Geddes puts it, the species is substituted for the genus.

10. ᾧ ἂν μονάς] Similarly, instead of assigning *περιττότης* as the cause of oddness in a number, he will assign the idea of that particular odd number, whatever it may be: *μονάς*, like *πυρετός*, is merely given as an example.

14. ὅ τι ἂν αὐτὴ κατὰσκη] It

κατάσκη, αἰὲν ἥκει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο φέρουσα ζωὴν; Ἦκει μέντοι, ἔφη.  
Πότερον δ' ἔστι τι ζωὴ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν; Ἦστιν, ἔφη. Τί;  
Θάνατος. Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ὃ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει αἰὲν οὐ

is to be noted that the usage of *κατάσκη* here is different from that in 104 D. The soul does not occupy the body in the sense in which *τριάς* occupies *τρία*: the triad is the cause why the three are three, the soul is not the cause why body is body, but the cause why it is alive. The difference lies in this: the triad is the idea of three; the soul which quickens the body is not the idea of soul, but a particular soul, just as the fever is a particular fever. Thus we have the following terms, (1) the idea of life, (2) the idea of soul, which carries the idea of life to particular souls, (3) the particular soul, which vivifies the body, (4) the body in which is displayed this vivifying power. It is true that an idea of soul is a metaphysical monstrosity; but we cannot escape it here, first because otherwise Plato's elaborate parallel breaks down, secondly because in the earlier Platonism an idea of soul is inevitable. Wherever there is a group of particulars called by the same name, we are told in the *Republic*, there is an idea corresponding: therefore since there are particular *ψυχαί*, there must be *αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι ψυχὴ*. This is one of the errors which Plato rectifies in his later dialogues; for the present we must bear with it. The whole point of this sentence is that not only the idea of soul but also a particular soul *ἐπιφέρει ζωὴν*, and accordingly *τὸ ἐναντίον ὃ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει αἰὲν οὐ μὴ ποτε δέξηται*.

105 D—106 D, c. lv. As then that which will not admit even is uneven, so that which will not admit death, namely soul, is deathless.

Now if the negation of even or of heat or of cold necessarily implied indestructibility, then three and snow and fire would not perish at the approach of the opposite to the idea contained in them, but would merely withdraw from it. This however is not the case: these negations do not imply indestructibility; therefore three and snow and fire can cease to exist at the approach of the opposite. But the negation of death does imply indestructibility: soul therefore, on the approach of death, not only refuses to admit it, but also refuses to perish: soul is thus not only deathless but indestructible. Indeed if the eternal principle of life could perish, then there is nothing in existence that should not perish.

We have seen that *πῦρ* and *τρία*, on the approach of cold or evenness, had two alternatives open to them, either *ὑπεκχωρεῖν* or *ἀπόλλυσθαι*: what is not open to them is *δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον*. Therefore if in any case *ἀπόλλυσθαι* were identified with *δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον*, it would necessarily be precluded. In the foregoing instances this is not so: *ἀπόλλυσθαι* is not identical with *δέχεσθαι ψυχρὸν* nor with *δέχεσθαι ἄρτιον*. Consequently both alternatives are open to *πῦρ* and *τρία*. But in the case of *ψυχὴ* this identification actually occurs: *δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον* is for the principle of life *δέχεσθαι θάνατον*: *ἀπόλλυσθαι* is the same as *δέχεσθαι θάνατον*: therefore, since *δέχεσθαι θάνατον* is precluded, so also is *ἀπόλλυσθαι*; else we should find soul doing what we have agreed is impossible, viz. admitting the opposite idea to the idea contained in it.

μή ποτε δέσονται, ὥς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὡμολόγηται; Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

LV. Τί οὖν τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέαν; τί νῦν δὴ ταῦτα ὠνομάζομεν; Ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ 5 δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχεται; Ἄμουςον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον. Εἶεν. ὃ δ' ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχεται, τί καλοῦμεν; Ἀθάνατον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; Οὔ. Ἀθάνατον ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ; Ἀθάνατον. Εἶεν, ἔφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδείξει φῶμεν· ἢ πῶς δοκεῖ; Καὶ μάλα γε ἱκανῶς, ὦ 10 Σώκρατες. Τί οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ Κέβης; εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγ- 106 καῖον ἦν ἀνωλέεργον εἶναι, ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἢ ἀνώλεερα ἂν ἦν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεερον εἶναι, ὁπότε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἐπαγάγοι, ὑπεξῆει ἂν ἡ χιὼν οὐσα σῶς καὶ ἄτηκτος; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετό γε, οὐδ' αὖ 15 ὑπομένουσα ἐδέετο ἂν τὴν θερμότητα. Ἀλλοῦ, ἔφη, 15 λέγεις. Ὡσαύτως, οἶμαι, καὶ εἰ τὸ ἄψυχρον ἀνώλεερον ἦν,

3. τί νῦν δὴ ταῦτα] ταῦτα is in BCD, omitted by Z. and St. Schanz cites *Alcib. I* 109 c πρὸς ταῦτ' ἄρα, τὸ δίκαιον, τοὺς λόγους ποιήσκει.

8. ἀθάνατον ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ;] It is necessary to distinguish very carefully the meaning of ἀθάνατον. All it denotes here is ὃ ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχεται: it is that which contains the opposite idea to θάνατος, as ἀνάρτιον contains the opposite idea to ἄρτιον. It signifies in fact not what soul is but what she is not; and for the present we must dissociate the word from the positive notion of imperishability. We are now merely expressing the particular ἐναντίον which soul will not admit; that the exclusion of this ἐναντίον involves indestructibility is an inference we do not reach until we declare that ἀθάνατον = ἀνώλεθρον. Wytttenbach accurately says 'ἀθάνατον hic dicitur ὃ ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχεται: ἀνώλεθρον, quod superveniente contrario οὐκ ἀπόλλυται.' For a somewhat similar subtlety compare Aristotle *Topica* vi vi 145<sup>b</sup> 21 foll. where ἀθάνατον is regarded as logically distinguishable,

though not actually separable, from ἄφθαρτον.

τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδείξει φῶμεν] What has been demonstrated is, not the eternal existence of soul, which is a subsequent inference, but that soul contains the opposite idea to death. Dead soul would be analogous to cold fire or even three. It must be borne in mind that ψυχὴ means the principle of life: a dead vital principle is a contradiction in terms. That this is only a preliminary step to the final induction is marked by the τοῦτο μὲν.

12. εἰ τὸ ἄθερμον] If τὸ ἄθερμον were necessarily indestructible—that is, if ὄλεθρος were the opposite idea to ἄθερμον, then snow, as containing ἄθερμον, would not have the alternative of perishing on the approach of its opposite; it must withdraw whole and unmelted. χιὼν ἀπολομένη would then be as impossible as χιὼν θερμὴ is now.

16. εἰ τὸ ἄψυχρον] The correction ἄψυχρον, suggested by Wytttenbach, seems to me certain. In order to formulate his antitheses with the

ὁπότε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν τι ἐπῆει, οὐποτ' ἂν ἀπесβέννυτο οὐδ'  
 ἀπώλλυτο, ἀλλὰ cὼν ἂν ἀπελθὼν ζῶχετο. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Οὐκ-  
 οὔν καὶ ὦδε, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου εἰπεῖν; εἰ μὲν B  
 τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλερόν ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ, ὅταν θάνατος  
 5 ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἴῃ, ἀπόλλυσθαι· θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρη-  
 μένων οὐδέσσεται οὐδ' ἔσται τεθνηκυῖα, ὥσπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ  
 ἔσται, ἔφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὐδέ γ' αὐτὸ περιττόν, οὐδὲ δὴ πῦρ  
 ψυχρόν, οὐδέ γε ἢ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμότης. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει,  
 φαίη ἂν τις, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γίνεσθαι ἐπιόντος τοῦ  
 10 ἄρτίου, ὥσπερ ὠμολόγηται, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ' ἐκείνου C  
 ἄρτιον γεγενῆσθαι; τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν διαμάχεσθαι  
 ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλυται· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλερόν ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ  
 εἰ τοῦτο ὠμολόγητο ἡμῖν, ῥαδίως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελεόνη-  
 τος τοῦ ἄρτίου τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὰ τρία οἴχεται ἀπιόντα· καὶ  
 15 περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα.  
 ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου,  
 εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλερον εἶναι, ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη  
 πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλερος· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλου ἂν D

utmost precision, Plato has coined the words *ἀνάρτιον* and *ἄθερμον*, to express the direct opposites of *ἄρτιον* and *θερμόν*: it seems hardly doubtful that he also coined the word *ἄψυχρον* to express the direct opposite of *ψυχρόν*. *ἄψυκτον*, as Wyttenbach says, is the counterpart of *ἀθέρμαντον*, not of *ἄθερμον*: and in a passage where Plato is choosing his terms with such extreme nicety the slightest failure in fitness is not to be tolerated. It is surprising that Wyttenbach's admirable correction has been so completely ignored by subsequent editors. Dr. Jackson, independently of Wyttenbach, made the same emendation. *ἄψυχρον* is confirmed by the corrupt reading *ψυχρὸν* in Stobaeus *Ecl.* I 814.

3. εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον] The inference that soul is immortal is not yet definitely drawn, but is based upon the two statements made in this sentence, (1) soul is *ἀθάνατος*, i.e. she cannot combine with death and

so become dead soul; (2) therefore if *ἀθάνατος* involves *ἀνώλεθρον*, soul is *ἀνώλεθρον*, i.e. she cannot perish. When these two propositions are put side by side, it becomes obvious that the refusal of the soul to admit death implies her indestructibility, since we know that *ἀθάνατος* does involve *ἀνώλεθρον*.

6. οὐδ' ἔσται τεθνηκυῖα] It is noteworthy that *τεθνηκυῖα* has a different sense here from that of *τεθνηκὸς* in the discussion at 71 c: there it implied merely the state of separation of soul and body, but here denotes the actual destruction of the soul.

13. εἰ τοῦτο ὠμολόγητο] sc. τὸ ἀνάρτιον ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι: that in the case of *ἀνάρτιον*, ἀπόλλυσθαι is equivalent to δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον, sc. *ἄρτιον*.

18. πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος] At last we have the inference definitely stated. Since soul will not admit the opposite of its immanent idea,



δέοι λόγου. 'ΑΛΛ' οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἔφη, τούτου γε ἕνεκα· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἴ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον αἰΐδιον ὃν φθορὰν δέσσεται.

and since that opposite is death, soul, being deathless, must be imperishable.

1. **σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν**] Here we have the fundamental postulate on which the whole argument rests: viz. that energy cannot be annihilated. All other things, being but forms of energy, may make way for their opposites, since their conversion into the opposite state involves not destruction but simply modification of energy. But vital principle is energy itself, therefore its conversion into the opposite state would mean conversion into non-energy, *i.e.* annihilation of energy. Plato is simply applying to spirit the principle which the older physicists laid down for matter, and which Persius formulates in the words 'ex nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti.' Similarly we have in 72 **οὐ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θνήσκουσι, τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι**; Compare *Phaedrus* 245 **οὐ τοῦτο δ' οὐτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι οὐτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στήναι καὶ μήποτε αὖθις ἔχειν ὅθεν κινηθέντα γενήσεται**.

2. **μὴ δέχοιτο**] It is easier to feel the correctness of *μὴ* than to explain it grammatically. The meaning is 'hardly could there be anything else incapable of admitting destruction, if the immortal, being eternal, will admit it.' *μὴ δέχοιτο φθορὰν* is in fact equivalent to *εἴη τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον φθορὰν*. Wohlrab compares *Cratylus* 429 **οὕτως γὰρ ἂν, ὃ Σώκρατες, λέγων γέ τις τοῦτο, ὃ λέγει, μὴ τὸ ὄν λέγοι**; Add *Gorgias* 510 **οὐ τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδεὶς**

*με ἀδικοῖη*. Also Thucydides vi 18 **ὥστε τί ἂν λέγοντες εἰκὸς ἢ αὐτοὶ ἀποκνοῖμεν ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἐκεῖ ξυμμάχους σκηπτόμενοι μὴ βοηθοῖμεν**; For the form of the sentence Dr. Jackson compares *Protagoras* 330 **οὐ σχολῇ μὲν τᾶν τι ἄλλο ὅσιον εἴη, εἰ μὴ αὕτη γέ ἡ ὁσιότης ὅσιον ἔσται**.

**εἰ . . . δέσσεται** = *εἰ ἐθέλει* or *μέλλει δέξασθαι*. The distinction between *εἰ* with future indicative and *ἐάν* with subjunctive is apt to be overlooked. The former is constantly used as an equivalent to *εἰ μέλλει*, or even *εἰ χρή*, with infinitive; and the substitution of *ἐάν* would be, as here, impossible. It were easy to multiply instances, but one may suffice: Aristophanes *Frogs* 1460 **εὕρισκε νῆ Δ', εἴπερ ἀναδύσει πάλιν**, 'you must find something, if you mean to go on earth again.' Cf. *Timaeus* 31 A. This usage is recognised by Prof. Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses* § 49, 1, note 3; he, however, regards a number of cases as falling into the class of ordinary future conditions equivalent to *ἐάν* with subjunctive (§ 50). I cannot but think that such cases are very rare: nearly if not quite all of the instances he quotes might be taken the other way; especially Isokrates *Archidamos* § 107, where *εἰ δὲ φοβησόμεθα* is, I conceive, precisely parallel to *ἢν ἐθέλωμεν ἀποθνήσκειν*: 'if we mean to be cowards.'

Here it may be convenient to give concisely a synopsis of the reasoning in chapters I—IV. After agreeing that the truth of immortality will be best established if we can show that it is a legitimate deduction from the theory of ideas, we set forth thus:

LVI. Ὁ δὲ γε θεός, οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν, παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὁμολογήσειν μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι. Παρὰ πάντων μέντοι καὶ Δί', ἔφη, ἀνθρώπων τέ γε καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὥς ἐγώ μαι, παρὰ  
5 θεῶν. Ὅποτε δὴ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδιάφθορόν ἐστιν, ἄλλο τι ἢ ψυχὴ ἢ, εἰ ἀθάνατος τυγχάνει οὐσα, καὶ ἀνώλερος ἂν εἴη;

(1) particulars partake successively, or even simultaneously, of contrary ideas, but the idea itself can never admit its opposite, but at the approach thereof either withdraws or perishes; and this applies both to ideas as existing in nature and as immanent in particulars: (2) there is a second set of ideas, not being themselves opposites, but containing opposite ideas; no such idea can admit the opposite of the idea it contains, but either withdraws or perishes; *e.g.* the triad contains the idea of odd and cannot admit that of even: (3) particulars which one of this second class of ideas informs can never admit the opposite of the contained idea; *e.g.* three things can never be even: (4) if in any such instance refusal to admit the opposite necessarily involved indestructibility, we could predicate immortality of that which refused to admit it; *e.g.* if refusal to admit evenness involved indestructibility, three would be imperishable; but since this is not so, three may perish at the approach of evenness: (5) but in the case of soul refusal to admit the opposite of its contained idea does involve indestructibility, since the contained idea is life, whose opposite is death; and that which will not admit death is imperishable: soul therefore on the approach of death has not the option of perishing, but must adopt the other alternative, *ὑπεκχωρεῖν*. Else, if the principle of life perished, nothing could be found to resist destruction.

106 D—107 B, c. lvi. Thus from the general principle that all things which refuse to admit death are indestructible we infer that soul can never perish: when death comes upon a man, his mortal part perishes, but his soul withdraws, making way for death, while she herself is saved alive. It must be then that our souls live in Hades. Kebes is now fully convinced: Simmias cannot controvert the reasoning of Sokrates but still feels misgivings; whereupon Sokrates encourages him to sift the matter until he is thoroughly satisfied.

1. ὁ δὲ γε θεός] We must identify θεός with absolute universal mind, the νοῦς βασιλεὺς of the *Philebus*, the mythical δημιουργός of the *Timaeus*. Eternity cannot be ascribed either to the deities of popular worship or to those of Plato's cosmology: see *Timaeus* 41 A, where they are thus addressed by the creator: δι' αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπέπερ γενένησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ οὐδ' ἄλντοι τὸ πᾶν, οὐ τι μὲν δὴ λυθήσεσθε γε οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας, τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριωτέρου λαχόντες ἐκείνων, οἷς ὅτ' ἐγίγνεσθε ξυνεδείσθε. In the final development of Plato's system we find that God, the idea of life, and universal soul are identical: ψυχὴ ἁπλῶς of all things is αὐτοκίνητον καὶ ἀθάνατον. This identification however is not to be found in the *Phaedo*: it belongs to the consummated idealism of the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*.

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Ἐπιόντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπον τὸ μὲν ἐνητόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτοῦ ἀπονεύσκει, τὸ δ' ἀθάνατον ὥν καὶ ἀδιάφορον οἵχεται ἀπίον, ὑπεκχωρήσαν τῷ θανάτῳ. Φαίνεται. Παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον  
 107 καὶ ἀνώλεστον, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν Ἄιδου. 5  
 Οὐκοῦν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδὲ πῃ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ τι Σιμμίας ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ κατασιγῆσαι· ὥς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὅτινά τις ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἢ τι εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, 10  
 ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω ὅπῃ ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε τῶν λεγομένων· ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ ὧν οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, B καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσέβειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστίαν

2. ἀπονεύσκει] Here again the word denotes annihilation; not as in 71 c.

3. καὶ ἀδιάφορον] The distinction made in the last chapter between ἀθάνατον and ἀνώλεστον must be carefully borne in mind.

8. εἰς ὅτινα . . . ἀναβάλλοιτο] It is needless, as I think, to insert ἄν: this use of the optative both in direct and indirect questions is established by a number of indubitable instances, and probably ought to be retained in some other cases where the editors introduce ἄν. It seems rash to assume in the face of much strong ms. evidence that the old use of the optative had entirely died out in Attic Greek. With the present example Wohlrab compares *Euthydemus* 296 Ε οὐκ ἔχω ὑμῖν πῶς ἀμφισβητοῖν. A case in direct interrogation is *Gorgias* 492 Β τί τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἰσχίον καὶ κάκιον εἶη; In both these passages some would insert ἄν; but it is not so easy to dispose of cases like Aeschylus *Choephoroe* 172 and several other passages in tragedy. In *Soph. Oed. Col.* 170 the Laurentian has ποῖ τις φροντίδος ἔλθοι; The force is very much the same as that of the

'deliberative' subjunctive; but there is a distinction closely analogous to that drawn by Prof. Goodwin between ἐὰν γένηται and εἰ γένοιτο: the optative expresses a conception less vivid and more vague. The following words ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα are very needlessly bracketed by Hirschig.

13. τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσέβειαν ἀτιμάζων] 'through distrust of human fallibility.' Cf. 85 D. The contrast between the clear-headed logician Kebes and the somewhat vague-minded Simmias is well brought out here. Kebes, sceptical as he is, has found an argument that in his judgment is free from flaw; he therefore freely accepts its consequences: Simmias still hesitates, not because he can find any defect in the reasoning, but rather because the 'child in him' cannot be soothed by reason. A good piece of dialectic does not come home to him as to his friend. Sokrates, it may be noticed, while commending his caution, points out what it ought to lead to: not to sighing over human weakness, but to a vigorous examination of the ὑποθέσεις.

ἔτι ἔχειν παρ' ἑμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. Οὐ μόνον γ' ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις, καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέα σαφέστερον· καὶ ἔαν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλhte, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀκολου-

1. οὐ μόνον γε] 'yes, Simmias, and not only so, but, besides what you have just so rightly suggested, you should also, however secure they may seem to you, nevertheless re-examine our first premisses.'—Cope. There seems no sufficient reason for ejecting ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις as Hirschig would do: nor can Ast's ταῦτά γε εἰ λέγεις be commended.

3. ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέα σαφέστερον] I have followed Schanz in accepting this correction: the vulgate ἐπισκεπτέαι involves an anacoluthon so harsh as to amount to bad writing.

4. καὶ ἔαν αὐτάς] 'and if you succeed in analysing them satisfactorily, you will follow up the reasoning, so far as it is possible for man to follow; and only when the result becomes perfectly plain will you cease to prosecute your search.' καὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, i.e. if the security of the ὑποθέσεις and the validity of the deductions from them become plain, then only you will be justified in relaxing your efforts.

107 B—114 C, cc. lvii—lxii. Now follows the myth setting forth the conformation of the earth and the fate of souls in the underworld. Seeing that the soul is immortal, earnest indeed should be the care we bestow upon her training; for upon that will depend her happiness and misery for all time. The ways of Hades are many and intricate; but the soul that has studied death will find herself at home there, and guided by her attendant genius to the place of judgment will pass her appointed sojourn in the companionship of gods: but the impure will be without friend or companion. To

realise what regions the soul enters after death, we must understand the true form of the earth. It is a sphere in equilibrium at the centre of the heavens: the part we inhabit is but a small cavity on its surface, filled with the coarser sediment of air which gathers in it. We have no idea that we dwell in such a hollow, but fancy we are on the surface and that our atmosphere is the true air; but could we mount to the surface, we should see how murky and impure is our dwelling compared with that bright region. We should see the earth's surface splendid with zones of the most brilliant colours, of which ours are a faint image, glowing with flowers and trees and precious stones, all bathed in purest aether, untouched by decay; and the dwellers thereon are free from age and sickness, and the gods come to dwell among them. There are many other hollows on the earth besides ours, greater and less, having subterranean communication; but the greatest of all is called Tartaros, which is pierced right through the earth from side to side. From this all rivers issue forth, and into it they all return; and a great pulse sways up and down Tartaros, carrying with it all the air and liquid that are therein, and it replenishes now the rivers that are on one side the earth, now those on the other. All the rivers fall again into Tartaros at a lower point than they flowed out; but not lower than the centre, from which in all directions it is an ascent. Of these rivers the four greatest are Okeanos, Acheron, Pyriphlegethon, and Styx, which flow in many tor-

εἴσεται τῷ λόγῳ, καθ' ὅσον δυνατόν μάλιστα ἀνθρώπων ἐπακολουθεῖσαι· καὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω. Ἀληθεῖ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

- C LVII. Ἀλλὰ τότε γ' ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον διανοηθῆναι ὅτι, εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐκ ὑπὲρ τοῦ 5 χρόνου τούτου μόνον, ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντός ἀπαλλαγὴ, ἔρμαιον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἅμ' ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς· 10 νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὖσα, οὐδεμία ἂν εἴη αὐτῇ D ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Αἴδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθεὺς ἐν 15 ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκείσε πορείας. λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευτή-

tuous windings, some beneath the earth and some on its surface. So when the souls of the departed come to judgment, they whose lives have been moderately good proceed to Acheron and dwell there till they are cleansed of any guilt that clings to them; but they whose wickedness is past cure are hurled into Tartaros, whence they come forth no more. All whose guilt is heinous but not yet beyond remedy dwell in Tartaros for a year, and then are cast forth by one of the rivers, on whose banks they meet those they have wronged. Then if they can win the pardon of these, they come forth and are purified; but if not, they return to Tartaros for another period; and this they continue to do until they have gained their pardon. But all that have lived in perfect holiness ascend to the earth's true surface, where they dwell henceforth in bliss and purity.

6. ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν] a short expression for ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν ὁ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν. The editors quote several similar phrases: Wytten-

bach says he could fill a book with them.

8. εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει] 'if we mean to neglect her.'

10. ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας] A vicious soul would be well rid of her vice even at the cost of her existence. But in *Laws* 958 a death is regarded as a remedy for those whom milder measures will not serve: οἷσι δὲ ὄντως ἐπικεκλωσμέναι [αἱ δόξαι], θάνατον ἴαμα ταῖς οὕτω διατεθείσαις ψυχαῖς διανέμοντες. And in 854 c suicide is recommended to the incurable sinner as his only relief: καὶ ἔαν μὲν σοὶ δρῶντι ταῦτα λωφῇ τι τὸ νόσημα—εἰ δὲ μή, καλῶ θάνατον σκεψάμενος ἀπαλλάττου τοῦ βίου. We may perhaps regard death as offering a chance of turning over a new leaf.

13. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα] Cf. *Gorgias* 523 E καὶ τὸν κριτὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἐκάστων, ἔρημον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ γῆς πάντα ἐκέκινον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ᾗ.

σαντα ἕκαστον ὁ ἕκαστου δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήκει, οὗτος ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δὴ τινα τόπον, οἱ δὲ τοὺς συλλεγέντας διαδικασαμένους εἰς Ἄιδου πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου ᾧ δὴ προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθῆνδε ἐκεῖσε πορεύσθαι· τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ  
 5 ὧν δὲ τυχεῖν καὶ μείναντας ὃν χρόνον ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιν ἡγεμὼν κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις. ἔστι δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὥς ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τήλεφος λέγει· ἐκεῖνος  
 μὲν γὰρ ἀπλὴν οἶμόν φησιν εἰς Ἄιδου φέρειν, ἡ δ' οὔτε ἀπλὴ οὔτε μία φαίνεται μοι εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἡγεμόνων ἔδει· οὗ

1. ὁ ἕκαστου δαίμων] Olympiodoros denies that each soul has a distinct δαίμων for sundry reasons, one of which is ὅτι τοῦ βίου λυθέντος ἀργήσει ὁ λαχὼν ἐκείνης διοικεῖν τὸν βίον. But there can be no doubt that he is wrong: cf. *Republic* 620 D ἐκείνην δ' ἕκαστῳ ὃν εἴλετο δαίμονα, τοῦτον φύλακα ξυμπέμπειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἰρεθέντων. We have a different sort of daemonic supervision in *Politicus* 274 B τῆς τοῦ κεκτημένου καὶ νέμοντος ἡμᾶς δαίμονος ἀπερημωθέντες ἐπιμελείας. In *Timaeus* 90 A, the rational part of the soul is said to be a man's δαίμων. In *Laus* 730 A we find a ξένιος ἕκαστων δαίμων καὶ θεός, who protects strangers.

ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήκει] In *Republic* 617 E, on the other hand, we read οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἰρήσεσθε. But, as Olympiodoros explains, a δαίμων was assigned to the life chosen by the soul, so that either phrase might be used; though where Plato is so strongly insisting upon the perfect freedom of choice, he naturally selects δαίμονα αἰρεῖσθαι. No doubt the other was a popular phrase, cf. Theokr. IV 40 αἰαὶ τῷ σκληρῷ μάλα δαίμονος, ὃς με λελόγχει: and Plato there takes the opportunity of protesting against it.

3. μετὰ ἡγεμόνος] The two ἡγεμόνες are evidently distinct from

the δαίμων, whose duties seem to cease when he has conveyed the soul to the place of judgment. In *οἱ δὲ* above, the form of the adverb is determined by τοὺς συλλεγέντας, though in sense it belongs quite as much to διαδικασαμένους.

6. ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις] Plato does not here specify the number and length of these periods; but in *Phaedrus* 248 E foll. we learn that each soul must fulfil ten millennial periods, except that of the philosopher, who is let off with three. Cf. Pindar *Olymp.* II 68 ὅσοι δ' ἐτόλμασαν ἐστρὶς | ἐκατέρωθι μείναντες ἀπὸ πάμπαν ἀδίκων ἔχειν | ψυχάν, ἔπειλαν Διὸς ὁδὸν παρὰ Κρόνον τύρσιν. In *Republic* 615 A we have also a χιλιέτης πορεία, and the reason for this number is assigned. Every man must be requited tenfold for his good and evil deeds; and calculating human life on the liberal estimate of 100 years, Plato devotes 1000 to his reward and punishment. The Egyptians made the period 3000 years (Herod. II 123); Empedokles goes as far as 30,000 for a murderer, εἰδὲ τις ἀμπακίησι φόνῳ φίλα γνῖα μνήνῃ | τρίς μιν μυρίας ὥρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησθαι | γεινόμενον παντοῖα διὰ χρέω εἶδεα θνητῶν.

8. ἀπλὴν οἶμον] This expression seems to have been proverbial. The verse of Aeschylus has not been preserved.

γάρ πού τις ἂν διαμάρτοι οὐδαμῶς μιᾶς ὁδοῦ οὕσης. νῦν δὲ  
 ἔοικε στίσεις τε καὶ περιόδους πολλὰς ἔχειν· ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρίων τε  
 καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνεῶδες τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω. ἡ μὲν κοσμία  
 τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχὴ ἔπεται τε καὶ οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα· ἡ  
 δ' ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν 5  
 Β εἶπον, περὶ ἐκεῖνο πολὺν χρόνον ἐπτονημένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὁρα-  
 τὸν τόπον, πολλὰ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθεύσα, βίᾳ καὶ μόγις  
 ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἴχεται ἀγομένη. ἀφικομέ-  
 νην δὲ ὅτιπερ αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καὶ τι πεποικυῖαν  
 τοιοῦτον, ἡ φόνων ἀδίκων ἡμμένην ἢ ἄλλ' ἅττα τοιαῦτα 10  
 εἰργασμένην, ἃ τούτων ἀδελφὰ τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἔργα  
 τυγχάνει ὄντα, ταύτην μὲν ἅπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται  
 καὶ οὔτε εὐνέμπορος οὔτε ἡγεμὼν ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴ δὲ πλα-  
 C νᾶται ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένη ἀπορία, ἕως ἂν δὴ τινες χρόνοι γένων-  
 ται, ὧν ἐλθόντων ὑπ' ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πρέ- 15  
 πουςαν οἴκησιν· ἡ δὲ καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον  
 διεξελοῦσα, καὶ εὐνεμπόρων καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα,  
 ὥκνησεν τὸν αὐτὴν ἐκάστη τόπον προσήκοντα. εἰςὶν δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ  
 θαυμαστοὶ τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὐτὴ οὔτε οἷα οὔτε ὅση δοξάζεται  
 ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν, ὥς ἐγὼ ὑπὸ τινος πέπεισμαι. 20

2. ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρίων τε καὶ νομίμων] 'judging by the funeral offerings and ordinances on earth.' ὅσια καὶ νόμιμα are the offerings made in honour of the departed. As these were made on the shrines of Hekate at the *τρίοδοι*, Plato seems to infer by analogy that the road to Hades is also forked. Cf. *Gorgias* 524 A οἱτοὶ οὖν, ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσωσι, δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἐξ ἧς φέρετον τὸ δῶδ, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ' εἰς τάρταρον. The old reading *θυσιῶν* is now universally discarded.

4. οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα] Wyttenbach well observes 'agnoscit eam sibi iam antea meditatione mortis et philosophia cognitam.'

5. ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον] 81 C ἔλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, φόβῳ τοῦ αἰδοῦς καὶ Ἀιδου, ὥσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματά τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη.

Plutarch *de genio Socratis* § 22 in a curious myth expands the notion of the present passage: his imagery is however chiefly borrowed from the *Phaedrus*.

9. ὅτιπερ αἱ ἄλλαι] so the mss. Schanz adopts Cobet's *οἱπερ*.

13. αὐτὴ δὲ πλανᾶται] 'she strays by herself.'

19. οὔτε ὅση δοξάζεται] i.e. not so small as is supposed: cf. 83 B οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν, and *Sophist* 217 E.

20. ὑπὸ τινος πέπεισμαι] Some think that Anaximandros is meant, because he first made a map of the world. But there is no evidence that his description of it had anything in common with Plato's; and it seems very doubtful whether a reference to any definite person is intended. Plato is fond of giving an air of antiquity to his fables by referring them to some supposititious

LVIII. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Πῶς ταῦτα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες ; D  
 περὶ γάρ τοι γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἀκήκοα, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα  
 ἅ σε πείθει· ἡδέως οὖν ἂν ἀκούσαιμι. Ἄλλα μέντοι, ὦ Σιμμία,  
 οὐκὶ Γλαύκου τέχνην γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγέσασθαι ἅ γ' ἐστίν·  
 5 ὥς μέντοι ἀληθεῖ, χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν  
 Γλαύκου τέχνην, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἴσως οὐδ' ἂν οἶός τε εἶην,  
 ἅμα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἡπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός, ὦ Σιμμία,  
 τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐπαρκεῖ. τὴν μέντοι ἰδέαν τῆς γῆς,  
 οἷαν πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδέν με κωλύει E  
 10 λέγειν. Ἄλλ' ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας καὶ ταῦτα ἄρκει. Πέπεισμαι τοίνυν,  
 ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐγώ, ὥς πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερῆς  
 οὖσα, μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν μήτε 109  
 ἄλλης ἀνάγκης μηδεμιᾶς τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν ἴσχειν  
 τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ πάντῃ καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς  
 15 τὴν ἰσορροπίαν· ἰσορροπὸν γὰρ πρᾶγμα ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐν μέσῳ  
 τεθεῖν οὐκ ἔξει μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἦττον οὐδαμῶς κλιθῆναι, ὁμοίως  
 δ' ἔχον ἀκλινὲς μενεῖ. πρῶτον μὲν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τοῦτο πέπεισμαι.  
 Καὶ ὁρῶς γε, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἔτι τοίνυν, ἔφη, πάμμεγά τι

author: e.g. the Αἰγύπτιος λόγος in *Phaedrus* 274 c, and the legendary war between Athens and Atlantis, *Timaeus* 24. Wagner strangely takes τινὸς to be neuter.

4. οὐκὶ Γλαύκου τέχνη] The origin of this proverb is obscure. Wohlrab supposes that the sea-god Glaukos is meant, the patron of sailors. None of the ancient authorities however take this view, but oscillate between various artificers bearing this name; the most distinguished of whom seems to have been Glaukos of Chios, mentioned by Herodotus (I 25), who invented the art of soldering metal. The diverse theories will be found in Heindorf's note.

7. μοι δοκεῖ] see on 77 A.

14. τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ] Plato's assumption is that the earth has no natural tendency to move in any one direction; and the substance of the universe, being homogeneous, offers it no inducement to move this way or that: were the surrounding

mass of various density in different parts, the earth might move in the direction where the least resistance was offered; as it is, it remains poised in the centre of a uniform mass. It must be observed that Plato is putting this forward, not to show that the earth must necessarily abide in the centre, but that there is no reason why it should not. A similar theory is attributed to Anaximandros by Aristotle *de caelo* II xiii 295<sup>b</sup> 11 εἰς δὲ τινες οἱ διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητά φασιν αὐτὴν μένειν, ὥσπερ τῶν ἀρχαίων ὁ Ἀναξίμανδρος· μάλλον μὲν γὰρ οὐθὲν ἄνω ἢ κάτω ἢ εἰς τὰ πλάγια φέρεσθαι προσήκει τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσῳ ἰδρυμένον καὶ ὁμοίως πρὸς τὰ ἑσχάτα ἔχον, ἅμα δ' ἀδύνατον εἰς τὰναντία ποιείσθαι τὴν κίνησιν· ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης μένειν. Compare *Timaeus* 62 E εἰ γάρ τι καὶ στερεὸν εἴη κατὰ μέσον τοῦ παντὸς ἰσοπαλές, εἰς οὐδὲν ἂν ποτε τῶν ἑσχατῶν ἐνεχθείη διὰ τὴν πάντῃ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῶν: the theory of the *Timaeus* is however different.



- Β εἶναι αὐτό, καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακλείων σπηλῶν ἀπὸ  
 Φάσιδος ἐν μικρῷ τινι μορίῳ, ὥσπερ περὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἢ  
 βατράχους, περὶ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκοῦντας, καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοι  
 πολλοὺς ἐν πολλοῖς τοιοῦτοῖς τόποις οἰκεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῇ  
 περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοῖλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ 5  
 μεγέθη, εἰς ἃ ξυνερρυηκέναι τό τε ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν ὀμίχλην καὶ  
 τὸν ἀέρα· αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ κεῖσθαι τῷ  
 C οὐρανῷ, ἐν ᾧ περ ἐστὶ τὰ ἄστρα, ὃν δὲ αἰθέρα ὀνομάζειν τοὺς  
 πολλοὺς τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰωσῶτων λέγειν· οὐ δὲ  
 ὑποστάμεν ταῦτα εἶναι καὶ ξυρρεῖν αἰεὶ εἰς τὰ κοῖλα τῆς γῆς. 10  
 ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκοῦντας ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις αὐτῆς λεληθέναι καὶ οἷεσθαι  
 ἄνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι  
 τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οἷοιτό τε ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκεῖν καὶ διὰ  
 τοῦ ὕδατος ὁρῶν τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα τὴν θάλατταν  
 ἡγοῖτο οὐρανὸν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ βραδυτῆτά τε καὶ ἀσθένειαν μὴδε- 15  
 D πώποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἀφигμένος μὴδὲ ἑωρακώς  
 εἶναι, ἐκθὺς καὶ ἀνακύψας ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τὸν ἐνωάδε τόπον,  
 ὅσῳ καθαρώτερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ὢν τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι,  
 μὴδὲ ἄλλου ἀκνηοῦς εἶναι τοῦ ἑωρακότος. ταῦτόν δὲ τοῦτο  
 καὶ ἡμᾶς πεπονηθέναι· οἰκοῦντας γὰρ ἐν τινὶ κοίλῳ τῆς γῆς 20  
 οἷεσθαι ἐπάνω αὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν, ὥς  
 διὰ τούτου οὐρανοῦ ὄντος τὰ ἄστρα χωροῦντα· τὸ δὲ [εἶναι  
 E ταῦτόν.] ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτῆτος οὐχ οἷους τε εἶναι ἡμᾶς

2. ἐν μικρῷ τινι μορίῳ] We are conceived as inhabiting a depression or cavity scooped out of the earth's surface, small and shallow when compared with the extent and mass of the earth, but still wide and deep enough to prevent us from ever scaling its sides. Many other such hollows exist on the earth, but we are of course cut off from all communication with their inhabitants, as well as with the dwellers on the true surface. Evidently Plato's estimate of the earth's dimensions was immense.

7. αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν] *i.e.* the real surface of the earth, as distinguished from the hollows.

9. οὐ δὲ ὑποστάμεν] *i.e.* our atmosphere is the sediment of aether, which collects in the depressions on

the earth's surface. ταῦτα = ὕδωρ καὶ ὀμίχλην καὶ ἀέρα.

21. τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν] We are in the same plight as the supposed dwellers at the bottom of the sea, who, looking up through the water at the stars, would fancy that the sea above them was the heaven; so we, looking up through the air, fancy it is that wherein the stars move, and that the air is heaven.

22. τὸ δὲ [εἶναι ταῦτόν] No satisfactory defence of the words εἶναι ταῦτόν has been made; nor is Heindorf's τὸ δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον attractive. Hermann, after Baiter, reads τὸ δὲ δεινότατον: but there is no special aptness in this. Hirschig suggests ταῦτιον, but I think Schanz, following Rückert, is right in

διεξελεεῖν ἐπ' ἔσχατον τὸν ἀέρα· ἐπεὶ, εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἐπ' ἄκρα  
 ἔλθοι ἢ πτηνὸς γενόμενος ἀνάπτοιτο, κατιδεῖν ἀνακύψαντα,  
 ὥσπερ ἐνεάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἰχθεύς ἀνακύπτοντες ὁρῶσι τὰ  
 ἐνεάδε, οὕτως ἂν τίνα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν, καὶ εἰ ἢ φύσις  
 5 ἱκανὴ εἴη ἀνέχεσθαι θεωροῦσα, γινῶναι ἂν ὅτι ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ  
 ἀληθὺς οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἀληθὺς φῶς καὶ ἢ ὥς ἀληθὺς γῆ. ἥδε 110  
 μὲν γὰρ ἢ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἅπας ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐνεάδε διεφθαρμένα  
 ἐστὶν καὶ καταβεβρωμένα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης,  
 καὶ οὔτε φύεται οὐδὲν ἄξιον λόγου ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, οὔτε τέλειον,  
 10 ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ, σήραγγες δὲ καὶ ἄμμος καὶ πηλὸς ἀμή-  
 χανος καὶ βόρβοροί εἰσιν, ὅπου ἂν καὶ γῆ ἦ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ'  
 ἡμῖν κάλλη κρίνεσθαι οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν ἄξια· ἐκεῖνα δὲ αὖ τῶν  
 παρ' ἡμῖν πολὺ ἂν ἔτι πλεον φανεῖν διαφέρειν. εἰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ B  
 μῦθον λέγειν, ἄξιον ἀκούσαι, ὦ Σιμμία, οἷα τυγχάνει τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς  
 15 γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦ  
 Κώκρατες, ἡμεῖς γε τούτου τοῦ μύθου ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσασμεν.

LIX. Λέγεται τοῖνυν, ἔφη, ὦ ἐταῖρε, πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι  
 τοιαύτη ἢ γῆ αὐτὴ ἰδεῖν, εἴ τις ἄνωθεν θεῶτο, ὥσπερ αἱ  
 δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι, ποικίλη, χρώμασιν διελημμένη, ὧν καὶ

bracketing εἶναι ταῦτόν and retain-  
 ing τὸ δέ, which is exactly the con-  
 necting link we want: 'but the  
 truth is that.' τὸ δέ occurs in this  
 sense *Theaetetus* 157 A, *Sophist* 244  
 A, *Laws* 642 A, 967 A, *Meno* 97 c,  
 etc. εἶναι ταῦτόν might be the  
 insertion of a copyist who did not  
 understand the idiom.

1. εἴ τις αὐτοῦ] *i.e.* if we could  
 either climb the sides of the hollow  
 in which we dwell, or fly up through  
 the air to its surface and peep up, as  
 fishes do out of the sea.

2. κατιδεῖν ἀνακύψαντα] Most  
 editors have ἂν ἀνακύψαντα, but ἂν  
 is wanting in the mss. It could, it  
 is true, easily have fallen out in that  
 position; but since κατιδεῖν is pre-  
 sently repeated with ἂν, it seems to  
 me hardly necessary to insert the  
 particle here.

11. ὅπου ἂν καὶ γῆ ἦ] Schanz  
 retains ἢ γῆ with the best mss. But  
 the meaning is, whenever any earth

is present in the sea, the result is  
 βόρβοροι.

13. εἰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ μῦθον λέγειν]  
 After this some mss. and editions  
 have the pointless addition καλόν:  
 the word however is absent in the  
 Bodleian and other mss. and is cer-  
 tainly to be omitted.

18. ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖ-  
 ραι] The number twelve refers to  
 the twelve signs of the zodiac, as is  
 clear from *Timaeus* 55 c ἔτι δὲ οὐσῆς  
 ξυστάσεως μιᾶς πέμπτῃς, ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν  
 ὁ θεὸς αὐτῇ κατεχρήσατο ἐκείνο δια-  
 ζωγραφῶν: 'and whereas there re-  
 mained yet a fifth figure, God used  
 it as a model for the universe in  
 describing its signs.' The πέμπτῃ  
 ξύστασις was the dodecahedron: cf.  
*Timaeus Locrus* 98 E τὸ δὲ δωδεκά-  
 εδρον εἰκόνα τοῦ παντὸς ἐστάσατο,  
 ἔγγιστα σφαίρας ἑόν. The last  
 words, ἔγγιστα σφαίρας ἑόν, are a  
 foolish addition by the compiler of  
 the *Timaeus Locrus*: for the dodeca-

τὰ ἐνεάδε εἶναι χρώματα ὥσπερ δείγματα, οἷς δὲ οἱ γραφεῖς  
 C καταχρῶνται· ἐκεῖ δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι, καὶ  
 πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἢ τούτων· τὴν  
 μὲν γὰρ ἁλουργὴν εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ  
 χρυσοειδῆ, τὴν δὲ ὅση λευκὴ γύψου ἢ χιόνος λευκοτέραν, καὶ 5  
 ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων συγκειμένην ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔτι πλείο-  
 νων καὶ καλλιόνων ἢ ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐωράκαμεν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ  
 ταῦτα τὰ κοῖλα αὐτῆς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος ἔκπλεα ὄντα, χρώμα-  
 D τός τι εἶδος παρέχεσθαι στίλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων  
 ποικιλίᾳ, ὥστε ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς εἶδος συνεχὲς ποικίλον φαντάζεσθαι. 10  
 ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὐκ οὐκ τοιαύτῃ ἀνὰ λόγον τὰ φυόμενα φύεσθαι, δένδρα  
 τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς καρπούς· καὶ αὐτὰ ὅρη ὡσαύτως καὶ τοὺς  
 λίθους ἔχειν ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τὴν τε λειότητα καὶ τὴν δια-  
 φάνειαν καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίω· ὦν καὶ τὰ ἐνεάδε λιθίδια εἶναι  
 ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, κάρδιά τε καὶ ἰάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγ- 15  
 E θους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι  
 καὶ ἔτι τούτων καλλίω. τὸ δ' αἴτιον τούτου εἶναι, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι  
 οἱ λίθοι εἰς καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι,  
 ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνεάδε ὑπὸ σιπεδόνοιο καὶ ἄλμης, ὑπὸ τῶν δεύρο

hedron has nothing to do with the shape of the universe, which is a perfect sphere modelled after the image of the αὐτὸ ζῶον: it merely affords the type for the duodenary division of the zodiac. In the present passage the δωδεκάσκιτος σφαῖρα, a ball covered with patches of leather variously coloured, is used to represent not only the twelve signs, but also the variegated surface of the earth. A great store of erudition on the virtues of the number twelve is to be found in Wyttenbach's note.

7. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα] 'even these very hollows, being full of water and of air, display a kind of colour that gleams amid the dazzling diversity of the rest; so that the earth's form appears as one unbroken surface of varied hues.' To an observer viewing the earth from above even such hollows as that wherein we dwell would appear as patches of

colour, iridescent we may suppose; so that the many-coloured surface would not be marred by any blots of obscurity. συνεχὲς is regarded by Heindorf and others as adverbial: perhaps, however, we might treat εἶδος συνεχὲς as practically one word, which is qualified by ποικίλον.

15. ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα] 'the stones that here are so much prized.' For this sense of ἀγαπᾶν compare *Politicus* 286 D δεύτερον ἀλλ' οὐ πρῶτον ὁ λόγος ἀγαπᾶν παραγγέλλει.

19. ὑπὸ σιπεδόνοιο καὶ ἄλμης] 'not corroded and spoilt by the sediment that has gathered here, as the stones with us are by corruption and brine.' For the punctuation and interpretation I am indebted to Dr. Verrall. In the ordinary texts there is no punctuation after διεφθαρμένοι and ἄλμης, and the second ὑπὸ is but an awkward repetition of the first. Schanz brackets ὑπὸ σηπε-

ΞΥΠΕΡΡΥΗΚΟΤΩΝ, ἃ καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς αἴσχη τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει. τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν κεκοσμήσθαι τούτοις τε ἅπασι καὶ ἔτι χρυσῷ καὶ ἀργύρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αὖ τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἐκφανῇ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, 111  
 5 ὄντα πολλὰ πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλαχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὥστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν. ζῶα δ' ἐπ' αὐτῇ εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ οἰκοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δ' ἐν νήσοις ἅς περιρρεῖν τὸν ἀέρα πρὸς τῇ  
 10 ἡπίρῳ οὕσας, καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ὃ παρ' ἡμῖν τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ ἡ θάλαττά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν χρείαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἀέρα, ὃ δὲ ἡμῖν ἄηρ, ἐκείνοις τὸν αἰθέρα. τὰς δὲ ὥρας αὐτῆς B κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνότους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε γῆν πολὺ πλείω τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει  
 15 καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει, ἥπερ ἄηρ τε ὕδατος ἀφέστηκεν καὶ αἰθήρ ἀέρος πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ θὴ καὶ θεῶν ἄλχη τε καὶ ἱερὰ αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις

δόμος καὶ ἄλμης as a gloss upon ὑπὸ τῶν δεῦρο ξυπερρυηκότων. Heindorf inserts τε after the second ὑπό, and Stallbaum substitutes ἀπό. I formerly followed the suggestion of Wyttenbach in bracketing the second ὑπό only.

4. ἐκφανῇ γάρ] they are exposed to view on the surface, not, as with us, hidden in mines.

8. τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα] i.e. round the edges of the hollows, which are filled with air. Others again dwell on islands amid the aerial ocean, their bases plunged beneath the air but their surfaces encompassed with aether.

12. ἄηρ] The article is wanting in the mss. and supplied by Bekker. I have, on the suggestion of Schanz, written it as a crasis.

13. κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην] Compare the description of the climate of ancient Attica, *Timaeus* 24 c, where Athens chooses the site of her city τὴν ἐγκρασίαν τῶν ὁρῶν ἐν αὐτῷ

κατιδοῦσα, ὅτι φρονιμωτάτους ἄνδρας οἴσται.

14. ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει] This reading has the all but unanimous support of the mss. Heindorf with one ms. reads ὁσφρήσει for φρονήσει, saying 'ingenii praestantiam non sane tam obiter uno verbo memorasset Plato, nec post φρονήσεως mentionem addidisset haec καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις.' These arguments do not seem very cogent; and it is hardly credible that Plato should have omitted to ascribe superior φρόνησις to his dwellers in aether. Schanz justly compares *Republic* 367 c οἶον ὁρᾶν ἀκούειν φρονεῖν. In fact ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ stand for αἰσθήσει. 'In sight, hearing, and intelligence [i.e. both in bodily and mental power] they excel us in the same proportion as air excels water and aether air in purity.' Z. adopts ὁσφρήσει.

17. ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς εἶναι] i.e. in these temples is

C τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας γίνεσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς· καὶ τὸν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα ὁρᾶσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.

LX. Καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν οὕτω πεφυκέναι καὶ τὰ 5  
περὶ τὴν γῆν· τόπους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἔγκοιλα αὐτῆς  
κύκλῳ περὶ ὅλην πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν βαυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπτα-  
μένους μάλλον ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς οἰκοῦμεν, τοὺς δὲ βαυτέρους  
ὄντας τὸ χάσμα αὐτῶν ἔλαττον ἔχειν τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν τόπου,  
ἔστι δ' οὕς καὶ βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει τοῦ ἐνεάδε εἶναι καὶ 10  
D πλατυτέρους· τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν εἰς ἀλλήλους συντετρῆ-  
σθαι τε πολλαχῇ καὶ κατὰ στενότερα καὶ εὐρύτερα, καὶ διεσόδους  
ἔχειν, ἥ πολὺ μὲν ὕδωρ ρεῖν ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἰς ἀλλήλους ὥσπερ  
εἰς κρατῆρας, καὶ ἀενάων ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν  
γῆν καὶ θερμῶν ὑδάτων καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς 15  
μεγάλους ποταμούς, πολλοὺς δὲ ὑγροῦ πηλοῦ καὶ καθαρωτέρου  
E καὶ βορβορωδεστέρου, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ῥύακος  
πηλοῦ ῥέοντες ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ῥύας. ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐκάστους  
τοὺς τόπους πληροῦσθαι, ὥς ἂν ἐκάστοις τύχῃ ἐκάστοτε ἢ  
περιρροὴ γιγνομένη. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινεῖν ἄνω καὶ κάτω 20  
ὥσπερ αἰώραν τινὰ ἐνούσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ· ἔστι δὲ ἄρα αὕτη ἢ

the very presence of the gods themselves; whereas we have but their statues. 'And they had groves and temples of the gods, wherein the gods in very truth were dwellers, and voices and prophecies and visions of them, and of this kind was their communion with them, face to face.' τοιαύτας = personal communion. αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτοὺς should be taken in the most emphatic sense, literally 'the people themselves with the gods themselves.'

9. τὸ χάσμα αὐτῶν] There is a slight anacoluthon; the regular construction would be ἔχοντας. For αὐτῶν BDE give αὐτούς, which Wytttenbach illustrates by Xen. *Cyrop.* i iii 13 πειράσομαι ἀγαθῶν ἱππέων κράτιστος ὧν ἱππεὺς συμμαχεῖν αὐτῷ. There is no lack of instances of a redundant pronoun, but the effect here is harsh. Schanz

reads τὸ αὐτῶν χάσμα, Heindorf τὸ χάσμα αὐτῶν, which latter I have adopted, as being nearly identical with the reading of c, τὸ χάσμα αὐτῶν.

18. ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐκάστους τοὺς τόπους] 'wherewith each of the places is filled in turn as the stream in its course round chances each time to reach it.'—COPE. The stream, when replenished by the αἰώρα presently to be mentioned, makes a circuit of these hollows through the subterranean channels. ὥς ἂν is Stallbaum's correction for ὧν ἂν, which Z. retains.

21. ὥσπερ αἰώραν] 'all these are moved backwards and forwards by a kind of oscillation which exists in the earth.' αἰώρα properly signifies a seesaw movement, like that of a pair of scales equally balanced. It is the name given to a kind of gymnastic

αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν τοιάνδε τινά. ἔν τι τῶν κασμάτων τῆς γῆς  
ἄλλως τε μέγιστον τυγχάνει ὃν καὶ διαμπερὲς τετρημένον δι'  
ὅλης τῆς γῆς, τοῦτο ὅπερ Ὅμηρος εἶπε, λέγων αὐτὸ

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τῆλε μάλ' ἔχει βάθειστον ὑπὸ κρονός ἐστι βέρεθρον·

5 ὃ καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρ-  
ταρον κεκλήκασι. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα κυρρέουσί τε πάντες  
οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν ἐκρέουσιν· γίνονται δὲ ἕκαστοι  
τοιοῦτοι δι' οἷας ἄν καὶ τῆς γῆς ῥέωσιν. ἡ δὲ αἰτία ἐστὶν τοῦ  
ἐκρεῖν τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ εἰςρεῖν πάντα τὰ ρεύματα, ὅτι πνευμένα B  
10 οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ὑγρὸν τοῦτο. αἰωρεῖται δὲ καὶ κυμαίνει

machine like a swing. By the force of this αἰώρα the volume of air and fluid in Tartaros is perpetually swaying to and fro like a pendulum. When the mass which is ἄνω surges towards the centre, the mass that is κάτω is necessarily driven towards the extremity: then the latter in its turn recoils towards the centre and forces the former towards the opposite extremity.

2. διαμπερὲς τετρημένον] Tartaros differs from all the other ἐγκοίλα, not only in its far greater magnitude, but in being pierced right through the earth from end to end; whereas the rest are merely depressions more or less deep. The physical theory of the present passage is simple enough. Let us suppose for the sake of clearness that Tartaros is a chasm pierced from the north to the south pole; and let us concede so much to popular usage as to call one hemisphere, say the northern, ἄνω and the other κάτω. For each of these hemispheres the centre of the earth is the lowest point, towards which all things gravitate. Out of Tartaros ramify a number of channels in all directions through the earth, some reaching to the surface, some subterranean throughout their whole length. Now the αἰώρα pulsing up and down Tartaros carries with it all

the fluid that is therein; and when it rushes northwards, it forces the liquid into the channels of the northern hemisphere; then returning southward it fills those in the southern. Thus the stream is violently impelled through the channel by the force of the αἰώρα: but when this force is spent, it obeys the law of gravitation and makes its way back to Tartaros at a lower level than that whence it started. It can however never pass beyond the centre, since that is the absolutely lowest point from whatever direction it is approached, and an ascent from it would be contrary to the force of gravitation.

3. ὅπερ Ὅμηρος εἶπε] *Iliad* viii 14: cf. viii 481.

9. ὅτι πνευμένα οὐκ ἔχει] The cause of the αἰώρα is that there is no bottom or foundation on which the liquid mass can rest. Were there a solid platform at the centre of the earth, the fluid on either side would settle there and remain stationary. Of this passage a doubtfully accurate statement and a certainly unfair criticism is made by Aristotle *Meteorologica* II ii 355<sup>b</sup> 32 foll., cf. I 349<sup>b</sup> 28. Plato's doctrine of gravitation, which is incomparably more scientific than anything to be found in Aristotle on that subject, is very clearly expounded in *Timaeus* 62 c—63 E.

ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἄηρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ταῦτόν ποιεῖ· **ΞΥΝΕΠΕΤΑΙ** γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῆς γῆς ὀρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε, καὶ ὥσπερ τῶν ἀναπνεόντων ἀεὶ ἐκπνεῖ τε καὶ ἀναπνεῖ ῥέον τὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖ **ΞΥΝΑΙΩΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ** τῷ ὕγρῳ τὸ πνεῦμα δεινούς τινας ἀνέμους 5 καὶ ἀμυχάνους παρέχεται καὶ εἰσιδὼν καὶ ἐξιόν. ὅταν τε οὖν **C** ὑποχωρήσῃ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, [τοῖς] κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ ῥεύματα διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ τε καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ ὥσπερ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες· ὅταν τε αὖ ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἀπολίπη 10 δεῦρο δὲ ὀρμήσῃ, τὰ ἐνεῶδε πληροῖ αὖθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα 10 ῥεῖ διὰ τῶν ὀχετῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἕκαστα ἀφικνούμενα, εἰς οὓς ἐκάστους ὁδοποιεῖται, θαλάττας τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ ποταμούς καὶ κρήνας ποιεῖ· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πάλιν **D** δυόμενα κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν μακροτέρους τόπους περιελθόντα καὶ πλείους, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν εἰς τὸν 15 **Tάρταρον** ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω ἢ ἐπηνητλεῖτο, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγον· πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροῆς. καὶ ἔνια μὲν

6. ὅταν τε οὖν ὑποχωρήσῃ] Many editions, including Z. and St., have ὀρμήσαν after οὖν : but since it is absent from the best mss. I have omitted it.

7. τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον] Plato considers the expression incorrect, as is indicated by δῆ. Cf. *Timaeus* 62 c φύσει γὰρ δὴ τινὰς τόπους δύο εἶναι διειληφότας διχῇ τὸ πᾶν ἐναντίους, τὸν μὲν κάτω, πρὸς ὃν φέρεται πᾶνθ' ὅσα τινὰ σώματος ὄγκον ἔχει, τὸν δὲ ἄνω, πρὸς ὃν ἀκουσίως ἔρχεται πᾶν, οὐκ ὀρθὸν οὐδαμῇ νομίζειν. For some very curious reasoning on the other side see Aristotle *de caelo* II ii 284<sup>b</sup> 6 foll.

8. [τοῖς] κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ ῥεύματα] If the text is sound we must translate 'it (τὸ ὕδωρ) flows into the parts about those streams'; unless with Prof. Geddes we take τοῖς as an instrumental dative, which is hardly probable. But either way the phrase is a singularly awkward one and can scarcely, I think, have been written

by Plato; though H. Schmidt defends it, translating 'das zu jenen Strömen Gehörende.' Madvig's εἰσφρεῖ, which Schanz adopts, leaves the sentence as clumsy as before. Wyttenbach reads τότε for τοῖς, which may be right: Ast brackets τοῖς. Mr. Cope translates 'it flows through the earth to the neighbourhood of those streams and fills them, as it were by a pump.' But surely διὰ τῆς γῆς describes the progress of the water after it has entered the channels: it would be a strange expression to apply to its surging up and down Tartaros.

10. τὰ ἐνεῶδε] i.e. the rivers in our hemisphere. We are regarded as living in the 'upper' hemisphere: and so said the Pythagoreans, cf. Aristotle *de caelo* 285<sup>b</sup> 21. Aristotle himself said our hemisphere was the lower: to Plato of course the distinction is meaningless.

16. ἐπηνητλεῖτο] i.e. were pumped into the channels: it is needless to read ἐξηνητλεῖτο with Heindorf.

καταντικρὺ ἢ εἰσρεῖ ἐξέπεσεν, ἔνια δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος· ἔστι δὲ ἅ παντάπασιν κύκλῳ περιελθόντα, ἢ ἅπασ ἢ καὶ πλεονάκις περιελιχθέντα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὥσπερ οἱ ὄφεις, εἰς τὸ δυνατόν κάτω καθέντα πάλιν ἐμβάλλει. δυνατόν δὲ ἐστὶν ἐκατέρωσε  
 5 μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθίεναι, πέρα δ' οὐ· ἄναντες γὰρ πρόσω ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ρεύμασι τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν γίνεται μέρος.

LXI. Τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ρεύματά ἐστι· τυγχάνει δ' ἄρα ὄντα ἐν τούτοις

1. καταντικρὺ ἢ εἰσρεῖ] *i.e.* καταντικρὺ τῆς χώρας ἣ εἰσρεῖ. This seems to mean that a stream which issued forth from Tartaros, say in an easterly direction, may, by a circuit of the earth, re-enter it on the western side. Aristotle's version of this (*Meteorologica* 356<sup>a</sup> 9) is τὰ δὲ καταντικρὺ τῇ θέσει τῆς ἐκροῆς, οἷον εἰ ρεῖν ἤρξαντο κάτωθεν, ἀνωθεν ἐκβάλλειν. This is usually regarded as a misstatement on Aristotle's part: but H. Schmidt (*Krit. Comm.* II 107 foll.) ingeniously endeavours to reconcile it with Plato's words. He lays stress on the fact that Aristotle says, not ἀνω and κάτω, but ἀνωθεν and κάτωθεν: and he explains it thus. A river may issue from Tartaros in the southern hemisphere, and in the course of its wanderings pass into the northern, finally discharging itself into the very centre of Tartaros. Thus after rising in the southern hemisphere (κάτωθεν) it enters Tartaros from the side of the northern (ἀνωθεν); but since it discharges itself at the centre, it has not violated the law μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθίεναι, πέρα δ' οὐ. The weak point in the explanation seems to me this. When the stream has once reached the northern hemisphere, it is subject to precisely the same laws of gravitation as the rivers of that hemisphere; and there is no reason why it should be compelled to descend to the very centre any more than a stream which has risen in the

northern hemisphere: yet, if it does not, it has passed beyond the centre, relatively to its source. Schmidt's theory in fact breaks down, unless we can understand the words μέχρι τοῦ μέσου, πέρα δ' οὐ relatively to the direction of the stream after it has once begun its downward course, irrespective of its point of issue. Perhaps, however, Plato had not thought of the case of a river passing from one hemisphere to another while on the surface of the earth: or, as exact science is hardly to be expected in a myth, the rivers may be prohibited from crossing the plane which divides the two hemispheres. Aristotle's paraphrase sounds like a reproduction of the Platonic passage based on an imperfect recollection of it. The notion, entertained by some, that καταντικρὺ ἢ εἰσρεῖ means that the stream on discharging itself crosses Tartaros and emerges on the opposite side is assuredly untenable. Schanz, against all mss., has ἐξέπεσεν εἰσρεῖ.

4. καθέντα] This word comes to be practically intransitive similarly to ἐμβάλλει: the river is conceived as a power which pours down and discharges its waters. καθίημι is similarly used of a wind, as we see in Aristophanes *Knights* 430 ἔξεμι γὰρ σοι λαμπρὸς ἥδη καὶ μέγας καθιείς.

5. ἄναντες γὰρ πρόσω] so Heindorf for πρὸς. Z. and St. omit πρὸσω.



τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ' ἄττα ρεύματα, ὧν τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ  
 ἐξωτάτω ρέον [περὶ] κύκλῳ ὁ καλούμενος Ὀκεανός ἐστιν,  
 τούτου δὲ καταπτικρὺ καὶ ἐναντίως ρέων Ἀχέρων, ὃς δι'  
 113 ἐρήμων τε τόπων ρεῖ ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν ρέων εἰς  
 τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, οἱ αἱ τῶν τετελευτη- 5  
 κότων ψυχὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ τινὰς εἰμαρμένους  
 χρόνους μέιναι, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους,  
 πάλιν ἐκπέμπονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζώων γενέσεις. τρίτος δὲ  
 ποταμὸς τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐκβολῆς  
 εἰσπίπτει εἰς τόπον μέγαν πυρὶ πολλῷ καϊόμενον, καὶ λίμνην 10  
 ποιεῖ μείζω τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν θαλάττης, ζέουσιν ὕδατος καὶ  
 Β πηλοῦ· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ χωρεῖ κύκλῳ θολερὸς καὶ πηλώδης,  
 περιελιττόμενος δὲ [τῇ γῇ] ἄλλος τε ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ'  
 ἔσχατα τῆς Ἀχερουσιάδος λίμνης, οὐ συμμαίγνυμενος τῷ ὕδατι·  
 περιελιχθεὶς δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωτέρω τοῦ 15  
 Ταρτάρου· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὃν ἐπονομάζουσιν Πυριφλεγέθοντα,

1. τέτταρ' ἄττα ρεύματα] Homer  
*Odyssey* x 511,

νῆα μὲν αὐτοῦ κέλσαι ἐπ' Ὀκεανῷ βαθυ-  
 δίνῃ,  
 αὐτὸς δ' εἰς Ἀΐδεω ἰέναι δόμον εὐρώεντα·  
 ἐνθα μὲν εἰς Ἀχέροντα Πυριφλεγέθων τε  
 ῥέουσιν  
 Κωκυτός θ', ὃς δὴ Στυγὸς ὕδατος ἐστὶν  
 ἀπορρώξ.

2. [περὶ] κύκλῳ] The only passage  
 cited in defence of this phrase is  
 Plutarch *ἔρωτικὸς* x 5, where Didot's  
 edition has *περικύκλῳ*. The latter  
 is the reading of the best mss. here ;  
 but Heindorf justly denounces it as  
 'monstri simile.' Stallbaum's refer-  
 ence to *Laus* 964 E is totally  
 irrelevant. Heindorf proposes *πέριξ*,  
 Hermann has *πέρι*, adverbial: but  
 it seems probable that the word has  
 crept in from the margin.

5. αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων]  
 Cf. 114 A.

9. ἐκβάλλει] 'issues forth.' In  
 the passage of Aristotle already  
 quoted *ἐκβάλλειν* has the opposite  
 sense, 'discharges itself'; it is in  
 fact equivalent to *ἐμβάλλει* in  
 Plato's account. Aristotle follows

the ordinary usage, whereas Plato  
 has formed his compounds to fit his  
 present descriptions.

11. ζέουσιν ὕδατος καὶ πηλοῦ]  
 'boiling with water and mud.' The  
 genitive is joined with the verb as  
 describing the material: cf. *Anthol.*  
*Platn.* iv 39

καὶ πεδία ζεῖοντα πολυσπερέων Ἀγαρηνῶν.

13. περιελιττόμενος δὲ [τῇ γῇ]  
 Of the three writers who quote this  
 passage, Stobaeus, Theodoret, and  
 Eusebius, *τῇ γῇ* is found in the first  
 alone: the words are, however, in all  
 the mss. The objection to them is  
 that they seem to make Pyri-  
 phlegethon flow on the surface of  
 the earth, which, Schmidt notwith-  
 standing, cannot be allowed. Stall-  
 baum retains *τῇ γῇ*, and explains  
 that Pyriphlegethon encircles the  
 earth beneath its surface. But this  
 seems scarcely a natural interpreta-  
 tion; and I have thought it better  
 to bracket the words, which the  
 Zürich editors expunge.

15. κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου  
 'into a lower depth of Tartaros'

οὐ καὶ οἱ ῥύακες ἀποσπάσματα ἀναφυσώσιν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι τῆς  
 γῆς. τούτου δὲ αὖ καταντικρὺ ὁ τέταρτος ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον  
 πρῶτον δεινόν τε καὶ ἄγριον, ὡς λέγεται, χρώμα δ' ἔχοντα  
 ὅλον οἶον ὁ κυανός, ὃν δὲ ἐπονομάζουσι Cτύγιον, καὶ τὴν C  
 5 λίμνην, ἣν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμός ἐμβάλλων, Cτύγα· ὁ δ' ἐμπεσὼν  
 ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεινὰς δυνάμεις λαβὼν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, δὺς κατὰ τῆς  
 γῆς, περιελιττόμενος χωρεῖ ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι καὶ  
 ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ Ἀχερουσιάδι λίμνῃ ἐξ ἐναντίας· καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ  
 τούτου ὕδωρ οὐδενὶ μίγνυται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος κύκλῳ περιελεῶν  
 10 ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι· ὄνομα  
 δὲ τούτῳ ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν, Κωκυτός.

LXII. Τούτων δὲ οὕτως πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὰν ἀφίκωνται οἱ D  
 τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἱ ὁ δαίμων ἕκαστον κομίζει,  
 πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο οἱ τε καλῶς καὶ ὀσῶς βιώσαντες καὶ  
 15 οἱ μὴ. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἂν θόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι, πορευθέντες  
 ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέροντα, ἀναβάντες ἃ δὲ αὐτοῖς ὀχήματά ἐστιν, ἐπὶ  
 τούτων ἀφικνοῦνται εἰς τὴν λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦσι τε καὶ  
 καθειρόμενοι τῶν τε ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας ἀπολύονται, εἴ  
 τίς τι ἠδίκηκεν, τῶν τε εὐεργεσιῶν τιμὰς φέρονται κατὰ τὴν E  
 20 ἀξίαν ἕκαστος· οἱ δ' ἂν θόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μετέωρη

5. ἣν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμός] ἦν is absent from most mss. but is rightly added from Theodoret and certain mss. by Heindorf, who compares *Laws* 683 A. The construction is indeed familiar enough.

Cτύγα] Plato's conception of Styx as a lake differs from that of the older authorities: cf. Hesiod *Theogonia* 786 foll. where Styx is a river, a branch (κέρας) of Okeanos; and Homer *ll.* makes Kokytos a branch of Styx.

8. ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ Ἀχερουσιάδι λίμνῃ] The convolutions of these four rivers are a little perplexing. They issue from Tartaros on four different sides: Okeanos emerges to the surface and encompasses the whole earth; of its return to Tartaros we are told nothing. Acheron, issuing from the opposite side, flows in the contrary direction, partly on the surface, partly beneath the earth; and before re-entering

Tartaros forms the Acherusian lake. Pyriphlegethon, rising half-way between the two former, not far from its source forms the boiling lake, and after many windings skirts one end of the Acherusian lake before plunging into the profoundest depths of Tartaros. Its course is entirely subterranean. Kokytos, flowing in the opposite direction, ascends to the surface, where it spreads into the Stygian lake; then diving into the earth, it reaches the Acherusian lake from the contrary side to Pyriphlegethon; and making another circuit enters Tartaros opposite to that river. Styx, it will be noticed, is on the earth's surface, whereas the other two lakes are subterranean.

13. ὁ δαίμων] Cf. 107 D.

16. ἀναβάντες] 'going on board vessels which, it is said (δῆ), are provided for them.'

20. ἀνιάτως ἔχειν] These in-

τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φόνους  
 ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξεργασμένοι, ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα  
 τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὄντα, τούτους δὲ ἢ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ρίπτει  
 εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὐποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν. οἱ δ' ἂν ἰάσιμα  
 μὲν, μεγάλα δὲ δόξωσιν ἡμαρτηκέναι ἀμαρτήματα, οἷον πρὸς 5  
 πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ὑπ' ὀργῆς βίαιόν τι πράξαντες, καὶ μεταμέλον  
 114 αὐτοῖς τὸν ἄλλον βίον βιώσιν, ἢ ἀνδροφόνοι τοιούτῳ τινὶ  
 ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ γένωνται, τούτους δὲ ἐμπεσεῖν μὲν εἰς τὸν  
 Τάρταρον ἀνάγκη, ἐμπεσόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖ  
 γενομένους ἐκβάλλει τὸ κύμα, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόνους κατὰ 10  
 τὸν Κωκυτὸν, τοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν  
 Πυριφλεγέθοντα· ἐπειδὰν δὲ φερόμενοι γένωνται κατὰ τὴν  
 λίμνην τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, ἐνταῦθα βοῶσί τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ

curables were cast into Tartaros, not in retribution for their crimes, but as warnings to others; since to Plato punishment is always either remedial or exemplary. So *Gorgias* 525 c οἱ δ' ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται οὐδέν, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται οἱ τούτους ὀρώντες διὰ τὰς ἀμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερότατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Ἀΐδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς αἰὲ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νοσητήματα. Cf. *Republic* 616 A.

1. **ἱεροσυλίας]** This was a peculiarly heinous offence: cf. *Laws* 854 A, where the law thus addresses the sacrilegious, ὃ θανμάσιε, οὐκ ἀνθρώπινόν σε κακὸν οὐδὲ θεῖον κινεῖ τὸ νῦν ἐπὶ τὴν ἱεροσυλίαν προτρέπον ἵεναι, οἷστρος δὲ σέ τίς ἐμφυόμενος ἐκ παλαιῶν καὶ ἀκαθάρτων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδικημάτων, περιφερόμενος ἀλιτηριώδης.

4. **ὅθεν οὐποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν]** In the *νέκυια* of the *Republic* and *Gorgias* also incurable criminals are doomed to eternal punishment: and

this is natural where Plato is weaving up popular tradition with his own phantasy. But in *Timaeus* 42 c it is evident that the degenerate soul at any period of her transmigrations has the chance of reformation and final restoration to her original purity; nor is this possibility excluded in *Phaedrus* 248 c foll.

6. **καὶ μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς]** 'and who have lived the rest of their days in a state of repentance.' The participle *μεταμέλον* is used absolutely.

7. **τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ]** i.e. their offence is similar to that of the *πατραλοῖαι*, in that it was committed in sudden passion and followed by repentance, and different from that of the *φόνους ἀδίκους* καὶ *παρανόμους* πολλοὺς ἐξεργασμένοι.

10. **τὸ κύμα]** i.e. ἡ αἰώρα.

11. **πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας]** These terms apply not only to parricides and matricides, but to any one who strikes a father or mother.

12. **κατὰ τὴν λίμνην]** It will be remembered that both these rivers enter the Acherusian lake.

μὲν οὐς ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ οὐς ὕβρισαν, καλέσαντες δ' ἰκετεύουσι  
καὶ δέονται ἑᾶσαι σφᾶς ἐκβῆναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην καὶ δέεσθαι, B  
καὶ ἂν μὲν πείωσιν, ἐκβαίνουσί τε καὶ λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν,  
εἰ δὲ μή, φέρονται αὖθις εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον καὶ ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν  
5 εἰς τοὺς ποταμούς, καὶ ταῦτα πάσχοντες οὐ πρότερον παύονται,  
πρὶν ἂν πείωσιν οὐς ἠδίκησαν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δίκη ὑπὸ τῶν  
δικαστῶν αὐτοῖς ἐτάχθη. οἱ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως  
† πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιώσθαι†, οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶνδε μὲν τῶν τόπων  
τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευθερούμενοί τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι ὥσπερ  
10 δεσμωτηρίων, ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν ἀφικνούμενοι C  
καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκισζόμενοι. τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφία ἱκανῶς  
καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωματῶν ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν

6. πρὶν ἂν πείωσιν οὐς ἠδίκησαν] This was no doubt suggested by the Athenian law which enacted that a person guilty of involuntary homicide must appease the family of the deceased before he could return from exile: cf. Demosth. *Aristokr.* p. 644 τὸν ἄλόντ' ἐπ' ἀκουσίῳ φόνῳ ἐν τισιν εἰρημένοις χρόνοις ἀπελθεῖν τακτὴν ὁδὸν καὶ φεύγειν, ἕως ἂν αἰδέσθῃται τινα [? τις] τῶν ἐν γένει τοῦ πεπονθότος. It would appear that the injured family could not insist upon more than a year's exile, which was called ἀπεναντισμός. Plato adopts this period in *Laws* 869 E ὡς ἀκουσίου γεγονότος τοῦ φόνου οἱ τε καθαρμοὶ γινέσθωσαν τῷ δράσαντι καὶ ἐνι-αυτὸς εἰς ἔστω τῆς ἐκδημίας ἐν νόμῳ: cf. 865 E. In *Laws* 872 E we are told that in another life it shall be done to the wilful homicide as he did to his victim: τοῦ γὰρ κοινοῦ μιανθέντος αἵματος οὐκ εἶναι κάθαρσιν ἄλλην οὐδ' ἐκπλυτον ἐθέλειν γίνεσθαι τὸ μιανθέν, πρὶν φόνον φόνῳ ὁμοίῳ ὁμοιον ἢ δράσασα ψυχὴ τίσῃ καὶ πάσης τῆς ξυγγενείας τὸν θυμὸν ἀφίλασάμενη κοιμίσῃ: cf. 870 E.

7. δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιώσθαι] The text is certainly corrupt. Stallbaum's attempt

to make βιώναι do double duty is futile, and his quotations are transparently irrelevant. Schanz, following Heindorf, inserts from Theodoret προκεκρίσθαι after βιώναι. This has some support from Clement of Alexandria, who reads προκεκλήσθαι; but it is not satisfactory. For while it is sense to say 'who are deemed to have lived holily,' it is not sense to say 'who are deemed to have been judged to have lived holily.' I suspect that Theodoret's προκεκρίσθαι is merely a clumsy attempt to supply a deficiency which existed in his copy, and that Plato's real word has been lost: possibly ἔχειν after διαφερόντως, unless we should read πρὸς τὸ ὅσιον.

11. ἐπὶ γῆς] so all mss. Eusebius, Theodoret, and Stobaeus have ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς: but the article is not required. 'Upon the earth' means of course on the true surface, distinguished from the hollow wherein we dwell.

12. καθηράμενοι] a genuine reflexive middle: 'who have purified themselves.'

ἄνευ τε σωματῶν] I conceive this to mean 'without earthly bodies': for the most exalted of finite spirits, even the gods, must

ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκίσεις ἔτι τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνού-  
ται, ἃς οὔτε ῥάδιον δηλῶσαι οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ  
παρόντι. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα χρὴ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν, ὦ  
Σιμμία, πᾶν ποιεῖν, ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ  
μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ αἶθρον καὶ ἡ ἐλπίς μεγάλη.

5

- D LXIII. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διιχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὥς  
ἐγὼ διεληλύθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί· ὅτι μέντοι ἡ  
ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαῦτ' ἄλλα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς  
οἰκίσεις, ἐπεὶ περ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ  
πρέπει μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεύσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν·  
καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος· καὶ χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπάρδειν  
ἑαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μνηκύνω τὸν μῦθον. ἀλλὰ  
τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα θαρρεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ ἄνδρα,  
E ὅστις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἡδονὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ  
τοὺς κόσμους εἶσε χαίρειν, ὥς ἀλλοτρίους τε ὄντας καὶ πλέον  
θάτερον ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰς δὲ περὶ τὸ μαθεῖν  
ἐσπούδασέ τε καὶ κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ  
αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνῃ τε καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ  
115 ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, οὕτω περιμένει τὴν εἰς Αἴδου πορείαν,  
ὥς πορευόμενος ὅταν ἡ εἰμαρμένη καλῇ. ὑμεῖς μὲν οὖν, 20

have body of some sort; that is, they are subject to the conditions of space and time. Cf. *Phaedrus* 246 c. *ἀνευ σωμάτων* to Plato signifies freedom from bodily appetites.

114 D—115 A, c. lxiii. To insist that all these details are strictly accurate were folly; yet something like this is the fate of the soul and her habitation after death. Wherefore it is well worth while for a man to bestow all care upon his soul during this life, that she may be free from bodily passions and adorned with true virtue. And now, continues Sokrates, my hour is at hand; and I will go to bathe my body for my burial.

6. τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διιχυ-  
ρίσασθαι] Plato lays no stress upon the exact details of his description; indeed he is never at any pains to make his various accounts of 'die

letzten Dinge' precisely correspond: all he is really concerned about is that the virtuous soul is better off in the other world than the vicious.

11. ἐπάρδειν ἑαυτῷ] cf. 77 E ἀλλὰ χρὴ ἐπάρδειν αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας, ἕως ἂν ἐξεπάρσῃτε.

12. διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μνηκύνω τὸν μῦθον] This phrase would seem to bear out the view of the myth given in the Introduction, p. xv.

15. πλέον θάτερον ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι] 'thinking that they do more harm than good.' For this use of θάτερον cf. *Euthydemus* 280 E, 297 D. Also Pindar *Pythia* III 34 δαίμων δ' ἕτερος.

19. ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ] 'with freedom and truth.' These terms practically correspond to φρόνησις or σοφία. ἐλευθερία is that state of liberation from the body which enables the soul to grasp ἀλήθεια.

ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰσαυθὺς ἔν τινι χρόνῳ ἕκαστοι πορεύσεσθε· ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἤδη καλεῖ, φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ἢ εἰμαρμένη, καὶ σχεδὸν τί μοι ὥρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν· δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ βέλτιον εἶναι λουσάμενον πιεῖν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναῖσι παρέχειν νεκρὸν λούειν.

LXIV. Ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Κρίτων, Εἶεν, ἔφη, ὦ Β Cώκратες· τί δὲ τούτοις ἢ ἐμοὶ ἐπιστέλλεις ἢ περὶ τῶν παίδων ἢ περὶ ἄλλου του, ὅ τι ἂν σοι ποιοῦντες ἡμεῖς ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα ποιοῖμεν; Ἄπερ ἀεὶ λέγω, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν 10 καινότερον· ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι ὑμεῖς καὶ ἐμοὶ

2. ἕκαστοι πορεύσεσθε] so nearly all mss. Schanz writes ἕκαστος after Stallbaum.

φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός] 'to speak like a hero of tragedy.' The good taste of this parenthesis is admirable. ὅταν ἡ εἰμαρμένη καλῇ is in perfect keeping with the eloquent passage which is its context; but in applying the phrase to himself Sokrates instinctively feels the risk that it may sound high-flown. And so with these words he passes simply and naturally from his lofty flight of moralising to the homely, but eminently characteristic, ὥρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν.

5. καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναῖσι παρέχειν] 'and not to give the women the trouble of washing my corpse.' This piece of thoughtfulness for others is admirable evidence of the perfect serenity with which Sokrates awaits his doom.

115 A—116 A, c. lxiv. Kriton now inquires of Sokrates what are his last injunctions. Only that you will take good heed to yourselves, he replies, and put into practice the principles affirmed in our late discourse. But how are we to bury you? asks Kriton. Sokrates answers with a smile, As you please, provided you can catch me. It would seem that all my words have been

thrown away, and I fail to persuade you that this Sokrates who now speaks to you will presently take flight to the company of the gods, and that all you will bury is his forsaken body. So, my friends, be surety for me to Kriton, not this time that I shall stay, but that I shall verily depart. But seriously such incorrect language is mischievous: say then that it is my body which you bury, and bury it as seems to you best.

7. ἐπιστέλλεις] 'proprium de extrema morientium voluntate.'—HEINDORF. Cf. 116 B ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο.

9. ἅπερ ἀεὶ λέγω] 'what I am always saying; nothing fresh: that if you take good care of yourselves you will best please me and mine and yourselves also in whatever you do, even though you make no promise now; but if you are negligent of yourselves and will not guide your lives along the track of our present and our former discourse, though your promises be never so many and earnest at this moment, you will profit nothing.' ἐπιμελούμενοι = taking heed to your ways, that you may live virtuously and rationally. Cobet would omit κατὰ before τὰ νῦν, but Schanz cites *Euthyphron* 2 c ἔρχεται κατηγορήσων μου ὡς πρὸς μητέρα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν.

καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἅττ' ἂν  
 ποιῆτε, κἄν μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσετε· ἔαν δὲ ὑμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν  
 ἀμελήτε, καὶ μὴ θέλητε, ὥσπερ κατ' ἵκνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε  
 εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζῆν, οὐδὲ ἔαν πολλὰ  
 C ὁμολογήσετε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε. 5  
 Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν προεμνησκόμεθα, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν· θάπ-  
 τωμεν δέ σε τίνα τρόπον; Ὅπως ἂν, ἔφη, βούλησθε, εἴηπερ  
 γε λάβητέ με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς. γελᾶσας δὲ ἅμα ἡκυκῆ  
 καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν, Οὐ πείθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωννα,  
 ὥς ἐγὼ εἴμι οὗτος ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ νυνὶ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ 10  
 διατάττων ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλ' οἷεταί με ἐκείνων  
 D εἶναι, ὃν ὄψεται ὀλίγον ὕστερον νεκρόν, καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δή, πῶς με  
 θάπτῃ. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάσαι πολὺν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὥς, ἐπειδὴν  
 πῖω τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ, ἀλλ' οἰκήσομαι  
 ἀπὼν εἰς μακάρων θή τινος εὐδαιμονίας, ταῦτα μὴ δοκῶ 15  
 αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθεούμενος ἅμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἅμα δ'  
 ἑμαυτόν. ἐγγυήσατο οὖν με πρὸς Κρίτωννα, ἔφη, τὴν ἐναντίαν  
 ἐγγύην ἢ ἢν οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἡγγυᾶτο. οὗτος μὲν  
 γὰρ ἢ μὴν παραμενεῖν· ὑμεῖς δὲ ἢ μὴν μὴ παραμενεῖν  
 E ἐγγυήσατο, ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνω, ἀλλὰ οἰκήσεσθαι ἀπίοντα, ἵνα 20  
 Κρίτων ῥῆον φέρῃ, καὶ μὴ ὀρών μου τὸ σῶμα ἢ καίόμενον  
 ἢ κατορυπτόμενον ἀγανακτῇ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ὥς δεινὰ πάσχοντος,  
 μηδὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ, ὥς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτη ἢ ἐκφέρει  
 ἢ κατορυπτεῖ. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθαι, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ ἄριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ

10. ὥς ἐγὼ εἴμι] 'I cannot persuade Kriton, my friends, that the real "I" is that Sokrates who now converses with you and duly arranges every part of his discourse; he imagines I am that which he will presently see as a corpse; and he actually (δῆ) inquires how he is to bury me.' The article is omitted before Σωκράτης in the best mss. and by some editors. In that case we should take Σωκράτης as in apposition to οἷτος. Wytttenbach appositely quotes *Laws* 959 A τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἠνδαλλόμενον ἡμῶν ἐκάστοις ἐπεσθαι, καὶ τελευτησάντων λέγεσθαι καλῶς εἶδωλα εἶναι τὰ τῶν νεκρῶν σώματα, τὸν δ' ὄντα ἡμῶν ἕκαστον ὄντως ἀθάνατον εἶναι, ψυχὴν

ἐπονομαζόμενον, παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους ἀπιέναι.

15. ταῦτα μὴ δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν] I have on the suggestion of Dr. Jackson substituted *μὴ* for the vulgate *μοι*, which Schanz, following Madvig, brackets.

18. οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἡγγυᾶτο] Kriton was bail for Sokrates in conjunction with Plato and Kritobulos and Apollodoros. *Apology* 38 B.

24. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθαι] 'for you must know that incorrect speech is not only offensive on that score alone, but engenders mischief in our souls.' An inaccurate mode of expression is apt to produce a loose and careless

καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημμελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ  
κακόν τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ θαρρεῖν τε χρὴ καὶ φάναι  
τοῦμὸν σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν οὕτως ὅπως ἂν σοι φίλον 116  
ἦ καὶ μάλιστα ἢ γὰρ νόμιμον εἶναι.

- 5 LXV. Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι ὥς  
λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἶπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευε περι-  
μένειν. περιεμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλεγόμενοι  
περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτὲ δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς  
10 συμφορᾶς διεξιόντες, ὅση ἡμῖν γεγонуῖα εἴη, ἀτεχνῶς ἡγο-  
μενοι ὥσπερ πατρὸς στερηθέντες διάξειν ὄρφανοὶ τὸν ἔπειτα  
βίον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐλούσατο καὶ ἠνέχθη παρ' αὐτὸν τὰ παιδία— B  
δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ υἱεῖς μικροὶ ἦσαν, εἰς δὲ μέγας—καὶ αἱ  
οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες ἀφίκοντο, [ἐκείναις] ἐναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος

habit of thinking: Sokrates' great object was to find out what things really are and call them by their right names, by obtaining a precise definition of each thing. That which we speak of as Sokrates is his soul, not his body; although, since the body is all we see, popular usage applies the name to the body even when the soul has quitted it. But, says Sokrates, not only is this in itself a slovenly mode of speech, but it may habituate us to thinking that the body is all that exists of a man.

3. **θάπτειν οὕτως**] Most of the recent editors make *θάπτειν* depend upon *φάναι*. There seems to me no valid reason for doing so; and it makes better sense to take it with *χρῆ*.

116 A—117 A, c. lxv. Sokrates retires to the bath, and on his return takes leave of his children and household. After a little further conversation with his friends he is warned by the servant of the Eleven that the hour of his death is at hand. The man warmly testifies to the noble character of Sokrates and departs in tears. Sokrates, after a few kind words concerning him, bids the poison be brought. Nay, remonstrates Kriton, the sun is yet

on the mountains; many prisoners have put off drinking the hemlock till far on into the evening: there is no haste. They acted after their kind, answers Sokrates; but I were false to myself, were I so covetous of the little remnant of my life: therefore bring the poison.

12. **δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ**] cf. *Apology* 34 D οἰκεῖοί μοι εἰσι καὶ υἱεῖς, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἷς μὲν μαιράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία. In Diog. Laert. II 26 we are told that the name of the eldest was Lamprokles and those of the two younger Sophroniskos and Menexenos.

**αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες**] i.e. the women of his family. Probably his wife was not among them, else Plato would have mentioned her. Some suppose that this expression gave rise to the absurd fable that Sokrates had two wives living at the same time; of whom the second, Myrto, daughter or grand-daughter of the famous Aristeides, was the mother of his two younger children: see Diog. Laert. *ll.*

13. **[ἐκείναις] ἐναντίον**] The mss. vary between *ἐκείναις* and *ἐκείναι*, and also in the position of the word, which in many follows *ἐναντίον*. Since *ἐκείναι* and the position after



διαλεχθεῖς τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παῖδιά ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ' ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἦν ἥδη ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυσμῶν· χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτριπεν ἔνδον. ἐλθὼν δ' ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος, καὶ οὐ πολλὰ μετὰ ταῦτα διελέχεν, καὶ ἦκεν ὁ τῶν ἔνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ στὰς παρ' αὐτόν, ὧν Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ καταγνώσσομαι σοῦ ὅπερ ἄλλων καταγιγνώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουν καὶ καταρῶνται, ἐπειδὴν αὐτοῖς παραγγέλλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων. σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναιοτάτον καὶ πραότατον καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πώποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνοις. νῦν, οἶσα γὰρ ἂν ἦλεον ἀγγέλλων, χαίρε τε καὶ πειρῶ ὥς ῥᾶστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. καὶ ἅμα θακρύνεις μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῆει. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτόν, Καὶ σύ, ἔφη, χαίρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. καὶ ἅμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὧς ἀστεῖος, ἔφη, ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσχέει καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε καὶ ἦν ἀνδρῶν λῶςτος, καὶ νῦν ὥς γενναίως με ἀποθακρύνει. ἀλλ' ἄγε θή, ὦ Κρίτων, πεισώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται· εἰ δὲ μή, τριψάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος. καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, Ἄλλ' οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρεσιν καὶ οὕτω δευκέσαι. καὶ ἅμα

ἐναντίον are alike impossible, I read as above; bracketing, however, ἐκείναις as highly suspicious.

4. ἔνδον] sc. ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ.

6. οὐ καταγνώσσομαι] 'I shall not have the complaint to make of you that I make of others.'

11. οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις] Some read χαλεπανεῖς, but the present is found in the best mss. and gives the best sense. 'I know it is not with me that you are angry, but with them; for you know who are to blame for it.' There is a subtle dramatic propriety in these words which is one of the finer touches of this matchless narrative. This man must have had a large experience of criminals and been accustomed to look on the baser side of humanity. He could, how-

ever, appreciate the nobility of Sokrates, so far as it is directly brought before his eyes; but he never thought of Sokrates as bearing no ill-will even against those who were really the cause of his death: this is something outside his experience.

13. ἂν ἦλεον ἀγγέλλων] So the best mss. Schanz needlessly reads ἀγγελῶν: but ἀγγέλλων is equivalent to ἀγγελίαν φέρων which we have in *Crito* 43 c.

16. ὥς ἀστεῖος] 'how courteous the good fellow is; throughout all this time he used to come and talk to me now and then, and was the best of men: and now how honestly he mourns for me.' ἀποθακρύνει me as below 117 c ἀπέκλαιον ἐμάντόν.

- ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἄλλους πάνυ ὁψὲ πίνοντας, ἐπειδὴν παραγγελοῦ  
αὐτοῖς, δειπνήσαντάς τε καὶ πίνοντας εὖ μάλα, καὶ εὐγενενομένους  
γ' ἐπίους ὧν ἂν τύχωσιν ἐπιουμοῦντες. ἀλλὰ μὴδὲν ἐπεῖγου·  
ἔτι γὰρ ἐγκωρεῖ. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰκότως γε, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων,  
5 ἐκεῖνοί τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὐς εὖ λέγεις, οἷοντα γὰρ κερδανεῖν  
ταῦτα ποιήσαντες, καὶ ἔγωγε ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω· οὐδὲν  
γὰρ οἶμαι κερδανεῖν ὀλίγον ὕστερον πινὼν ἄλλο γε ἢ γέλωτα 117  
ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἑμαυτῷ, γλιχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος  
οὐθενὸς ἔτι ἐνότος. ἀλλ' ἴθι, ἔφη, πιθοῦ καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖ.  
10 LXVI. Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδὶ πλησίον  
ἑστῶτι, καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελεῶν καὶ συκνὸν χρόνον διατρίψας ἤκεν  
ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα διδόναι τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα  
τετριμμένον· ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Εἶεν, ἔφη, ὦ  
βέλτιστε, εὖ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; Οὐδὲν  
15 ἄλλο, ἔφη, ἢ πίνοντα περιέπει, ἕως ἄν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς  
σκέλεσι γένηται, ἔπειτα κατακείσθαι· καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει. B  
καὶ ἅμα ὥρεε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Σωκράτει· καὶ ὁ λαβὼν καὶ

4. ἔτι γὰρ ἐγκωρεῖ] 'for there is still time to spare.'

6. ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω] Hirschig condemns εἰκότως, for no reason that I can see, though Schanz brackets it.

οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι κερδανεῖν] The ms. authority is stronger for κερδαίνειν, but here I think Schanz is right in accepting the future. Prof. Geddes defends the present by a reference to Herodotus ix 106; but there Abicht reads ἐμμενέειν τε καὶ μὴ ἀποστῆσθαι: besides which the construction is different. Plato could very well say οὐδὲν οἶμαι κερδαίνειν ἀλλὰ ὀφλήσειν, but οὐδὲν ἄλλο κερδαίνειν ἢ ὀφλήσειν seems very doubtful Greek.

8. φειδόμενος οὐθενὸς ἔτι ἐνότος] 'being chary when the vessel is empty'; a proverbial expression which we find in Hesiod *Works and Days* 367 μεσσόθι φείδεσθαι, δειλὴ δ' ἐνὶ πυθμένι φειδώ.

117 A—118 A, cc. lxvi, lxvii. The last moments of Sokrates.

16. αὐτὸ ποιήσει] 'the poison

will act of itself.' ποιεῖν is used in this technical sense by medical writers: Heindorf cites Dioscorides i 95 ποιεῖ πρὸς φάρμακα, 'is efficacious against poison.' The lexicons also give Strabo 234 λούτρα κάλλιστα ποιοῦντα πρὸς νόσους.

17. καὶ ὁ λαβὼν] 'and he took it right cheerfully, Echekrates, without a shudder or any change of complexion or countenance; but looking on the man with bent brows, as his manner was, he asked, What say you of this potion as to pouring a libation to some deity? is it permitted or not?' Notice the earnest emphasis thrown on the words μάλα ἱλεως by the following ὦ Ἐχέκρατες. διαφθείρας = changing for the worse, as Prof. Geddes says: the partitive genitives strengthen the force of the negation. ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας describes the fixed piercing gaze habitual to Sokrates, cf. 86 D. For the use of πρὸς Stallbaum compares *Symposium* 174 B, 176 B. The man's matter-

- μάλα ἴλεως, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰώθει ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τί λέγεις, ἔφη, περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ πώματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπεῖσθαι τινι; ἔξεστιν, ἢ οὔ; Τοσοῦτον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τρίβομεν, ὅσον οἴομεθα μέτριον εἶναι πιεῖν. 5
- C Μανεάνω, ἢ δ' ὅς· ἀλλ' εὐχεσθαι γέ που τοῖς θεοῖς ἔξεστί τε καὶ χρή, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνεέηδε ἐκεῖσε εὐτυχῇ γενέσθαι· ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὐχομαί τε καὶ γένοιτο ταύτῃ. καὶ ἄμ' εἰπὼν ταῦτα ἐπισχόμενος καὶ μάλα εὐχερώς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπιεν. καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς οἰοί τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ θακρύνειν, ὥς 10 δὲ εἴδομεν πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βίᾳ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀστακτὶ ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὥστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλαιον ἑμαυτόν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκεῖνόν γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἑμαυτοῦ
- D τύχην, οἷου ἀνδρὸς ἐταίρου ἐστερμημένος εἶην. ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι πρότερος ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, 15 ἐξανέστη. Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο θακρύνων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχασάμενος κλαίων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα ὄντινα οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων, πλήν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους. ἐκεῖνος δέ, Οἶα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτου ἕνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας 20 ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ τοιαῦτα πλημμελοῖεν· καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα, ὅτι
- E ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρή τελευτᾶν. ἀλλ' ἡσυχίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτε-

of - fact reply and his conduct throughout serve to heighten the pathos: he does not mean to be unfeeling, but familiarity with such scenes has produced a certain professional indifference; he seems not to have been personally influenced by Sokrates like the servant of the Eleven.

8. ἐπισχόμενος] 'putting it to his lips.' The active ἐπισχεῖν is used of giving a draught to another.

10. κατέχειν] 'we were able to refrain from tears.' This usage of κατέχειν is rare: cf. Soph. *Oed. Tyr.* 781 *κἀγὼ βαρυνθεὶς τὴν μὲν οἶσαν ἡμέραν μόλις κατέσχον*. Below we have the common use, κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα.

11. ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βίᾳ καὶ αὐτοῦ] 'but in spite of myself my tears began to flow in torrents.'—COPE.

17. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχασάμενος] 'then above all bursting into loud sobs, by his weeping and lamenting he utterly broke down every one of the company, save Sokrates himself.' Hirschig would omit *κλαίων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν*, Schanz brackets *κλαίων καὶ*: but can any one read the sentence without feeling that its rhythm is hopelessly ruined by either of these needless and mischievous omissions? With κατέκλασε Heindorf compares the Homeric *κατεκλάσθη φίλον ἦτορ*: and Stallbaum quotes two passages of Plutarch, *Perikles* 37, *Demosth.* 22, where the word is used as here. The old editions had κατέκλανσε: Stephanus conjectured κατέκλασε, which was afterwards discovered in certain mss.

21. ἀκήκοα, ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρή

ρεῖτε. καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἡσχύνημέν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ  
 δακρύειν. ὁ δὲ περιελθὼν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἔφη τὰ σκέλη,  
 κατεκλίθη ὑπτιος· οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ ἅμα  
 ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὗτος ὁ δοὺς τὸ φάρμακον διαλιπὼν χρόνον  
 5 ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κάπειτα σφόδρα πιέσας αὐτοῦ  
 τὸν πόδα ἤρετο, εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔφη· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο  
 αὐτοῖς τὰς κνήμας· καὶ ἐπανιῶν οὕτως ἡμῖν ἐπεδείκνυτο, ὅτι 118  
 ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πηγνύτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἤπτετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι,  
 ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰκήσεται. ἤδη οὖν  
 10 σκεδόν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἥτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψά-  
 μενος, ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ, εἶπεν, ὁ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγγατο,  
 ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα· ἀλλὰ  
 ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσετε. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων·  
 ἀλλ' ὅρα, εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις. ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι  
 15 ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ  
 ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὅς τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν· ἰδὼν  
 δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς.

τελευτᾶν] According to Olympiodoros it was a Pythagorean precept.

3. οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν] i.e. ὑπτιον κατακλιθῆναι.

4. οὗτος ὁ δοὺς τὸ φάρμακον] Schanz brackets these words, but I think they are justly defended and retained by Heindorf.

8. πηγνύτο contracted from πηγνύοιτο, cf. 77 B.

καὶ αὐτὸς ἤπτετο] Sokrates himself did the same as the man. This seems to be mentioned simply as evidence of his perfect calmness. Forster proposes αἰθεῖς, supposing that the subject of ἤπτετο is ὁ δοὺς τὸ φάρμακον, and Schanz reads αἶ, presumably on the same hypothesis. Neither alteration is to be commended.

12. τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα] It might have been supposed that the conception of life as a 'fitful fever' was familiar enough to spare us all the unprofitable ingenuity that has been

expended on this passage. The last words of Sokrates are in perfect harmony with the whole tenor of his foregoing discourse. His soul is on the point of being liberated from the body and all its attendant infirmities and will presently be restored to her primal purity and health. Corporeal existence is in fact a morbid condition of the soul, for which death is the remedy; wherefore Sokrates vows to Asklepios the sacrifice customary on recovery from sickness. Prof. Geddes aptly quotes *Timon of Athens* v 1 'my long sickness of health and living now begins to mend.' So Olympiodoros: ἵνα τὰ νεοσηκότα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ γενέσει ταῦτα ἐξιάσῃται: he speaks too of an oracle which declares τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναγομένας τὸν παιᾶνα ἄδειν.

15. ἐκινήθη] 'he stirred': probably some slight spasm or shudder at the moment of dissolution. ἐκινήθη is far too mild a word to signify convulsions, as some would have it.

LXVII. Ἦδε ἡ τελευτή, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἐταίρου ἡμῶν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαίμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.

1. Ἦδε ἡ τελευτή] The last three lines of the dialogue have been variously assailed by different critics on divers grounds. First Wytttenbach, offended by τότε, proposes τῶν πώποτε. Heindorf would have πάντων, τότε ὡς ἐπειράθημεν. Schanz brackets ἄλλως. Hirschig is actually prepared to cancel all after ἐγένετο. I believe that every word stands exactly as Plato wrote it, and that not one could be altered or omitted without marring the sad music of this solemn close. Wytttenbach supports his τῶν πώποτε from Plutarch, but the Platonic passages he quotes have γενομένων, ἀφικομένων, etc., which makes all the difference. Moreover he introduces a tone of panegyric, which, though not perhaps exaggerated, is quite discordant with the subdued simplicity which is the chief charm of this wonderful scene, and with the studiously modest ὡς ἡμεῖς

φαίμεν ἄν: this has been remarked by Prof. Geddes. τῶν τότε, as Stallbaum says, 'solemnis est formula in eiusmodi praeconiis,' meaning 'of all his contemporaries'; and for the reference of τότε to a recent period he cites *Politicus* 263 E. But probably, as Grote suggests, Plato used the word rather from his own point of view at the time he wrote than from that of the supposed speaker. ἄλλως has reference not to τῶν τότε, as Heindorf thinks, but to ἀρίστου: 'in other respects' is practically equivalent to 'moreover,' or 'besides': it merely serves to mark the transition from the vaguer to the more definite expressions of praise. Preserving the sentence intact I should translate: 'such was the end, O Echekrates, of our companion—a man, as we should say, among all then living whom we knew the noblest, ay and the wisest and most just.'



## APPENDIX I

### δημοτικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή

To the student of Plato's ethics it is obviously important to determine exactly what is to be understood by the popular, as contrasted with the philosophic, ἀρετή, and should there prove to be more than one variety of the former, to distinguish between them. With a view to this, I propose to examine briefly Plato's principal statements on the subject. Besides the passages in the *Phaedo*, 68 D foll. and 82 A, the following extracts seem to me to contain a complete exposition of Plato's views.

i. *Republic* 554 c. ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τούτῳ δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις **ἑμβολαίοις** ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἐν οἷς εὐδοκιμεῖ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι, ἐπικεῖ τινὶ ἑαυτοῦ βίᾳ κατέχει ἄλλας κακὰς ἐπιθυμίας, οὐ πείθων ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινον, οὐδ' ἡμερῶν λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκῃ καὶ φόβῳ, περὶ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τρέμων; Καὶ πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Καὶ νῦν Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, τοῖς πολλοῖς γε αὐτῶν εὐρήσεις, ὅταν δέῃ τ' ἀλλότρια ἀναλίσκειν, τὰς τοῦ κηφῆνος **ἐυγενεῖς** ἐνούσας ἐπιθυμίας. Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς, σφόδρα. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἴη ἀστασίαστος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὐδὲ εἷς, ἀλλὰ διπλοῦς τις, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὥς τὸ πολὺ κρατούσας ἂν ἔχοι βελτίους χειρόνων. Ἔστιν οὕτως. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ, οἶμαι, **εὐσχημονέστερος** ἂν πολλῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος εἴη· ὁμοιοητικῆς δὲ καὶ ἡρμοσμένης τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθοῦς ἀρετὴν πόρρῳ ποι ἐκφεύγοι ἂν αὐτόν.

ii. *Republic* 506 A. οἶμαι γοῦν, εἶπον, δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοούμενα, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθὰ ἔστιν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινὸς ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτήσθαι ἂν ἑαυτῶν τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦντα· **μαντεύομαι** δὲ μὴδὲνα αὐτὰ πρότερον γινώσcesθαι ἱκανῶς.

iii. *Republic* 500 D. ἂν οὖν τις, εἶπον, αὐτῷ [sc. τῷ φιλοσόφῳ] ἀνάγκη γένηται ἃ ἐκεῖ ὁρᾷ μελετᾶσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἥθη καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιέναι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, ἄρα κακὸν δημιουργὸν

αὐτὸν οἶει γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ συμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς; Ἡκιστά γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. 501 A. ἔπειτα, οἶμαι, ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν ἐκατέρως ἀποβλέποιεν πρὸς τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ, ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν, συμμαίγνυντες τε καὶ κεραυννύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρείκελον, ὃ δὴ καὶ Ὀμηρὸς ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον.

iv. *Laws* 710 A. ΚΛ. Σωφροσύνην μοι δοκεῖ φράζειν, ὦ Μέγилле, δεῖν εἶναι τὴν συνεπομένην ὁ ξένος· ἦ γάρ; ΑΘ. Τὴν δημῶδὴν γε, ὦ Κλεινία, καὶ οὐχ ἦν τις σεμνύνων ἂν λέγοι, ἀλλ' ὅπερ εὐθεὺς παιδὶ καὶ ἡρώοις, τοῖς μὲν ἀκρατῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, συμφυτον ἐπανθεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ἐγκρατῶς· ὃ καὶ μονούμενον ἔφαμεν τῶν πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι λόγου.

v. *Meno* 99 E. εἰ δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐν παντὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καλῶς ἐζητήσαμεν τε καὶ ἐλέγομεν, ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θεῖα μοῖρα παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ, οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται, εἰ μὴ τις εἴη τοιοῦτος τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἷος καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι πολιτικόν. εἰ δὲ εἴη, σχεδὸν ἂν τι οὗτος λέγοιτο τοιοῦτος ἐν τοῖς ζώσιν, οἷον ἔφη Ὀμηρὸς ἐν τοῖς τεθνεώσι Τειρεσίαν εἶναι, λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅτι οἷος πέπνυται τῶν ἐν Ἀΐδου, αἱ δὲ σκιαὶ αἰσχροῦσι. ταῦτόν ἂν καὶ εὐθεὺς τοιοῦτος, ὥσπερ παρὰ σκιάς ἀληθὲς ἂν πρᾶγμα, εἴη πρὸς ἀρετὴν.

vi. *Laws* 642 c. μόνοι γὰρ ἄνευ ἀνάγκης αὐτοφυῶς θεῖα μοῖρα ἀληθῶς καὶ οὐ τι πλαστῶς εἰσὶν ἀγαθοί.

vii. *Republic* 619 c. εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν [sc. τὸν τὴν μεγίστην τυραννίδα ἐλόμενον] τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκόντων, ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιωκότα, ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετεिल्φότα. ὥς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάττους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἀλικομένους τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκόντας, ἅτε πόνων ἀγυμνάστους.

viii. *Republic* 401 E. τῶν παραλειπομένων καὶ μὴ καλῶς δημιουργηέντων ἢ μὴ καλῶς φύντων ὁξύτατ' ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεῖ τραφεὶς ὥς ἔδει, καὶ ὁρθῶς δὴ χαίρων καὶ δυσχεραίνων<sup>1</sup> τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο καλός τε κἀγαθός, τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι τ' ἂν ὁρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι νέος ὢν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάσοιτ' ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι' ὁμοιότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφεὶς.

Other passages might be quoted more or less bearing on the subject, e.g. *Republic* 409 A, 430 B, *Phaedrus* 256 E, *Protagoras*

<sup>1</sup> I have followed the text of the Zürich editors.



355 c foll., but none, so far as I am aware, which throw any additional light upon it.

In the extract first quoted we have, it is clear, precisely the same conception of the vulgar sort of virtue as in *Phaedo* 68 D. Plato has been describing, in one of the most scathing passages he ever penned, the character of the **ὀλιγαρχικὸς ἀνὴρ**. Such a man sets lucre above all things; he scrapes and hoards and denies himself, subduing all other appetites beneath the master-passion of amassing wealth. And since such habits tend in the main to outward orderliness of conduct, he acquires the reputation of being a worthy respectable man. Yet he is filled with a swarm of 'drone lusts,' which are commonly held down by the strong hand of avarice, but are suffered to riot unchecked, if this may be done at another's expense. And all this happens because he has paid no heed to his education. Here we have a perfect picture of a man **δι' ἀκολασίαν σεσωφρονισμένος**: in that he controls his sensual appetites he is so far **σώφρων**, but he controls them only because he is **ἀκόλαστος** in the indulgence of unbounded avarice. In ii again Plato insists upon the point which is so strongly emphasised in the *Phaedo*; that no real knowledge of things just and beautiful can exist which is not based on knowledge of the good. We see then in these passages that the **δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ** is a morality formed by the mass of mankind for themselves on strictly utilitarian principles, by balancing pains and pleasures, and without knowledge of the good. We observe also that for this Plato has nothing but scorn and sarcasm: he would not indeed deny that a temperance which is the effect of intemperance is better than no temperance at all; but it is at best a base and sordid counterfeit of true virtue.

But in iii we have quite a different picture. Here we see the philosopher himself, as prophet and teacher, creating the **δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ** in the souls of his fellow men, by moulding their characters after the image of that justice and beauty whereof he beholds the eternal ideas. As the painter's glance passes to and fro between his model and his canvas, so is the gaze of the philosopher turned now to his ideal archetype, now to the human image of the divine that he is fashioning. Now it is evident that this virtue can no longer be a contemptible thing, since it is worth the philosopher's while to pause in his study of the truth, that he may implant it in the hearts of men: it is indeed

the highest that the great mass of mankind can hope to attain, who live and die in the darkness of the cave. Again this is no longer an ethical code which the multitude frame for themselves; it is one which the philosopher frames for them: nor does he construct it on any utilitarian basis, but out of his knowledge of ideal truth. Yet as held by them it is still utilitarian, for they accept it on utilitarian grounds: they receive it, not because they know why it is good, for they are without knowledge of the good, but because the philosopher convinces them that it is for their advantage to do so; that by submitting to its restrictions they avoid great evils. As they hold it, therefore, it is utilitarian; as he conceives it, not so: thus they are still, though in a far more refined sense, δι' ἀκολασίαν σεωφρονισμένοι. Plato acknowledges that the morality of the multitude must be utilitarian, since none other is attainable save by the highly trained metaphysician. Therefore, however superior the morality of those who obey this code may be to that of the oligarchical man, it is sundered from that of the philosopher by a fathomless gulf—it is ἄνευ φρονήσεως.

In the next three quotations Plato is speaking of an innate virtue, not springing from reason or any system, but from natural instinct. The most interesting and important of these passages is that from the *Meno*, which with its context gives a pretty full statement of Plato's view. This instinctive virtue is due to no effort of its possessor but to the dispensation of heaven; εἰς μοῖρα<sup>1</sup> παραγιννομένη—a phrase which is explained in vi by αὐτοφυῶς.<sup>2</sup> Some men are so happily endowed by divine favour that without consciously striving after virtue they lead virtuous lives; they do right without knowing the difference between right and wrong. Now this natural virtue seems at first sight difficult to classify along with either form of δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ before described. But a closer examination will show that, however

<sup>1</sup> A careful investigation into the meaning of the phrase εἰς μοῖρα will be found in Zeller's *Philosophie der Griechen* II i p. 497 note (3rd ed.) See also Dr. Thompson's note on *Gorgias* 506 ε οὐχ οὕτως εἰκὴ κάλλιστα παραγίνεται.

<sup>2</sup> This seems at first sight to conflict with the opposition of εἰς μοῖρα with

φύσει in the *Meno*. But I think that while in the *Laws* Plato is contrasting the αὐτοφυῶς ἀρετὴ with that which is the result of ἐπιστήμη, in the *Meno* he merely notes that ἀρετὴ is no inbred attribute of human nature, but where it occurs without ἐπιστήμη, it is bestowed by special favour of the gods. Cf. 89 B.

much more attractive it may be, it does not in principle differ from the first. For we observe (1) that the virtue which these **εεῖοι** follow by the impulse of their own hearts is the ordinary utilitarian virtue, (2) they are just, temperate, etc., simply because these virtues are more natural and therefore more easy and pleasant to them than the opposite vices, not because they choose them as being better: their virtue, when analysed, is an amiable form of selfishness. Therefore they must, harsh as it seems, be classed with **οἱ δι' ἀκολασίαν σεσωφρονισμένοι**, and with the first variety, since their virtue is of themselves, not from the philosopher.

The whole discussion in the *Meno* brings out two points very clearly: (1) the fundamental difference between popular and philosophic **ἀρετή** is the same as that between true opinion and knowledge; (2) true opinion, where it is present, leads in the same path as knowledge: the **ιδιώτης** who has a true opinion about what is right will act in the same way as the **φιλόσοφος** who knows what is right.<sup>1</sup> Therefore the popular virtue in its highest conceivable form leads to the same conduct as the philosophic virtue. The difference is that we can trust the latter and not the former: we cannot ensure that a man will always have right opinions; they may at any moment slip away from him like the statues of Daidalos. But the knowledge of the philosopher can never fail him: thence it is that he must come forward as the instructor of mankind; they must not be left to their good instincts, which may betray them, or to their utilitarian codes, which must lower them: they must accept a morality founded on the philosopher's sure and abiding knowledge of the good.<sup>2</sup>

In vii we have a slight distinction. Here is one who is virtuous by habit and convention. There is, however, no specific difference between him and the **εεῖοι** of the *Meno*: his conduct is equally influenced by unreflecting impulse, and we must conceive him as naturally well disposed. Plato notes, however, that this unthinking obedience to custom and tradition may lead to the most disastrous consequences, when a man is placed in a situation where custom and tradition are of no avail. How little value

<sup>1</sup> The **ιδιώτης** and the **φιλόσοφος** are aiming at precisely the same thing, viz. the good: only the **φιλόσοφος** seeks it as it really is, the **ιδιώτης** as it is adumbrated in his own mind: the demotic good is, as Plato says, the shadow of the philosophic.

<sup>2</sup> Thus we see the Platonic origin of Aristotle's conception of **ἀρετὴ ὠριμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσκειν**. *Nic. Eth.* II vi 15. Cf. *Eud. Eth.* III v 1232<sup>a</sup> 36.

Plato set on this conventional virtue may be gathered from *Phaedo* 82 B, where those who have lived virtuously **ἐξ ἑθους τε καὶ μελέτης ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ** pass at death into the form of some social and peaceable animal, bee, wasp or ant, or at best live again as decent and orderly citizens.

In viii we have the description of a child who is receiving a true education. He is to be surrounded from infancy with an atmosphere of the purest morality, **ὥσπερ αὔρα φέρουσα ἀπὸ χρηστῶν τόπων ὑγίαιαν**, till he insensibly glides into harmony with fair reason; music is to sink into his soul, filling it with a love of concord and order: and thus being habituated to all that is noble and beautiful, while still too young to understand the reason why it is so, when in maturer years he at last attains knowledge of the reason, he welcomes it with joy, because all his previous training has fitted him to receive it. Thus we see that the **δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ** in its highest form serves as a propaedeutic for **ἀρετὴ μετὰ φρονήσεως**. That is to the philosophic child but an early stage which to the unphilosophic many is their journey's end; the highest level their maturity attains is for his youth a starting-point to the knowledge of the good.

The result then of our investigation is this. While **all δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ** is radically distinguished from philosophical morality by the fact that it is **ἄνευ φρονήσεως**, we may I think discern two well-marked varieties of it, represented by extracts i and iii; regarding that of v, vi and vii as not specifically distinct from i. The first is an ethical code formed (1) by the multitude for themselves, (2) on utilitarian principles, (3) without knowledge of the good; the second is (1) formed by the philosopher for the multitude, (2) not on utilitarian principles, (3) with knowledge of the good, but (4) accepted by the multitude on utilitarian principles and without knowledge of the good. The first Plato regards with unmixed contempt; the second he recognises as the best which the great majority of mankind can attain, and by it he hopes to supersede the other: nay, so much importance does he attach to this, that his philosophers must take it in turns to desist from their own meditations and give their minds to instructing their fellow citizens. We must beware of regarding these two varieties as two successive conceptions by Plato of the **δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ**: they are two distinct kinds, of which one is utterly condemned, the other positively enforced upon the masses.

Finally it may be noted that the perfection of philosophic virtue is only to be found in the perfect philosopher in whom all knowledge and wisdom are consummated, **ὅς φιλοσοφίας ἐπ' ἄκρον ἀπάσης ἐλήλυθε**. Plato did not pretend that he or any one else had reached such knowledge; therefore he would admit that his moral code was necessarily incomplete and tentative. But this is only to say that no ethical system based on metaphysical research can be perfect until the object of that research has been fully attained; until, that is, absolute knowledge has been won. And though such knowledge may be unattainable, Plato has still consolation: if philosophy's advance in cognition of the truth be endless, endless also must be her progress in virtue.

## APPENDIX II

THE ordinary interpretation of chapter xlviii represents Sokrates, after failing to unravel the secrets of nature by the methods of the physicists, as betaking himself to the contemplation of nature through the medium of **λόγοι**. This view has been set forth with such clearness and precision by Principal Geddes that I cannot do better than give it in his words. 'Having failed in his *first* voyage, under the guidance of the physicists, Sokrates says that he set out by himself on a second voyage of discovery in search of a solid basis of Being, not by gazing on the outward world of matter, but by meditating on the inner world of thought' . . . 'Sokrates had stated that the study of the external world by the senses simply would not conduct to knowledge of causation, and that the effect of such study would be like looking at an eclipse of the sun with the naked eye; viz. dizziness under the dazzling maze of phenomena (cf. **ἰλιγγίᾳ** in 79 c, **ταράττομαι** in 100 d). Therefore, he goes on to say, as one uses a *medium* in looking at an eclipse, such as the reflection in water, or the like, so we must proceed regarding the external world, by studying phenomena through media or images, which images can be nothing else than **οἱ λόγοι**, *i.e.* principles or reasons intellectually apprehended. This simile, however, has the disadvantage of representing the intellectual world as the shadow and not the reality; and therefore Sokrates at once anticipates and corrects a misimpression that might arise from the use of such a simile. *Perhaps, however, the process I refer to (viz. τὸ ἐν λόγοις σκοπεῖν) is in a certain respect not parallel with that to which I compare it. For I do not at all admit that the man who looks at things in their principles sees things a whit more by images than one who looks*

at them in their external effects.<sup>1</sup> "Although it is true," says Socrates, "that those who look at the sun's reflection in water see a reflection and nothing more, I do not admit that those who study to obtain a knowledge of Being through the medium of the principles in the intellect (οἱ λόγοι) perceive mere reflections of things, and not realities. Therefore the simile I have used is simply an illustration indicating that transition in which I turned from the blinding spectacle of τὰ ἔργα, as studied by the physicists, to the less remote, but not less real, world of οἱ λόγοι, or the intellectual principles of things."

Now the first remark I have to offer upon the above exposition is that the representation of δεύτερος πλοῦς as a 'second voyage of discovery' is not consistent with the perfectly correct explanation of that proverb given by Principal Geddes himself a little earlier; 'it signifies a "second resource in default of a better," and is applied, not to what is *absolutely*, but to what is *relatively*, best.' Ast indeed denies this: but that such is the meaning is conclusively determined, not only by the origin of the proverb, but by its use in every one of the passages where it occurs. Sokrates means that having failed in the highest object of his endeavour he betakes himself to this method of λόγοι as the closest feasible approximation to it.

But what is this highest object, the πρῶτος πλοῦς? Certainly not the investigation of phenomena by means of physical science. On the study of phenomena Plato is perpetually heaping the most contumelious epithets, especially in the period to which the *Phaedo* belongs: even in the *Timaeus*, great part of which is occupied with physical speculations, the most Plato will say for such pursuits is that they are a sober and harmless recreation in the intervals of more serious studies (59 c). Neither in matter nor in our opinions about it is there any certainty, stability, or truth: matter therefore cannot be meant when Sokrates says ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν. It is true that he guards himself by the provision οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ κ.τ.λ., but this very fact is inconsistent with the theory that phenomena are the ὄντα which Sokrates failed to reach: the λόγοι must in some sense be εἰκόνες of something, else what is the point of the comparison? Apart from this, Sokrates has in the previous chapter given us two perfectly precise statements: (1) that he had actually tested and dis-

<sup>1</sup> The italics are Prof. Geddes's own.

credited the methods of the physicists, (2) that his hope was to discover τὰ γαθὸν καὶ δέον as the ultimate αἰτία; in other words, to construct a teleological theory of the universe. This then is the 'great and wondrous hope' which the physicists could not gratify, and which he himself failed to fulfil; and this it is for which the method of λόγοι offers a substitute.

I conceive then that Principal Geddes has fallen into error as to the nature of the πρῶτος πλοῦς by failing to keep a firm hold upon the meaning of δεύτερος πλοῦς: for I cannot imagine he would maintain that Plato even for a moment could speak of the study of λόγοι as inferior to the study of phenomena. But I have another very grave objection to his interpretation. He speaks of the 'dazzling maze of phenomena,' 'the blinding spectacle of τὰ ἔργα, as studied by the physicists'; and in his exposition the sun symbolises material particulars. But where shall we find such language in Plato? If we turn to a part of the *Republic* with which our present passage is intimately connected, we shall see something very different. In 508 c we read ὁφθαλμοὶ οἶσέ' ὅτι, ὅταν μηκέτ' ἐπ' ἐκεῖνά τις αὐτοὺς τρέπη ὦν ἂν τὰς χροὰς τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχῃ, ἀλλὰ ὦν νυκτερινὰ φέγγη, ἀμβλυώττουσί τε καὶ ἐγγὺς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης καθαράς ὕψεως. καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. ὅταν δέ γ', οἶμαι, ὦν ὁ ἥλιος καταλάμπῃ, σαφῶς ὁρώσι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὁμμασιν ἐνούσα φαίνεται. τί μήν; οὕτω τοῖνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὧδε νόει· ὅταν μὲν οὐ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, εἰς τοῦτο ἀπερείσθται, ἐνόησέ τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται· ὅταν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ τῷ σκότῳ κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον καὶ ἔοικεν αὐτὸ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι. Again if we turn to 516 A we find the very same metaphor: the sun moon and stars represent the ideas, and their reflections in water represent these very λόγοι with which we are dealing in the present passage. It is to me absolutely incredible that Plato should have inverted his metaphor, should have reversed the relation of thought and matter. Thought is always to him the region of truth and light, matter of dimness and uncertainty: and that he should even for a moment represent thought as a medium to temper the blinding glare of material existence is in my judgment unnatural and inconsistent with the whole tenor of his language on this subject.



Principal Geddes appeals to the use of ἡλιγιᾶ and ταραττομαι, but Plato tells us (*Republic* 518 A) ὅτι διτταὶ καὶ ἀπὸ διττῶν γίνονται ἐπιταράξεις ὁμῶσιν, ἕκ τε φωτὸς εἰς σκότος μεθισταμένων καὶ ἐκ σκότους εἰς φῶς. Moreover in the interpretation I am criticising λόγοι are used as helps to the contemplation of phenomena, whereas Plato always treats them as helps to the contemplation of the ideas.<sup>1</sup>

In a former edition I interpreted the passage as follows. I attempted, says Sokrates, to discover τὸ ἀγαθὸν as the ultimate cause working in nature. But when, after long endeavour, I failed in the struggle, I began to fear that by fixing my gaze too intently on realities I might be blinded in soul, as men are bereft of their bodily vision by gazing on the sun. So I bethought me of framing in my own mind images or concepts of those realities which I desired to study, and in them safely to examine the nature of their types. But though I admit these concepts are but images of the realities, mind I don't allow that they are so in any greater degree than material phenomena: both in fact are images; but whereas phenomena are the images presented to us by our senses, concepts are the images deliberately formed by our understanding; concepts therefore are more real than phenomena in proportion as understanding is more sure than sense. Be that as it may, I did form these concepts and used them as a standard to estimate the truth or falsehood of particulars.

Sokrates in fact, since he despairs of actually grasping the eternal ideas, of which all natural phenomena are symbols, endeavours to form from those symbols mental concepts or universals, which shall represent the ideas to him: they are the ideas as reflected in his intelligence. The verity of these concepts cannot be thoroughly ascertained, as the *Republic* tells us, until the ideas have been actually apprehended and compared

<sup>1</sup> Principal Geddes in his second edition says nothing in reply to my criticism, except that it 'assumes that the mental history described belongs to Plato also.' I am unable to see that I have anywhere assumed this; and although personally I believe that it does belong to Plato, I have carefully refrained from asserting this or basing any

argument thereupon. All that I have 'assumed' is that the Platonic Sokrates, in describing his own method (as in this chapter he is doing), is as usual Plato's mouthpiece. Principal Geddes gives no explanation of the inconsistency I have pointed out in his conception of the δεύτερος πλοῦς.

with them : meanwhile they afford the best working hypothesis that can be obtained. No prospect of this verification is held out in the *Phaedo* ; in the *Republic*, however, Plato speaks more hopefully.

This interpretation, as it appeared to me, established the right relation between the **δεύτερος πλοῦς** and the **πρώτος πλοῦς**, gave to Plato's illustration its natural and customary significance, and brought the passage into complete harmony with the *Republic*. At the same time I could not but feel the difficulties which beset this explanation, owing to the sentence **βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα κ.τ.λ.** I was obliged to understand **τὰ πράγματα** as signifying the ideas, and all the terms denoting sensuous perceptions as metaphorically applying to the apprehension of the ideas by pure thought. This interpretation of **πράγματα** is to some extent countenanced by the use of **αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα** in 66 E ; and despite the refractoriness of the phrase **ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῶν**, I am still convinced that this view of the passage was far preferable to the chaotic confusion of thought and language which is involved by the generally received interpretation. None the less it would clearly be no small gain if we could find an explanation which, while avoiding this Charybdis, would enable us to understand these words in their natural sense.

An interpretation has recently been brought to my notice by Mr. C. E. Campbell of Trinity Hall, which I believe is successful in attaining this end. Mr. Campbell justly observes that the initial sentence **μετὰ ταῦτα . . . σκοπῶν** indicates that Sokrates is no longer describing the result he apprehends from seeking immediate intuition of the good, which he had already abandoned. He must refer to some mode of conducting the **δεύτερος πλοῦς**, and he is explaining why he deserted **πράγματα** for their (apparent) **εἰκόνες** in **λόγοι**. Again the words **ἴσως μὲν οὖν . . . ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις** imply a previous antithesis between **λόγοι** and **πράγματα**. For if he were merely pointing out that while **ἔργα** and **λόγοι** are both **εἰκόνες** of **ὄντα**, **ἔργα** are the more remote, he had no occasion to apologise for incorrectness in the simile. What then is this antithesis ? Mr. Campbell obtains the answer by making the eclipse a material part of the similitude. Thus we get the following parallel :—

- (1) **ἥλιος** = **τὰ ὄντα**, *i.e.* ideas.

- (2) ἥλιος ἐκλείπων = τὰ ὄντα eclipsed in the form of γιγνώμενα, or material nature.
- (3) Image of ἥλιος ἐκλείπων in water = image of γιγνώμενα in λόγοι, i.e. Sokratic universals.

Thus γιγνώμενα are regarded as eclipsed ὄντα, the light of the latter everywhere struggling through the darkness of the former. The problem is to arrive at the one primal light by a study of its partial manifestations, which are best investigated by their reflection in λόγοι.

The statement of Sokrates then comes to this. When I recognised that the αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν was not directly cognisable, that like the sun in eclipse it was obscured by the darkness of γιγνώμενα, through which it nevertheless is flashing all the time, I perceived that complete knowledge of the ἀγαθὸν must be approached by a study of this broken radiance, and that soul-blindness would be most surely avoided by examining its gleams clearly reflected in mental concepts.

The simile indeed, says Sokrates parenthetically, is not perfect: for since λόγοι have more immediate truth than ἔργα, the latter are more justly to be termed εἰκόνες, or images in contradistinction to realities.

This then was my δεύτερος πλοῦς. I could not see my way to a complete cognition of Being, so I betook myself to studying the reflections of Being as it flashes through Becoming.

By this ingenious explanation Mr. Campbell, as it seems to me, has avoided the difficulties incidental to my former interpretation, while preserving the object for which I was mainly contending. We have certainly to thank him for a valuable contribution towards elucidating this very difficult passage.

The views of other editors agree in the main with that of Principal Geddes, but show some minor points of difference. Fischer, followed by Stallbaum, regards both λόγοι and ἔργα as εἰκόνες, and translates ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις 'ex effectis alicuius rei.' Ast and H. Schmidt understanding ἔργοις of material objects, deny that λόγοι are εἰκόνες: and the former expressly, the latter by implication, denies that δεύτερος πλοῦς signifies an inferior method. I think the two latter are right about ἔργοις, but in respect of the λόγοι and the δεύτερος πλοῦς Fischer and Stallbaum are unquestionably nearer the truth. But all these views are in my judgment

radically vitiated by failure to recognise that a theory of final causes is that which Sokrates had hitherto vainly attempted to reach by apprehension of the ultimate **αἰτία** itself, and to which he now hoped to make an approximation by the aid of his logical method.

The interpretation set forth above obviates the objections which I formerly felt to the sentence **βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὁμμασι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῶν**. Although these words were by a certain amount of strain capable, as I thought, of reasonable explanation, yet for sundry reasons it seemed to me, as it had to Dr. Jackson, that they were probably due to an interpolator. But now there no longer seems any reason for rejecting them, nor for suspecting any part of the text throughout the chapter.

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Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε λαβόντες ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιλελή-  
 σμεθα, εἰδότες αἰεὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ διὰ βίου εἰδέναι· τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι  
 τοῦτ' ἐστίν, λαβόντα του ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέκεναι·  
 ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λήθη λέγομεν, ὧς Σιμμία, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν;  
 Εἰ πάντως δήπου, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἰ δέ γε οἶμαι λαβόντες 5  
 πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνώμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι  
 χρώμενοι περὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἅς  
 ποτε καὶ πρὶν εἶχομεν, ἄρ' οὐχ ὁ καλούμεν μαθεῖν οἰκείαν  
 ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἂν εἴη; τοῦτο δέ που ἀναμνησκέσθαι  
 λέγοντες ὁρεῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν; Πάνυ γε. Δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ 10  
 76 τοῦτό γε ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενόν τι ἢ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην  
 αἴσθησιν λαβόντα ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐννοῆσαι ὁ ἐπελέληστο,  
 ὅς τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν ἀνόμοιον ὢν ἢ ὅμοιον· ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω,  
 δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα, ἦτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγονάμεν καὶ ἐπι-  
 στάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον, οὐς φάμεν μαθεῖν, 15  
 οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ ἀναμνησκονται οὗτοι, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις  
 ἂν εἴη. Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

1. ἐκάστοτε] *i.e.* 'and if after receiving it we have not, in every instance of our doing so, forgotten it, we are always born in possession of this knowledge and retain it through life.' I do not think it necessary to insert *γιγνώμενοι* after *ἐκάστοτε* with Heindorf, although I fully agree with his interpretation. Prof. Geddes' rendering can hardly stand, and he, rather than Heindorf, seems to have mistaken the argument. 'If we have,' he says, 'in all the crises of our history, retained this knowledge.' But Plato does not say 'if we have retained,' but 'if we have not forgotten': and though it is sense to say 'if we have retained it in all the crises,' it is not sense to say 'if we have not forgotten it in all the crises'; since we have forgotten it once for all, and that, as Heindorf says, at our birth. I think in fact that *ἐκάστοτε* is to be taken in close connexion with *λαβόντες*: 'in every instance of our receiving it, we have not forgotten.' (Prof. Geddes is also scarcely


accurate in saying that *ἐπιστήμη* is *ἀνάμνησις*: Plato says *μάθησις* is *ἀνάμνησις*, which is another thing.) The perfect *ἐπιλελήσμεθα*, as Wohlrab rightly observes, shows that Plato still expresses no opinion.

7. περὶ ταῦτα] This reading seems necessary, although *αὐτὰ* has stronger ms. authority. *ταῦτα* means the objects of sense, in antithesis to *ἐκείνας*. Wohlrab retains *αὐτὰ* but does not inform us how he proposes to make sense of it.

8. οἰκείαν] 'a knowledge that is already ours.'

11. ἐφάνη] in 73 c.

12. ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου] 'to derive from this a conception of something different that he had forgotten, with which this was associated, whether unlike or like.'—COPE. *ὅ* refers to *ἕτερόν τι ὁ ἐπελέληστο*, *τοῦτο* to *τούτου*. I see no sufficient reason for bracketing the second *ὅ* with Schanz. Here there is nothing amiss in the introduction of the *ὅμοιον* and *ἀνόμοιον*, for Plato is expressly repeating the statement in 73 c.

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